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SUSE:SLE-12-SP4:Update
compat-openssl098.18668
CVE-2012-0884.patch
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File CVE-2012-0884.patch of Package compat-openssl098.18668
Index: openssl-0.9.8j/apps/cms.c =================================================================== --- openssl-0.9.8j.orig/apps/cms.c +++ openssl-0.9.8j/apps/cms.c @@ -226,6 +226,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) else if (!strcmp(*args,"-camellia256")) cipher = EVP_camellia_256_cbc(); #endif + else if (!strcmp (*args, "-debug_decrypt")) + flags |= CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT; else if (!strcmp (*args, "-text")) flags |= CMS_TEXT; else if (!strcmp (*args, "-nointern")) @@ -1013,6 +1015,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) ret = 4; if (operation == SMIME_DECRYPT) { + if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT) + CMS_decrypt(cms, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, flags); if (secret_key) { Index: openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/cms/cms.h =================================================================== --- openssl-0.9.8j.orig/crypto/cms/cms.h +++ openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/cms/cms.h @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(CMS_Receipt #define CMS_PARTIAL 0x4000 #define CMS_REUSE_DIGEST 0x8000 #define CMS_USE_KEYID 0x10000 +#define CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT 0x20000 const ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_type(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); Index: openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c =================================================================== --- openssl-0.9.8j.orig/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c +++ openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c @@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_E const EVP_CIPHER *ciph; X509_ALGOR *calg = ec->contentEncryptionAlgorithm; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], *piv = NULL; + unsigned char *tkey = NULL; + size_t tkeylen; int ok = 0; @@ -137,32 +139,57 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_E CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR); goto err; } - - - if (enc && !ec->key) + /* Generate random session key */ + if (!enc || !ec->key) { - /* Generate random key */ - if (!ec->keylen) - ec->keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx); - ec->key = OPENSSL_malloc(ec->keylen); - if (!ec->key) + tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx); + tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen); + if (!tkey) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } - if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, ec->key) <= 0) + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, tkey) <= 0) goto err; - keep_key = 1; } - else if (ec->keylen != (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx)) + + if (!ec->key) + { + ec->key = tkey; + ec->keylen = tkeylen; + tkey = NULL; + if (enc) + keep_key = 1; + else + ERR_clear_error(); + + } + + if (ec->keylen != tkeylen) { /* If necessary set key length */ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, ec->keylen) <= 0) { - CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, - CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); - goto err; + /* Only reveal failure if debugging so we don't + * leak information which may be useful in MMA. + */ + if (ec->debug) + { + CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, + CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); + goto err; + } + else + { + /* Use random key */ + OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen); + OPENSSL_free(ec->key); + ec->key = tkey; + ec->keylen = tkeylen; + tkey = NULL; + ERR_clear_error(); + } } } @@ -198,6 +225,11 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_E OPENSSL_free(ec->key); ec->key = NULL; } + if (tkey) + { + OPENSSL_cleanse(tkey, tkeylen); + OPENSSL_free(tkey); + } if (ok) return b; BIO_free(b); Index: openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/cms/cms_env.c =================================================================== --- openssl-0.9.8j.orig/crypto/cms/cms_env.c +++ openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/cms/cms_env.c @@ -352,6 +352,8 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decryp unsigned char *ek = NULL; int eklen; int ret = 0; + CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec; + ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo; if (ktri->pkey == NULL) { @@ -382,8 +384,14 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decryp ret = 1; - cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->key = ek; - cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->keylen = eklen; + if (ec->key) + { + OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen); + OPENSSL_free(ec->key); + } + + ec->key = ek; + ec->keylen = eklen; err: if (!ret && ek) Index: openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h =================================================================== --- openssl-0.9.8j.orig/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h +++ openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h @@ -175,6 +175,8 @@ struct CMS_EncryptedContentInfo_st const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; unsigned char *key; size_t keylen; + /* Set to 1 if we are debugging decrypt and don't fake keys for MMA */ + int debug; }; struct CMS_RecipientInfo_st