File pam_namespace-fix-potential-privilege-escalation.patch of Package pam.38813
Adapted from the commit:
From df1dab1a1a7900650ad4be157fea1a002048cc49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Bal-Petre <olivier.bal-petre@ssi.gouv.fr>
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2025 14:37:02 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] pam_namespace: fix potential privilege escalation
Existing protection provided by protect_dir() and protect_mount() were
bind mounting on themselves all directories part of the to-be-secured
paths. However, this works *only* against attacks executed by processes
in the same mount namespace as the one the mountpoint was created in.
Therefore, a user with an out-of-mount-namespace access, or multiple
users colluding, could exploit multiple race conditions, and, for
instance, elevate their privileges to root.
This commit keeps the existing protection as a defense in depth
measure, and to keep the existing behavior of the module. However,
it converts all the needed function calls to operate on file
descriptors instead of absolute paths to protect against race
conditions globally.
Signed-off-by: Olivier Bal-Petre <olivier.bal-petre@ssi.gouv.fr>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@strace.io>
Signed-off: Valentin Lefebvre <valentin.lefebvre@suse.com>
Index: Linux-PAM-1.3.0/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
===================================================================
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.0.orig/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.0/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
@@ -35,8 +35,19 @@
#define _ATFILE_SOURCE
#include "pam_namespace.h"
+#include "pam_cc_compat.h"
+#include "pam_inline.h"
#include "argv_parse.h"
+#define MAGIC_LNK_FD_SIZE 64
+
+/* --- evaluating all files in VENDORDIR/security/namespace.d and /etc/security/namespace.d --- */
+static const char *base_name(const char *path)
+{
+ const char *base = strrchr(path, '/');
+ return base ? base+1 : path;
+}
+
/*
* Adds an entry for a polyinstantiated directory to the linked list of
* polyinstantiated directories. It is called from process_line() while
@@ -83,12 +94,283 @@ static void del_polydir_list(struct poly
}
}
+static void
+strip_trailing_slashes(char *str)
+{
+ char *p = str + strlen(str);
+
+ while (--p > str && *p == '/')
+ *p = '\0';
+}
+
+static int protect_mount(int dfd, const char *path, struct instance_data *idata)
+{
+ struct protect_dir_s *dir = idata->protect_dirs;
+ char tmpbuf[MAGIC_LNK_FD_SIZE];
+
+ while (dir != NULL) {
+ if (strcmp(path, dir->dir) == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ dir = dir->next;
+ }
+
+ dir = calloc(1, sizeof(*dir));
+
+ if (dir == NULL) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ dir->dir = strdup(path);
+
+ if (dir->dir == NULL) {
+ free(dir);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ snprintf(tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf), "/proc/self/fd/%d", dfd);
+
+ if (idata->flags & PAMNS_DEBUG) {
+ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_INFO,
+ "Protect mount of %s over itself", path);
+ }
+
+ if (mount(tmpbuf, tmpbuf, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) != 0) {
+ int save_errno = errno;
+ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "Protect mount of %s failed: %m", tmpbuf);
+ free(dir->dir);
+ free(dir);
+ errno = save_errno;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ dir->next = idata->protect_dirs;
+ idata->protect_dirs = dir;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns a fd to the given absolute path, acquired securely. This means:
+ * - iterating on each segment of the path,
+ * - not following user symlinks,
+ * - using race-free operations.
