File ovmf-bsc1163969-fix-DxeImageVerificationHandler... of Package ovmf.6568

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File ovmf-bsc1163969-fix-DxeImageVerificationHandler.patch of Package ovmf.6568

From d7e725dbf738afda49a848da90d042fcbd31b696 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Cinnamon Shia <cinnamon.shia@hpe.com>
Date: Fri, 13 May 2016 12:24:59 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 01/23] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationLib: Add DEBUG messages
 for image verification failures

Add DEBUG messages in DxeImageerificationLib to help debug Secure Boot image verification failures

Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Cinnamon Shia <cinnamon.shia@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Samer EL-Haj-Mahmoud <elhaj@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit 531c89a1edef39dc7cae02ab81d2d32d75937545)
---
 .../DxeImageVerificationLib.c                 | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

From 11b0e155b8d36ffd99d48a4e7872fae10ab9d5bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Zhang, Chao B" <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2017 11:27:19 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 02/23] SecurityPkg: DxeImageVerificationLib: Update PCR[7]
 measure logic

Update PCR[7] measure logic according to TCG PC Client PFP 00.37.
Only entries in DB that is used for image authentication need to be
measured.
http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/PC-ClientSpecific_Platform_Profile_for_TPM_2p0_Systems_v21.pdf

Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5b196b06b29db91e71cc72b91c86c539eb1ac90c)
---
 .../DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c  | 10 +++++++---
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

From e1f28caa6d6509f4a85623eb878380c3888d630c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2020 11:37:04 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 03/23] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: simplify
 "VerifyStatus"

In the DxeImageVerificationHandler() function, the "VerifyStatus" variable
can only contain one of two values: EFI_SUCCESS and EFI_ACCESS_DENIED.
Furthermore, the variable is only consumed with EFI_ERROR().

Therefore, using the EFI_STATUS type for the variable is unnecessary.
Worse, given the complex meanings of the function's return values, using
EFI_STATUS for "VerifyStatus" is actively confusing.

Rename the variable to "IsVerified", and make it a simple BOOLEAN.

This patch is a no-op, regarding behavior.

Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-2-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year
 Holiday: <https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/53429>; msgid
 <d3fbb76dabed4e1987c512c328c82810@intel.com>]
(cherry picked from commit 1e0f973b65c34841288c25fd441a37eec8a30ac7)
---
 .../DxeImageVerificationLib.c                 | 20 +++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

From 2c2e3d80b0302c7f6b7784f1f7f04f39b6c9c0b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2020 11:44:09 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 04/23] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: remove "else"
 after return/break

In the code structure

if (condition) {
    //
    // block1
    //
    return;
  } else {
    //
    // block2
    //
  }

nesting "block2" in an "else" branch is superfluous, and harms
readability. It can be transformed to:

if (condition) {
    //
    // block1
    //
    return;
  }
  //
  // block2
  //

with identical behavior, and improved readability (less nesting).

The same applies to "break" (instead of "return") in a loop body.

Perform these transformations on DxeImageVerificationHandler().

This patch is a no-op for behavior. Use

git show -b -W

for reviewing it more easily.

Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-3-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year
 Holiday: <https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/53429>; msgid
 <d3fbb76dabed4e1987c512c328c82810@intel.com>]
(cherry picked from commit eccb856f013aec700234211e7371f03454ef9d52)
---
 .../DxeImageVerificationLib.c                 | 41 ++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

From 3f0cac27913170f4d3a5874ed89a7075fc214c49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2020 12:14:14 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 05/23] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: keep PE/COFF
 info status internal

The PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo() function may return various error codes,
such as RETURN_INVALID_PARAMETER and RETURN_UNSUPPORTED.

Such error values should not be assigned to our "Status" variable in the
DxeImageVerificationHandler() function, because "Status" generally stands
for the main exit value of the function. And
SECURITY2_FILE_AUTHENTICATION_HANDLER functions are expected to return one
of EFI_SUCCESS, EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION, and EFI_ACCESS_DENIED only.

Introduce the "PeCoffStatus" helper variable for keeping the return value
of PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo() internal to the function. If
PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo() fails, we'll jump to the "Done" label with
"Status" being EFI_ACCESS_DENIED, inherited from the top of the function.

Note that this is consistent with the subsequent PE/COFF Signature check,
where we jump to the "Done" label with "Status" having been re-set to
EFI_ACCESS_DENIED.

