File openssl-Extended-OAEP-support.patch of Package compat-openssl098.31475
From 271fef0ef39a1c0cb5233a5adf3ff8733abb375e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <steve@openssl.org>
Date: Tue, 21 May 2013 23:55:50 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Exetended OAEP support.
Extend OAEP support. Generalise the OAEP padding functions to support
arbitrary digests. Extend EVP_PKEY RSA method to handle the new OAEP
padding functions and add ctrls to set the additional parameters.
---
CHANGES | 4 ++
crypto/rsa/rsa.h | 28 +++++++++-
crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c | 7 ++-
crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c | 105 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c | 121 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
5 files changed, 217 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
Index: openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
===================================================================
--- openssl-0.9.8j.orig/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
+++ openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
@@ -237,6 +237,26 @@ struct rsa_st
*/
#endif
+#define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, md) \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, \
+ EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)md)
+
+#define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(ctx, md) \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)md)
+
+#define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, pmd) \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, \
+ EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)pmd)
+
+#define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, l, llen) \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL, llen, (void *)l)
+
+#define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 9)
+#define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 10)
#define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING 1
#define RSA_SSLV23_PADDING 2
@@ -364,6 +384,14 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned
int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to,int tlen,
const unsigned char *f,int fl,int rsa_len,
const unsigned char *p,int pl);
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+ const unsigned char *param, int plen,
+ const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md);
+int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num,
+ const unsigned char *param, int plen,
+ const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md);
int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to,int tlen,
const unsigned char *f,int fl);
int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to,int tlen,
@@ -421,6 +449,7 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
#define RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT 135
#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE 107
#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP 121
+#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1 154
#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS 125
#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1 108
#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2 109
@@ -428,6 +457,7 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_X931 127
#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_NONE 111
#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP 122
+#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1 153
#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1 112
#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2 113
#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23 114
@@ -464,6 +494,7 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
#define RSA_R_DMQ1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D 125
#define RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1 123
#define RSA_R_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID 133
+#define RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST 157
#define RSA_R_INVALID_HEADER 137
#define RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 131
#define RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING 138
Index: openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-0.9.8j.orig/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
+++ openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_functs[]=
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE), "RSA_padding_add_none"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP"},
+{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2"},
@@ -97,6 +98,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_functs[]=
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_X931), "RSA_padding_add_X931"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_NONE), "RSA_padding_check_none"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP), "RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP"},
+{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1), "RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1), "RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2), "RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23), "RSA_padding_check_SSLv23"},
@@ -136,6 +138,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[]
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DMQ1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D),"dmq1 not congruent to d"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1),"d e not congruent to 1"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID) ,"first octet invalid"},
+{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST) ,"invalid digest"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_HEADER) ,"invalid header"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH),"invalid message length"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING) ,"invalid padding"},
Index: openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-0.9.8j.orig/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+++ openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
@@ -28,47 +28,62 @@
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
-int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
- const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen);
-
int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
const unsigned char *from, int flen,
const unsigned char *param, int plen)
{
+ return RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(to, tlen, from, flen,
+ param, plen, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+ const unsigned char *param, int plen,
+ const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
+{
int i, emlen = tlen - 1;
unsigned char *db, *seed;
- unsigned char *dbmask, seedmask[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char *dbmask, seedmask[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ int mdlen;
+
+ if (md == NULL)
+ md = EVP_sha1();
+ if (mgf1md == NULL)
+ mgf1md = md;
+
+ mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
- if (flen > emlen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1)
+ if (flen > emlen - 2 * mdlen - 1)
{
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP,
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
return 0;
}
if (emlen < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1)
{
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
- dbmask = OPENSSL_malloc(emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ dbmask = OPENSSL_malloc(emlen - mdlen);
if (dbmask == NULL)
{
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
to[0] = 0;
seed = to + 1;
- db = to + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1;
+ db = to + mdlen + 1;
- EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, db, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
- memset(db + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0,
- emlen - flen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1);
- db[emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1] = 0x01;
- memcpy(db + emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, from, (unsigned int) flen);
- if (RAND_bytes(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0)
+ if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, db, NULL, md, NULL))
+ return 0;
+ memset(db + mdlen, 0,
+ emlen - flen - 2 * mdlen - 1);
+ db[emlen - flen - mdlen - 1] = 0x01;
+ memcpy(db + emlen - flen - mdlen, from, (unsigned int) flen);
+ if (RAND_bytes(seed, mdlen) <= 0)
return 0;
#ifdef PKCS_TESTVECT
memcpy(seed,
@@ -76,12 +91,15 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned
20);
#endif
- MGF1(dbmask, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- for (i = 0; i < emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+ if (PKCS1_MGF1(dbmask, emlen - mdlen, seed, mdlen, mgf1md) < 0)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < emlen - mdlen; i++)
db[i] ^= dbmask[i];
- MGF1(seedmask, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, db, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+ if (PKCS1_MGF1(seedmask, mdlen, db, emlen - mdlen, mgf1md) < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++)
seed[i] ^= seedmask[i];
OPENSSL_free(dbmask);
@@ -92,14 +110,32 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigne
const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num,
const unsigned char *param, int plen)
{
+ return RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(to, tlen, from , flen, num,
+ param, plen,
+ NULL, NULL);
+ }
+
+int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num,
+ const unsigned char *param, int plen,
+ const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
+ {
int i, dblen, mlen = -1;
const unsigned char *maskeddb;
int lzero;
- unsigned char *db = NULL, seed[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], phash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char *db = NULL, seed[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], phash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char *padded_from;
int bad = 0;
+ int mdlen;
+
+ if (md == NULL)
+ md = EVP_sha1();
+ if (mgf1md == NULL)
+ mgf1md = md;
+
+ mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
- if (--num < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1)
+ if (--num < 2 * mdlen + 1)
/* 'num' is the length of the modulus, i.e. does not depend on the
* particular ciphertext. */
goto decoding_err;
@@ -117,11 +153,11 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigne
flen = num; /* don't overflow the memcpy to padded_from */
}
- dblen = num - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ dblen = num - mdlen;
db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen + num);
if (db == NULL)
{
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
@@ -131,23 +167,26 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigne
memset(padded_from, 0, lzero);
memcpy(padded_from + lzero, from, flen);
- maskeddb = padded_from + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ maskeddb = padded_from + mdlen;
- MGF1(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, maskeddb, dblen);
- for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+ if (PKCS1_MGF1(seed, mdlen, maskeddb, dblen, mgf1md))
+ return -1;
+ for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++)
seed[i] ^= padded_from[i];
- MGF1(db, dblen, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ if (PKCS1_MGF1(db, dblen, seed, mdlen, mgf1md))
+ return -1;
for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++)
db[i] ^= maskeddb[i];
- EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
+ if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, md, NULL))
+ return -1;
- if (CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0 || bad)
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, mdlen) != 0 || bad)
goto decoding_err;
else
{
- for (i = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i < dblen; i++)
+ for (i = mdlen; i < dblen; i++)
if (db[i] != 0x00)
break;
if (i == dblen || db[i] != 0x01)
@@ -159,7 +198,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigne
mlen = dblen - ++i;
if (tlen < mlen)
{
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
mlen = -1;
}
else
@@ -172,7 +211,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigne
decoding_err:
/* to avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not reveal
* which kind of decoding error happened */
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
if (db != NULL) OPENSSL_free(db);
return -1;
}
@@ -213,8 +252,4 @@ int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long
return 0;
}
-int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen)
- {
- return PKCS1_MGF1(mask, len, seed, seedlen, EVP_sha1());
- }
#endif