+ *
+ * Takes a bit mask to specify the operation mode:
+ * - SECURE_OPENDIR_PROTECT: call protect_mount() on each unsafe segment of path
+ * - SECURE_OPENDIR_MKDIR: create last segment of path if does not exist
+ * - SECURE_OPENDIR_FULL_FD: open the directory with O_RDONLY instead of O_PATH,
+ * allowing more operations to be done with the returned fd
+ *
+ * Be aware that using SECURE_OPENDIR_PROTECT:
+ * - will modify some external state (global structure...) and should not be
+ * called in cleanup code paths. See wrapper secure_opendir_stateless()
+ * - need a non-NULL idata to call protect_mount()
+ */
+static int secure_opendir(const char *path, int opm, mode_t mode,
+ struct instance_data *idata)
+{
+ char *p;
+ char *d;
+ char *dir;
+ int dfd = -1;
+ int dfd_next;
+ int save_errno;
+ int flags = O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC;
+ int rv = -1;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (opm & SECURE_OPENDIR_FULL_FD)
+ flags |= O_RDONLY;
+ else
+ flags |= O_PATH;
+
+ /* Check for args consistency */
+ if ((opm & SECURE_OPENDIR_PROTECT) && idata == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Accept only absolute paths */
+ if (*path != '/')
+ return -1;
+
+ dir = p = strdup(path);
+ if (p == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Assume '/' is safe */
+ dfd = open("/", flags);
+ if (dfd == -1)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* Needed to not loop too far and call openat() on NULL */
+ strip_trailing_slashes(p);
+
+ dir++;
+
+ /* In case path is '/' */
+ if (*dir == '\0') {
+ free(p);
+ return dfd;
+ }
+
+ while ((d=strchr(dir, '/')) != NULL) {
+ *d = '\0';
+
+ dfd_next = openat(dfd, dir, flags);
+ if (dfd_next == -1)
+ goto error;
+
+ if (fstat(dfd_next, &st) != 0) {
+ close(dfd_next);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if ((flags & O_NOFOLLOW) && (opm & SECURE_OPENDIR_PROTECT)) {
+ /* we are inside user-owned dir - protect */
+ if (protect_mount(dfd_next, p, idata) == -1) {
+ close(dfd_next);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Reopen the directory to obtain a new descriptor
+ * after protect_mount(), this is necessary in cases
+ * when another directory is going to be mounted over
+ * the given path.
+ */
+ close(dfd_next);
+ dfd_next = openat(dfd, dir, flags);
+ if (dfd_next == -1)
+ goto error;
+ } else if (st.st_uid != 0
+ || (st.st_gid != 0 && (st.st_mode & S_IWGRP))
+ || (st.st_mode & S_IWOTH)) {
+ /* do not follow symlinks on subdirectories */
+ flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+ }
+
+ close(dfd);
+ dfd = dfd_next;
+
+ *d = '/';
+ dir = d + 1;
+ }
+
+ rv = openat(dfd, dir, flags);
+
+ if (rv == -1) {
+ if ((opm & SECURE_OPENDIR_MKDIR) && mkdirat(dfd, dir, mode) == 0)
+ rv = openat(dfd, dir, flags);
+
+ if (rv == -1)
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if ((flags & O_NOFOLLOW) && (opm & SECURE_OPENDIR_PROTECT)) {
+ /* we are inside user-owned dir - protect */
+ if (protect_mount(rv, p, idata) == -1) {
+ save_errno = errno;
+ close(rv);
+ rv = -1;
+ errno = save_errno;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Reopen the directory to obtain a new descriptor after
+ * protect_mount(), this is necessary in cases when another
+ * directory is going to be mounted over the given path.
+ */
+ close(rv);
+ rv = openat(dfd, dir, flags);
+ }
+
+error:
+ save_errno = errno;
+ free(p);
+ if (dfd >= 0)
+ close(dfd);
+ errno = save_errno;
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns a fd to the given path, acquired securely.
+ * It can be called in all situations, including in cleanup code paths, as
+ * it does not modify external state (no access to global structures...).
+ */
+static int secure_opendir_stateless(const char *path)
+{
+ return secure_opendir(path, 0, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Umount securely the given path, even if the directories along
+ * the path are under user control. It should protect against
+ * symlinks attacks and race conditions.
+ */
+static int secure_umount(const char *path)
+{
+ int save_errno;
+ int rv = -1;
+ int dfd = -1;
+ char s_path[MAGIC_LNK_FD_SIZE];
+
+ dfd = secure_opendir_stateless(path);
+ if (dfd == -1)
+ return rv;
+
+ if (pam_sprintf(s_path, "/proc/self/fd/%d", dfd) < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ /*
+ * We still have a fd open to path itself,
+ * so we need to do a lazy umount.