As a consequence, we can at once remove the

Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

assignment right after the "PeCoffStatus" check.

This patch does not change the control flow in the function, it only
changes the "Status" outcome from API-incompatible error codes to
EFI_ACCESS_DENIED, under some circumstances.

Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-4-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year
 Holiday: <https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/53429>; msgid
 <d3fbb76dabed4e1987c512c328c82810@intel.com>]
(cherry picked from commit 61a9fa589a15e9005bec293f9766c78b60fbc9fc)
---
 .../DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c      | 7 +++----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

From a326b159f490b58aeb68d930fb7b83cd30b9ef16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2020 12:56:59 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 06/23] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: narrow down
 PE/COFF hash status

Inside the "for" loop that scans the signatures of the image, we call
HashPeImageByType(), and assign its return value to "Status".

Beyond the immediate retval check, this assignment is useless (never
consumed). That's because a subsequent access to "Status" may only be one
of the following:

- the "Status" assignment when we call HashPeImageByType() in the next
  iteration of the loop,

- the "Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED" assignment right after the final
  "IsVerified" check.

To make it clear that the assignment is only useful for the immediate
HashPeImageByType() retval check, introduce a specific helper variable,
called "HashStatus".

This patch is a no-op, functionally.

Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-5-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year
 Holiday: <https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/53429>; msgid
 <d3fbb76dabed4e1987c512c328c82810@intel.com>]
(cherry picked from commit 47650a5cab608e07c31d66bdb9b4cc6e58bdf22f)
---
 .../DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c        | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

From e4efe4cde211d758db50adf12c86f83e63a55baa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2020 13:07:46 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 07/23] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: fix retval on
 memalloc failure

A SECURITY2_FILE_AUTHENTICATION_HANDLER function is not expected to return
EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES. We should only return EFI_SUCCESS,
EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION, or EFI_ACCESS_DENIED.

In case we run out of memory while preparing "SignatureList" for
AddImageExeInfo(), we should simply stick with the EFI_ACCESS_DENIED value
that is already in "Status" -- from just before the "Action" condition --,
and not suppress it with EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES.

This patch does not change the control flow in the function, it only
changes the "Status" outcome from API-incompatible error codes to
EFI_ACCESS_DENIED, under some circumstances.

Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129
Fixes: 570b3d1a7278df29878da87990e8366bd42d0ec5
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-6-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year
 Holiday: <https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/53429>; msgid
 <d3fbb76dabed4e1987c512c328c82810@intel.com>]
(cherry picked from commit f891b052c5ec13c1032fb9d340d5262ac1a7e7e1)
---
 .../Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c   | 2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)

From b3bee7cacca3ecdf787f4597fe88c588903a1be7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2020 13:19:26 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 08/23] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: remove
 superfluous Status setting

After the final "IsVerified" check, we set "Status" to EFI_ACCESS_DENIED.
This is superfluous, as "Status" already carries EFI_ACCESS_DENIED value
there, from the top of the function. Remove the assignment.

Functionally, this change is a no-op.

Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-7-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year
 Holiday: <https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/53429>; msgid
 <d3fbb76dabed4e1987c512c328c82810@intel.com>]
(cherry picked from commit 12a4ef58a8b1f8610f6f7cd3ffb973f924f175fb)
---
 .../Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c    | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

From 6bb97832cf7c71e845e6870562a82e9878fb7d49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2020 13:23:10 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 09/23] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: unnest
 AddImageExeInfo() call

Before the "Done" label at the end of DxeImageVerificationHandler(), we
now have a single access to "Status": we set "Status" to EFI_ACCESS_DENIED
at the top of the function. Therefore, the (Status != EFI_SUCCESS)
condition is always true under the "Done" label.

Accordingly, unnest the AddImageExeInfo() call dependent on that
condition, remove the condition, and also rename the "Done" label to
"Failed".

Functionally, this patch is a no-op. It's easier to review with:

git show -b -W

Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-8-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: replace EFI_D_INFO w/ DEBUG_INFO for PatchCheck.py]
[lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year
 Holiday: <https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/53429>; msgid
 <d3fbb76dabed4e1987c512c328c82810@intel.com>]
(cherry picked from commit c602e97446a8e818bf09182f5dc9f3fa409ece95)
---
 .../DxeImageVerificationLib.c                 | 34 +++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

From 23eb1870f737d5c78c7bea612a43589d35fc8c6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2020 13:34:21 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 10/23] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: eliminate
 "Status" variable

The "Status" variable is set to EFI_ACCESS_DENIED at the top of the
function. Then it is overwritten with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION under the
"Failed" (earlier: "Done") label. We finally return "Status".

