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SUSE:SLE-12-SP3:GA
openssh.5295
openssh-7.2p2-fips.patch
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File openssh-7.2p2-fips.patch of Package openssh.5295
# HG changeset patch # Parent 5f2b8faa3b60de28124d9d4a44ffa2635d67f601 FIPS 140-2 compliance. Perform selftests on start and use only FIPS approved algorithms. diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in --- a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in @@ -89,16 +89,18 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \ poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \ ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o digest-libc.o hmac.o \ sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o \ kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \ kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o \ kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o \ platform-pledge.o +LIBSSH_OBJS += fips.o + SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \ sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \ audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \ sshpty.o sshlogin.o servconf.o serverloop.o \ auth.o auth1.o auth2.o auth-options.o session.o \ auth-chall.o auth2-chall.o groupaccess.o \ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-rsa.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-rsa.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-rsa.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-rsa.c @@ -46,16 +46,18 @@ #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "digest.h" +#include "fips.h" + /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; /* * Session identifier that is used to bind key exchange and authentication * responses to a particular session. */ extern u_char session_id[16]; @@ -86,45 +88,52 @@ auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *key) if (BN_mod(challenge, challenge, key->rsa->n, ctx) == 0) fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_mod failed"); BN_CTX_free(ctx); return challenge; } int -auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16]) +auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, + u_char response[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]) { - u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16]; + u_char buf[2 * SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], mdbuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; struct ssh_digest_ctx *md; int len; + int dgst; + size_t dgst_len; /* don't allow short keys */ if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) { error("%s: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits", __func__, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE); return (0); } - /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */ + dgst = fips_correct_dgst(SSH_DIGEST_MD5); + dgst_len = ssh_digest_bytes(dgst); + + /* The response is a hash of decrypted challenge plus session id. + * Normally this is MD5, in FIPS mode a stronger function is used. */ len = BN_num_bytes(challenge); - if (len <= 0 || len > 32) + if (len <= 0 || (unsigned int)len > (2 * dgst_len)) fatal("%s: bad challenge length %d", __func__, len); - memset(buf, 0, 32); - BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len); - if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL || - ssh_digest_update(md, buf, 32) < 0 || - ssh_digest_update(md, session_id, 16) < 0 || + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 2 * dgst_len - len); + if ((md = ssh_digest_start(dgst)) == NULL || + ssh_digest_update(md, buf, 2 * dgst_len) < 0 || + ssh_digest_update(md, session_id, dgst_len) < 0 || ssh_digest_final(md, mdbuf, sizeof(mdbuf)) < 0) fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__); ssh_digest_free(md); /* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */ - if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) { + if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, dgst_len) != 0) { /* Wrong answer. */ return (0); } /* Correct answer. */ return (1); } /* @@ -132,17 +141,17 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNU * and returns true (non-zero) if the client gave the correct answer to * our challenge; returns zero if the client gives a wrong answer. */ int auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *key) { BIGNUM *challenge, *encrypted_challenge; - u_char response[16]; + u_char response[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; int i, success; if ((encrypted_challenge = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("auth_rsa_challenge_dialog: BN_new() failed"); challenge = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key)); /* Encrypt the challenge with the public key. */ @@ -153,17 +162,17 @@ auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *key) packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE); packet_put_bignum(encrypted_challenge); packet_send(); BN_clear_free(encrypted_challenge); packet_write_wait(); /* Wait for a response. */ packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE); - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) + for (i = 0; i < ssh_digest_bytes(fips_dgst_min()); i++) response[i] = (u_char)packet_get_char(); packet_check_eom(); success = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_verify_response(key, challenge, response)); BN_clear_free(challenge); return (success); } diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/cipher-ctr.c b/openssh-7.2p2/cipher-ctr.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/cipher-ctr.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/cipher-ctr.c @@ -22,16 +22,18 @@ #include <stdarg.h> #include <string.h> #include <openssl/evp.h> #include "xmalloc.h" #include "log.h" +#include "fips.h" + /* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #ifndef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL #include <openssl/aes.h> #endif struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx @@ -134,13 +136,15 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void) aes_ctr.iv_len = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; aes_ctr.key_len = 16; aes_ctr.init = ssh_aes_ctr_init; aes_ctr.cleanup = ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup; aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr; #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV; + if (fips_mode()) + aes_ctr.flags |= EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS; #endif return (&aes_ctr); } #endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR) */ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/cipher.c b/openssh-7.2p2/cipher.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/cipher.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/cipher.c @@ -46,16 +46,19 @@ #include "cipher.h" #include "misc.