+ */
+ rv = umount2(s_path, MNT_DETACH);
+
+error:
+ save_errno = errno;
+ close(dfd);
+ errno = save_errno;
+ return rv;
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * Rmdir the given path securely, protecting against symlinks attacks
+ * and race conditions.
+ * This function is currently called only in cleanup code paths where
+ * any errors returned are not handled, so do not handle them either.
+ * Basically, try to rmdir the path on a best-effort basis.
+ */
+static void secure_try_rmdir(const char *path)
+{
+ int dfd;
+ char *buf;
+ char *parent;
+
+ buf = strdup(path);
+ if (buf == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ parent = dirname(buf);
+
+ dfd = secure_opendir_stateless(parent);
+ if (dfd >= 0) {
+ unlinkat(dfd, base_name(path), AT_REMOVEDIR);
+ close(dfd);
+ }
+
+ free(buf);
+}
+
static void unprotect_dirs(struct protect_dir_s *dir)
{
struct protect_dir_s *next;
while (dir != NULL) {
- umount(dir->dir);
+ secure_umount(dir->dir);
free(dir->dir);
next = dir->next;
free(dir);
@@ -434,27 +717,17 @@ static int process_line(char *line, cons
* Populate polyinstantiated directory structure with appropriate
* pathnames and the method with which to polyinstantiate.
*/
- if (strlen(dir) >= sizeof(poly->dir)
- || strlen(rdir) >= sizeof(poly->rdir)
- || strlen(instance_prefix) >= sizeof(poly->instance_prefix)) {
- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Pathnames too long");
- goto skipping;
- }
- strcpy(poly->dir, dir);
- strcpy(poly->rdir, rdir);
- strcpy(poly->instance_prefix, instance_prefix);
if (parse_method(method, poly, idata) != 0) {
goto skipping;
}
- if (poly->method == TMPDIR) {
- if (sizeof(poly->instance_prefix) - strlen(poly->instance_prefix) < 7) {
+ if (pam_sprintf(poly->dir, "%s", dir) < 0
+ || pam_sprintf(poly->rdir, "%s", rdir) < 0
+ || pam_sprintf(poly->instance_prefix, "%s", instance_prefix) < 0) {
pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Pathnames too long");
goto skipping;
}
- strcat(poly->instance_prefix, "XXXXXX");
- }
/*
* Ensure that all pathnames are absolute path names.
@@ -726,6 +998,23 @@ static char *md5hash(const char *instnam
}
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+static char *secure_getfilecon(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *dir)
+{
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ int dfd = secure_opendir(dir, SECURE_OPENDIR_FULL_FD, 0, NULL);
+ if (dfd < 0) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error getting fd to %s: %m", dir);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (fgetfilecon(dfd, &ctx) < 0)
+ ctx = NULL;
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "Error getting poly dir context for %s: %m", dir);
+ close(dfd);
+ return ctx;
+}
+
static int form_context(const struct polydir_s *polyptr,
security_context_t *i_context, security_context_t *origcon,
struct instance_data *idata)
@@ -737,12 +1026,9 @@ static int form_context(const struct pol
/*
* Get the security context of the directory to polyinstantiate.
*/
- rc = getfilecon(polyptr->dir, origcon);
- if (rc < 0 || *origcon == NULL) {
- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
- "Error getting poly dir context, %m");
- return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
- }
+ *origcon = secure_getfilecon(idata->pamh, polyptr->dir);
+ if (*origcon == NULL)
+ return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
if (polyptr->method == USER) return PAM_SUCCESS;
@@ -832,29 +1118,52 @@ static int form_context(const struct pol
#endif
/*
- * poly_name returns the name of the polyinstantiated instance directory
+ * From the instance differentiation string, set in the polyptr structure:
+ * - the absolute path to the instance dir,
+ * - the absolute path to the previous dir (parent),
+ * - the instance name (may be different than the instance differentiation string)
+ */
+static int set_polydir_paths(struct polydir_s *polyptr, const char *inst_differentiation)
+{
+ char *tmp;
+
+ if (pam_sprintf(polyptr->instance_absolute, "%s%s",
+ polyptr->instance_prefix, inst_differentiation) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ polyptr->instname = strrchr(polyptr->instance_absolute, '/') + 1;
+
+ if (pam_sprintf(polyptr->instance_parent, "%s", polyptr->instance_absolute) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ tmp = strrchr(polyptr->instance_parent, '/') + 1;
+ *tmp = '\0';
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the name of the polyinstantiated instance directory
* based on the method used for polyinstantiation (user, context or level)
* In addition, the function also returns the security contexts of the
* original directory to polyinstantiate and the polyinstantiated instance
* directory.
