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SUSE:SLE-12-SP5:Update
openssh.7980
openssh-7.2p2-audit.patch
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File openssh-7.2p2-audit.patch of Package openssh.7980
# HG changeset patch # Parent fd37335de0fea44a296b6b847f07a6701c6e2a21 Extended auditing through the Linux Auditing subsystem diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in --- a/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/Makefile.in @@ -94,16 +94,17 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \ ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o digest-libc.o hmac.o \ sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o \ kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \ kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o kexgssc.o \ kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o kexgsss.o \ platform-pledge.o LIBSSH_OBJS += fips.o +LIBSSH_OBJS += auditstub.o SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \ sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \ audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \ sshpty.o sshlogin.o servconf.o serverloop.o \ auth.o auth1.o auth2.o auth-options.o session.o \ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/audit-bsm.c b/openssh-7.2p2/audit-bsm.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/audit-bsm.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/audit-bsm.c @@ -370,34 +370,53 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, /* this is used on IPv4-only machines */ tid->port = (dev_t)port; tid->machine = inet_addr(host); snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%08x", tid->machine); debug3("BSM audit: machine ID %s", buf); #endif } -void +int audit_run_command(const char *command) { /* not implemented */ + return 0; +} + +void +audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + +void +audit_count_session_open(void) +{ + /* not necessary */ } void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li) { /* not implemented */ } void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) { /* not implemented */ } +int +audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + void audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) { char textbuf[BSM_TEXTBUFSZ]; static int logged_in = 0; const char *user = the_authctxt ? the_authctxt->user : "(unknown user)"; if (cannot_audit(0)) @@ -449,9 +468,45 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT: bsm_audit_bad_login("interactive password entry"); break; default: debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event); } } + +void +audit_unsupported_body(int what) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + +void +audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + +void +audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + +void +audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + +void +audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + +void +audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} #endif /* BSM */ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/audit-linux.c b/openssh-7.2p2/audit-linux.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/audit-linux.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/audit-linux.c @@ -30,97 +30,381 @@ #include "includes.h" #if defined(USE_LINUX_AUDIT) #include <libaudit.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <string.h> #include "log.h" #include "audit.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "misc.h" /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */ +#include "servconf.h" #include "canohost.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 256 + +extern ServerOptions options; +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; +extern u_int utmp_len; const char* audit_username(void); -int -linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username, - const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success) +static void +linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username, + const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event) { int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; audit_fd = audit_open(); if (audit_fd < 0) { if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) - return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */ + return; /* No audit support in kernel */ else - return 0; /* Must prevent login */ + goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */ } - rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN, + rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event, NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)", username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success); saved_errno = errno; close(audit_fd); /* * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non * root user. */ if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0)) rc = 0; errno = saved_errno; - return (rc >= 0); + if (rc < 0) { +fatal_report: + fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno)); + } } +static void +linux_audit_user_auth(int uid, const char *username, + const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event) +{ + int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; + static const char *event_name[] = { + "maxtries exceeded", + "root denied", + "success", + "none", + "password", + "challenge-response", + "pubkey", + "hostbased", + "gssapi", + "invalid user", + "nologin", + "connection closed", + "connection abandoned", + "unknown" + }; + + audit_fd = audit_open(); + if (audit_fd < 0) { + if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || + errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) + return; /* No audit support in kernel */ + else + goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */ + } + + if ((event < 0) || (event > SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN)) + event = SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN; + + rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, + NULL, event_name[event], username ? username : "(unknown)", + username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success); + saved_errno = errno; + close(audit_fd); + /* + * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non + * root user. + */ + if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0)) + rc = 0; + errno = saved_errno; + if (rc < 0) { +fatal_report: + fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno)); + } +} + +int +audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv) +{ + char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; + int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; + + audit_fd = audit_open(); + if (audit_fd < 0) { + if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || + errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) + return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */ + else + return 0; /* Must prevent login */ + } + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth rport=%d", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", get_remote_port()); + rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL, + buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv); + if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) + goto out; + /* is the fingerprint_prefix() still needed? + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "key algo=%s size=%d fp=%s%s rport=%d", + type, bits, sshkey_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, get_remote_port()); + */ + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "key algo=%s size=%d fp=%s rport=%d", + type, bits, fp, get_remote_port()); + rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL, + buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv); +out: + saved_errno = errno; + audit_close(audit_fd); + errno = saved_errno; + /* do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ + return (rc >= 0) || ((rc == -EPERM) && (getuid() != 0)); +} + +static int user_login_count = 0; + /* Below is the sshd audit API code */ void audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port) { + /* not implemented */ } - /* not implemented */ + +int +audit_run_command(const char *command) +{ + if (!user_login_count++) + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), + NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), + NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START); + return 0; +} void -audit_run_command(const char *command) +audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) { - /* not implemented */ + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), + NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END); + if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), + NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); +} + +void +audit_count_session_open(void) +{ + user_login_count++; } void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li) { - if (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, - NULL, li->line, 1) == 0) - fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno)); + if (!user_login_count++) + linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, + NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); + linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, + NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START); } void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) { - /* not implemented */ + linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, + NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END); + if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) + linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, + NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); } void audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) { switch(event) { case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS: - case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE: - case SSH_NOLOGIN: - case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES: - case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED: + linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL, + get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 1, event); break; + case SSH_NOLOGIN: + case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED: + linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL, + get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event); + linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL, + get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); + break; + + case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI: + linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL, + get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event); + break; + + case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE: + if (user_login_count) { + while (user_login_count--) + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), + NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END); + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), + NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); + } + break; + + case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON: case SSH_INVALID_USER: - linux_audit_record_event(-1, audit_username(), NULL, - get_remote_ipaddr(), "sshd", 0); + linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL, + get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); break; default: debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event); } } +void +audit_unsupported_body(int what) +{ +#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION + char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; + const static char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" }; + char *s; + int audit_fd; + + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=unsupported-%s direction=? cipher=? ksize=? rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", + name[what], get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), + get_local_port()); + free(s); + audit_fd = audit_open(); + if (audit_fd < 0) + /* no problem, the next instruction will be fatal() */ + return; + audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION, + buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 0); + audit_close(audit_fd); +#endif +} + +const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" }; + +void +audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid, + uid_t uid) +{ +#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION + char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; + int audit_fd, audit_ok; + const struct sshcipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc); + char *s; + + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d mac=%s pfs=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", + direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0, mac, pfs, + (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid, + get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), get_local_port()); + free(s); + audit_fd = audit_open(); + if (audit_fd < 0) { + if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || + errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) + return; /* No audit support in kernel */ + else + fatal("cannot open audit"); /* Must prevent login */ + } + audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION, + buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1); + audit_close(audit_fd); + /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ + if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) + fatal("cannot write into audit"); /* Must prevent login */ +#endif +} + +void +audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; + int audit_fd, audit_ok; + char *s; + + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=session fp=? direction=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", + direction[ctos], (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid, + get_remote_port(), + (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), + get_local_port()); + free(s); + audit_fd = audit_open(); + if (audit_fd < 0) { + if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT && + errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) + error("cannot open audit"); + return; + } + audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, + buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1); + audit_close(audit_fd); + /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ + if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) + error("cannot write into audit"); +} + +void +audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; + int audit_fd, audit_ok; + + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=server fp=%s direction=? spid=%jd suid=%jd ", + fp, (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid); + audit_fd = audit_open(); + if (audit_fd < 0) { + if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT && + errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) + error("cannot open audit"); + return; + } + audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, + buf, NULL, + listening_for_clients() ? NULL : get_remote_ipaddr(), + NULL, 1); + audit_close(audit_fd); + /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ + if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) + error("cannot write into audit"); +} + +void +audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp) +{ + char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; + int audit_fd, audit_ok; + + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=create kind=server fp=%s direction=? ", fp); + audit_fd = audit_open(); + if (audit_fd < 0) { + if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT && + errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) + error("cannot open audit"); + return; + } + audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, + buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1); + audit_close(audit_fd); + /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ + if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) + error("cannot write into audit"); +} #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/audit.c b/openssh-7.2p2/audit.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/audit.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/audit.c @@ -23,31 +23,38 @@ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include <stdarg.h> #include <string.h> +#include <unistd.h> #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS #include "audit.h" #include "log.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" +#include "ssh-gss.h" +#include "monitor_wrap.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "servconf.h" /* * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when * audit_connection_from() is called and MAY NOT be initialized when * audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON) is called. Test for NULL before using. */ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; +extern ServerOptions options; /* Maybe add the audit class to struct Authmethod? */ ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *method) { if (strcmp(method, "none") == 0) return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE; else if (strcmp(method, "password") == 0) @@ -66,23 +73,20 @@ audit_classify_auth(const char *method) else return SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN; } /* helper to return supplied username */ const char * audit_username(void) { - static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown user)"; - static const char invaliduser[] = "(invalid user)"; + static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown)"; - if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL) + if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid) return (unknownuser); - if (!the_authctxt->valid) - return (invaliduser); return (the_authctxt->user); } const char * audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev) { int i; static struct event_lookup_struct { @@ -106,16 +110,50 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev) }; for (i = 0; event_lookup[i].event != SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN; i++) if (event_lookup[i].event == ev) break; return(event_lookup[i].name); } +void +audit_key(int host_user, int *rv, const Key *key) +{ + char *fp; + const char *crypto_name; + + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX); + if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) + crypto_name = "ssh-rsa1"; + else + crypto_name = key_ssh_name(key); + if (audit_keyusage(host_user, crypto_name, key_size(key), fp, *rv) == 0) + *rv = 0; + free(fp); +} + +void +audit_unsupported(int what) +{ + PRIVSEP(audit_unsupported_body(what)); +} + +void +audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs) +{ + PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, pfs, getpid(), getuid())); +} + +void +audit_session_key_free(int ctos) +{ + PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, getpid(), getuid())); +} + # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS /* * Null implementations of audit functions. * These get used if SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS is defined but no audit module is enabled. */ /* * Called after a connection has been accepted but before any authentication @@ -135,16 +173,27 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, void audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) { debug("audit event euid %d user %s event %d (%s)", geteuid(), audit_username(), event, audit_event_lookup(event)); } /* + * Called when a child process has called, or will soon call, + * audit_session_open. + */ +void +audit_count_session_open(void) +{ + debug("audit count session open euid %d user %s", geteuid(), + audit_username()); +} + +/* * Called when a user session is started. Argument is the tty allocated to * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated. * * Note that this may be called multiple times if multiple sessions are used * within a single connection. */ void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li) @@ -169,18 +218,96 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li debug("audit session close euid %d user %s tty name %s", geteuid(), audit_username(), t); } /* * This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command. Note that * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows - * multiple sessions within a single connection. + * multiple sessions within a single connection. Returns a "handle" for + * audit_end_command. */ -void +int audit_run_command(const char *command) { debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(), audit_username(), command); + return 0; +} + +/* + * This will be called when the non-interactive command finishes. Note that + * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows + * multiple sessions within a single connection. "handle" should come from + * the corresponding audit_run_command. + */ +void +audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) +{ + debug("audit end nopty exec euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(), + audit_username(), command); +} + +/* + * This will be called when user is successfully autherized by the RSA1/RSA/DSA key. + * + * Type is the key type, len is the key length(byte) and fp is the fingerprint of the key. + */ +int +audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv) +{ + debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s key type %s key length %d fingerprint %s%s, result %d", + host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(), type, bits, + sshkey_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, rv); +} + +/* + * This will be called when the protocol negotiation fails. + */ +void +audit_unsupported_body(int what) +{ + debug("audit unsupported protocol euid %d type %d", geteuid(), what); +} + +/* + * This will be called on succesfull protocol negotiation. + */ +void +audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid, + uid_t uid) +{ + debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s pfs %s from pid %ld uid %u", + (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, pfs, (long)pid, + (unsigned)uid); +} + +/* + * This will be called on succesfull session key discard + */ +void +audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u", + (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid); +} + +/* + * This will be called on destroy private part of the server key + */ +void +audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + debug("audit destroy sensitive data euid %d fingerprint %s from pid %ld uid %u", + geteuid(), fp, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid); +} + +/* + * This will be called on generation of the ephemeral server key + */ +void +audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *) +{ + debug("audit create ephemeral server key euid %d fingerprint %s", geteuid(), fp); } # endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/audit.h b/openssh-7.2p2/audit.h --- a/openssh-7.2p2/audit.h +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/audit.h @@ -23,16 +23,17 @@ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef _SSH_AUDIT_H # define _SSH_AUDIT_H #include "loginrec.h" +#include "key.h" enum ssh_audit_event_type { SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES, SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED, SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS, SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE, SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD, SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT, /* keyboard-interactive or challenge-response */ @@ -40,18 +41,38 @@ enum ssh_audit_event_type { SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED, /* ssh2 hostbased or ssh1 rhostsrsa */ SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI, SSH_INVALID_USER, SSH_NOLOGIN, /* denied by /etc/nologin, not implemented */ SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE, /* closed after attempting auth or session */ SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON, /* closed without completing auth */ SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN }; + +enum ssh_audit_kex { + SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER, + SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_MAC, + SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION +}; typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t; +int listening_for_clients(void); + void audit_connection_from(const char *, int); void audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t); +void audit_count_session_open(void); void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *); void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *); -void audit_run_command(const char *); +int audit_run_command(const char *); +void audit_end_command(int, const char *); ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *); +int audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int); +void audit_key(int, int *, const Key *); +void audit_unsupported(int); +void audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *, char *); +void audit_unsupported_body(int); +void audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); +void audit_session_key_free(int ctos); +void audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t); +void audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t); +void audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *); #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auditstub.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auditstub.c new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auditstub.c @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +/* $Id: auditstub.c,v 1.1 jfch Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved. + * Use is subject to license terms. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com> + */ + +#include <sys/types.h> + +void +audit_unsupported(int n) +{ +} + +void +audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs) +{ +} + +void +audit_session_key_free(int ctos) +{ +} + +void +audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ +} diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-rsa.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-rsa.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-rsa.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-rsa.c @@ -96,16 +96,20 @@ int auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]) { u_char buf[2 * SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], mdbuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; struct ssh_digest_ctx *md; int len; int dgst; size_t dgst_len; + int rv; +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + char *fp; +#endif /* don't allow short keys */ if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) { error("%s: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits", __func__, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE); return (0); } @@ -123,22 +127,28 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNU if ((md = ssh_digest_start(dgst)) == NULL || ssh_digest_update(md, buf, 2 * dgst_len) < 0 || ssh_digest_update(md, session_id, dgst_len) < 0 || ssh_digest_final(md, mdbuf, sizeof(mdbuf)) < 0) fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__); ssh_digest_free(md); /* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */ - if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, dgst_len) != 0) { - /* Wrong answer. */ - return (0); - } - /* Correct answer. */ - return (1); + rv = (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, dgst_len) == 0); + +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX); + if (audit_keyusage(1, "ssh-rsa1", RSA_size(key->rsa) * 8, fp, rv) == 0) { + debug("unsuccessful audit"); + rv = 0; + } + free(fp); +#endif + + return rv; } /* * Performs the RSA authentication challenge-response dialog with the client, * and returns true (non-zero) if the client gave the correct answer to * our challenge; returns zero if the client gives a wrong answer. */ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c @@ -640,19 +640,16 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user) #endif if (pw == NULL) { logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s", user, get_remote_ipaddr()); #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN record_failed_login(user, get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh"); #endif -#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER); -#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ return (NULL); } if (!allowed_user(pw)) return (NULL); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) { debug("unable to get login class: %s", user); return (NULL); diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth.h b/openssh-7.2p2/auth.h --- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth.h +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth.h @@ -187,16 +187,17 @@ int allowed_user(struct passwd *); struct passwd * getpwnamallow(const char *user); char *get_challenge(Authctxt *); int verify_response(Authctxt *, const char *); void abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt *); char *expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw); char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *); +int user_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int); FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int); FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int); int auth_key_is_revoked(Key *); HostStatus check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *, Key *, const char *, const char *, const char *); @@ -205,16 +206,17 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *, Key *get_hostkey_by_index(int); Key *get_hostkey_public_by_index(int, struct ssh *); Key *get_hostkey_public_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *); Key *get_hostkey_private_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *); int get_hostkey_index(Key *, int, struct ssh *); int ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *); int sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *, Key *, u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int); +int hostbased_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int); /* debug messages during authentication */ void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); void auth_debug_send(void); void auth_debug_reset(void); struct passwd *fakepw(void); diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth2-hostbased.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth2-hostbased.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth2-hostbased.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth2-hostbased.c @@ -133,33 +133,45 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) #endif pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost); /* test for allowed key and correct signature */ authenticated = 0; if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) && - PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), + PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b))) == 1) authenticated = 1; buffer_free(&b); done: debug2("userauth_hostbased: authenticated %d", authenticated); if (key != NULL) key_free(key); free(pkalg); free(pkblob); free(cuser); free(chost); free(sig); return authenticated; } +int +hostbased_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen) +{ + int rv; + + rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen); +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + audit_key(0, &rv, key); +#endif + return rv; +} + /* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */ int hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost, Key *key) { const char *resolvedname, *ipaddr, *lookup, *reason; HostStatus host_status; int len; diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth2-pubkey.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth2-pubkey.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth2-pubkey.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth2-pubkey.c @@ -171,17 +171,17 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) #ifdef DEBUG_PK buffer_dump(&b); #endif pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL); /* test for correct signature */ authenticated = 0; if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 1)) && - PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), + PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b))) == 1) { authenticated = 1; /* Record the successful key to prevent reuse */ auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key); key = NULL; /* Don't free below */ } buffer_free(&b); free(sig); @@ -251,16 +251,28 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, con auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key), fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra); free(fp); } free(extra); } +int +user_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen) +{ + int rv; + + rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen); +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + audit_key(1, &rv, key); +#endif + return rv; +} + /* * Splits 's' into an argument vector. Handles quoted string and basic * escape characters (\\, \", \'). Caller must free the argument vector * and its members. */ static int split_argv(const char *s, int *argcp, char ***argvp) { diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth2.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth2.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth2.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth2.c @@ -236,19 +236,16 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32 authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user)); authctxt->user = xstrdup(user); if (authctxt->pw && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) { authctxt->valid = 1; debug2("input_userauth_request: setting up authctxt for %s", user); } else { logit("input_userauth_request: invalid user %s", user); authctxt->pw = fakepw(); -#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER)); -#endif } #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt)); #endif setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown", use_privsep ? " [net]" : ""); authctxt->service = xstrdup(service); diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/cipher.c b/openssh-7.2p2/cipher.