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "digest.h" #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" +#include "fips.h" +#include "log.h" + #ifdef WITH_SSH1 extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(void); extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void); extern int ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int); #endif struct sshcipher { char *name; @@ -72,17 +75,17 @@ struct sshcipher { #define CFLAG_NONE (1<<3) #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void); #else void *ignored; #endif }; -static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = { +static const struct sshcipher ciphers_all[] = { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 { "des", SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc }, { "3des", SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des }, { "blowfish", SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH, 8, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_bf }, #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL { "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null }, { "3des-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc }, @@ -114,27 +117,75 @@ static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] { "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_NONE, NULL }, #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ { "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 64, 0, 16, 0, CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY, NULL }, { NULL, SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL } }; +static const struct sshcipher ciphers_fips140_2[] = { +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 + { "3des", SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des }, +#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + { "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null }, + { "3des-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc }, + { "aes128-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_128_cbc }, + { "aes192-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_192_cbc }, + { "aes256-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc }, + { "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se", + SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc }, + { "aes128-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_ctr }, + { "aes192-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_192_ctr }, + { "aes256-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr }, +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM + { "aes128-gcm@openssh.com", + SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_gcm }, + { "aes256-gcm@openssh.com", + SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_gcm }, +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM */ +#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + { "aes128-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL }, + { "aes192-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL }, + { "aes256-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL }, + { "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_NONE, NULL }, +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + { NULL, SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL } +}; + /*--*/ +/* Returns array of ciphers available depending on selected FIPS mode */ +static const struct sshcipher * +fips_select_ciphers(void) +{ + int fips = fips_mode(); + switch (fips) { + case 0: + return ciphers_all; + case 1: + return ciphers_fips140_2; + default: + /* should not be reached */ + fatal("Fatal error: incorrect FIPS mode '%i' at %s:%u", + fips, __FILE__, __LINE__); + return NULL; + } +} + /* Returns a comma-separated list of supported ciphers. */ char * cipher_alg_list(char sep, int auth_only) { char *tmp, *ret = NULL; size_t nlen, rlen = 0; const struct sshcipher *c; - for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) { + for (c = fips_select_ciphers(); c->name != NULL; c++) { if (c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2) continue; if (auth_only && c->auth_len == 0) continue; if (ret != NULL) ret[rlen++] = sep; nlen = strlen(c->name); if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) { @@ -208,27 +259,27 @@ cipher_mask_ssh1(int client) } return mask; } const struct sshcipher * cipher_by_name(const char *name) { const struct sshcipher *c; - for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) + for (c = fips_select_ciphers(); c->name != NULL; c++) if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0) return c; return NULL; } const struct sshcipher * cipher_by_number(int id) { const struct sshcipher *c; - for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) + for (c = fips_select_ciphers(); c->name != NULL; c++) if (c->number == id) return c; return NULL; } #define CIPHER_SEP "," int ciphers_valid(const char *names) @@ -259,17 +310,17 @@ ciphers_valid(const char *names) */ int cipher_number(const char *name) { const struct sshcipher *c; if (name == NULL) return -1; - for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) + for (c = fips_select_ciphers(); c->name != NULL; c++) if (strcasecmp(c->name, name) == 0) return c->number; return -1; } char * cipher_name(int id) { @@ -477,25 +528,26 @@ cipher_cleanup(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc) /* * Selects the cipher, and keys if by computing the MD5 checksum of the * passphrase and using the resulting 16 bytes as the key. */ int cipher_set_key_string(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, const struct sshcipher *cipher, const char *passphrase, int do_encrypt) { - u_char digest[16]; + u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; + int dgst = fips_correct_dgst(SSH_DIGEST_MD5); int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_MD5, + if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(dgst, passphrase, strlen(passphrase), digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) goto out; - r = cipher_init(cc, cipher, digest, 16, NULL, 0, do_encrypt); + r = cipher_init(cc, cipher, digest, ssh_digest_bytes(dgst), NULL, 0, do_encrypt); out: explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); return r; } /* * Exports an IV from the sshcipher_ctx required to export the key * state back from the unprivileged child to the privileged parent diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/dh.h b/openssh-7.2p2/dh.h --- a/openssh-7.2p2/dh.h +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/dh.h @@ -45,16 +45,17 @@ int dh_pub_is_valid(DH *, BIGNUM *); u_int dh_estimate(int); /* * Max value from RFC4419. * Miniumum increased in light of DH precomputation attacks. */ #define DH_GRP_MIN_RFC 1024 #define DH_GRP_MIN 2048 +#define DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS 2048 #define DH_GRP_MAX 8192 /* * Values for "type" field of moduli(5) * Specifies the internal structure of the prime modulus. */ #define MODULI_TYPE_UNKNOWN (0) #define MODULI_TYPE_UNSTRUCTURED (1) diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/fips.c b/openssh-7.2p2/fips.c new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/fips.c @@ -0,0 +1,237 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2012 Petr Cerny. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include "fips.h" + +#include "cipher.h" +#include "dh.h" +#include "digest.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "mac.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" + +#include <string.h> +#include <openssl/crypto.h> + +/* import from dh.c */ +extern int dh_grp_min; + +static int fips_state = -1; + +static int +fips_check_required_env(void) +{ + int fips_required = 0; + char *env = getenv(SSH_FORCE_FIPS_ENV); + + if (env) { + errno = 0; + fips_required = strtol(env, NULL, 10); + if (errno) { + debug("bogus value in the %s environment variable, ignoring\n" + , SSH_FORCE_FIPS_ENV); + fips_required = 0; + } else + fips_required = 1; + } + return fips_required; +} + +int +fips_mode(void) +{ + if (-1 == fips_state) { + fips_state = FIPS_mode(); + if (fips_state) + debug("FIPS mode initialized"); + else { + if (fips_check_required_env()) { + debug("FIPS mode requested through the environment variable '%s'" + , SSH_FORCE_FIPS_ENV); + if (!FIPS_mode_set(1)) + fatal("Unable to enter FIPS mode as requested through the environment variable '%s'" + , SSH_FORCE_FIPS_ENV); + fips_state = 1; + } + } + } + return fips_state; +} + +int +fips_correct_dgst(int digest) +{ + int fips; + int rv = -1; + + fips = fips_mode(); + switch (fips) { + case 0: + rv = digest; + break; + case 1: + switch (digest) { + case SSH_DIGEST_MD5: + case SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160: + debug("MD5/RIPEMD160 digests not allowed in FIPS 140-2 mode" + "using SHA-256 instead."); + rv = SSH_DIGEST_SHA256; + break; + default: + rv = digest; + break; + } + break; + default: + /* should not be reached */ + fatal("Fatal error: incorrect FIPS mode '%i' at %s:%u", + fips, __FILE__, __LINE__); + } + + return rv; +} + +/* + * filter out FIPS disallowed algorithms + * *crypto MUST be free()-able - it is assigned newly allocated memory and + * the previous one is freed + * + * returns zero if all algorithms were rejected, non-zero otherwise + */ +int +fips_filter_crypto(char **crypto, fips_filters filter) +{ + char *token, *tmp, *tmp_sav, *new; + int plus = 0; + int valid; + int comma = 0; + int empty = 1; + size_t len; + + tmp = tmp_sav = xstrdup(*crypto); + + len = strlen(tmp) + 1; + new = xcalloc(1, len); + + if ('+' == *tmp) { + plus = 1; + tmp++; + } + + while ((token = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL) { + switch(filter) { + case FIPS_FILTER_CIPHERS: + valid = ciphers_valid(token); + if (!valid) + debug("Cipher '%s' is not allowed in FIPS mode", + token); + break; + case FIPS_FILTER_MACS: + valid = mac_valid(token); + if (!valid) + debug("MAC '%s' is not allowed in FIPS mode", + token); + break; + case FIPS_FILTER_KEX_ALGS: + valid = kex_names_valid(token); + if (!valid) + debug("KEX '%s' is not allowed in FIPS mode", + token); + break; + default: + /* should not be reached */ + fatal("Fatal error: incorrect FIPS filter '%i' requested at %s:%u", + filter, __FILE__, __LINE__); + } + + if (valid) { + empty = 0; + if (plus) { + strlcat(new, "+", len); + plus = 0; + } + if (comma) + strlcat(new, ",", len); + else + comma = 1; + strlcat(new, token, len); + } + } + + /* free tmp and re-allocate shorter buffer for result if necessary */ + free(tmp_sav); + free(*crypto); + *crypto = new; + + return (!empty); +} + +int +fips_dgst_min(void) +{ + int fips; + int dgst; + + fips = fips_mode(); + switch (fips) { + case 0: + dgst = SSH_DIGEST_MD5; + break; + case 1: + dgst = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; + break; + default: + /* should not be reached */ + fatal("Fatal error: incorrect FIPS mode '%i' at %s:%u", + fips, __FILE__, __LINE__); + } + return dgst; +} + +int +fips_dh_grp_min(void) +{ + int fips; + int dh; + + fips = fips_mode(); + switch (fips) { + case 0: + dh = dh_grp_min; + break; + case 1: + dh = DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS; + break; + default: + /* should not be reached */ + fatal("Fatal error: incorrect FIPS mode '%i' at %s:%u", + fips, __FILE__, __LINE__); + } + return dh; +} + diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/fips.h b/openssh-7.2p2/fips.h new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/fips.h @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2012 Petr Cerny. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#ifndef FIPS_H +#define FIPS_H + +#include "key.h" + +#define SSH_FORCE_FIPS_ENV "SSH_FORCE_FIPS" + +typedef enum { + FIPS_FILTER_CIPHERS, + FIPS_FILTER_MACS, + FIPS_FILTER_KEX_ALGS +} fips_filters; + +int fips_mode(void); +int fips_correct_dgst(int); +int fips_dgst_min(void); +int fips_dh_grp_min(void); +enum fp_type fips_correct_fp_type(enum fp_type); +int fips_filter_crypto(char **, fips_filters); + +#endif + diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/hmac.c b/openssh-7.2p2/hmac.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/hmac.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/hmac.c @@ -139,17 +139,17 @@ ssh_hmac_free(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx) /* cc -DTEST hmac.c digest.c buffer.c cleanup.c fatal.c log.c xmalloc.c -lcrypto */ static void hmac_test(void *key, size_t klen, void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *e, size_t elen) { struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx; size_t i; u_char digest[16]; - if ((ctx = ssh_hmac_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL) + if ((ctx = ssh_hmac_start(fips_correct_dgst(SSH_DIGEST_MD5))) == NULL) printf("ssh_hmac_start failed"); if (ssh_hmac_init(ctx, key, klen) < 0 || ssh_hmac_update(ctx, m, mlen) < 0 || ssh_hmac_final(ctx, digest, sizeof(digest)) < 0) printf("ssh_hmac_xxx failed"); ssh_hmac_free(ctx); if (memcmp(e, digest, elen)) { diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c b/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c @@ -49,16 +49,18 @@ #include "misc.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "monitor.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "digest.h" +#include "fips.h" + #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256 # else extern const EVP_MD *evp_ssh_sha256(void); # endif #endif @@ -80,17 +82,17 @@ static const char *proposal_names[PROPOS }; struct kexalg { char *name; u_int type; int ec_nid; int hash_alg; }; -static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = { +static const struct kexalg kexalgs_all[] = { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL { KEX_DH1, KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, { KEX_DH14, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, { KEX_DHGEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, #ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 { KEX_DHGEX_SHA256, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 */ #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC @@ -105,24 +107,62 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = { #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ #if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) || !