File fix-CVE-2022-39253.patch of Package git

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File fix-CVE-2022-39253.patch of Package git

commit 6f054f9fb3a501c35b55c65e547a244f14c38d56
Author: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Date:   Thu Jul 28 17:35:17 2022 -0400

builtin/clone.c: disallow `--local` clones with symlinks
    
    When cloning a repository with `--local`, Git relies on either making a
    hardlink or copy to every file in the "objects" directory of the source
    repository. This is done through the callpath `cmd_clone()` ->
    `clone_local()` -> `copy_or_link_directory()`.
    
    The way this optimization works is by enumerating every file and
    directory recursively in the source repository's `$GIT_DIR/objects`
    directory, and then either making a copy or hardlink of each file. The
    only exception to this rule is when copying the "alternates" file, in
    which case paths are rewritten to be absolute before writing a new
    "alternates" file in the destination repo.
    
    One quirk of this implementation is that it dereferences symlinks when
    cloning. This behavior was most recently modified in 36596fd2df (clone:
    better handle symlinked files at .git/objects/, 2019-07-10), which
    attempted to support `--local` clones of repositories with symlinks in
    their objects directory in a platform-independent way.
    
    Unfortunately, this behavior of dereferencing symlinks (that is,
    creating a hardlink or copy of the source's link target in the
    destination repository) can be used as a component in attacking a
    victim by inadvertently exposing the contents of file stored outside of
    the repository.
    
    Take, for example, a repository that stores a Dockerfile and is used to
    build Docker images. When building an image, Docker copies the directory
    contents into the VM, and then instructs the VM to execute the
    Dockerfile at the root of the copied directory. This protects against
    directory traversal attacks by copying symbolic links as-is without
    dereferencing them.
    
    That is, if a user has a symlink pointing at their private key material
    (where the symlink is present in the same directory as the Dockerfile,
    but the key itself is present outside of that directory), the key is
    unreadable to a Docker image, since the link will appear broken from the
    container's point of view.
    
    This behavior enables an attack whereby a victim is convinced to clone a
    repository containing an embedded submodule (with a URL like
    "file:///proc/self/cwd/path/to/submodule") which has a symlink pointing
    at a path containing sensitive information on the victim's machine. If a
    user is tricked into doing this, the contents at the destination of
    those symbolic links are exposed to the Docker image at runtime.
    
    One approach to preventing this behavior is to recreate symlinks in the
    destination repository. But this is problematic, since symlinking the
    objects directory are not well-supported. (One potential problem is that
    when sharing, e.g. a "pack" directory via symlinks, different writers
    performing garbage collection may consider different sets of objects to
    be reachable, enabling a situation whereby garbage collecting one
    repository may remove reachable objects in another repository).
    
    Instead, prohibit the local clone optimization when any symlinks are
    present in the `$GIT_DIR/objects` directory of the source repository.
    Users may clone the repository again by prepending the "file://" scheme
    to their clone URL, or by adding the `--no-local` option to their `git
    clone` invocation.
    
    The directory iterator used by `copy_or_link_directory()` must no longer
    dereference symlinks (i.e., it *must* call `lstat()` instead of `stat()`
    in order to discover whether or not there are symlinks present). This has
    no bearing on the overall behavior, since we will immediately `die()` on
    encounter a symlink.
    
    Note that t5604.33 suggests that we do support local clones with
    symbolic links in the source repository's objects directory, but this
    was likely unintentional, or at least did not take into consideration
    the problem with sharing parts of the objects directory with symbolic
    links at the time. Update this test to reflect which options are and
    aren't supported.
    
    Helped-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
    Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>

diff --git a/builtin/clone.c b/builtin/clone.c
index e335734b4c..e626073b1f 100644
--- a/builtin/clone.c
+++ b/builtin/clone.c
@@ -420,13 +420,11 @@ static void copy_or_link_directory(struct strbuf *src, struct strbuf *dest,
 	int src_len, dest_len;
 	struct dir_iterator *iter;
 	int iter_status;
-	unsigned int flags;
 	struct strbuf realpath = STRBUF_INIT;
 
 	mkdir_if_missing(dest->buf, 0777);
 