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/cipher.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/cipher.c @@ -55,36 +55,16 @@ #include "log.h" #ifdef WITH_SSH1 extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(void); extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void); extern int ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int); #endif -struct sshcipher { - char *name; - int number; /* for ssh1 only */ - u_int block_size; - u_int key_len; - u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */ - u_int auth_len; - u_int discard_len; - u_int flags; -#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0) -#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1) -#define CFLAG_AESCTR (1<<2) -#define CFLAG_NONE (1<<3) -#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void); -#else - void *ignored; -#endif -}; - static const struct sshcipher ciphers_all[] = { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 { "des", SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc }, { "3des", SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des }, { "blowfish", SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH, 8, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_bf }, #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL { "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null }, diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/cipher.h b/openssh-7.2p2/cipher.h --- a/openssh-7.2p2/cipher.h +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/cipher.h @@ -57,17 +57,36 @@ #define SSH_CIPHER_BROKEN_RC4 5 /* Alleged RC4 */ #define SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH 6 #define SSH_CIPHER_RESERVED 7 #define SSH_CIPHER_MAX 31 #define CIPHER_ENCRYPT 1 #define CIPHER_DECRYPT 0 -struct sshcipher; +struct sshcipher { + char *name; + int number; /* for ssh1 only */ + u_int block_size; + u_int key_len; + u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */ + u_int auth_len; + u_int discard_len; + u_int flags; +#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0) +#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1) +#define CFLAG_AESCTR (1<<2) +#define CFLAG_NONE (1<<3) +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void); +#else + void *ignored; +#endif +}; + struct sshcipher_ctx { int plaintext; int encrypt; EVP_CIPHER_CTX evp; struct chachapoly_ctx cp_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */ struct aesctr_ctx ac_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */ const struct sshcipher *cipher; }; diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c b/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/kex.c @@ -48,16 +48,17 @@ #include "match.h" #include "misc.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "monitor.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "digest.h" +#include "audit.h" #include "fips.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L @@ -687,18 +688,22 @@ kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *ssh) return kex_send_kexinit(ssh); } static int choose_enc(struct sshenc *enc, char *client, char *server) { char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); - if (name == NULL) + if (name == NULL) { +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + audit_unsupported(SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER); +#endif return SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH; + } if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; enc->name = name; enc->enabled = 0; enc->iv = NULL; enc->iv_len = cipher_ivlen(enc->cipher); enc->key = NULL; enc->key_len = cipher_keylen(enc->cipher); @@ -706,36 +711,44 @@ choose_enc(struct sshenc *enc, char *cli return 0; } static int choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshmac *mac, char *client, char *server) { char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); - if (name == NULL) + if (name == NULL) { +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + audit_unsupported(SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_MAC); +#endif return SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH; + } if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* truncate the key */ if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_HMAC) mac->key_len = 16; mac->name = name; mac->key = NULL; mac->enabled = 0; return 0; } static int choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server) { char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); - if (name == NULL) + if (name == NULL) { +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + audit_unsupported(SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION); +#endif return SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH; + } if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) { comp->type = COMP_DELAYED; } else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) { comp->type = COMP_ZLIB; } else if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) { comp->type = COMP_NONE; } else { return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; @@ -896,16 +909,20 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh) need = MAX(need, newkeys->enc.key_len); need = MAX(need, newkeys->enc.block_size); need = MAX(need, newkeys->enc.iv_len); need = MAX(need, newkeys->mac.key_len); dh_need = MAX(dh_need, cipher_seclen(newkeys->enc.cipher)); dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->enc.block_size); dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->enc.iv_len); dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->mac.key_len); + debug("kex: %s need=%d dh_need=%d", kex->name, need, dh_need); +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + audit_kex(mode, newkeys->enc.name, newkeys->mac.name, newkeys->comp.name, kex->name); +#endif } /* XXX need runden? */ kex->we_need = need; kex->dh_need = dh_need; /* ignore the next message if the proposals do not match */ if (first_kex_follows && !proposals_match(my, peer) && !(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX)) @@ -1072,8 +1089,38 @@ derive_ssh1_session_id(BIGNUM *host_modu #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH) void dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, int len) { fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", msg); sshbuf_dump_data(digest, len, stderr); } #endif + +static void +enc_destroy(struct sshenc *enc) +{ + if (enc == NULL) + return; + + if (enc->key) { + memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len); + free(enc->key); + } + + if (enc->iv) { + memset(enc->iv, 0, enc->iv_len); + free(enc->iv); + } + + memset(enc, 0, sizeof(*enc)); +} + +void +newkeys_destroy(struct newkeys *newkeys) +{ + if (newkeys == NULL) + return; + + enc_destroy(&newkeys->enc); + mac_destroy(&newkeys->mac); + memset(&newkeys->comp, 0, sizeof(newkeys->comp)); +} diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/kex.h b/openssh-7.2p2/kex.h --- a/openssh-7.2p2/kex.h +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/kex.h @@ -199,16 +199,18 @@ int kexecdh_server(struct ssh *); int kexc25519_client(struct ssh *); int kexc25519_server(struct ssh *); #ifdef GSSAPI int kexgss_client(struct ssh *); int kexgss_server(struct ssh *); #endif +void newkeys_destroy(struct newkeys *newkeys); + int kex_dh_hash(const char *, const char *, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, u_char *, size_t *); int kexgex_hash(int, const char *, const char *, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, int, int, int, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/key.h b/openssh-7.2p2/key.h --- a/openssh-7.2p2/key.h +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/key.h @@ -45,16 +45,17 @@ typedef struct sshkey Key; #define key_ssh_name_plain sshkey_ssh_name_plain #define key_type_from_name sshkey_type_from_name #define key_ecdsa_nid_from_name sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name #define key_type_is_cert sshkey_type_is_cert #define key_size sshkey_size #define key_ecdsa_bits_to_nid sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid #define key_ecdsa_key_to_nid sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid #define key_is_cert sshkey_is_cert +#define key_is_private sshkey_is_private #define key_type_plain sshkey_type_plain #define key_curve_name_to_nid sshkey_curve_name_to_nid #define key_curve_nid_to_bits sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits #define key_curve_nid_to_name sshkey_curve_nid_to_name #define key_ec_nid_to_hash_alg sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg #define key_dump_ec_point sshkey_dump_ec_point #define key_dump_ec_key sshkey_dump_ec_key #endif diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/mac.c b/openssh-7.2p2/mac.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/mac.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/mac.c @@ -259,16 +259,30 @@ mac_clear(struct sshmac *mac) if (mac->umac_ctx != NULL) umac128_delete(mac->umac_ctx); } else if (mac->hmac_ctx != NULL) ssh_hmac_free(mac->hmac_ctx); mac->hmac_ctx = NULL; mac->umac_ctx = NULL; } +void +mac_destroy(struct sshmac *mac) +{ + if (mac == NULL) + return; + + if (mac->key) { + memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len); + free(mac->key); + } + + memset(mac, 0, sizeof(*mac)); +} + /* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */ #define MAC_SEP "," int mac_valid(const char *names) { char *maclist, *cp, *p; if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0) diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/mac.h b/openssh-7.2p2/mac.h --- a/openssh-7.2p2/mac.h +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/mac.h @@ -42,10 +42,11 @@ struct sshmac { int mac_valid(const char *); char *mac_alg_list(char); int mac_setup(struct sshmac *, char *); int mac_init(struct sshmac *); int mac_compute(struct sshmac *, u_int32_t, const u_char *, int, u_char *, size_t); void mac_clear(struct sshmac *); +void mac_destroy(struct sshmac *); #endif /* SSHMAC_H */ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/monitor.c b/openssh-7.2p2/monitor.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/monitor.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/monitor.c @@ -96,31 +96,34 @@ #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "monitor_fdpass.h" #include "compat.