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) { KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */ { NULL, -1, -1, -1}, }; +static const struct kexalg kexalgs_fips140_2[] = { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + { KEX_DH14, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, + { KEX_DHGEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, +#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 + { KEX_DHGEX_SHA256, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, +#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 */ +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, + NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, + { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp384r1, + SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 }, +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 + { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp521r1, + SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 }, +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + { NULL, -1, -1, -1}, +}; + +/* Returns array of macs available depending on selected FIPS mode */ +static const struct kexalg * +fips_select_kexalgs(void) +{ + int fips = fips_mode(); + switch (fips) { + case 0: + return kexalgs_all; + case 1: + return kexalgs_fips140_2; + default: + /* should not be reached */ + fatal("Fatal error: incorrect FIPS mode '%i' at %s:%u", + fips, __FILE__, __LINE__); + } +} + char * kex_alg_list(char sep) { char *ret = NULL, *tmp; size_t nlen, rlen = 0; const struct kexalg *k; - for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { + for (k = fips_select_kexalgs(); k->name != NULL; k++) { if (ret != NULL) ret[rlen++] = sep; nlen = strlen(k->name); if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) { free(ret); return NULL; } ret = tmp; @@ -132,17 +172,17 @@ kex_alg_list(char sep) return ret; } static const struct kexalg * kex_alg_by_name(const char *name) { const struct kexalg *k; - for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { + for (k = fips_select_kexalgs(); k->name != NULL; k++) { if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0) return k; } return NULL; } /* Validate KEX method name list */ int @@ -967,39 +1007,41 @@ kex_derive_keys_bn(struct ssh *ssh, u_ch int derive_ssh1_session_id(BIGNUM *host_modulus, BIGNUM *server_modulus, u_int8_t cookie[8], u_int8_t id[16]) { u_int8_t hbuf[2048], sbuf[2048], obuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; struct ssh_digest_ctx *hashctx = NULL; size_t hlen, slen; int r; + int digest; hlen = BN_num_bytes(host_modulus); slen = BN_num_bytes(server_modulus); if (hlen < (512 / 8) || (u_int)hlen > sizeof(hbuf) || slen < (512 / 8) || (u_int)slen > sizeof(sbuf)) return SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH; if (BN_bn2bin(host_modulus, hbuf) <= 0 || BN_bn2bin(server_modulus, sbuf) <= 0) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } - if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL) { + digest = fips_correct_dgst(SSH_DIGEST_MD5); + if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(digest)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hbuf, hlen) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, sbuf, slen) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, cookie, 8) != 0 || ssh_digest_final(hashctx, obuf, sizeof(obuf)) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } - memcpy(id, obuf, ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)); + memcpy(id, obuf, ssh_digest_bytes(digest)); r = 0; out: ssh_digest_free(hashctx); explicit_bzero(hbuf, sizeof(hbuf)); explicit_bzero(sbuf, sizeof(sbuf)); explicit_bzero(obuf, sizeof(obuf)); return r; } diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexc.c b/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexc.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexc.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexc.c @@ -46,32 +46,31 @@ #include "packet.h" #include "dh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "compat.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" -/* import from dh.c */ -extern int dh_grp_min; +#include "fips.h" static int input_kex_dh_gex_group(int, u_int32_t, void *); static int input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int, u_int32_t, void *); int kexgex_client(struct ssh *ssh) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; int r; u_int nbits; nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8); - kex->min = dh_grp_min; + kex->min = fips_dh_grp_min(); kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX; kex->nbits = nbits; if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE) kex->nbits = MIN(kex->nbits, 4096); /* New GEX request */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->min)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 || diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexs.c b/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexs.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexs.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexs.c @@ -49,18 +49,17 @@ #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" -/* import from dh.c */ -extern int dh_grp_min; +#include "fips.h" static int input_kex_dh_gex_request(int, u_int32_t, void *); static int input_kex_dh_gex_init(int, u_int32_t, void *); int kexgex_server(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST, @@ -81,19 +80,19 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &max)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; kex->nbits = nbits; kex->min = min; kex->max = max; - min = MAX(dh_grp_min, min); + min = MAX(fips_dh_grp_min(), min); max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max); - nbits = MAX(dh_grp_min, nbits); + nbits = MAX(fips_dh_grp_min(), nbits); nbits = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits); if (kex->max < kex->min || kex->nbits < kex->min || kex->max < kex->nbits) { if (kex->nbits < kex->min && kex->nbits >= DH_GRP_MIN_RFC) logit("DH parameter requested by the client (%d bits) " "is considered insecure. " "You can lower the accepted minimum " diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/mac.c b/openssh-7.2p2/mac.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/mac.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/mac.c @@ -35,31 +35,34 @@ #include "umac.h" #include "mac.h" #include "misc.