*/
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-static int poly_name(const struct polydir_s *polyptr, char **i_name,
- security_context_t *i_context, security_context_t *origcon,
- struct instance_data *idata)
+static int poly_name(struct polydir_s *polyptr, char **i_context,
+ char **origcon, struct instance_data *idata)
#else
-static int poly_name(const struct polydir_s *polyptr, char **i_name,
- struct instance_data *idata)
+static int poly_name(struct polydir_s *polyptr, struct instance_data *idata)
#endif
{
int rc;
+ char *inst_differentiation = NULL;
char *hash = NULL;
enum polymethod pm;
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
security_context_t rawcon = NULL;
#endif
- *i_name = NULL;
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
*i_context = NULL;
*origcon = NULL;
@@ -888,10 +1197,8 @@ static int poly_name(const struct polydi
switch (pm) {
case USER:
- if (asprintf(i_name, "%s", idata->user) < 0) {
- *i_name = NULL;
+ if ((inst_differentiation = strdup(idata->user)) == NULL)
goto fail;
- }
break;
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
@@ -901,26 +1208,25 @@ static int poly_name(const struct polydi
pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error translating directory context");
goto fail;
}
- if (polyptr->flags & POLYDIR_SHARED) {
- if (asprintf(i_name, "%s", rawcon) < 0) {
- *i_name = NULL;
- goto fail;
- }
- } else {
- if (asprintf(i_name, "%s_%s", rawcon, idata->user) < 0) {
- *i_name = NULL;
+ if (polyptr->flags & POLYDIR_SHARED)
+ inst_differentiation = strdup(rawcon);
+ else
+ inst_differentiation = pam_asprintf("%s_%s", rawcon, idata->user);
+ if (inst_differentiation == NULL)
goto fail;
- }
- }
break;
#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
case TMPDIR:
+ if ((inst_differentiation = strdup("XXXXXX")) == NULL)
+ goto fail;
+ goto success;
+
case TMPFS:
- if ((*i_name=strdup("")) == NULL)
- goto fail;
- return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ if ((inst_differentiation=strdup("")) == NULL)
+ goto fail;
+ goto success;
default:
if (idata->flags & PAMNS_DEBUG)
@@ -929,31 +1235,35 @@ static int poly_name(const struct polydi
}
if (idata->flags & PAMNS_DEBUG)
- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "poly_name %s", *i_name);
+ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "poly_name %s", inst_differentiation);
- if ((idata->flags & PAMNS_GEN_HASH) || strlen(*i_name) > NAMESPACE_MAX_DIR_LEN) {
- hash = md5hash(*i_name, idata);
- if (hash == NULL) {
+ if ((idata->flags & PAMNS_GEN_HASH) || strlen(inst_differentiation) > NAMESPACE_MAX_DIR_LEN) {
+ hash = md5hash(inst_differentiation, idata);
+ if (hash == NULL) {
goto fail;
}
if (idata->flags & PAMNS_GEN_HASH) {
- free(*i_name);
- *i_name = hash;
+ free(inst_differentiation);
+ inst_differentiation = hash;
hash = NULL;
} else {
char *newname;
if (asprintf(&newname, "%.*s_%s", NAMESPACE_MAX_DIR_LEN-1-(int)strlen(hash),
- *i_name, hash) < 0) {
+ inst_differentiation, hash) < 0) {
goto fail;
}
- free(*i_name);
- *i_name = newname;
+ free(inst_differentiation);
+ inst_differentiation = newname;
}
}
- rc = PAM_SUCCESS;
+success:
+ if (set_polydir_paths(polyptr, inst_differentiation) == -1)
+ goto fail;
+ rc = PAM_SUCCESS;
fail:
free(hash);
+ free(inst_differentiation);
