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File 0002-ECDSA-Address-a-timing-side-channel-whereby-it-is-possible.patch of Package openssl (Revision 87d49f12f6232d376009f4c8b30d01d5)

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From 23f7e974d59a576ad7d8cfd9f7ac957a883e361f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pauli <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Nov 2017 09:47:13 +1000
Subject: [PATCH] Address a timing side channel whereby it is possible to
 determine some

information about the length of the scalar used in ECDSA operations
from a large number (2^32) of signatures.

Thanks to Neals Fournaise, Eliane Jaulmes and Jean-Rene Reinhard for
reporting this issue.

Refer to #4576 for further details.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4623)
---
 crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

Index: openssl-1.0.2j/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-1.0.2j.orig/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c	2018-11-05 15:51:47.630744047 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.2j/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c	2018-11-05 15:51:47.750744872 +0100
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *ecke
     EC_POINT *tmp_point = NULL;
     const EC_GROUP *group;
     int ret = 0;
+    int order_bits;
 
     if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL) {
         ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
@@ -129,6 +130,13 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *ecke
         goto err;
     }
 
+    /* Preallocate space */
+    order_bits = BN_num_bits(order);
+    if (!BN_set_bit(k, order_bits)
+        || !BN_set_bit(r, order_bits)
+        || !BN_set_bit(X, order_bits))
+        goto err;
+
     do {
         /* get random k */
         do
@@ -142,13 +150,19 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *ecke
         /*
          * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we
          * compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed bit-length.
+         *
+         * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a
+         * small timing information leakage.  We then choose the sum that is
+         * one bit longer than the order.  This guarantees the code
+         * path used in the constant time implementations elsewhere.
+         *
+         * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic
+         * conditional copy.
          */
-
-        if (!BN_add(k, k, order))
+        if (!BN_add(r, k, order)
+            || !BN_add(X, r, order)
+            || !BN_copy(k, BN_num_bits(r) > order_bits ? r : X))
             goto err;
-        if (BN_num_bits(k) <= BN_num_bits(order))
-            if (!BN_add(k, k, order))
-                goto err;
 
         /* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */
         if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {

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File 0002-ECDSA-Address-a-timing-side-channel-whereby-it-is-possible.patch of Package openssl (Revision 87d49f12f6232d376009f4c8b30d01d5)

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