The above covers the complete usage of "Status" in
DxeImageVerificationHandler(). Remove the variable, and simply return
EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION in the end.

This patch is a no-op, regarding behavior.

Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-9-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year
 Holiday: <https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/53429>; msgid
 <d3fbb76dabed4e1987c512c328c82810@intel.com>]
(cherry picked from commit fb02f5b2cd0b2a2d413a4f4fc41e085be2ede089)
---
 .../DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c        | 5 +----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)

From e39668bb91f9175be9722d094ca87d119c0edc4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2020 13:39:19 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 11/23] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: fix retval for
 (FileBuffer==NULL)

"FileBuffer" is a non-optional input (pointer) parameter to
DxeImageVerificationHandler(). Normally, when an edk2 function receives a
NULL argument for such a parameter, we return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER or
RETURN_INVALID_PARAMETER. However, those don't conform to the
SECURITY2_FILE_AUTHENTICATION_HANDLER prototype.

Return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED when "FileBuffer" is NULL; it means that no image
has been loaded.

This patch does not change the control flow in the function, it only
changes the "Status" outcome from API-incompatible error codes to
EFI_ACCESS_DENIED, under some circumstances.

Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129
Fixes: 570b3d1a7278df29878da87990e8366bd42d0ec5
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-10-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year
 Holiday: <https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/53429>; msgid
 <d3fbb76dabed4e1987c512c328c82810@intel.com>]
(cherry picked from commit 6d57592740cdd0b6868baeef7929d6e6fef7a8e3)
---
 .../Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c   | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

From cf98d232eb3572dfb771bc310e7d4fe8cf62ea3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2020 14:19:58 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 12/23] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: fix imgexec
 info on memalloc fail

It makes no sense to call AddImageExeInfo() with (Signature == NULL) and
(SignatureSize > 0). AddImageExeInfo() does not crash in such a case -- it
avoids the CopyMem() call --, but it creates an invalid
EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO record. Namely, the
"EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO.InfoSize" field includes "SignatureSize", but
the actual signature bytes are not filled in.

Document and ASSERT() this condition in AddImageExeInfo().

In DxeImageVerificationHandler(), zero out "SignatureListSize" if we set
"SignatureList" to NULL due to AllocateZeroPool() failure.

(Another approach could be to avoid calling AddImageExeInfo() completely,
in case AllocateZeroPool() fails. Unfortunately, the UEFI v2.8 spec does
not seem to state clearly whether a signature is mandatory in
EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO, if the "Action" field is
EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED or EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND.

For now, the EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO addition logic is not changed; we
only make sure that the record we add is not malformed.)

Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-11-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year
 Holiday: <https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/53429>; msgid
 <d3fbb76dabed4e1987c512c328c82810@intel.com>]
(cherry picked from commit 6aa31db5ebebe18b55aa5359142223a03592416f)
---
 .../Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

From 91b4a5872979f8f493d1ae6a72512c6ccc05ef3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2020 14:45:38 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 13/23] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: fix "defer"
 vs. "deny" policies

In DxeImageVerificationHandler(), we should return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
for a rejected image only if the platform sets
DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION as the policy for the image's source.
Otherwise, EFI_ACCESS_DENIED must be returned.

Right now, EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION is returned for all rejected images,
which is wrong -- it causes LoadImage() to hold on to rejected images (in
untrusted state), for further platform actions. However, if a platform
already set DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION, the platform will not
expect the rejected image to stick around in memory (regardless of its
untrusted state).

Therefore, adhere to the platform policy in the return value of the
DxeImageVerificationHandler() function.

Furthermore, according to "32.4.2 Image Execution Information Table" in
the UEFI v2.8 spec, and considering that edk2 only supports (AuditMode==0)
at the moment:

> When AuditMode==0, if the image's signature is not found in the
> authorized database, or is found in the forbidden database, the image
> will not be started and instead, information about it will be placed in
> this table.

we have to store an EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO record in both the "defer"
case and the "deny" case. Thus, the AddImageExeInfo() call is not being
made conditional on (Policy == DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION); the
documentation is updated instead.

Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129
Fixes: 5db28a6753d307cdfb1cfdeb2f63739a9f959837
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-12-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year
 Holiday: <https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/53429>; msgid
 <d3fbb76dabed4e1987c512c328c82810@intel.com>]
(cherry picked from commit 8b0932c19f31cbf9da26d3b8d4e8d954bdbb5269)
---
 .../DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c | 11 ++++++++---
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

From f0e1da88d68b6b78c01fd86e899267eb32806bd6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 11:06:53 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 14/23] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationLib: Fix memory leaks
 (CVE-2019-14575)

REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1608

Pointer HashCtx used in IsCertHashFoundInDatabase() is not freed inside
the while-loop, if it will run more than once.

Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit fbb96072233b5eaecf4d229cbee47b13dcab39e1)
---
 .../Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c  | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

From ec809b9330496fadb770a21480abe50c7d7c45f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 11:14:47 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 15/23] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationLib: reject
 CertStack.CertNumber==0 per DBX (CVE-2019-14575)

In case the signers' certificate stack, retrieved from the PE/COFF image's
Authenticode blob, has zero elements (=there are zero signer certificates),
then we should consider the image forbidden by DBX, not accepted by DBX.

Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit c13742b180095e5181e41dffda954581ecbd9b9c)
---
 .../Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c   | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

From 51de872e31e15a0a148177b2f441472f8c3f6012 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 11:46:16 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 16/23] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationLib: fix wrong fetch
 dbx in IsAllowedByDb (CVE-2019-14575)

REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1608

Normally two times of calling gRT->GetVariable() are needed to get
the data of a variable: get the variable size by passing zero variable
size, and then allocate enough memory and pass the correct variable size
and buffer.

But in the inner loop in IsAllowedByDb(), the DbxDataSize was not
initialized to zero before calling gRT->GetVariable(). It won't cause
problem if dbx does not exist. But it will give wrong result if dbx
exists and the DbxDataSize happens to be a small enough value. In this
situation, EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL will be returned. Then the result check
code followed will jump to 'Done', which is not correct because it's
actually the value expected.

if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
              goto Done;
            }

Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9e569700901857d0ba418ebdd30b8086b908688c)
---
 .../Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c  | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

From 86e91a73a3bbea29b202d08ae15857936b8f5b5c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 14:28:36 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 17/23] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationLib: avoid bypass in
 fetching dbx (CVE-2019-14575)

REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1608

In timestamp check after the cert is found in db, the original code jumps
to 'Done' if any error happens in fetching dbx variable. At any of the
jump, VerifyStatus equals to TRUE, which means allowed-by-db. This should
not be allowed except to EFI_NOT_FOUND case (meaning dbx doesn't exist),
because it could be used to bypass timestamp check.

This patch add code to change VerifyStatus to FALSE in the case of memory
allocation failure and dbx fetching failure to avoid potential bypass
issue.

Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit 929d1a24d12822942fd4f9fa83582e27f92de243)
---
 .../DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c | 11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

From 38ba9793c1538574f1fcd1b6171d0a9162f08c5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 15:49:55 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 18/23] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationLib: refactor db/dbx
 fetching code (CVE-2019-14575)

REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1608

The dbx fetching code inside the while/for-loop causes code hard to
understand. Since there's no need to get dbx more than once, this patch
simplify the code logic by moving related code to be outside the while-
loop. db fetching code is also refined accordingly to reduce the indent
level of code.

More comments are also added or refined to explain more details.

Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit adc6898366298d1f64b91785e50095527f682758)
---
 .../DxeImageVerificationLib.c                 | 144 ++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 83 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)

diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
index eacbf0403e97..194194e2f74f 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
@@ -1430,76 +1430,92 @@ IsAllowedByDb (
   RootCertSize      = 0;
   VerifyStatus      = FALSE;
 