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "authfd.h" +#include "audit.h" #include "match.h" #include "ssherr.h" #ifdef GSSAPI static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL; #endif /* Imports */ extern ServerOptions options; extern u_int utmp_len; extern u_char session_id[]; extern Buffer auth_debug; extern int auth_debug_init; extern Buffer loginmsg; +extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int); + /* State exported from the child */ static struct sshbuf *child_state; /* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */ int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *); @@ -158,16 +161,21 @@ int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *); #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *); +int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *); +int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *); +int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *); +int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int, Buffer *); +int mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int, Buffer *); #endif static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *); static Authctxt *authctxt; #ifdef WITH_SSH1 static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */ @@ -214,16 +222,20 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx}, #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, #endif #ifdef BSD_AUTH {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery}, {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond}, #endif #ifdef SKEY {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery}, {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond}, @@ -252,16 +264,21 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20 #endif {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign}, {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty}, {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup}, {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term}, #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, #endif {0, 0, NULL} }; struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow}, {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey}, @@ -284,29 +301,38 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx}, #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, #endif #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ {0, 0, NULL} }; struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty}, {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup}, {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term}, #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, #endif #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ {0, 0, NULL} }; struct mon_table *mon_dispatch; /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */ @@ -1423,26 +1449,30 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data } int mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m) { Key *key; u_char *signature, *data, *blob; u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen; + int type = 0; int verified = 0; int valid_data = 0; + type = buffer_get_int(m); blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen); signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen); data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen); if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL || !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen)) fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__); + if (type != key_blobtype) + fatal("%s: bad key type", __func__); key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen); if (key == NULL) fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__); switch (key_blobtype) { case MM_USERKEY: valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen); @@ -1453,17 +1483,27 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m) break; default: valid_data = 0; break; } if (!valid_data) fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__); - verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); + switch (key_blobtype) { + case MM_USERKEY: + verified = user_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); + break; + case MM_HOSTKEY: + verified = hostbased_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); + break; + default: + verified = 0; + break; + } debug3("%s: key %p signature %s", __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified"); /* If auth was successful then record key to ensure it isn't reused */ if (verified == 1 && key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY) auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key); else key_free(key); @@ -1514,16 +1554,22 @@ mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passw static void mm_session_close(Session *s) { debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid); if (s->ttyfd != -1) { debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd); session_pty_cleanup2(s); } +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + if (s->command != NULL) { + debug3("%s: command %d", __func__, s->command_handle); + session_end_command2(s); + } +#endif session_unused(s->self); } int mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m) { extern struct monitor *pmonitor; Session *s; @@ -1796,16 +1842,18 @@ mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req) /* The child is terminating */ session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close); #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) sshpam_cleanup(); #endif + destroy_sensitive_data(0); + while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) exit(1); res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1; /* Terminate process */ exit(res); @@ -1838,21 +1886,53 @@ mm_answer_audit_event(int socket, Buffer return (0); } int mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buffer *m) { u_int len; char *cmd; + Session *s; debug3("%s entering", __func__); cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + /* sanity check command, if so how? */ - audit_run_command(cmd); + s = session_new(); + if (s == NULL) + fatal("%s: error allocating a session", __func__); + s->command = cmd; + s->command_handle = audit_run_command(cmd); + + buffer_clear(m); + buffer_put_int(m, s->self); + + mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m); + + return (0); +} + +int +mm_answer_audit_end_command(int socket, Buffer *m) +{ + int handle; + u_int len; + char *cmd; + Session *s; + + debug3("%s entering", __func__); + handle = buffer_get_int(m); + cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + + s = session_by_id(handle); + if (s == NULL || s->ttyfd != -1 || s->command == NULL || + strcmp(s->command, cmd) != 0) + fatal("%s: invalid handle", __func__); + mm_session_close(s); free(cmd); return (0); } #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ void monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor) { @@ -1899,23 +1979,39 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *p } } /* This function requries careful sanity checking */ void mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor) { + Buffer m; debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__); if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, child_state); debug3("%s: GOT new keys", __func__); + +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + if (compat20) { + buffer_init(&m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m); + mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m); + buffer_free(&m); + } +#endif + + /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */ + while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0) + ; + } /* XXX */ #define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \ if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \ fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \ @@ -2157,8 +2253,91 @@ mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Bu mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m); return(0); } #endif /* GSSAPI */ +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +int +mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int sock, Buffer *m) +{ + int what; + + what = buffer_get_int(m); + + audit_unsupported_body(what); + + buffer_clear(m); + + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, m); + return 0; +} + +int +mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffer *m) +{ + int ctos, len; + char *cipher, *mac, *compress, *pfs; + pid_t pid; + uid_t uid; + + ctos = buffer_get_int(m); + cipher = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + mac = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + compress = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + pfs = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + pid = buffer_get_int64(m); + uid = buffer_get_int64(m); + + audit_kex_body(ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pfs, pid, uid); + + free(cipher); + free(mac); + free(compress); + free(pfs); + buffer_clear(m); + + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, m); + return 0; +} + +int +mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int sock, Buffer *m) +{ + int ctos; + pid_t pid; + uid_t uid; + + ctos = buffer_get_int(m); + pid = buffer_get_int64(m); + uid = buffer_get_int64(m); + + audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, pid, uid); + + buffer_clear(m); + + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m); + return 0; +} + +int +mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int sock, Buffer *m) +{ + int len; + char *fp; + pid_t pid; + uid_t uid; + + fp = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + pid = buffer_get_int64(m); + uid = buffer_get_int64(m); + + audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid); + + free(fp); + buffer_clear(m); + + return 0; +} +#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/monitor.h b/openssh-7.2p2/monitor.h --- a/openssh-7.2p2/monitor.h +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/monitor.h @@ -58,17 +58,23 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111, - MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 115, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 116, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 119, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 120, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 121, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 122, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 123, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 124, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 201, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 202, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 203, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 204, }; struct mm_master; struct monitor { diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/monitor_wrap.c b/openssh-7.2p2/monitor_wrap.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/monitor_wrap.