-	flags = DIR_ITERATOR_PEDANTIC | DIR_ITERATOR_FOLLOW_SYMLINKS;
-	iter = dir_iterator_begin(src->buf, flags);
+	iter = dir_iterator_begin(src->buf, DIR_ITERATOR_PEDANTIC);
 
 	if (!iter)
 		die_errno(_("failed to start iterator over '%s'"), src->buf);
@@ -442,6 +440,10 @@ static void copy_or_link_directory(struct strbuf *src, struct strbuf *dest,
 		strbuf_setlen(dest, dest_len);
 		strbuf_addstr(dest, iter->relative_path);
 
+		if (S_ISLNK(iter->st.st_mode))
+			die(_("symlink '%s' exists, refusing to clone with --local"),
+			    iter->relative_path);
+
 		if (S_ISDIR(iter->st.st_mode)) {
 			mkdir_if_missing(dest->buf, 0777);
 			continue;
diff --git a/t/t5604-clone-reference.sh b/t/t5604-clone-reference.sh
index 2f7be23044..9d32f1c4a4 100755
--- a/t/t5604-clone-reference.sh
+++ b/t/t5604-clone-reference.sh
@@ -300,8 +300,6 @@ test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'setup repo with manually symlinked or unknown file
 		ln -s ../an-object $obj &&
 
 		cd ../ &&
-		find . -type f | sort >../../../T.objects-files.raw &&
-		find . -type l | sort >../../../T.objects-symlinks.raw &&
 		echo unknown_content >unknown_file
 	) &&
 	git -C T fsck &&
@@ -310,19 +308,27 @@ test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'setup repo with manually symlinked or unknown file
 
 
 test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'clone repo with symlinked or unknown files at objects/' '
-	for option in --local --no-hardlinks --shared --dissociate
+	# None of these options work when cloning locally, since T has
+	# symlinks in its `$GIT_DIR/objects` directory
+	for option in --local --no-hardlinks --dissociate
 	do
-		git clone $option T T$option || return 1 &&
-		git -C T$option fsck || return 1 &&
-		git -C T$option rev-list --all --objects >T$option.objects &&
-		test_cmp T.objects T$option.objects &&
-		(
-			cd T$option/.git/objects &&
-			find . -type f | sort >../../../T$option.objects-files.raw &&
-			find . -type l | sort >../../../T$option.objects-symlinks.raw
-		)
+		test_must_fail git clone $option T T$option 2>err || return 1 &&
+		test_i18ngrep "symlink.*exists" err || return 1
 	done &&
 
+	# But `--shared` clones should still work, even when specifying
+	# a local path *and* that repository has symlinks present in its
+	# `$GIT_DIR/objects` directory.
+	git clone --shared T T--shared &&
+	git -C T--shared fsck &&
+	git -C T--shared rev-list --all --objects >T--shared.objects &&
+	test_cmp T.objects T--shared.objects &&
+	(
+		cd T--shared/.git/objects &&
+		find . -type f | sort >../../../T--shared.objects-files.raw &&
+		find . -type l | sort >../../../T--shared.objects-symlinks.raw
+	) &&
+
 	for raw in $(ls T*.raw)
 	do
 		sed -e "s!/../!/Y/!; s![0-9a-f]\{38,\}!Z!" -e "/commit-graph/d" \
@@ -330,26 +336,6 @@ test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'clone repo with symlinked or unknown files at obje
 		sort $raw.de-sha-1 >$raw.de-sha || return 1
 	done &&
 
-	cat >expected-files <<-EOF &&
-	./Y/Z
-	./Y/Z
-	./Y/Z
-	./a-loose-dir/Z
-	./an-object
-	./info/packs
-	./pack/pack-Z.idx
-	./pack/pack-Z.pack
-	./packs/pack-Z.idx
-	./packs/pack-Z.pack
-	./unknown_file
-	EOF
-
-	for option in --local --no-hardlinks --dissociate
-	do
-		test_cmp expected-files T$option.objects-files.raw.de-sha || return 1 &&
-		test_must_be_empty T$option.objects-symlinks.raw.de-sha || return 1
-	done &&
-
 	echo ./info/alternates >expected-files &&
 	test_cmp expected-files T--shared.objects-files.raw &&
 	test_must_be_empty T--shared.objects-symlinks.raw

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File fix-CVE-2022-39253.patch of Package git

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