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" +#include "fips.h" +#include "log.h" + #define SSH_DIGEST 1 /* SSH_DIGEST_XXX */ #define SSH_UMAC 2 /* UMAC (not integrated with OpenSSL) */ #define SSH_UMAC128 3 struct macalg { char *name; int type; int alg; int truncatebits; /* truncate digest if != 0 */ int key_len; /* just for UMAC */ int len; /* just for UMAC */ int etm; /* Encrypt-then-MAC */ }; -static const struct macalg macs[] = { +static const struct macalg macs_all[] = { /* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */ { "hmac-sha1", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, { "hmac-sha1-96", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 96, 0, 0, 0 }, #ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 { "hmac-sha2-256", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, { "hmac-sha2-512", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, #endif { "hmac-md5", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, @@ -80,25 +83,60 @@ static const struct macalg macs[] = { { "hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 96, 0, 0, 1 }, { "hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, { "umac-64-etm@openssh.com", SSH_UMAC, 0, 0, 128, 64, 1 }, { "umac-128-etm@openssh.com", SSH_UMAC128, 0, 0, 128, 128, 1 }, { NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 } }; +static const struct macalg macs_fips140_2[] = { + /* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */ + { "hmac-sha1", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, +#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 + { "hmac-sha2-256", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, + { "hmac-sha2-512", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, +#endif + + /* Encrypt-then-MAC variants */ + { "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, +#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 + { "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, + { "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, +#endif + + { NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 } +}; + +/* Returns array of macs available depending on selected FIPS mode */ +static const struct macalg * +fips_select_macs(void) +{ + int fips = fips_mode(); + switch (fips) { + case 0: + return macs_all; + case 1: + return macs_fips140_2; + default: + /* should not be reached */ + fatal("Fatal error: incorrect FIPS mode '%i' at %s:%u", + fips, __FILE__, __LINE__); + } +} + /* Returns a list of supported MACs separated by the specified char. */ char * mac_alg_list(char sep) { char *ret = NULL, *tmp; size_t nlen, rlen = 0; const struct macalg *m; - for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) { + for (m = fips_select_macs(); m->name != NULL; m++) { if (ret != NULL) ret[rlen++] = sep; nlen = strlen(m->name); if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) { free(ret); return NULL; } ret = tmp; @@ -127,17 +165,17 @@ mac_setup_by_alg(struct sshmac *mac, con return 0; } int mac_setup(struct sshmac *mac, char *name) { const struct macalg *m; - for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) { + for (m = fips_select_macs(); m->name != NULL; m++) { if (strcmp(name, m->name) != 0) continue; if (mac != NULL) return mac_setup_by_alg(mac, m); return 0; } return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/myproposal.h b/openssh-7.2p2/myproposal.h --- a/openssh-7.2p2/myproposal.h +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/myproposal.h @@ -128,16 +128,18 @@ "hmac-sha2-256," \ "hmac-sha2-512," \ "hmac-sha1" #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ +#error "OpenSSL support is needed for FIPS mode to compile" + #define KEX_SERVER_KEX \ "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org" #define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \ "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "ssh-ed25519" #define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \ "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \ "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr" diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c @@ -57,16 +57,17 @@ #include "readconf.h" #include "match.h" #include "kex.h" #include "mac.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "digest.h" #include "dh.h" +#include "fips.h" /* Format of the configuration file: # Configuration data is parsed as follows: # 1. command line options # 2. user-specific file # 3. system-wide file # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set. @@ -1628,16 +1629,33 @@ read_config_file(const char *filename, s /* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */ int option_clear_or_none(const char *o) { return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0; } +/* remove algorithms not approved for use in FIPS mode, when running in FIPS + * mode + */ +void +filter_fips_algorithms(Options *o) +{ + if (fips_mode()) { + if (!fips_filter_crypto(&o->ciphers, FIPS_FILTER_CIPHERS)) + fatal("None of selected ciphers can be used in FIPS mode"); + if (!fips_filter_crypto(&o->macs, FIPS_FILTER_MACS)) + fatal("None of selected MAC algorithms can be used in FIPS mode"); + if (!fips_filter_crypto(&o->kex_algorithms, FIPS_FILTER_KEX_ALGS)) + fatal("None of selected KEX algorithms can be used in FIPS mode"); + } + return; +} + /* * Initializes options to special values that indicate that they have not yet * been set. Read_config_file will only set options with this value. Options * are processed in the following order: command line, user config file, * system config file. Last, fill_default_options is called. */ void @@ -1817,19 +1835,20 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) if (options->connection_attempts == -1) options->connection_attempts = 1; if (options->number_of_password_prompts == -1) options->number_of_password_prompts = 3; /* Selected in ssh_login(). */ if (options->cipher == -1) options->cipher = SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET; if (options->kex_dhmin == -1) - options->kex_dhmin = DH_GRP_MIN_RFC; + options->kex_dhmin = fips_dh_grp_min(); else { - options->kex_dhmin = MAX(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MIN_RFC); + options->kex_dhmin = MAX(options->kex_dhmin, + fips_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN_RFC); options->kex_dhmin = MIN(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MAX); } dh_grp_min = options->kex_dhmin; /* options->hostkeyalgorithms, default set in myproposals.h */ if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2; if (options->add_keys_to_agent == -1) options->add_keys_to_agent = 0; @@ -1914,26 +1933,29 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1) options->canonicalize_max_dots = 1; if (options->canonicalize_fallback_local == -1) options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1; if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1) options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO; if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1) options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; + options->fingerprint_hash = + fips_correct_dgst(options->fingerprint_hash); if (options->update_hostkeys == -1) options->update_hostkeys = 0; if (kex_assemble_names(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, &options->ciphers) != 0 || kex_assemble_names(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, &options->macs) != 0 || kex_assemble_names(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, &options->kex_algorithms) != 