File perl-PlRPC-CVE-2013-7284.patch of Package perl-PlRPC.15745

Overview Repositories Revisions Requests Users Attributes Meta

File perl-PlRPC-CVE-2013-7284.patch of Package perl-PlRPC.15745

From 29f5ad4805a04e4c4fd18795f7153798c80a46ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20P=C3=ADsa=C5=99?= <ppisar@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2013 12:20:52 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Security notice on Storable and reply attack
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Signed-off-by: Petr Písař <ppisar@redhat.com>
---
 README              | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 lib/RPC/PlServer.pm | 15 +++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+)

diff --git a/README b/README
index 8a68657..48a33e4 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -245,6 +246,10 @@ SECURITY
     that I missed something. Security was a design goal, but not *the*
     design goal. (A well known problem ...)
 
+    Due to implementation of PlRPC, it's hard to use internal authentication
+    mechanisms properly to achieve secured remote calls. Therefore users are
+    advised to use an external authentication mechanism like TLS or IPsec.
+
     I highly recommend the following design principles:
 
   Protection against "trusted" users
@@ -263,6 +268,14 @@ SECURITY
     Be restrictive
         Think twice, before you give a client access to a method.
 
+    Use of Storable
+        Storable module used for serialization and deserialization
+        underneath is inherently insecure. Deserialized data can contain
+        objects which lead to loading foreign modules and executing possible
+        attached destructors. Do not accept host-based unauthorized
+        connections. The Storable module is exercised before checking user
+        password.
+
     perlsec
         And just in case I forgot it: Read the "perlsec" man page. :-)
 
@@ -283,6 +296,9 @@ SECURITY
         authorized, you should switch to a user based key. See the
         DBI::ProxyServer for an example.
 
+        Please note PlRPC encryption does not protect from reply attacks.
+        You should have implement it on the application or the cipher level.
+
 AUTHOR AND COPYRIGHT
     The PlRPC-modules are
 
diff --git a/lib/RPC/PlServer.pm b/lib/RPC/PlServer.pm
index 10b56c9..ce38594 100644
--- a/lib/RPC/PlServer.pm
+++ b/lib/RPC/PlServer.pm
@@ -613,6 +613,10 @@ I did my best to avoid security problems, but it is more than likely,
 that I missed something. Security was a design goal, but not *the*
 design goal. (A well known problem ...)
 
+Due to implementation of PlRPC, it's hard to use internal authentication
+mechanisms properly to achieve secured remote calls. Therefore users are
+advised to use an external authentication mechanism like TLS or IPsec.
+
 I highly recommend the following design principles:
 
 =head2 Protection against "trusted" users
@@ -637,6 +641,14 @@ object handle is valid before coercing a method on it.
 
 Think twice, before you give a client access to a method.
 
+=item Use of Storable
+
+L<Storable> module used for serialization and deserialization underneath is
+inherently insecure. Deserialized data can contain objects which lead to
+loading foreign modules and executing possible attached destructors. Do not
+accept host-based unauthorized connections. The L<Storable> module is
+exercised before checking user password.
+
 =item perlsec
 
 And just in case I forgot it: Read the C<perlsec> man page. :-)
@@ -667,6 +679,9 @@ login phase, where to use a host based key. As soon as the user
 has authorized, you should switch to a user based key. See the
 DBI::ProxyServer for an example.
 
+Please note PlRPC encryption does not protect from reply attacks. You should
+have implement it on the application or the cipher level.
+
 =back
 
 =head1 AUTHOR AND COPYRIGHT
-- 
1.8.3.1

Places

File perl-PlRPC-CVE-2013-7284.patch of Package perl-PlRPC.15745

Places