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/monitor_wrap.c @@ -438,30 +438,31 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, cha /* * This key verify needs to send the key type along, because the * privileged parent makes the decision if the key is allowed * for authentication. */ int -mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) +mm_key_verify(enum mm_keytype type, Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) { Buffer m; u_char *blob; u_int len; int verified = 0; debug3("%s entering", __func__); /* Convert the key to a blob and the pass it over */ if (!key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len)) return (0); buffer_init(&m); + buffer_put_int(&m, type); buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len); buffer_put_string(&m, sig, siglen); buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen); free(blob); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY", __func__); @@ -469,16 +470,28 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_i verified = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); return (verified); } +int +mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) +{ + return mm_key_verify(MM_HOSTKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen); +} + +int +mm_user_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) +{ + return mm_key_verify(MM_USERKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen); +} + void mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor) { struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ struct sshbuf *m; int r; if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) @@ -981,27 +994,48 @@ mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, event); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, &m); buffer_free(&m); } -void +int mm_audit_run_command(const char *command) { Buffer m; + int handle; debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_cstring(&m, command); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m); + + handle = buffer_get_int(&m); + buffer_free(&m); + + return (handle); +} + +void +mm_audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) +{ + Buffer m; + + debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command); + + buffer_init(&m); + buffer_put_int(&m, handle); + buffer_put_cstring(&m, command); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, &m); buffer_free(&m); } #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ #ifdef GSSAPI OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID goid) { @@ -1127,8 +1161,119 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_cc buffer_free(&m); return (ok); } #endif /* GSSAPI */ +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +void +mm_audit_unsupported_body(int what) +{ + Buffer m; + + buffer_init(&m); + buffer_put_int(&m, what); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, &m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, + &m); + + buffer_free(&m); +} + +void +mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, char *fps, pid_t pid, + uid_t uid) +{ + Buffer m; + + buffer_init(&m); + buffer_put_int(&m, ctos); + buffer_put_cstring(&m, cipher); + buffer_put_cstring(&m, (mac ? mac : "<implicit>")); + buffer_put_cstring(&m, compress); + buffer_put_cstring(&m, fps); + buffer_put_int64(&m, pid); + buffer_put_int64(&m, uid); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, &m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, + &m); + + buffer_free(&m); +} + +void +mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + Buffer m; + + buffer_init(&m); + buffer_put_int(&m, ctos); + buffer_put_int64(&m, pid); + buffer_put_int64(&m, uid); + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, + &m); + buffer_free(&m); +} + +void +mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + Buffer m; + + buffer_init(&m); + buffer_put_cstring(&m, fp); + buffer_put_int64(&m, pid); + buffer_put_int64(&m, uid); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, &m); + buffer_free(&m); +} + +int mm_forward_audit_messages(int fdin) +{ + u_char buf[4]; + u_int blen, msg_len; + Buffer m; + int ret = 0; + + debug3("%s: entering", __func__); + buffer_init(&m); + do { + blen = atomicio(read, fdin, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (blen == 0) /* closed pipe */ + break; + if (blen != sizeof(buf)) { + error("%s: Failed to read the buffer from child", __func__); + ret = -1; + break; + } + + msg_len = get_u32(buf); + if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) + fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len); + buffer_clear(&m); + buffer_append_space(&m, msg_len); + if (atomicio(read, fdin, buffer_ptr(&m), msg_len) != msg_len) { + error("%s: Failed to read the the buffer conent from the child", __func__); + ret = -1; + break; + } + if (atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, buf, blen) != blen || + atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, buffer_ptr(&m), msg_len) != msg_len) { + error("%s: Failed to write the messag to the monitor", __func__); + ret = -1; + break; + } + } while (1); + buffer_free(&m); + return ret; +} +void mm_set_monitor_pipe(int fd) +{ + pmonitor->m_recvfd = fd; +} +#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/monitor_wrap.h b/openssh-7.2p2/monitor_wrap.h --- a/openssh-7.2p2/monitor_wrap.h +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/monitor_wrap.h @@ -44,17 +44,18 @@ int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *); struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *); char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void); int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *); int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char *, char *, Key *, int); int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *, int); int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *); int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *); -int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int); +int mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int); +int mm_user_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int); int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **); int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *); BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *); #ifdef GSSAPI OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *); @@ -71,17 +72,24 @@ void *mm_sshpam_init_ctx(struct Authctxt int mm_sshpam_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **); int mm_sshpam_respond(void *, u_int, char **); void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *); #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS #include "audit.h" void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t); -void mm_audit_run_command(const char *); +int mm_audit_run_command(const char *); +void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *); +void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int); +void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); +void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t); +void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t); +int mm_forward_audit_messages(int); +void mm_set_monitor_pipe(int); #endif struct Session; void mm_terminate(void); int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t); void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *); /* SSHv1 interfaces */ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/packet.c b/openssh-7.2p2/packet.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/packet.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/packet.c @@ -62,16 +62,17 @@ #include <time.h> #include <zlib.h> #include "buffer.h" /* typedefs XXX */ #include "key.h" /* typedefs XXX */ #include "xmalloc.h" +#include "audit.h" #include "crc32.h" #include "deattack.h" #include "compat.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "kex.h" @@ -449,16 +450,23 @@ ssh_packet_get_connection_in(struct ssh /* Returns the descriptor used for writing. */ int ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh *ssh) { return ssh->state->connection_out; } +static int +packet_state_has_keys (const struct session_state *state) +{ + return state != NULL && + (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL || state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL); +} + /* * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string. The returned * string must not be freed. */ const char * ssh_remote_ipaddr(struct ssh *ssh) { @@ -493,23 +501,16 @@ ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; int r; u_int mode; if (!state->initialized) return; state->initialized = 0; - if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) { - shutdown(state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR); - close(state->connection_out); - } else { - close(state->connection_in); - close(state->connection_out); - } sshbuf_free(state->input); sshbuf_free(state->output); sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet); sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet); for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]); if (state->compression_buffer) { sshbuf_free(state->compression_buffer); @@ -531,22 +532,32 @@ ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *ssh) (unsigned long long)stream->total_out, (unsigned long long)stream->total_in, stream->total_out == 0 ? 0.0 : (double) stream->total_in / stream->total_out); if (state->compression_in_failures == 0) inflateEnd(stream); } } - if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context)) != 0) - error("%s: cipher_cleanup failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context)) != 0) - error("%s: cipher_cleanup failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (packet_state_has_keys(state)) { + if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context)) != 0) + error("%s: cipher_cleanup failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context)) != 0) + error("%s: cipher_cleanup failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + audit_session_key_free(MODE_OUT); + } free(ssh->remote_ipaddr); ssh->remote_ipaddr = NULL; + if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) { + shutdown(state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR); + close(state->connection_out); + } else { + close(state->connection_in); + close(state->connection_out); + } free(ssh->state); ssh->state = NULL; } /* Sets remote side protocol flags. */ void ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags(struct ssh *ssh, u_int protocol_flags) @@ -961,16 +972,17 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mod } if (state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) { debug("set_newkeys: rekeying, input %llu bytes %llu blocks, " "output %llu bytes %llu blocks", (unsigned long long)state->p_read.bytes, (unsigned long long)state->p_read.blocks, (unsigned long long)state->p_send.bytes, (unsigned long long)state->p_send.blocks); + audit_session_key_free(mode); if ((r = cipher_cleanup(cc)) != 0) return r; enc = &state->newkeys[mode]->enc; mac = &state->newkeys[mode]->mac; comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp; mac_clear(mac); explicit_bzero(enc->iv, enc->iv_len); explicit_bzero(enc->key, enc->key_len); @@ -2401,16 +2413,82 @@ ssh_packet_get_input(struct ssh *ssh) } void * ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *ssh) { return (void *)ssh->state->output; } +static void +newkeys_destroy_and_free(struct newkeys *newkeys) +{ + if (newkeys == NULL) + return; + + free(newkeys->enc.name); + + if (newkeys->mac.enabled) { + mac_clear(&newkeys->mac); + free(newkeys->mac.name); + } + + free(newkeys->comp.name); + + newkeys_destroy(newkeys); + free(newkeys); +} + +static void +packet_destroy_state(struct session_state *state) +{ + if (state == NULL) + return; + + cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context); + cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context); + + buffer_free(state->input); + state->input = NULL; + buffer_free(state->output); + state->output = NULL; + buffer_free(state->outgoing_packet); + state->outgoing_packet = NULL; + buffer_free(state->incoming_packet); + state->incoming_packet = NULL; + if( state->compression_buffer ) { + buffer_free(state->compression_buffer); + state->compression_buffer = NULL; + } + newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_IN]); + state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = NULL; + newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]); + state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL; + mac_destroy(state->packet_discard_mac); +// TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing; +// memset(state, 