File 58e395f2-XENMEM_exchange-properly-check-guest-r... of Package xen.5853

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File 58e395f2-XENMEM_exchange-properly-check-guest-ranges.patch of Package xen.5853

# Commit 938fd2586eb081bcbd694f4c1f09ae6a263b0d90
# Date 2017-04-04 14:47:46 +0200
# Author Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
memory: properly check guest memory ranges in XENMEM_exchange handling

The use of guest_handle_okay() here (as introduced by the XSA-29 fix)
is insufficient here, guest_handle_subrange_okay() needs to be used
instead.

Note that the uses are okay in
- XENMEM_add_to_physmap_batch handling due to the size field being only
  16 bits wide,
- livepatch_list() due to the limit of 1024 enforced on the
  number-of-entries input (leaving aside the fact that this can be
  called by a privileged domain only anyway),
- compat mode handling due to counts there being limited to 32 bits,
- everywhere else due to guest arrays being accessed sequentially from
  index zero.

This is CVE-2017-7228 / XSA-212.

Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

--- a/xen/common/memory.c
+++ b/xen/common/memory.c
@@ -409,8 +409,8 @@ static long memory_exchange(XEN_GUEST_HA
         goto fail_early;
     }
 
-    if ( !guest_handle_okay(exch.in.extent_start, exch.in.nr_extents) ||
-         !guest_handle_okay(exch.out.extent_start, exch.out.nr_extents) )
+    if ( !guest_handle_subrange_okay(exch.in.extent_start, exch.nr_exchanged,
+                                     exch.in.nr_extents - 1) )
     {
         rc = -EFAULT;
         goto fail_early;
@@ -420,11 +420,27 @@ static long memory_exchange(XEN_GUEST_HA
     {
         in_chunk_order  = exch.out.extent_order - exch.in.extent_order;
         out_chunk_order = 0;
+
+        if ( !guest_handle_subrange_okay(exch.out.extent_start,
+                                         exch.nr_exchanged >> in_chunk_order,
+                                         exch.out.nr_extents - 1) )
+        {
+            rc = -EFAULT;
+            goto fail_early;
+        }
     }
     else
     {
         in_chunk_order  = 0;
         out_chunk_order = exch.in.extent_order - exch.out.extent_order;
+
+        if ( !guest_handle_subrange_okay(exch.out.extent_start,
+                                         exch.nr_exchanged << out_chunk_order,
+                                         exch.out.nr_extents - 1) )
+        {
+            rc = -EFAULT;
+            goto fail_early;
+        }
     }
 
     d = rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id(exch.in.domid);
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/uaccess.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/uaccess.h
@@ -29,8 +29,9 @@ extern void *xlat_malloc(unsigned long *
 /*
  * Valid if in +ve half of 48-bit address space, or above Xen-reserved area.
  * This is also valid for range checks (addr, addr+size). As long as the
- * start address is outside the Xen-reserved area then we will access a
- * non-canonical address (and thus fault) before ever reaching VIRT_START.
+ * start address is outside the Xen-reserved area, sequential accesses
+ * (starting at addr) will hit a non-canonical address (and thus fault)
+ * before ever reaching VIRT_START.
  */
 #define __addr_ok(addr) \
     (((unsigned long)(addr) < (1UL<<47)) || \
@@ -40,7 +41,8 @@ extern void *xlat_malloc(unsigned long *
     (__addr_ok(addr) || is_compat_arg_xlat_range(addr, size))
 
 #define array_access_ok(addr, count, size) \
-    (access_ok(addr, (count)*(size)))
+    (likely(((count) ?: 0UL) < (~0UL / (size))) && \
+     access_ok(addr, (count) * (size)))
 
 #define __compat_addr_ok(d, addr) \
     ((unsigned long)(addr) < HYPERVISOR_COMPAT_VIRT_START(d))

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File 58e395f2-XENMEM_exchange-properly-check-guest-ranges.patch of Package xen.5853

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