0 || kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, &options->hostbased_key_types) != 0 || kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, &options->pubkey_key_types) != 0) fatal("%s: kex_assemble_names failed", __func__); + filter_fips_algorithms(options); #define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \ do { \ if (option_clear_or_none(v)) { \ free(v); \ v = NULL; \ } \ } while(0) diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.h b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.h --- a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.h +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.h @@ -180,16 +180,17 @@ typedef struct { #define SSHCONF_CHECKPERM 1 /* check permissions on config file */ #define SSHCONF_USERCONF 2 /* user provided config file not system */ #define SSHCONF_POSTCANON 4 /* After hostname canonicalisation */ #define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_NO 0 #define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_YES 1 #define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK 2 +void filter_fips_algorithms(Options *o); void initialize_options(Options *); void fill_default_options(Options *); void fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(Options *); int process_config_line(Options *, struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, char *, const char *, int, int *, int); int read_config_file(const char *, struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, Options *, int); int parse_forward(struct Forward *, const char *, int, int); diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c @@ -53,16 +53,17 @@ #include "groupaccess.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "packet.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "digest.h" #include "dh.h" +#include "fips.h" /* import from dh.c */ extern int dh_grp_min; static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int); static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int); /* Use of privilege separation or not */ @@ -179,45 +180,65 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions /* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */ static int option_clear_or_none(const char *o) { return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0; } +/* remove algorithms not approved for use in FIPS mode, when running in FIPS + * mode + */ +static void +filter_fips_algorithms_s(ServerOptions *o) +{ + if (fips_mode()) { + if (!fips_filter_crypto(&o->ciphers, FIPS_FILTER_CIPHERS)) + fatal("None of selected ciphers can be used in FIPS mode"); + if (!fips_filter_crypto(&o->macs, FIPS_FILTER_MACS)) + fatal("None of selected MAC algorithms can be used in FIPS mode"); + if (!fips_filter_crypto(&o->kex_algorithms, FIPS_FILTER_KEX_ALGS)) + fatal("None of selected KEX algorithms can be used in FIPS mode"); + } + return; +} + static void assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o) { if (kex_assemble_names(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, &o->ciphers) != 0 || kex_assemble_names(KEX_SERVER_MAC, &o->macs) != 0 || kex_assemble_names(KEX_SERVER_KEX, &o->kex_algorithms) != 0 || kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, &o->hostkeyalgorithms) != 0 || kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, &o->hostbased_key_types) != 0 || kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, &o->pubkey_key_types) != 0) fatal("kex_assemble_names failed"); + + filter_fips_algorithms_s(o); } void fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) { int i; /* Portable-specific options */ if (options->use_pam == -1) options->use_pam = 0; if (options->use_pam_check_locks == -1) options->use_pam_check_locks = 0; if (options->kex_dhmin == -1) - options->kex_dhmin = DH_GRP_MIN_RFC; + options->kex_dhmin = fips_dh_grp_min(); else { - options->kex_dhmin = MAX(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MIN_RFC); + options->kex_dhmin = MAX(options->kex_dhmin, + fips_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN_RFC); options->kex_dhmin = MIN(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MAX); } dh_grp_min = options->kex_dhmin; /* Standard Options */ if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2; if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) { /* fill default hostkeys for protocols */ @@ -363,16 +384,18 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption if (options->version_addendum == NULL) options->version_addendum = xstrdup(""); if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1) options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177; if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1) options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0; if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1) options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; + options->fingerprint_hash = + fips_correct_dgst(options->fingerprint_hash); assemble_algorithms(options); /* Turn privilege separation and sandboxing on by default */ if (use_privsep == -1) use_privsep = PRIVSEP_ON; #define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \ @@ -980,17 +1003,17 @@ static const struct multistate multistat { NULL, -1 } }; int process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, struct connection_info *connectinfo) { - char *cp, **charptr, *arg, *p; + char *cp, **charptr, *arg, *p, *tmp; int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, n, port; SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr; LogLevel *log_level_ptr; ServerOpCodes opcode; u_int i, flags = 0; size_t len; long long val64; const struct multistate *multistate_ptr; @@ -1465,44 +1488,72 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions xstrdup(arg); } break; case sCiphers: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); - if (!ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) + tmp = xstrdup(arg); + if (fips_mode()) { + if(!fips_filter_crypto(&tmp, FIPS_FILTER_CIPHERS)) + error("All ciphers were rejected " + "by the FIPS filter: '%s'.", arg); + } + if (!ciphers_valid(*tmp == '+' ? tmp + 1 : tmp)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>"); if (options->ciphers == NULL) - options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg); + options->ciphers = tmp; + else + free(tmp); break; case sMacs: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); - if (!mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) + tmp = xstrdup(arg); + if (fips_mode()) { + if(!fips_filter_crypto(&tmp, FIPS_FILTER_MACS)) + error("All ciphers were rejected " + "by the FIPS filter: '%s'.", arg); + } + if (!mac_valid(*tmp == '+' ? tmp + 1 : tmp)) + /* print the original line including any algorithms + * dropped by the FIPS filter */ fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 mac spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>"); if (options->macs == NULL) - options->macs = xstrdup(arg); + options->macs = tmp; + else + free(tmp); break; case sKexAlgorithms: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); - if (!