0, sizeof(state)); +} + +void +packet_destroy_all(int audit_it, int privsep) +{ + if (audit_it) + audit_it = (active_state != NULL && packet_state_has_keys(active_state->state)); + if (active_state != NULL) + packet_destroy_state(active_state->state); + if (audit_it) { +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + if (privsep) + audit_session_key_free(MODE_OUT); + else + audit_session_key_free_body(MODE_OUT, getpid(), getuid()); +#endif + } +} + /* Reset after_authentication and reset compression in post-auth privsep */ static int ssh_packet_set_postauth(struct ssh *ssh) { struct sshcomp *comp; int r, mode; debug("%s: called", __func__); diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/packet.h b/openssh-7.2p2/packet.h --- a/openssh-7.2p2/packet.h +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/packet.h @@ -195,9 +195,10 @@ extern struct ssh *active_state; # undef EC_GROUP # undef EC_POINT #elif !defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) # undef EC_KEY # undef EC_GROUP # undef EC_POINT #endif +void packet_destroy_all(int, int); #endif /* PACKET_H */ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c @@ -163,16 +163,22 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_ SC_ALLOW(geteuid32), #endif #ifdef __NR_getrandom SC_ALLOW(getrandom), #endif #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday), #endif +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + SC_ALLOW(getuid), +#ifdef __NR_getuid32 /* not defined on x86_64 */ + SC_ALLOW(getuid32), +#endif +#endif #ifdef __NR_madvise SC_ALLOW(madvise), #endif #ifdef __NR_mmap SC_ALLOW(mmap), #endif #ifdef __NR_mmap2 SC_ALLOW(mmap2), diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c @@ -135,17 +135,17 @@ static int session_pty_req(Session *); /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; extern char *__progname; extern int log_stderr; extern int debug_flag; extern u_int utmp_len; extern int startup_pipe; -extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void); +extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int); extern Buffer loginmsg; /* original command from peer. */ const char *original_command = NULL; /* data */ static int sessions_first_unused = -1; static int sessions_nalloc = 0; @@ -155,16 +155,20 @@ static Session *sessions = NULL; #define SUBSYSTEM_EXT 1 #define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP 2 #define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR 3 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP login_cap_t *lc; #endif +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +int paudit[2]; +#endif + static int is_child = 0; static int in_chroot = 0; /* Name and directory of socket for authentication agent forwarding. */ static char *auth_sock_name = NULL; static char *auth_sock_dir = NULL; /* removes the agent forwarding socket */ @@ -747,16 +751,24 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE); #endif s->pid = pid; /* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */ close(ttyfd); +#if !defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA) && defined(SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS) + /* do_login in the child did not affect state in this process, + compensate. From an architectural standpoint, this is extremely + ugly. */ + if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL)) + audit_count_session_open(); +#endif + /* Enter interactive session. */ s->ptymaster = ptymaster; packet_set_interactive(1, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); if (compat20) { session_set_fds(s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1, 1); } else { server_loop(pid, ptyfd, fdout, -1); @@ -842,40 +854,60 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command) tty == NULL ? "" : " on ", tty == NULL ? "" : tty, s->pw->pw_name, get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(), s->self); #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1) + fatal("do_exec: command already set"); if (command != NULL) - PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command)); + s->command = xstrdup(command); else if (s->ttyfd == -1) { char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell; if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */ shell =_PATH_BSHELL; - PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell)); + s->command = xstrdup(shell); } + if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1) + s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(s->command)); + if (pipe(paudit) < 0) + fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); #endif if (s->ttyfd != -1) ret = do_exec_pty(s, command); else ret = do_exec_no_pty(s, command); original_command = NULL; /* * Clear loginmsg: it's the child's responsibility to display * it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate * multiple copies of the login messages. */ buffer_clear(&loginmsg); +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + close(paudit[1]); + if (use_privsep && ret == 0) { + /* + * Read the audit messages from forked child and send them + * back to monitor. We don't want to communicate directly, + * because the messages might get mixed up. + * Continue after the pipe gets closed (all messages sent). + */ + ret = mm_forward_audit_messages(paudit[0]); + } + close(paudit[0]); +#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ + return ret; } /* administrative, login(1)-like work */ void do_login(Session *s, const char *command) { socklen_t fromlen; @@ -1697,18 +1729,37 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command extern char **environ; char **env; int env_size; char *argv[ARGV_MAX]; const char *shell, *shell0, *hostname = NULL; struct passwd *pw = s->pw; int r = 0; +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + int pparent = paudit[1]; + close(paudit[0]); + /* Hack the monitor pipe to avoid race condition with parent */ + if (use_privsep) + mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent); +#endif + /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */ - destroy_sensitive_data(); + destroy_sensitive_data(use_privsep); + /* + * We can audit this, because wer hacked the pipe to direct the + * messages over postauth child. But this message requires answer + * which we can't do using one-way pipe. + */ + packet_destroy_all(0, 1); + +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + /* Notify parent that we are done */ + close(pparent); +#endif /* Force a password change */ if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) { do_setusercontext(pw); child_close_fds(); do_pwchange(s); exit(1); } @@ -1925,16 +1976,19 @@ session_unused(int id) memset(&sessions[id], 0, sizeof(*sessions)); sessions[id].self = id; sessions[id].used = 0; sessions[id].chanid = -1; sessions[id].ptyfd = -1; sessions[id].ttyfd = -1; sessions[id].ptymaster = -1; sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL; +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + sessions[id].command_handle = -1; +#endif sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused; sessions_first_unused = id; } Session * session_new(void) { Session *s, *tmp; @@ -2007,16 +2061,29 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int cha if (s->pw == NULL || !authctxt->valid) fatal("no user for session %d", s->self); debug("session_open: session %d: link with channel %d", s->self, chanid); s->chanid = chanid; return 1; } Session * +session_by_id(int id) +{ + if (id >= 0 && id < sessions_nalloc) { + Session *s = &sessions[id]; + if (s->used) + return s; + } + debug("%s: unknown id %d", __func__, id); + session_dump(); + return NULL; +} + +Session * session_by_tty(char *tty) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1 && strcmp(s->tty, tty) == 0) { debug("session_by_tty: session %d tty %s", i, tty); return s; @@ -2529,16 +2596,42 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int sta * interested in data we write. * Note that we must not call 'chan_read_failed', since there could * be some more data waiting in the pipe. */ if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) chan_write_failed(c); } +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +void +session_end_command2(Session *s) +{ + if (s->command != NULL) { + if (s->command_handle != -1) + audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command); + free(s->command); + s->command = NULL; + s->command_handle = -1; + } +} + +static void +session_end_command(Session *s) +{ + if (s->command != NULL) { + if (s->command_handle != -1) + PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command)); + free(s->command); + s->command = NULL; + s->command_handle = -1; + } +} +#endif + void session_close(Session *s) { u_int i; verbose("Close session: user %s from %.200s port %d id %d", s->pw->pw_name, get_remote_ipaddr(), @@ -2570,16 +2663,20 @@ session_close(Session *s) exit(0); } else if (pid > 0) { waitpid(pid, NULL, 0); } } if (s->ttyfd != -1) session_pty_cleanup(s); +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + if (s->command) + session_end_command(s); +#endif free(s->term); free(s->display); free(s->x11_chanids); free(s->auth_display); free(s->auth_data); free(s->auth_proto); free(s->subsys); if (s->env != NULL) { @@ -2784,16 +2881,25 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s) } static void do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt) { server_loop2(authctxt); } +static void +do_cleanup_one_session(Session *s) +{ + session_pty_cleanup2(s); +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + session_end_command2(s); +#endif +} + void do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt) { static int called = 0; debug("do_cleanup"); /* no cleanup if we're in the child for login shell */ @@ -2832,10 +2938,10 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt) /* remove agent socket */ auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw); /* * Cleanup ptys/utmp only if privsep is disabled, * or if running in monitor. */ if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) - session_destroy_all(session_pty_cleanup2); + session_destroy_all(do_cleanup_one_session); } diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/session.h b/openssh-7.2p2/session.h --- a/openssh-7.2p2/session.h +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/session.h @@ -56,29 +56,37 @@ struct Session { int *x11_chanids; int is_subsystem; char *subsys; u_int num_env; struct { char *name; char *val; } *env; + + /* exec */ +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + int command_handle; + char *command; +#endif }; void do_authenticated(Authctxt *); void do_cleanup(Authctxt *); int session_open(Authctxt *, int); void session_unused(int); int session_input_channel_req(Channel *, const char *); void session_close_by_pid(pid_t, int); void session_close_by_channel(int, void *); void session_destroy_all(void (*)(Session *)); void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *); +void session_end_command2(Session *); Session *session_new(void); +Session *session_by_id(int); Session *session_by_tty(char *); void session_close(Session *); void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *); void child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name, const char *value); #endif diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.c @@ -118,16 +118,17 @@ #include "channels.h" #include "session.h" #include "monitor_mm.h" #include "monitor.