+  //
+  // Fetch 'db' content. If 'db' doesn't exist or encounters problem to get the
+  // data, return not-allowed-by-db (FALSE).
+  //
   DataSize = 0;
   Status   = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);
-  if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
-    Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);
-    if (Data == NULL) {
-      return VerifyStatus;
+  ASSERT (EFI_ERROR (Status));
+  if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+    return VerifyStatus;
+  }
+
+  Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);
+  if (Data == NULL) {
+    return VerifyStatus;
+  }
+
+  Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *) Data);
+  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+    goto Done;
+  }
+
+  //
+  // Fetch 'dbx' content. If 'dbx' doesn't exist, continue to check 'db'.
+  // If any other errors occured, no need to check 'db' but just return
+  // not-allowed-by-db (FALSE) to avoid bypass.
+  //
+  DbxDataSize = 0;
+  Status      = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DbxDataSize, NULL);
+  ASSERT (EFI_ERROR (Status));
+  if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+    if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {
+      goto Done;
+    }
+    //
+    // 'dbx' does not exist. Continue to check 'db'.
+    //
+  } else {
+    //
+    // 'dbx' exists. Get its content.
+    //
+    DbxData = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DbxDataSize);
+    if (DbxData == NULL) {
+      goto Done;
     }
 
-    Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *) Data);
+    Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DbxDataSize, (VOID *) DbxData);
     if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
       goto Done;
     }
+  }
 
-    //
-    // Find X509 certificate in Signature List to verify the signature in pkcs7 signed data.
-    //
-    CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;
-    while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {
-      if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {
-        CertData  = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
-        CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;
+  //
+  // Find X509 certificate in Signature List to verify the signature in pkcs7 signed data.
+  //
+  CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;
+  while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {
+    if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {
+      CertData  = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
+      CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;
 
-        for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {
-          //
-          // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.
-          //
-          RootCert     = CertData->SignatureData;
-          RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);
+      for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {
+        //
+        // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.
+        //
+        RootCert     = CertData->SignatureData;
+        RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);
 
+        //
+        // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct.
+        //
+        VerifyStatus = AuthenticodeVerify (
+                         AuthData,
+                         AuthDataSize,
+                         RootCert,
+                         RootCertSize,
+                         mImageDigest,
+                         mImageDigestSize
+                         );
+        if (VerifyStatus) {
           //
-          // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct.
+          // The image is signed and its signature is found in 'db'.
           //
-          VerifyStatus = AuthenticodeVerify (
-                           AuthData,
-                           AuthDataSize,
-                           RootCert,
-                           RootCertSize,
-                           mImageDigest,
-                           mImageDigestSize
-                           );
-          if (VerifyStatus) {
+          if (DbxData != NULL) {
             //
             // Here We still need to check if this RootCert's Hash is revoked
             //
-            DbxDataSize = 0;
-            Status   = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DbxDataSize, NULL);
-            if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
-              if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {
-                VerifyStatus = FALSE;
-              }
-              goto Done;
-            }
-            DbxData = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DbxDataSize);
-            if (DbxData == NULL) {
-              //
-              // Force not-allowed-by-db to avoid bypass
-              //
-              VerifyStatus = FALSE;
-              goto Done;
-            }
-
-            Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DbxDataSize, (VOID *) DbxData);
-            if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
-              //
-              // Force not-allowed-by-db to avoid bypass
-              //
-              VerifyStatus = FALSE;
-              goto Done;
-            }
-
             if (IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (RootCert, RootCertSize, (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)DbxData, DbxDataSize, &RevocationTime)) {
               //
               // Check the timestamp signature and signing time to determine if the RootCert can be trusted.
@@ -1509,17 +1525,23 @@ IsAllowedByDb (
                 DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Image is signed and signature is accepted by DB, but its root cert failed the timestamp check.\n"));
               }
             }
-
-            goto Done;
           }
 
-          CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertData + CertList->SignatureSize);
+          //
+          // There's no 'dbx' to check revocation time against (must-be pass),
+          // or, there's revocation time found in 'dbx' and checked againt 'dbt'
+          // (maybe pass or fail, depending on timestamp compare result). Either
+          // way the verification job has been completed at this point.
+          //
+          goto Done;
         }
+
+        CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertData + CertList->SignatureSize);
       }
-
-      DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;
-      CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);
     }
+
+    DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;
+    CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);
   }
 
 Done:
-- 
2.25.0

From 228c687848fa98e5be08e0a64875714f2bb3b261 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2019 16:52:58 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 19/23] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationLib: Differentiate
 error/search result (1) (CVE-2019-14575)

REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1608

To avoid false-negative issue in check hash against dbx, both error
condition (as return value) and check result (as out parameter) of
IsCertHashFoundInDatabase() are added. So the caller of this function
will know exactly if a failure is caused by a black list hit or
other error happening, and enforce a more secure operation to prevent
secure boot from being bypassed. For a white list check (db), there's
no such necessity.

Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit a83dbf008cc73406cbdc0d5ac3164cc19fff6683)
---
 .../DxeImageVerificationLib.c                 | 64 ++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
index 194194e2f74f..e571a9f2712d 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
@@ -840,22 +840,23 @@ AddImageExeInfo (
   @param[in]  SignatureList     Pointer to the Signature List in forbidden database.
   @param[in]  SignatureListSize Size of Signature List.
   @param[out] RevocationTime    Return the time that the certificate was revoked.
+  @param[out] IsFound           Search result. Only valid if EFI_SUCCESS returned.
 
-  @return TRUE   The certificate hash is found in the forbidden database.
-  @return FALSE  The certificate hash is not found in the forbidden database.
+  @retval EFI_SUCCESS           Finished the search without any error.
+  @retval Others                Error occurred in the search of database.
 
 **/
-BOOLEAN
+EFI_STATUS
 IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (
   IN  UINT8               *Certificate,
   IN  UINTN               CertSize,
   IN  EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST  *SignatureList,
   IN  UINTN               SignatureListSize,
-  OUT EFI_TIME            *RevocationTime
+  OUT EFI_TIME            *RevocationTime,
+  OUT BOOLEAN             *IsFound
   )
 {
-  BOOLEAN             IsFound;
-  BOOLEAN             Status;
+  EFI_STATUS          Status;
   EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST  *DbxList;
   UINTN               DbxSize;
   EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA  *CertHash;
@@ -869,21 +870,22 @@ IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (
   UINT8               *TBSCert;
   UINTN               TBSCertSize;
 
-  IsFound  = FALSE;
+  Status   = EFI_ABORTED;
+  *IsFound = FALSE;
   DbxList  = SignatureList;
   DbxSize  = SignatureListSize;
   HashCtx  = NULL;
   HashAlg  = HASHALG_MAX;
 
   if ((RevocationTime == NULL) || (DbxList == NULL)) {
-    return FALSE;
+    return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
   }
 
   //
   // Retrieve the TBSCertificate from the X.509 Certificate.
   //
   if (!X509GetTBSCert (Certificate, CertSize, &TBSCert, &TBSCertSize)) {
-    return FALSE;
+    return Status;
   }
 
   while ((DbxSize > 0) && (SignatureListSize >= DbxList->SignatureListSize)) {
@@ -913,16 +915,13 @@ IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (
     if (HashCtx == NULL) {
       goto Done;
     }
-    Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit (HashCtx);
-    if (!Status) {
+    if (!mHash[HashAlg].HashInit (HashCtx)) {
       goto Done;
     }
-    Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate (HashCtx, TBSCert, TBSCertSize);
-    if (!Status) {
+    if (!mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate (HashCtx, TBSCert, TBSCertSize)) {
       goto Done;
     }
-    Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal (HashCtx, CertDigest);
-    if (!Status) {
+    if (!mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal (HashCtx, CertDigest)) {
       goto Done;
     }
 
@@ -941,7 +940,8 @@ IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (
         //
         // Hash of Certificate is found in forbidden database.
         //
-        IsFound = TRUE;
+        Status   = EFI_SUCCESS;
+        *IsFound = TRUE;
 
         //
         // Return the revocation time.
@@ -956,12 +956,14 @@ IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (
     DbxList  = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList + DbxList->SignatureListSize);
   }
 
+  Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
+
 Done:
   if (HashCtx != NULL) {
     FreePool (HashCtx);
   }
 
-  return IsFound;
+  return Status;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1234,6 +1236,7 @@ IsForbiddenByDbx (
 {
   EFI_STATUS                Status;
   BOOLEAN                   IsForbidden;
+  BOOLEAN                   IsFound;
   UINT8                     *Data;
   UINTN                     DataSize;
   EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST        *CertList;
@@ -1362,20 +1365,29 @@ IsForbiddenByDbx (
     //
     CertPtr = CertPtr + sizeof (UINT32) + CertSize;
 