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) + tmp = xstrdup(arg); + if (fips_mode()) { + if(!fips_filter_crypto(&tmp, FIPS_FILTER_KEX_ALGS)) + error("All ciphers were rejected " + "by the FIPS filter: '%s'.", arg); + } + if (!kex_names_valid(*tmp == '+' ? tmp + 1 : tmp)) + /* print the original line including any algorithms + * dropped by the FIPS filter */ fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>"); if (options->kex_algorithms == NULL) - options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg); + options->kex_algorithms = tmp; + else + free(tmp); break; case sKexDHMin: intptr = &options->kex_dhmin; goto parse_int; case sProtocol: intptr = &options->protocol; diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keygen.c b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keygen.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keygen.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh-keygen.c @@ -53,16 +53,18 @@ #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "krl.h" #include "digest.h" +#include "fips.h" + #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL # define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa" #else # define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "ed25519" #endif /* Number of bits in the RSA/DSA key. This value can be set on the command line. */ #define DEFAULT_BITS 2048 @@ -965,42 +967,61 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) if (invalid) fatal("%s is not a public key file.", path); exit(0); } static void do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw) { - struct { + struct Key_types { char *key_type; char *key_type_display; char *path; - } key_types[] = { + }; + + struct Key_types key_types_all[] = { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #ifdef WITH_SSH1 { "rsa1", "RSA1", _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE }, #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ { "rsa", "RSA" ,_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE }, { "dsa", "DSA", _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE }, #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC { "ecdsa", "ECDSA",_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE }, #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ { "ed25519", "ED25519",_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE }, { NULL, NULL, NULL } }; + struct Key_types key_types_fips140_2[] = { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + { "rsa", "RSA" ,_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE }, +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + { "ecdsa", "ECDSA",_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE }, +#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + { NULL, NULL, NULL } + }; + + struct Key_types *key_types; int first = 0; struct stat st; struct sshkey *private, *public; char comment[1024]; int i, type, fd, r; FILE *f; + if (fips_mode()) { + key_types = key_types_fips140_2; + } else { + key_types = key_types_all; + } + for (i = 0; key_types[i].key_type; i++) { if (stat(key_types[i].path, &st) == 0) continue; if (errno != ENOENT) { error("Could not stat %s: %s", key_types[i].path, strerror(errno)); first = 0; continue; @@ -2610,16 +2631,23 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) do_gen_all_hostkeys(pw); return (0); } if (key_type_name == NULL) key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME; type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name); + + /* protocol v1 is not allowed in FIPS mode, DSA is not acceptable because + * it has to be 1024 bit due to RFC 4253 using SHA-1 which implies 1024 bit + * keys due to FIPS-186 specification for DSS */ + if (fips_mode() && (type == KEY_RSA1 || type == KEY_DSA)) + fatal("Key type %s not alowed in FIPS mode", key_type_name); + type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits); if (!quiet) printf("Generating public/private %s key pair.\n", key_type_name); if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0) fatal("key_generate failed"); if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0) diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh.c b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh.c @@ -104,16 +104,18 @@ #include "sshpty.h" #include "match.h" #include "msg.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "version.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "myproposal.h" +#include "fips.h" + #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #endif extern char *__progname; /* Saves a copy of argv for setproctitle emulation */ #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE @@ -604,16 +606,18 @@ main(int ac, char **av) logfile = NULL; argv0 = av[0]; again: while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "1246ab:c:e:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvx" "ACD:E:F:GI:KL:MNO:PQ:R:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case '1': + if (fips_mode()) + fatal("Protocol 1 not allowed in the FIPS mode."); options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_1; break; case '2': options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_2; break; case '4': options.address_family = AF_INET; break; @@ -1073,16 +1077,22 @@ main(int ac, char **av) */ if (addrs != NULL && options.port > 0) set_addrinfo_port(addrs, options.port); } /* Fill configuration defaults. */ fill_default_options(&options); + if (fips_mode()) { + options.protocol &= SSH_PROTO_2; + if (options.protocol == 0) + fatal("Protocol 2 disabled by configuration but required in the FIPS mode"); + } + if (options.port == 0) options.port = default_ssh_port(); channel_set_af(options.address_family); /* Tidy and check options */ if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) lowercase(options.host_key_alias); if (options.proxy_command != NULL && diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.0 --- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.0 +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.0 @@ -376,16 +376,18 @@ DESCRIPTION ultimate forwarding destination fail. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. FingerprintHash Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints. Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. + In the FIPS mode the minimum of SHA-1 is enforced. + ForwardAgent Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if any) will be forwarded to the remote machine. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the agent's Unix-domain socket) can access the local agent through @@ -623,16 +625,19 @@ DESCRIPTION only know short DH group parameters. Note, that while by default this option is set to 1024 to maintain maximum backward compatibility, using it can severly impact security and thus should be viewed as a temporary fix of last resort and all efforts should be made to fix the (broken) counterparty. + In the FIPS mode the FIPS standard takes precedence over RFC and + forces the minimum to a higher value, currently 2048 bits. + LocalCommand Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after successfully connecting to the server. The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's shell. The following escape character substitutions will be performed: M-bM-^@M-^X%dM-bM-^@M-^Y (local user's home directory), M-bM-^@M-^X%hM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote host name), M-bM-^@M-^X%lM-bM-^@M-^Y (local host name), M-bM-^@M-^X%nM-bM-^@M-^Y (host name as provided on the command line), M-bM-^@M-^X%pM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote port), M-bM-^@M-^X%rM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote user name) or diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5 --- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5 +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5 @@ -727,16 +727,18 @@ The default is .It Cm FingerprintHash Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints. Valid options are: .Dq md5 and .Dq sha256 . The default is .Dq sha256 . +.Pp +In the FIPS mode the minimum of SHA-1 is enforced. .It Cm ForwardAgent Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if any) will be forwarded to the remote machine. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is @@ -1108,16 +1110,19 @@ than the current minimum, down to the RF Using this option may be needed when connecting to servers that only know short DH group parameters. .Pp Note, that while by default this option is set to 1024 to maintain maximum backward compatibility, using it can severly impact security and thus should be viewed as a temporary fix of last resort and all efforts should be made to fix the (broken) counterparty. +.Pp +In the FIPS mode the FIPS standard takes precedence over RFC and +forces the minimum to a higher value, currently 2048 bits. .It Cm LocalCommand Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after successfully connecting to the server. The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's shell. The following escape character substitutions will be performed: .Ql %d (local user's home directory), diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c @@ -120,16 +120,18 @@ #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "ssh-sandbox.h" #include "version.h" #include "ssherr.h" +#include "fips.h" + #ifndef O_NOCTTY #define O_NOCTTY 0 #endif /* Re-exec fds */ #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1) #define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2) #define REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 3) @@ -1824,16 +1826,20 @@ main(int ac, char **av) if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(pubkey, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); debug("%s host key #%d: %s %s", key ? "private" : "agent", i, keytype == KEY_RSA1 ? sshkey_type(pubkey) : sshkey_ssh_name(pubkey), fp); free(fp); } + if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && fips_mode()) { + logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Not allowed in the FIPS mode."); + options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; + } if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) { logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key"); options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; } if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) { logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key"); options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2; } diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 --- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 @@ -344,16 +344,18 @@ DESCRIPTION AllowUsers, DenyGroups, and finally AllowGroups. See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns. FingerprintHash Specifies the hash algorithm used when logging key fingerprints. Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. + In the FIPS mode the minimum of SHA-1 is enforced. + ForceCommand Forces the execution of the command specified by ForceCommand, ignoring any command supplied by the client and ~/.ssh/rc if present. The command is invoked by using the user's login shell with the -c option. This applies to shell, command, or subsystem execution. It is most useful inside a Match block. The command originally supplied by the client is available in the SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable. Specifying a command @@ -556,16 +558,19 @@ DESCRIPTION clients only know short DH group parameters. Note, that while by default this option is set to 1024 to maintain maximum backward compatibility, using it can severly impact security and thus should be viewed as a temporary fix of last resort and all efforts should be made to fix the (broken) counterparty. + In the FIPS mode the FIPS standard takes precedence over RFC and + forces the minimum to a higher value, currently 2048 bits. + KeyRegenerationInterval In protocol version 1, the ephemeral server key is automatically regenerated after this many seconds (if it has been used). The purpose of regeneration is to prevent decrypting captured sessions by later breaking into the machine and stealing the keys. The key is never stored anywhere. If the value is 0, the key is never regenerated. The default is 3600 (seconds). diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 --- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 @@ -572,16 +572,18 @@ for more information on patterns. .It Cm FingerprintHash Specifies the hash algorithm used when logging key fingerprints. Valid options are: .Dq md5 and .Dq sha256 . The default is .Dq sha256 . +.Pp +In the FIPS mode the minimum of SHA-1 is enforced. .It Cm ForceCommand Forces the execution of the command specified by .Cm ForceCommand , ignoring any command supplied by the client and .Pa ~/.ssh/rc if present. The command is invoked by using the user's login shell with the -c option. This applies to shell, command, or subsystem execution. @@ -911,16 +913,19 @@ than the current minimum, down to the RF Using this option may be needed when some of the connectiong clients only know short DH group parameters. .Pp Note, that while by default this option is set to 1024 to maintain maximum backward compatibility, using it can severly impact security and thus should be viewed as a temporary fix of last resort and all efforts should be made to fix the (broken) counterparty. +.Pp +In the FIPS mode the FIPS standard takes precedence over RFC and +forces the minimum to a higher value, currently 2048 bits. .It Cm KeyRegenerationInterval In protocol version 1, the ephemeral server key is automatically regenerated after this many seconds (if it has been used). The purpose of regeneration is to prevent decrypting captured sessions by later breaking into the machine and stealing the keys. The key is never stored anywhere. If the value is 0, the key is never regenerated.
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