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
freecon(rawcon);
#endif
@@ -964,187 +1274,34 @@ fail:
freecon(*origcon);
*origcon = NULL;
#endif
- free(*i_name);
- *i_name = NULL;
}
return rc;
}
-static int protect_mount(int dfd, const char *path, struct instance_data *idata)
-{
- struct protect_dir_s *dir = idata->protect_dirs;
- char tmpbuf[64];
-
- while (dir != NULL) {
- if (strcmp(path, dir->dir) == 0) {
- return 0;
- }
- dir = dir->next;
- }
-
- dir = calloc(1, sizeof(*dir));
-
- if (dir == NULL) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- dir->dir = strdup(path);
-
- if (dir->dir == NULL) {
- free(dir);
- return -1;
- }
-
- snprintf(tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf), "/proc/self/fd/%d", dfd);
-
- if (idata->flags & PAMNS_DEBUG) {
- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_INFO,
- "Protect mount of %s over itself", path);
- }
-
- if (mount(tmpbuf, tmpbuf, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) != 0) {
- int save_errno = errno;
- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
- "Protect mount of %s failed: %m", tmpbuf);
- free(dir->dir);
- free(dir);
- errno = save_errno;
- return -1;
- }
-
- dir->next = idata->protect_dirs;
- idata->protect_dirs = dir;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int protect_dir(const char *path, mode_t mode, int do_mkdir,
- struct instance_data *idata)
-{
- char *p = strdup(path);
- char *d;
- char *dir = p;
- int dfd = AT_FDCWD;
- int dfd_next;
- int save_errno;
- int flags = O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY;
- int rv = -1;
- struct stat st;
-
- if (p == NULL) {
- goto error;
- }
-
- if (*dir == '/') {
- dfd = open("/", flags);
- if (dfd == -1) {
- goto error;
- }
- dir++; /* assume / is safe */
- }
-
- while ((d=strchr(dir, '/')) != NULL) {
- *d = '\0';
- dfd_next = openat(dfd, dir, flags);
- if (dfd_next == -1) {
- goto error;
- }
-
- if (dfd != AT_FDCWD)
- close(dfd);
- dfd = dfd_next;
-
- if (fstat(dfd, &st) != 0) {
- goto error;
- }
-
- if (flags & O_NOFOLLOW) {
- /* we are inside user-owned dir - protect */
- if (protect_mount(dfd, p, idata) == -1)
- goto error;
- } else if (st.st_uid != 0 || st.st_gid != 0 ||
- (st.st_mode & S_IWOTH)) {
- /* do not follow symlinks on subdirectories */
- flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
- }
-
- *d = '/';
- dir = d + 1;
- }
-
- rv = openat(dfd, dir, flags);
-
- if (rv == -1) {
- if (!do_mkdir || mkdirat(dfd, dir, mode) != 0) {
- goto error;
- }
- rv = openat(dfd, dir, flags);
- }
-
- if (flags & O_NOFOLLOW) {
- /* we are inside user-owned dir - protect */
- if (protect_mount(rv, p, idata) == -1) {
- save_errno = errno;
- close(rv);
- rv = -1;
- errno = save_errno;
- }
- }
-
-error:
- save_errno = errno;
- free(p);
- if (dfd != AT_FDCWD && dfd >= 0)
- close(dfd);
- errno = save_errno;
-
- return rv;
-}
-
-static int check_inst_parent(char *ipath, struct instance_data *idata)
+static int check_inst_parent(int dfd, struct instance_data *idata)
{
struct stat instpbuf;
- char *inst_parent, *trailing_slash;
- int dfd;
+
/*
- * stat the instance parent path to make sure it exists
- * and is a directory. Check that its mode is 000 (unless the
- * admin explicitly instructs to ignore the instance parent
- * mode by the "ignore_instance_parent_mode" argument).