-    if (IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (Cert, CertSize, (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)Data, DataSize, &RevocationTime)) {
+    Status = IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (Cert, CertSize, (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)Data, DataSize, &RevocationTime, &IsFound);
+    if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
       //
-      // Check the timestamp signature and signing time to determine if the image can be trusted.
+      // Error in searching dbx. Consider it as 'found'. RevocationTime might
+      // not be valid in such situation.
       //
       IsForbidden = TRUE;
+    } else if (IsFound) {
+      //
+      // Found Cert in dbx successfully. Check the timestamp signature and
+      // signing time to determine if the image can be trusted.
+      //
       if (PassTimestampCheck (AuthData, AuthDataSize, &RevocationTime)) {
         IsForbidden = FALSE;
         //
         // Pass DBT check. Continue to check other certs in image signer's cert list against DBX, DBT
         //
         continue;
+      } else {
+        IsForbidden = TRUE;
+        DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Image is signed but signature failed the timestamp check.\n"));
+        goto Done;
       }
-      DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Image is signed but signature failed the timestamp check.\n"));
-      goto Done;
     }
 
   }
@@ -1410,6 +1422,7 @@ IsAllowedByDb (
 {
   EFI_STATUS                Status;
   BOOLEAN                   VerifyStatus;
+  BOOLEAN                   IsFound;
   EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST        *CertList;
   EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA        *CertData;
   UINTN                     DataSize;
@@ -1516,7 +1529,14 @@ IsAllowedByDb (
             //
             // Here We still need to check if this RootCert's Hash is revoked
             //
-            if (IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (RootCert, RootCertSize, (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)DbxData, DbxDataSize, &RevocationTime)) {
+            Status = IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (RootCert, RootCertSize, (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)DbxData, DbxDataSize, &RevocationTime, &IsFound);
+            if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+              //
+              // Error in searching dbx. Consider it as 'found'. RevocationTime might
+              // not be valid in such situation.
+              //
+              VerifyStatus = FALSE;
+            } else if (IsFound) {
               //
               // Check the timestamp signature and signing time to determine if the RootCert can be trusted.
               //
-- 
2.25.0

From 91b0484e90dc2f035e8fd56ebbed66821553d1cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2019 11:04:33 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 20/23] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationLib: tighten default
 result (CVE-2019-14575)

REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1608

All intermediate results inside this function will be checked and
returned immediately upon any failure or error, like out-of-resource,
hash calculation error or certificate retrieval failure.

Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5cd8be6079ea7e5638903b2f3da0f4c10ec7f1da)
---
 .../DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c | 11 ++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

From a4cfc93115272ccf590dfdbe9f2422ef0b4284d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2019 13:41:57 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 21/23] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationLib: plug Data leak in
 IsForbiddenByDbx() (CVE-2019-14575)

REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1608

If the second GetVariable() call for "dbx" fails, in IsForbiddenByDbx(),
we have to free Data. Jump to "Done" for that.

Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit cb30c8f25162e6d8142c6b098f14c1e4e7f125ce)
---
 .../Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c   | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

From 43aade078551db67e39d789379d5404e6fe7132b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 15:02:17 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 22/23] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationLib: Differentiate
 error/search result (2) (CVE-2019-14575)

REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1608

To avoid false-negative issue in check hash against dbx, both error
condition (as return value) and check result (as out parameter) of
IsSignatureFoundInDatabase() are added. So the caller of this function
will know exactly if a failure is caused by a black list hit or
other error happening, and enforce a more secure operation to prevent
secure boot from being bypassed. For a white list check (db), there's
no such necessity.

All intermediate results inside this function will be checked and
returned immediately upon any failure or error, like out-of-resource,
hash calculation error or certificate retrieval failure.

Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit b1c11470598416c89c67b75c991fd0773bcbab9d)
---
 .../DxeImageVerificationLib.c                 | 77 ++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
index 417066dee655..110668153cfd 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
@@ -973,17 +973,19 @@ Done:
   @param[in]  Signature           Pointer to signature that is searched for.
   @param[in]  CertType            Pointer to hash algrithom.
   @param[in]  SignatureSize       Size of Signature.
+  @param[out] IsFound             Search result. Only valid if EFI_SUCCESS returned
 
-  @return TRUE                    Found the signature in the variable database.
-  @return FALSE                   Not found the signature in the variable database.
+  @retval EFI_SUCCESS             Finished the search without any error.
+  @retval Others                  Error occurred in the search of database.
 
