File openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch of Package compat-openssl098.14113

commit 6f35f6deb5ca7daebe289f86477e061ce3ee5f46
Author: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date:   Thu May 5 11:10:26 2016 +0100

    Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic
    
    A common idiom in the codebase is:
    
    if (p + len > limit)
    {
        return; /* Too long */
    }
    
    Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and
    limit == p + SIZE
    
    "len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS
    message).
    
    The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well
    defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually
    undefined behaviour.
    
    For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation
    provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for
    values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit!
    
    Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
    
    CVE-2016-2177
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Index: openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/s3_srvr.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-0.9.8j.orig/ssl/s3_srvr.c	2016-08-18 10:51:53.086597242 +0200
+++ openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/s3_srvr.c	2016-08-18 10:51:53.282600243 +0200
@@ -885,7 +885,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
 		goto f_err;
 		}
-	if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
+	if ((d+n) - p <= i)
 		{
 		/* not enough data */
 		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
@@ -952,7 +952,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 
 	/* compression */
 	i= *(p++);
-	if ((p+i) > (d+n))
+	if ((d + n) - p < i)
 		{
 		/* not enough data */
 		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
Index: openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/t1_lib.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-0.9.8j.orig/ssl/t1_lib.c	2016-08-18 10:51:52.738591916 +0200
+++ openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/t1_lib.c	2016-08-18 10:55:50.486229089 +0200
@@ -351,24 +351,28 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 	unsigned short len;
 	unsigned char *data = *p;
 	int renegotiate_seen = 0;
+	const unsigned char *limit = d + n;
 	s->servername_done = 0;
 	s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
 
-	if (data >= (d+n-2))
+	if (data == limit)
 		goto ri_check;
 
+	if (limit - data < 2)
+		goto err;
+
 	n2s(data,len);
 
-	if (data > (d+n-len)) 
-		goto ri_check;
+	if (limit - data != len) 
+		goto err;
 
-	while (data <= (d+n-4))
+	while (limit - data >= 4)
 		{
 		n2s(data,type);
 		n2s(data,size);
 
-		if (data+size > (d+n))
-	   		goto ri_check;
+		if (limit - data < size)
+	   		goto err;
 
 		if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
 			s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
@@ -611,6 +615,9 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 		}
 
 	return 1;
+err:
+	*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+	return 0;
 	}
 
 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
@@ -623,17 +630,17 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 	int tlsext_servername = 0;
 	int renegotiate_seen = 0;
 
-	if (data >= (d+n-2))
+	if ((d + n) - data <= 2)
 		goto ri_check;
 
 	n2s(data,len);
 
-	while(data <= (d+n-4))
+	while((d + n) - data >= 4)
 		{
 		n2s(data,type);
 		n2s(data,size);
 
-		if (data+size > (d+n))
+		if ((d + n) - data < size)
 	   		goto ri_check;
 
 		if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
@@ -731,6 +738,9 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 		}
 
 	return 1;
+err:
+	*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+	return 0;
 	}
 
 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
@@ -871,24 +881,26 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned
 		return -1;
 	/* Skip past cipher list */
 	n2s(p, i);
-	p+= i;
-	if (p >= limit)
+	if (limit - p <= i)
 		return -1;
+	p += i;
+
 	/* Skip past compression algorithm list */
 	i = *(p++);
-	p += i;
-	if (p > limit)
+	if (limit - p < i)
 		return -1;
+	p += i;
+
 	/* Now at start of extensions */
-	if ((p + 2) >= limit)
+	if (limit - p <= 2)
 		return 1;
 	n2s(p, i);
-	while ((p + 4) <= limit)
+	while (limit - p >= 4)
 		{
 		unsigned short type, size;
 		n2s(p, type);
 		n2s(p, size);
-		if (p + size > limit)
+		if (limit - p < size)
 			return 1;
 		if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
 			{
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