+ * Stat the instance parent directory to make sure it's writable by
+ * root only (unless the admin explicitly instructs to ignore the
+ * instance parent mode by the "ignore_instance_parent_mode" argument).
*/
- inst_parent = (char *) malloc(strlen(ipath)+1);
- if (!inst_parent) {
- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error allocating pathname string");
- return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
- }
-
- strcpy(inst_parent, ipath);
- trailing_slash = strrchr(inst_parent, '/');
- if (trailing_slash)
- *trailing_slash = '\0';
-
- dfd = protect_dir(inst_parent, 0, 1, idata);
+ if (idata->flags & PAMNS_IGN_INST_PARENT_MODE)
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
- if (dfd == -1 || fstat(dfd, &instpbuf) < 0) {
+ if (fstat(dfd, &instpbuf) < 0) {
pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
- "Error creating or accessing instance parent %s, %m", inst_parent);
- if (dfd != -1)
- close(dfd);
- free(inst_parent);
+ "Error accessing instance parent, %m");
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
- if ((idata->flags & PAMNS_IGN_INST_PARENT_MODE) == 0) {
- if ((instpbuf.st_mode & (S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)) || instpbuf.st_uid != 0) {
- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Mode of inst parent %s not 000 or owner not root",
- inst_parent);
- close(dfd);
- free(inst_parent);
- return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
- }
+ if ((instpbuf.st_mode & (S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)) || instpbuf.st_uid != 0) {
+ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "Mode of inst parent not 000 or owner not root");
+ return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
- close(dfd);
- free(inst_parent);
+
return PAM_SUCCESS;
}
@@ -1263,11 +1421,13 @@ static int create_polydir(struct polydir
}
#endif
- rc = protect_dir(dir, mode, 1, idata);
+ rc = secure_opendir(dir,
+ SECURE_OPENDIR_PROTECT | SECURE_OPENDIR_MKDIR | SECURE_OPENDIR_FULL_FD,
+ mode, idata);
if (rc == -1) {
pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
"Error creating directory %s: %m", dir);
- return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+ return -1;
}
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
@@ -1288,9 +1448,9 @@ static int create_polydir(struct polydir
pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
"Error changing mode of directory %s: %m", dir);
close(rc);
- umount(dir); /* undo the eventual protection bind mount */
- rmdir(dir);
- return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+ secure_umount(dir); /* undo the eventual protection bind mount */
+ secure_try_rmdir(dir);
+ return -1;
}
}
@@ -1308,42 +1468,38 @@ static int create_polydir(struct polydir
pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
"Unable to change owner on directory %s: %m", dir);
close(rc);
- umount(dir); /* undo the eventual protection bind mount */
- rmdir(dir);
- return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+ secure_umount(dir); /* undo the eventual protection bind mount */
+ secure_try_rmdir(dir);
+ return -1;
}
- close(rc);
-
if (idata->flags & PAMNS_DEBUG)
pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"Polydir owner %u group %u", uid, gid);
- return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ return rc;
}
/*
- * Create polyinstantiated instance directory (ipath).
+ * Create polyinstantiated instance directory.
+ * To protect against races, changes are done on a fd to the parent of the
+ * instance directory (dfd_iparent) and a relative path (polyptr->instname).
+ * The absolute path (polyptr->instance_absolute) is only updated when creating
+ * a tmpdir and used for logging purposes.
*/
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-static int create_instance(struct polydir_s *polyptr, char *ipath, struct stat *statbuf,
- security_context_t icontext, security_context_t ocontext,
- struct instance_data *idata)
+static int create_instance(struct polydir_s *polyptr, int dfd_iparent,
+ struct stat *statbuf, const char *icontext, const char *ocontext,
+ struct instance_data *idata)
#else
-static int create_instance(struct polydir_s *polyptr, char *ipath, struct stat *statbuf,
- struct instance_data *idata)
+static int create_instance(struct polydir_s *polyptr, int dfd_iparent,
+ struct stat *statbuf, struct instance_data *idata)
#endif
{
struct stat newstatbuf;
int fd;
/*
- * Check to make sure instance parent is valid.