 **/
-BOOLEAN
+EFI_STATUS
 IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (
-  IN CHAR16             *VariableName,
-  IN UINT8              *Signature,
-  IN EFI_GUID           *CertType,
-  IN UINTN              SignatureSize
+  IN  CHAR16            *VariableName,
+  IN  UINT8             *Signature,
+  IN  EFI_GUID          *CertType,
+  IN  UINTN             SignatureSize,
+  OUT BOOLEAN           *IsFound
   )
 {
   EFI_STATUS          Status;
@@ -993,22 +995,28 @@ IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (
   UINT8               *Data;
   UINTN               Index;
   UINTN               CertCount;
-  BOOLEAN             IsFound;
 
   //
   // Read signature database variable.
   //
-  IsFound   = FALSE;
+  *IsFound  = FALSE;
   Data      = NULL;
   DataSize  = 0;
   Status    = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);
   if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
-    return FALSE;
+    if (Status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) {
+      //
+      // No database, no need to search.
+      //
+      Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
+    }
+
+    return Status;
   }
 
   Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);
   if (Data == NULL) {
-    return FALSE;
+    return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
   }
 
   Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);
@@ -1028,7 +1036,7 @@ IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (
           //
           // Find the signature in database.
           //
-          IsFound = TRUE;
+          *IsFound = TRUE;
           //
           // Entries in UEFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE that are used to validate image should be measured
           //
@@ -1041,7 +1049,7 @@ IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (
         Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);
       }
 
-      if (IsFound) {
+      if (*IsFound) {
         break;
       }
     }
@@ -1055,7 +1063,7 @@ Done:
     FreePool (Data);
   }
 
-  return IsFound;
+  return Status;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1667,6 +1675,8 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
   CHAR16                               *NameStr;
   RETURN_STATUS                        PeCoffStatus;
   EFI_STATUS                           HashStatus;
+  EFI_STATUS                           DbStatus;
+  BOOLEAN                              IsFound;
 
   SignatureList     = NULL;
   SignatureListSize = 0;
@@ -1675,7 +1685,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
   PkcsCertData      = NULL;
   Action            = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_UNTESTED;
   IsVerified        = FALSE;
-
+  IsFound           = FALSE;
 
   //
   // Check the image type and get policy setting.
@@ -1832,7 +1842,14 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
       goto Failed;
     }
 
-    if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
+    DbStatus = IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (
+                 EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1,
+                 mImageDigest,
+                 &mCertType,
+                 mImageDigestSize,
+                 &IsFound
+                 );
+    if (EFI_ERROR (DbStatus) || IsFound) {
       //
       // Image Hash is in forbidden database (DBX).
       //
@@ -1840,7 +1857,14 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
       goto Failed;
     }
 
-    if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
+    DbStatus = IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (
+                 EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE,
+                 mImageDigest,
+                 &mCertType,
+                 mImageDigestSize,
+                 &IsFound
+                 );
+    if (!EFI_ERROR (DbStatus) && IsFound) {
       //
       // Image Hash is in allowed database (DB).
       //
@@ -1928,14 +1952,29 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
     //
     // Check the image's hash value.
     //
-    if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
+    DbStatus = IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (
+                 EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1,
+                 mImageDigest,
+                 &mCertType,
+                 mImageDigestSize,
+                 &IsFound
+                 );
+    if (EFI_ERROR (DbStatus) || IsFound) {
       Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND;
       DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Image is signed but %s hash of image is found in DBX.\n", mHashTypeStr));
       IsVerified = FALSE;
       break;
     }
+
     if (!IsVerified) {
-      if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
+      DbStatus = IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (
+                   EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE,
+                   mImageDigest,
+                   &mCertType,
+                   mImageDigestSize,
+                   &IsFound
+                   );
+      if (!EFI_ERROR (DbStatus) && IsFound) {
         IsVerified = TRUE;
       } else {
         DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Image is signed but signature is not allowed by DB and %s hash of image is not found in DB/DBX.\n", mHashTypeStr));
-- 
2.25.0

From b5c935dd390909bf8e0cfbce2bd89a5baa9e4b86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2020 13:50:32 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 23/23] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationLib: change
 IsCertHashFoundInDatabase name (CVE-2019-14575)

IsCertHashFoundInDatabase() is actually used only for searching dbx,
according to the function logic, its comments and its use cases. Changing
it to IsCertHashFoundInDbx to avoid confusion.

REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1608
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit c230c002accc4281ccc57bba7153a9b2d9b9ccd3)
---
 .../DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c       | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

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File ovmf-bsc1163969-fix-DxeImageVerificationHandler.patch of Package ovmf.6568

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