File quagga-13-CVE-2017-15865_rewind-fix.patch of Package quagga.35810
From bd2bdfd2c3eb225588613e835fa2dc074fd33081 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Marius Tomaschewski <mt@suse.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2024 12:16:48 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] bgpd: fix mishandled attribute length
References: CVE-2017-15865,bsc#1230866
Backported fix from frr:
- commit dacffad46143fb57e5fa973fcbfbd0eb51ea37b2
from https://github.com/FRRouting/frr/pull/1417
```
Author: Quentin Young <qlyoung@cumulusnetworks.com>
Subject: bgpd: fix mishandled attribute length
A crafted BGP UPDATE with a malformed path attribute length field causes
bgpd to dump up to 65535 bytes of application memory and send it as the
data field in a BGP NOTIFY message, which is truncated to 4075 bytes
after accounting for protocol headers. After reading a malformed length
field, a NOTIFY is generated that is supposed to contain the problematic
data, but the malformed length field is inadvertently used to compute
how much data we send.
CVE-2017-15865
```
diff --git a/bgpd/bgp_attr.c b/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
index fce4b542..fceb10cc 100644
--- a/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
+++ b/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
@@ -2167,10 +2167,44 @@ bgp_attr_parse (struct peer *peer, struct attr *attr, bgp_size_t size,
zlog (peer->log, LOG_WARNING,
"%s: BGP type %d length %d is too large, attribute total length is %d. attr_endp is %p. endp is %p", peer->host, type, length, size, attr_endp, endp);
zlog_warn ("%s: BGP type %d length %d is too large, attribute total length is %d. attr_endp is %p. endp is %p", peer->host, type, length, size, attr_endp, endp);
+ /*
+ * RFC 4271 6.3
+ * If any recognized attribute has an Attribute
+ * Length that conflicts with the expected length
+ * (based on the attribute type code), then the
+ * Error Subcode MUST be set to Attribute Length
+ * Error. The Data field MUST contain the erroneous
+ * attribute (type, length, and value).
+ * ----------
+ * We do not currently have a good way to determine the
+ * length of the attribute independent of the length
+ * received in the message. Instead we send the
+ * minimum between the amount of data we have and the
+ * amount specified by the attribute length field.
+ *
+ * Instead of directly passing in the packet buffer and
+ * offset we use the stream_get* functions to read into
+ * a stack buffer, since they perform bounds checking
+ * and we are working with untrusted data.
+ */
+ unsigned char ndata[BGP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE];
+ memset(ndata, 0x00, sizeof(ndata));
+ size_t lfl = CHECK_FLAG(flag, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_EXTLEN) ? 2 : 1;
+ /* Rewind to end of flag field */
+ stream_forward_getp(BGP_INPUT(peer), -(1 + lfl));
+ /* Type */
+ stream_get(&ndata[0], BGP_INPUT(peer), 1);
+ /* Length */
+ stream_get(&ndata[1], BGP_INPUT(peer), lfl);
+ /* Value */
+ size_t atl = attr_endp - startp;
+ size_t ndl = MIN(atl, STREAM_READABLE(BGP_INPUT(peer)));
+ stream_get(&ndata[lfl + 1], BGP_INPUT(peer), ndl);
+
bgp_notify_send_with_data (peer,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ERR,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ATTR_LENG_ERR,
- startp, endp - startp);
+ ndata, ndl + lfl + 1);
return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_ERROR;
}
--
2.43.0
From 0f97e676f577d5364d19b136e9ee4fbca6b39fb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Marius Tomaschewski <mt@suse.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2024 12:17:06 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] lib: add stream_rewind_getp()
References: CVE-2017-15865,bsc#1230866
Backport from frr:
- commit 06cf2c0c36e044dcdc4cdd5f7d6e971bc07a294c
from https://github.com/FRRouting/frr/pull/7046
```
Author: Quentin Young <qlyoung@nvidia.com>
Subject: lib: add stream_rewind_getp()
stream_forward_getp() cannot be used with negative numbers due to the
size_t argument, we'll end up doing overflow arithmetic.
```
diff --git a/lib/stream.c b/lib/stream.c
index b50992d6..01434c18 100644
--- a/lib/stream.c
+++ b/lib/stream.c
@@ -272,6 +272,19 @@ stream_forward_getp (struct stream *s, size_t size)
s->getp += size;
}
+void stream_rewind_getp(struct stream *s, size_t size)
+{
+ STREAM_VERIFY_SANE(s);
+
+ if (size > s->getp || !GETP_VALID(s, s->getp - size))
+ {
+ STREAM_BOUND_WARN (s, "rewind getp");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ s->getp -= size;
+}
+
void
stream_forward_endp (struct stream *s, size_t size)
{
diff --git a/lib/stream.h b/lib/stream.h
index 06b0ee12..c52f294c 100644
--- a/lib/stream.h
+++ b/lib/stream.h
@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ extern struct stream *stream_dupcat(struct stream *s1, struct stream *s2,
extern void stream_set_getp (struct stream *, size_t);
extern void stream_set_endp (struct stream *, size_t);
extern void stream_forward_getp (struct stream *, size_t);
+extern void stream_rewind_getp(struct stream *s, size_t size);
extern void stream_forward_endp (struct stream *, size_t);
/* steam_put: NULL source zeroes out size_t bytes of stream */
--
2.43.0
From 7b1f948357c92cfaf6fd7f9813ee2bcad2dfd242 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Marius Tomaschewski <mt@suse.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2024 12:17:23 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] bgpd: use stream_rewind_getp() to remove overflow
References: CVE-2017-15865,bsc#1230866
Backported fix from frr:
- commit 763a5d3c2dc7e9061006d56a9a983c2a8be64765
from https://github.com/FRRouting/frr/pull/7046
```
Author: Quentin Young <qlyoung@nvidia.com>
Subject: bgpd: use stream_rewind_getp() to remove overflow
Passing a negative argument to a size_t parameter creates an overflow
condition
```
diff --git a/bgpd/bgp_attr.c b/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
index fceb10cc..63a78d42 100644
--- a/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
+++ b/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
@@ -2191,7 +2191,7 @@ bgp_attr_parse (struct peer *peer, struct attr *attr, bgp_size_t size,
memset(ndata, 0x00, sizeof(ndata));
size_t lfl = CHECK_FLAG(flag, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_EXTLEN) ? 2 : 1;
/* Rewind to end of flag field */
- stream_forward_getp(BGP_INPUT(peer), -(1 + lfl));
+ stream_rewind_getp(BGP_INPUT(peer), (1 + lfl));
/* Type */
stream_get(&ndata[0], BGP_INPUT(peer), 1);
/* Length */
--
2.43.0
