File 0001-systemd-PID1-crash-with-specially-crafted-... of Package systemd-mini.10344

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File 0001-systemd-PID1-crash-with-specially-crafted-D-Bus-mess.patch of Package systemd-mini.10344

From 033395e3f397e521414e5035099baf9c68854a03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2019 18:32:56 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] systemd (PID1) crash with specially crafted D-Bus message

Fix for CVE-2019-6454 provided by Red Hat Product Security. Originally it
applies to systemd master (tested as of
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/31cbd2025359e1e8435a2dc371e439591846d8c4).

This patch will be replaced by its upstream version which will be available
once this issue will be made public.

[fbui: adjust context]
[fbui: fixes bsc#1125352]
[fbui: fixes CVE-2019-6454]
---
 src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.c |  2 +-
 src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.h |  4 +++
 src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c  | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++------
 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.c b/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.c
index 0bea8cac49..ceedb06b8f 100644
--- a/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.c
+++ b/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.c
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ bool object_path_is_valid(const char *p) {
         if (slash)
                 return false;
 
-        return true;
+        return (q - p) <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX;
 }
 
 char* object_path_startswith(const char *a, const char *b) {
diff --git a/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.h b/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.h
index ae5f66288f..931722e49d 100644
--- a/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.h
+++ b/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.h
@@ -285,6 +285,10 @@ struct sd_bus {
 
 #define BUS_MESSAGE_SIZE_MAX (64*1024*1024)
 #define BUS_AUTH_SIZE_MAX (64*1024)
+/* Note that the D-Bus specification states that bus paths shall have no size limit. We enforce here one
+ * anyway, since truly unbounded strings are a security problem. The limit we pick is relatively large however,
+ * to not clash unnecessarily with real-life applications. */
+#define BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX (64*1024)
 
 #define BUS_CONTAINER_DEPTH 128
 
diff --git a/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c b/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c
index 25f616bfbb..708d844b5d 100644
--- a/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c
+++ b/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c
@@ -1073,7 +1073,8 @@ static int object_manager_serialize_path_and_fallbacks(
                 const char *path,
                 sd_bus_error *error) {
 
-        char *prefix;
+        _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
+        size_t pl;
         int r;
 
         assert(bus);
@@ -1089,7 +1090,12 @@ static int object_manager_serialize_path_and_fallbacks(
                 return 0;
 
         /* Second, add fallback vtables registered for any of the prefixes */
-        prefix = alloca(strlen(path) + 1);
+        pl = strlen(path);
+        assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
+        prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
+        if (!prefix)
+                return -ENOMEM;
+
         OBJECT_PATH_FOREACH_PREFIX(prefix, path) {
                 r = object_manager_serialize_path(bus, reply, prefix, path, true, error);
                 if (r < 0)
@@ -1307,6 +1313,7 @@ static int object_find_and_run(
 }
 
 int bus_process_object(sd_bus *bus, sd_bus_message *m) {
+        _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
         int r;
         size_t pl;
         bool found_object = false;
@@ -1328,9 +1335,12 @@ int bus_process_object(sd_bus *bus, sd_bus_message *m) {
         assert(m->member);
 
         pl = strlen(m->path);
-        do {
-                char prefix[pl+1];
+        assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
+        prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
+        if (!prefix)
+                return -ENOMEM;
 
+        do {
                 bus->nodes_modified = false;
 
                 r = object_find_and_run(bus, m, m->path, false, &found_object);
@@ -2204,8 +2214,9 @@ _public_ int sd_bus_emit_properties_changed_strv(
                 char **names) {
 
         BUS_DONT_DESTROY(bus);
+        _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
         bool found_interface = false;
-        char *prefix;
+        size_t pl;
         int r;
 
         assert_return(bus, -EINVAL);
@@ -2223,6 +2234,12 @@ _public_ int sd_bus_emit_properties_changed_strv(
         if (names && names[0] == NULL)
                 return 0;
 
+        pl = strlen(path);
+        assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
+        prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
+        if (!prefix)
+                return -ENOMEM;
+
         do {
                 bus->nodes_modified = false;
 
@@ -2232,7 +2249,6 @@ _public_ int sd_bus_emit_properties_changed_strv(
                 if (bus->nodes_modified)
                         continue;
 
-                prefix = alloca(strlen(path) + 1);
                 OBJECT_PATH_FOREACH_PREFIX(prefix, path) {
                         r = emit_properties_changed_on_interface(bus, prefix, path, interface, true, &found_interface, names);
                         if (r != 0)
@@ -2344,7 +2360,8 @@ static int interfaces_added_append_one(
                 const char *path,
                 const char *interface) {
 
-        char *prefix;
+        _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
+        size_t pl;
         int r;
 
         assert(bus);
@@ -2358,7 +2375,12 @@ static int interfaces_added_append_one(
         if (bus->nodes_modified)
                 return 0;
 
-        prefix = alloca(strlen(path) + 1);
+        pl = strlen(path);
+        assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
+        prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
+        if (!prefix)
+                return -ENOMEM;
+
         OBJECT_PATH_FOREACH_PREFIX(prefix, path) {
                 r = interfaces_added_append_one_prefix(bus, m, prefix, path, interface, true);
                 if (r != 0)
-- 
2.20.1

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