Sign Up
Log In
Log In
or
Sign Up
Places
All Projects
Status Monitor
Collapse sidebar
SUSE:SLE-12-SP5:Update
xen.11319
CVE-2018-17962-qemuu-pcnet-integer-overflow-lea...
Overview
Repositories
Revisions
Requests
Users
Attributes
Meta
File CVE-2018-17962-qemuu-pcnet-integer-overflow-leads-to-buffer-overflow.patch of Package xen.11319
References: bsc#1111011 CVE-2018-17962 In pcnet_receive(), we try to assign size_ to size which converts from size_t to integer. This will cause troubles when size_ is greater INT_MAX, this will lead a negative value in size and it can then pass the check of size < MIN_BUF_SIZE which may lead out of bound access for both buf and buf1. Fixing by converting the type of size to size_t. CC: address@hidden Reported-by: Daniel Shapira <address@hidden> Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <address@hidden> Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <address@hidden> --- hw/net/pcnet.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) Index: xen-4.4.4-testing/tools/qemu-xen-dir-remote/hw/net/pcnet.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.4.4-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-dir-remote/hw/net/pcnet.c +++ xen-4.4.4-testing/tools/qemu-xen-dir-remote/hw/net/pcnet.c @@ -1026,14 +1026,14 @@ ssize_t pcnet_receive(NetClientState *nc uint8_t buf1[60]; int remaining; int crc_err = 0; - int size = size_; + size_t size = size_; if (CSR_DRX(s) || CSR_STOP(s) || CSR_SPND(s) || !size || (CSR_LOOP(s) && !s->looptest)) { return -1; } #ifdef PCNET_DEBUG - printf("pcnet_receive size=%d\n", size); + printf("pcnet_receive size=%zu\n", size); #endif /* if too small buffer, then expand it */
Locations
Projects
Search
Status Monitor
Help
OpenBuildService.org
Documentation
API Documentation
Code of Conduct
Contact
Support
@OBShq
Terms
openSUSE Build Service is sponsored by
The Open Build Service is an
openSUSE project
.
Sign Up
Log In
Places
Places
All Projects
Status Monitor