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File xsa215.patch of Package xen.7653

x86: correct create_bounce_frame

We may push up to 96 bytes on the guest (kernel) stack, so we should
also cover as much in the early range check. Note that this is the
simplest possible patch, which has the theoretical potential of
breaking a guest: We only really push 96 bytes when invoking the
failsafe callback, ordinary exceptions only have 56 or 64 bytes pushed
(without / with error code respectively). There is, however, no PV OS
known to place a kernel stack there.

This is XSA-215.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

Index: xen-4.5.5-testing/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
===================================================================
--- xen-4.5.5-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
+++ xen-4.5.5-testing/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ int80_slow_path:
         jmp   handle_exception_saved
 
 /* CREATE A BASIC EXCEPTION FRAME ON GUEST OS STACK:                     */
-/*   { RCX, R11, [DS-GS,] [CR2,] [ERRCODE,] RIP, CS, RFLAGS, RSP, SS }   */
+/*   { RCX, R11, [DS-GS,] [ERRCODE,] RIP, CS, RFLAGS, RSP, SS }          */
 /* %rdx: trap_bounce, %rbx: struct vcpu                                  */
 /* On return only %rbx and %rdx are guaranteed non-clobbered.            */
 create_bounce_frame:
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ create_bounce_frame:
 2:      andq  $~0xf,%rsi                # Stack frames are 16-byte aligned.
         movq  $HYPERVISOR_VIRT_START,%rax
         cmpq  %rax,%rsi
-        movq  $HYPERVISOR_VIRT_END+60,%rax
+        movq  $HYPERVISOR_VIRT_END+12*8,%rax
         sbb   %ecx,%ecx                 # In +ve address space? Then okay.
         cmpq  %rax,%rsi
         adc   %ecx,%ecx                 # Above Xen private area? Then okay.

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File xsa215.patch of Package xen.7653

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