File curl-CVE-2023-5981.patch of Package gnutls.31638
From 29d6298d0b04cfff970b993915db71ba3f580b6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Date: Mon, 23 Oct 2023 09:26:57 +0900
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] auth/rsa_psk: side-step potential side-channel
This removes branching that depends on secret data, porting changes
for regular RSA key exchange from
4804febddc2ed958e5ae774de2a8f85edeeff538 and
80a6ce8ddb02477cd724cd5b2944791aaddb702a. This also removes the
allow_wrong_pms as it was used sorely to control debug output
depending on the branching.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
---
lib/auth/rsa.c | 2 +-
lib/auth/rsa_psk.c | 90 ++++++++++++++++++----------------------------
lib/gnutls_int.h | 4 ---
lib/priority.c | 1 -
4 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
Index: gnutls-3.7.3/lib/auth/rsa.c
===================================================================
--- gnutls-3.7.3.orig/lib/auth/rsa.c
+++ gnutls-3.7.3/lib/auth/rsa.c
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t sess
session->key.key.size);
/* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
* in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
- * channel that can be used as an oracle, so treat very carefully */
+ * channel that can be used as an oracle, so tread carefully */
/* Error handling logic:
* In case decryption fails then don't inform the peer. Just use the
Index: gnutls-3.7.3/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
===================================================================
--- gnutls-3.7.3.orig/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
+++ gnutls-3.7.3/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
@@ -264,14 +264,13 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_se
{
gnutls_datum_t username;
psk_auth_info_t info;
- gnutls_datum_t plaintext;
gnutls_datum_t ciphertext;
gnutls_datum_t pwd_psk = { NULL, 0 };
int ret, dsize;
- int randomize_key = 0;
ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t cred;
gnutls_datum_t premaster_secret = { NULL, 0 };
+ volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min;
cred = (gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t)
_gnutls_get_cred(session, GNUTLS_CRD_PSK);
@@ -288,7 +287,7 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_se
return ret;
}
- /*** 1. Extract user psk_identity ***/
+ /*** 1. Extract user psk_identity ***/
DECR_LEN(data_size, 2);
username.size = _gnutls_read_uint16(&data[0]);
@@ -317,7 +316,7 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_se
/* Adjust data so it points to EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
data += username.size + 2;
- /*** 2. Decrypt and extract EncryptedPreMasterSecret ***/
+ /*** 2. Decrypt and extract EncryptedPreMasterSecret ***/
DECR_LEN(data_size, 2);
ciphertext.data = &data[2];
@@ -329,71 +328,49 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_se
}
ciphertext.size = dsize;
- ret =
- gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data(session->internals.selected_key, 0,
- &ciphertext, &plaintext);
- if (ret < 0 || plaintext.size != GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE) {
- /* In case decryption fails then don't inform
- * the peer. Just use a random key. (in order to avoid
- * attack against pkcs-1 formatting).
- */
- gnutls_assert();
- _gnutls_debug_log
- ("auth_rsa_psk: Possible PKCS #1 format attack\n");
- if (ret >= 0) {
- gnutls_free(plaintext.data);
- }
- randomize_key = 1;
- } else {
- /* If the secret was properly formatted, then
- * check the version number.
- */
- if (_gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session) !=
- plaintext.data[0]
- || (session->internals.allow_wrong_pms == 0
- && _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session) !=
- plaintext.data[1])) {
- /* No error is returned here, if the version number check
- * fails. We proceed normally.
- * That is to defend against the attack described in the paper
- * "Attacking RSA-based sessions in SSL/TLS" by Vlastimil Klima,
- * Ondej Pokorny and Tomas Rosa.
- */
- gnutls_assert();
- _gnutls_debug_log
- ("auth_rsa: Possible PKCS #1 version check format attack\n");
- }
- }
+ ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
+ ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
+
+ premaster_secret.data = gnutls_malloc(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
+ if (premaster_secret.data == NULL) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
+ }
+ premaster_secret.size = GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE;
- if (randomize_key != 0) {
- premaster_secret.size = GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE;
- premaster_secret.data =
- gnutls_malloc(premaster_secret.size);
- if (premaster_secret.data == NULL) {
- gnutls_assert();
- return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
- }
-
- /* we do not need strong random numbers here.
- */
- ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, premaster_secret.data,
- premaster_secret.size);
- if (ret < 0) {
- gnutls_assert();
- goto cleanup;
- }
- } else {
- premaster_secret.data = plaintext.data;
- premaster_secret.size = plaintext.size;
+ /* Fallback value when decryption fails. Needs to be unpredictable. */
+ ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, premaster_secret.data,
+ premaster_secret.size);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ goto cleanup;
}
+ gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key, 0,
+ &ciphertext, premaster_secret.data,
+ premaster_secret.size);
+ /* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
+ * in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
+ * channel that can be used as an oracle, so tread carefully */
+
+ /* Error handling logic:
+ * In case decryption fails then don't inform the peer. Just use the
+ * random key previously generated. (in order to avoid attack against
+ * pkcs-1 formatting).
+ *
+ * If we get version mismatches no error is returned either. We
+ * proceed normally. This is to defend against the attack described
+ * in the paper "Attacking RSA-based sessions in SSL/TLS" by
+ * Vlastimil Klima, Ondej Pokorny and Tomas Rosa.
+ */
+
/* This is here to avoid the version check attack
* discussed above.
*/
- premaster_secret.data[0] = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
- premaster_secret.data[1] = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
+ premaster_secret.data[0] = ver_maj;
+ premaster_secret.data[1] = ver_min;
/* find the key of this username
*/
Index: gnutls-3.7.3/lib/gnutls_int.h
===================================================================
--- gnutls-3.7.3.orig/lib/gnutls_int.h
+++ gnutls-3.7.3/lib/gnutls_int.h
@@ -977,7 +977,6 @@ struct gnutls_priority_st {
bool _no_etm;
bool _no_ext_master_secret;
bool _allow_key_usage_violation;
- bool _allow_wrong_pms;
bool _dumbfw;
unsigned int _dh_prime_bits; /* old (deprecated) variable */
@@ -995,7 +994,6 @@ struct gnutls_priority_st {
(x)->no_etm = 1; \
(x)->no_ext_master_secret = 1; \
(x)->allow_key_usage_violation = 1; \
- (x)->allow_wrong_pms = 1; \
(x)->dumbfw = 1
#define ENABLE_PRIO_COMPAT(x) \
@@ -1004,7 +1002,6 @@ struct gnutls_priority_st {
(x)->_no_etm = 1; \
(x)->_no_ext_master_secret = 1; \
(x)->_allow_key_usage_violation = 1; \
- (x)->_allow_wrong_pms = 1; \
(x)->_dumbfw = 1
/* DH and RSA parameters types.
@@ -1129,7 +1126,6 @@ typedef struct {
bool no_etm;
bool no_ext_master_secret;
bool allow_key_usage_violation;
- bool allow_wrong_pms;
bool dumbfw;
/* old (deprecated) variable. This is used for both srp_prime_bits
Index: gnutls-3.7.3/lib/priority.c
===================================================================
--- gnutls-3.7.3.orig/lib/priority.c
+++ gnutls-3.7.3/lib/priority.c
@@ -690,7 +690,6 @@ gnutls_priority_set(gnutls_session_t ses
COPY_TO_INTERNALS(no_etm);
COPY_TO_INTERNALS(no_ext_master_secret);
COPY_TO_INTERNALS(allow_key_usage_violation);
- COPY_TO_INTERNALS(allow_wrong_pms);
COPY_TO_INTERNALS(dumbfw);
COPY_TO_INTERNALS(dh_prime_bits);