Index: openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c =================================================================== --- openssl-0.9.8j.orig/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c +++ openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c @@ -622,7 +622,10 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInf STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *ris; CMS_RecipientInfo *ri; int i, r; + int debug = 0; ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms); + if (ris) + debug = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug; for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(ris); i++) { ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(ris, i); @@ -636,17 +639,38 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInf CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, pk); r = CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(cms, ri); CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, NULL); - if (r > 0) - return 1; if (cert) { + /* If not debugging clear any error and + * return success to avoid leaking of + * information useful to MMA + */ + if (!debug) + { + ERR_clear_error(); + return 1; + } + if (r > 0) + return 1; CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY, CMS_R_DECRYPT_ERROR); return 0; } - ERR_clear_error(); + /* If no cert and not debugging don't leave loop + * after first successful decrypt. Always attempt + * to decrypt all recipients to avoid leaking timing + * of a successful decrypt. + */ + else if (r > 0 && debug) + return 1; } } + /* If no cert and not debugging always return success */ + if (!cert && !debug) + { + ERR_clear_error(); + return 1; + } CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT); return 0; @@ -705,6 +729,12 @@ int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EV } if (!dcont && !check_content(cms)) return 0; + if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT) + cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 1; + else + cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 0; + if (!pk && !cert && !dcont && !out) + return 1; if (pk && !CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(cms, pk, cert)) return 0; Index: openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c =================================================================== --- openssl-0.9.8j.orig/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c +++ openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c @@ -423,6 +423,8 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE int max; X509_OBJECT ret; #endif + unsigned char *tkey = NULL; + int tkeylen; int jj; if ((etmp=BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher())) == NULL) @@ -464,36 +466,42 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE if (pcert == NULL) { + /* Temporary storage in case EVP_PKEY_decrypt + * overwrites output buffer on error. + */ + unsigned char *tmp2; + tmp2 = OPENSSL_malloc(jj); + if (!tmp2) + goto err; + jj = -1; + /* Always attempt to decrypt all cases to avoid + * leaking timing information about a successful + * decrypt. + */ for (i=0; i<sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++) { + int tret; ri=sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk,i); - jj=EVP_PKEY_decrypt(tmp, + tret=EVP_PKEY_decrypt(tmp2, M_ASN1_STRING_data(ri->enc_key), M_ASN1_STRING_length(ri->enc_key), pkey); - if (jj > 0) - break; + if (tret > 0) + { + memcpy(tmp, tmp2, tret); + OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2, tret); + jj = tret; + } ERR_clear_error(); - ri = NULL; - } - if (ri == NULL) - { - PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, - PKCS7_R_NO_RECIPIENT_MATCHES_KEY); - goto err; } + OPENSSL_free(tmp2); } else { jj=EVP_PKEY_decrypt(tmp, M_ASN1_STRING_data(ri->enc_key), M_ASN1_STRING_length(ri->enc_key), pkey); - if (jj <= 0) - { - PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, - ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - goto err; - } + ERR_clear_error(); } evp_ctx=NULL; @@ -502,23 +510,47 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE goto err; if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(evp_ctx,enc_alg->parameter) < 0) goto err; + /* Generate random key to counter MMA */ + tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx); + tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen); + if (!tkey) + goto err; + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(evp_ctx, tkey) <= 0) + goto err; + /* If we have no key use random key */ + if (jj <= 0) + { + OPENSSL_free(tmp); + jj = tkeylen; + tmp = tkey; + tkey = NULL; + } - if (jj != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx)) { + if (jj != tkeylen) { /* Some S/MIME clients don't use the same key * and effective key length. The key length is * determined by the size of the decrypted RSA key. */ if(!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(evp_ctx, jj)) { - PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, - PKCS7_R_DECRYPTED_KEY_IS_WRONG_LENGTH); - goto err; + /* As MMA defence use random key instead */ + OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, jj); + OPENSSL_free(tmp); + jj = tkeylen; + tmp = tkey; + tkey = NULL; } } + ERR_clear_error(); if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx,NULL,NULL,tmp,NULL,0) <= 0) goto err; OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp,jj); + if (tkey) + { + OPENSSL_cleanse(tkey, tkeylen); + OPENSSL_free(tkey); + } if (out == NULL) out=etmp;
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