File fix-open-redirect.patch of Package python-Flask-Security.26161
Index: Flask-Security-3.0.0/flask_security/core.py
===================================================================
--- Flask-Security-3.0.0.orig/flask_security/core.py
+++ Flask-Security-3.0.0/flask_security/core.py
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
"""
from datetime import datetime
+import re
import pkg_resources
from flask import current_app, render_template
@@ -63,6 +64,8 @@ _default_config = {
'POST_RESET_VIEW': None,
'POST_CHANGE_VIEW': None,
'UNAUTHORIZED_VIEW': lambda: None,
+ 'REDIRECT_VALIDATE_MODE': None,
+ 'REDIRECT_VALIDATE_RE': r'^/{4,}|\\{3,}|[\s\000-\037][/\\]{2,}',
'FORGOT_PASSWORD_TEMPLATE': 'security/forgot_password.html',
'LOGIN_USER_TEMPLATE': 'security/login_user.html',
'REGISTER_USER_TEMPLATE': 'security/register_user.html',
@@ -339,6 +342,8 @@ def _get_state(app, datastore, anonymous
_send_mail_task=None,
_unauthorized_callback=None
))
+ if "redirect_validate_re" in kwargs:
+ kwargs["_redirect_validate_re"] = re.compile(kwargs["redirect_validate_re"])
for key, value in _default_forms.items():
if key not in kwargs or not kwargs[key]:
Index: Flask-Security-3.0.0/flask_security/utils.py
===================================================================
--- Flask-Security-3.0.0.orig/flask_security/utils.py
+++ Flask-Security-3.0.0/flask_security/utils.py
@@ -269,6 +269,34 @@ def url_for_security(endpoint, **values)
def validate_redirect_url(url):
+ """Validate that the URL for redirect is relative.
+ Allowing an absolute redirect is a security issue - a so-called open-redirect.
+ Note that by default Werkzeug will always take this URL and make it relative
+ when setting the Location header - but that behavior can be overridden.
+
+ The complexity here is that urlsplit() does pretty well, but browsers even today
+ May 2021 are very lenient in what they accept as URLs - for example:
+ next=\\\\github.com
+ next=%5C%5C%5Cgithub.com
+ next=/////github.com
+ next=%20\\\\github.com
+ next=%20///github.com
+ next=%20//github.com
+ next=%19////github.com - i.e. browser will strip control chars
+ next=%E2%80%8A///github.com - doesn't redirect! That is a unicode thin space.
+
+ All will result in a null netloc and scheme from urlsplit - however many browsers
+ will gladly strip off uninteresting characters and convert backslashes to forward
+ slashes - and the cases above will actually cause a redirect to github.com
+ Sigh.
+
+ Some articles claim that a relative url has to start with a '/' - but that isn't
+ strictly true. From: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3986#section-5
+ a relative path can start with a "//", "/", a non-colon, or be empty. So it seems
+ that all the above URLs are valid.
+ By the time we get the URL, it has been unencoded - so we can't really determine
+ if it is 'valid' since it appears that '/'s can appear in the URL if escaped.
+ """
if url is None or url.strip() == '':
return False
url_next = urlsplit(url)
@@ -276,6 +304,9 @@ def validate_redirect_url(url):
if (url_next.netloc or url_next.scheme) and \
url_next.netloc != url_base.netloc:
return False
+ if config_value("REDIRECT_VALIDATE_MODE") == "regex":
+ matcher = _security._redirect_validate_re.match(url)
+ return matcher is None
return True
Index: Flask-Security-3.0.0/tests/test_misc.py
===================================================================
--- Flask-Security-3.0.0.orig/tests/test_misc.py
+++ Flask-Security-3.0.0/tests/test_misc.py
@@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ from flask_security.forms import ChangeP
RegisterForm, ResetPasswordForm, SendConfirmationForm, StringField, \
email_required, email_validator, valid_user_email
from flask_security.utils import capture_reset_password_requests, \
- encode_string, hash_data, string_types, verify_hash
+ encode_string, hash_data, string_types, verify_hash, \
+ validate_redirect_url
@pytest.mark.recoverable()
@@ -280,3 +281,19 @@ def test_custom_forms_via_config(app, sq
def test_without_babel(client):
response = client.get('/login')
assert b'Login' in response.data
+
+
+@pytest.mark.settings(redirect_validate_mode="regex")
+def test_validate_redirect(app, sqlalchemy_datastore):
+ """
+ Test various possible URLs that urlsplit() shows as relative but
+ many browsers will interpret as absolute - and this have a
+ open-redirect vulnerability. Note this vulnerability only
+ is viable if the application sets autocorrect_location_header = False
+ """
+ init_app_with_options(app, sqlalchemy_datastore)
+ with app.test_request_context("http://localhost:5001/login"):
+ assert not validate_redirect_url("\\\\\\github.com")
+ assert not validate_redirect_url(" //github.com")
+ assert not validate_redirect_url("\t//github.com")
+ assert not validate_redirect_url("//github.com") # this is normal urlsplit