File CVE-2018-10839-qemuu-ne2000-integer-overflow-leads-to-buffer-overflow-issue.patch of Package xen.11298
References: bsc#1110924 CVE-2018-10839
In ne2000_receive(), we try to assign size_ to size which converts
from size_t to integer. This will cause troubles when size_ is greater
INT_MAX, this will lead a negative value in size and it can then pass
the check of size < MIN_BUF_SIZE which may lead out of bound access of
for both buf and buf1.
Fixing by converting the type of size to size_t.
CC: address@hidden
Reported-by: Daniel Shapira <address@hidden>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <address@hidden>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <address@hidden>
---
hw/net/ne2000.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Index: xen-4.5.5-testing/tools/qemu-xen-dir-remote/hw/net/ne2000.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.5.5-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-dir-remote/hw/net/ne2000.c
+++ xen-4.5.5-testing/tools/qemu-xen-dir-remote/hw/net/ne2000.c
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ int ne2000_can_receive(NetClientState *n
ssize_t ne2000_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size_)
{
NE2000State *s = qemu_get_nic_opaque(nc);
- int size = size_;
+ size_t size = size_;
uint8_t *p;
unsigned int total_len, next, avail, len, index, mcast_idx;
uint8_t buf1[60];
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ ssize_t ne2000_receive(NetClientState *n
{ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff };
#if defined(DEBUG_NE2000)
- printf("NE2000: received len=%d\n", size);
+ printf("NE2000: received len=%zu\n", size);
#endif
if (s->cmd & E8390_STOP || ne2000_buffer_full(s))