File openssl-1.0.1i-fipslocking.patch of Package openssl.4105
Index: openssl-1.0.1i/crypto/fips/fips_drbg_rand.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-1.0.1i.orig/crypto/fips/fips_drbg_rand.c 2014-10-15 14:16:52.709471327 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1i/crypto/fips/fips_drbg_rand.c 2014-10-15 14:16:52.834472848 +0200
@@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ static int fips_drbg_bytes(unsigned char
int rv = 0;
unsigned char *adin = NULL;
size_t adinlen = 0;
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ int locked;
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
do
{
size_t rcnt;
@@ -109,7 +110,8 @@ static int fips_drbg_bytes(unsigned char
while (count);
rv = 1;
err:
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
return rv;
}
@@ -124,35 +126,51 @@ static int fips_drbg_status(void)
{
DRBG_CTX *dctx = &ossl_dctx;
int rv;
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ int locked;
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
rv = dctx->status == DRBG_STATUS_READY ? 1 : 0;
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
return rv;
}
static void fips_drbg_cleanup(void)
{
DRBG_CTX *dctx = &ossl_dctx;
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ int locked;
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
FIPS_drbg_uninstantiate(dctx);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
}
static int fips_drbg_seed(const void *seed, int seedlen)
{
DRBG_CTX *dctx = &ossl_dctx;
+ int locked;
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
if (dctx->rand_seed_cb)
- return dctx->rand_seed_cb(dctx, seed, seedlen);
- return 1;
+ ret = dctx->rand_seed_cb(dctx, seed, seedlen);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
+ return ret;
}
static int fips_drbg_add(const void *seed, int seedlen,
double add_entropy)
{
DRBG_CTX *dctx = &ossl_dctx;
+ int locked;
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
if (dctx->rand_add_cb)
- return dctx->rand_add_cb(dctx, seed, seedlen, add_entropy);
- return 1;
+ ret = dctx->rand_add_cb(dctx, seed, seedlen, add_entropy);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
+ return ret;
}
static const RAND_METHOD rand_drbg_meth =
Index: openssl-1.0.1i/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-1.0.1i.orig/crypto/rand/md_rand.c 2014-10-15 14:16:52.715471400 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1i/crypto/rand/md_rand.c 2014-10-15 14:16:52.834472848 +0200
@@ -143,12 +143,6 @@ static long md_count[2]={0,0};
static double entropy=0;
static int initialized=0;
-static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread
- * holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND
- * (to prevent double locking) */
-/* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */
-static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
-
#ifdef PREDICT
int rand_predictable=0;
@@ -195,7 +189,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
long md_c[2];
unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_MD_CTX m;
- int do_not_lock;
+ int locked;
if (!num)
return;
@@ -215,19 +209,8 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
* hash function.
*/
- /* check if we already have the lock */
- if (crypto_lock_rand)
- {
- CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- }
- else
- do_not_lock = 0;
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
- if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
st_idx=state_index;
/* use our own copies of the counters so that even
@@ -259,7 +242,8 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0);
- if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m);
for (i=0; i<num; i+=MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)
@@ -310,7 +294,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
- if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
/* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that
* other thread's seeding remains without effect (except for
* the incremented counter). By XORing it we keep at least as
@@ -321,7 +305,8 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
}
if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */
entropy += add;
- if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
#if !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]);
@@ -346,6 +331,7 @@ int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf
pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
#endif
int do_stir_pool = 0;
+ int locked;
#ifdef PREDICT
if (rand_predictable)
@@ -383,13 +369,7 @@ int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf
* global 'md'.
*/
if (lock)
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-
- /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- crypto_lock_rand = 1;
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
/* always poll for external entropy in FIPS mode, drbg provides the
* expansion
@@ -464,9 +444,8 @@ int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf
md_count[0] += 1;
/* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
- crypto_lock_rand = 0;
- if (lock)
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (lock && locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
while (num > 0)
{
@@ -519,11 +498,11 @@ int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf
MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
if (lock)
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
MD_Final(&m,md);
- if (lock)
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (lock && locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
if (ok)
@@ -553,32 +532,10 @@ static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsi
static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
{
- CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
int ret;
- int do_not_lock;
+ int locked;
- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
- /* check if we already have the lock
- * (could happen if a RAND_poll() implementation calls RAND_status()) */
- if (crypto_lock_rand)
- {
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- }
- else
- do_not_lock = 0;
-
- if (!do_not_lock)
- {
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-
- /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- crypto_lock_rand = 1;
- }
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
if (!initialized)
{
@@ -588,13 +545,8 @@ static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED;
- if (!do_not_lock)
- {
- /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
- crypto_lock_rand = 0;
-
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
- }
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
return ret;
}
Index: openssl-1.0.1i/crypto/rand/rand.h
===================================================================
--- openssl-1.0.1i.orig/crypto/rand/rand.h 2014-10-15 14:16:52.715471400 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1i/crypto/rand/rand.h 2014-10-15 14:16:52.834472848 +0200
@@ -124,6 +124,8 @@ void RAND_set_fips_drbg_type(int type, i
int RAND_init_fips(void);
#endif
+int private_RAND_lock(int lock);
+
/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
/* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
* made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
Index: openssl-1.0.1i/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-1.0.1i.orig/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c 2014-10-15 14:16:52.741471717 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1i/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c 2014-10-15 14:16:52.835472860 +0200
@@ -182,6 +182,41 @@ int RAND_status(void)
return 0;
}
+int private_RAND_lock(int lock)
+ {
+ static int crypto_lock_rand;
+ static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid;
+ int do_lock;
+
+ if (!lock)
+ {
+ crypto_lock_rand = 0;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* check if we already have the lock */
+ if (crypto_lock_rand)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ do_lock = !!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ }
+ else
+ do_lock = 1;
+ if (do_lock)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ crypto_lock_rand = 1;
+ }
+ return do_lock;
+ }
+
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
/* FIPS DRBG initialisation code. This sets up the DRBG for use by the
@@ -242,9 +277,9 @@ static int drbg_rand_add(DRBG_CTX *ctx,
RAND_SSLeay()->add(in, inlen, entropy);
if (FIPS_rand_status())
{
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ int locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
FIPS_drbg_reseed(ctx, NULL, 0);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (locked) private_RAND_lock(0);
}
return 1;
}
@@ -254,9 +289,9 @@ static int drbg_rand_seed(DRBG_CTX *ctx,
RAND_SSLeay()->seed(in, inlen);
if (FIPS_rand_status())
{
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ int locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
FIPS_drbg_reseed(ctx, NULL, 0);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (locked) private_RAND_lock(0);
}
return 1;
}