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" +#include "audit.h" #include "ssh-sandbox.h" #include "version.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "fips.h" #ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API #include <Security/AuthSession.h> @@ -263,17 +264,17 @@ Buffer cfg; /* message to be displayed after login */ Buffer loginmsg; /* Unprivileged user */ struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL; /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */ -void destroy_sensitive_data(void); +void destroy_sensitive_data(int); void demote_sensitive_data(void); #ifdef WITH_SSH1 static void do_ssh1_kex(void); #endif static void do_ssh2_kex(void); /* @@ -284,16 +285,25 @@ close_listen_socks(void) { int i; for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) close(listen_socks[i]); num_listen_socks = -1; } +/* + * Is this process listening for clients (i.e. not specific to any specific + * client connection?) + */ +int listening_for_clients(void) +{ + return num_listen_socks > 0; +} + static void close_startup_pipes(void) { int i; if (startup_pipes) for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) if (startup_pipes[i] != -1) @@ -563,60 +573,105 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in close(sock_out); logit("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr(), server_version_string, client_version_string); cleanup_exit(255); } } -/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */ +/* + * Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. Careful, + * this can be called from cleanup_exit() - i.e. from just about anywhere. + */ void -destroy_sensitive_data(void) +destroy_sensitive_data(int privsep) { int i; +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + pid_t pid; + uid_t uid; + pid = getpid(); + uid = getuid(); +#endif if (sensitive_data.server_key) { key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); sensitive_data.server_key = NULL; } for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { + char *fp; + + if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i])) + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX); + else + fp = NULL; key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; + if (fp != NULL) { +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + if (privsep) + PRIVSEP(audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, + pid, uid)); + else + audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, + pid, uid); +#endif + free(fp); + } } - if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) { + if (sensitive_data.host_certificates + && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) { key_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]); sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL; } } sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL; explicit_bzero(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH); } /* Demote private to public keys for network child */ void demote_sensitive_data(void) { Key *tmp; int i; +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + pid_t pid; + uid_t uid; + pid = getpid(); + uid = getuid(); +#endif if (sensitive_data.server_key) { tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.server_key); key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); sensitive_data.server_key = tmp; } for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { + char *fp; + + if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i])) + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX); + else + fp = NULL; tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp; if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1) sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp; + if (fp != NULL) { +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid); +#endif + free(fp); + } } /* Certs do not need demotion */ } /* We do not clear ssh1_host key and cookie. XXX - Okay Niels? */ } static void @@ -756,16 +811,22 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) monitor_reinit(pmonitor); pmonitor->m_pid = fork(); if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1) fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) { verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid); buffer_clear(&loginmsg); + if (*pmonitor->m_pkex != NULL ){ + newkeys_destroy((*pmonitor->m_pkex)->newkeys[MODE_OUT]); + newkeys_destroy((*pmonitor->m_pkex)->newkeys[MODE_IN]); + audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid()); + packet_destroy_all(0, 0); + } monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor); /* NEVERREACHED */ exit(0); } /* child */ @@ -1283,16 +1344,17 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so /* Wait in select until there is a connection. */ ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR) error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (received_sigterm) { logit("Received signal %d; terminating.", (int) received_sigterm); + destroy_sensitive_data(0); close_listen_socks(); if (options.pid_file != NULL) unlink(options.pid_file); exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255); } if (key_used && key_do_regen) { generate_ephemeral_server_key(); key_used = 0; @@ -2345,16 +2407,17 @@ main(int ac, char **av) #endif } /* * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers * the current keystate and exits */ if (use_privsep) { mm_send_keystate(pmonitor); + packet_destroy_all(1, 1); exit(0); } authenticated: /* * Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for * authentication. */ @@ -2387,30 +2450,33 @@ main(int ac, char **av) /* * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare * file descriptor passing. */ if (use_privsep) { privsep_postauth(authctxt); /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */ if (!compat20) - destroy_sensitive_data(); + destroy_sensitive_data(0); } packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval, options.client_alive_count_max); /* Try to send all our hostkeys to the client */ if (compat20) notify_hostkeys(active_state); /* Start session. */ do_authenticated(authctxt); /* The connection has been terminated. */ + packet_destroy_all(1, 1); + destroy_sensitive_data(1); + packet_get_bytes(&ibytes, &obytes); verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes", (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes); verbose("Closing connection to %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port); #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) @@ -2561,16 +2627,20 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void) packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported cipher."); /* Get check bytes from the packet. These must match those we sent earlier with the public key packet. */ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char()) packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match."); +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + audit_kex(MODE_OUT, cipher_name(cipher_type), "crc", "none", "none"); +#endif + debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type)); /* Get the encrypted integer. */ if ((real_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed"); packet_get_bignum(real_key_int); protocol_flags = packet_get_int(); @@ -2620,17 +2690,17 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void) * Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the * session id. */ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) session_key[i] ^= session_id[i]; } /* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */ - destroy_sensitive_data(); + destroy_sensitive_data(1); if (use_privsep) mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id); /* Destroy the decrypted integer. It is no longer needed. */ BN_clear_free(real_key_int); BN_clear_free(fake_key_int); @@ -2794,26 +2864,41 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) #endif debug("KEX done"); } /* server specific fatal cleanup */ void cleanup_exit(int i) { + static int in_cleanup = 0; + int is_privsep_child; + + /* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep + wrappers used for auditing. Make sure we don't recurse + indefinitely. */ + if (in_cleanup) + _exit(i); + in_cleanup = 1; + if (the_authctxt) { do_cleanup(the_authctxt); if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) { debug("Killing privsep child %d", pmonitor->m_pid); if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 && errno != ESRCH) error("%s: kill(%d): %s", __func__, pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno)); } } + is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid == 0; + if (sensitive_data.host_keys != NULL) + destroy_sensitive_data(is_privsep_child); + packet_destroy_all(1, is_privsep_child); #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */ - if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) + if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) && + (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())) audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON); #endif _exit(i); } diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshkey.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshkey.c --- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshkey.c +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshkey.c @@ -299,16 +299,43 @@ sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(int type) case KEY_ED25519: return 1; default: return 0; } } int +sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *k) +{ + switch (k->type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + case KEY_RSA1: + case KEY_RSA: + return k->rsa->d != NULL; + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + case KEY_DSA: + return k->dsa->priv_key != NULL; +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + case KEY_ECDSA: + return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) != NULL; +#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + case KEY_ED25519: + return (k->ed25519_pk != NULL); + default: + /* fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type); */ + return 0; + } +} + +int sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *k) { if (k == NULL) return 0; return sshkey_type_is_cert(k->type); } /* Return the cert-less equivalent to a certified key type */ diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshkey.h b/openssh-7.2p2/sshkey.h --- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshkey.h +++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshkey.h @@ -128,16 +128,17 @@ const char *sshkey_type(const struct ssh const char *sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *); int sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *, FILE *); int sshkey_read(struct sshkey *, char **); u_int sshkey_size(const struct sshkey *); int sshkey_generate(int type, u_int bits, struct sshkey **keyp); int sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey **); int sshkey_type_from_name(const char *); +int sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *); int sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *); int sshkey_type_is_cert(int); int sshkey_type_plain(int); int sshkey_to_certified(struct sshkey *); int sshkey_drop_cert(struct sshkey *); int sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *); int sshkey_cert_copy(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *); int sshkey_cert_check_authority(const struct sshkey *, int, int,
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