- */
- if (check_inst_parent(ipath, idata))
- return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
-
- /*
* Create instance directory and set its security context to the context
* returned by the security policy. Set its mode and ownership
* attributes to match that of the original directory that is being
@@ -1351,29 +1507,39 @@ static int create_instance(struct polydi
*/
if (polyptr->method == TMPDIR) {
- if (mkdtemp(polyptr->instance_prefix) == NULL) {
- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error creating temporary instance %s, %m",
- polyptr->instance_prefix);
- polyptr->method = NONE; /* do not clean up! */
- return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
- }
- /* copy the actual directory name to ipath */
- strcpy(ipath, polyptr->instance_prefix);
- } else if (mkdir(ipath, S_IRUSR) < 0) {
+ char s_path[PATH_MAX];
+ /*
+ * Create the template for mkdtemp() as a magic link based on
+ * our existing fd to avoid symlink attacks and races.
+ */
+ if (pam_sprintf(s_path, "/proc/self/fd/%d/%s", dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname) < 0
+ || mkdtemp(s_path) == NULL) {
+ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "Error creating temporary instance dir %s, %m",
+ polyptr->instance_absolute);
+ polyptr->method = NONE; /* do not clean up! */
+ return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy the actual directory name to polyptr->instname */
+ strcpy(polyptr->instname, base_name(s_path));
+ } else if (mkdirat(dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname, S_IRUSR) < 0) {
if (errno == EEXIST)
return PAM_IGNORE;
else {
pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error creating %s, %m",
- ipath);
+ polyptr->instance_absolute);
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
}
- /* Open a descriptor to it to prevent races */
- fd = open(ipath, O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY);
- if (fd < 0) {
- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error opening %s, %m", ipath);
- rmdir(ipath);
+ /* Open a descriptor to prevent races, based on our existing fd. */
+ fd = openat(dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname,
+ O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error opening %s, %m",
+ polyptr->instance_absolute);
+ unlinkat(dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname, AT_REMOVEDIR);
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
@@ -1383,17 +1549,19 @@ static int create_instance(struct polydi
if (icontext) {
if (fsetfilecon(fd, icontext) < 0) {
pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
- "Error setting context of %s to %s", ipath, icontext);
+ "Error setting context of %s to %s",
+ polyptr->instance_absolute, icontext);
close(fd);
- rmdir(ipath);
+ unlinkat(dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname, AT_REMOVEDIR);
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
} else {
if (fsetfilecon(fd, ocontext) < 0) {
pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
- "Error setting context of %s to %s", ipath, ocontext);
+ "Error setting context of %s to %s",
+ polyptr->instance_absolute, ocontext);
close(fd);
- rmdir(ipath);
+ unlinkat(dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname, AT_REMOVEDIR);
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
}
@@ -1401,8 +1569,8 @@ static int create_instance(struct polydi
#endif
if (fstat(fd, &newstatbuf) < 0) {
pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error stating %s, %m",
- ipath);
- rmdir(ipath);
+ polyptr->instance_absolute);
+ unlinkat(dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname, AT_REMOVEDIR);
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
if (newstatbuf.st_uid != statbuf->st_uid ||
@@ -1410,17 +1578,17 @@ static int create_instance(struct polydi
if (fchown(fd, statbuf->st_uid, statbuf->st_gid) < 0) {
pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
"Error changing owner for %s, %m",
- ipath);
+ polyptr->instance_absolute);
close(fd);
- rmdir(ipath);
+ unlinkat(dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname, AT_REMOVEDIR);
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
}
if (fchmod(fd, statbuf->st_mode & 07777) < 0) {
pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error changing mode for %s, %m",
- ipath);
+ polyptr->instance_absolute);
close(fd);
- rmdir(ipath);
+ unlinkat(dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname, AT_REMOVEDIR);
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
close(fd);
@@ -1439,10 +1607,13 @@ static int ns_setup(struct polydir_s *po
struct instance_data *idata)
{
int retval;
+ int dfd_iparent = -1;
+ int dfd_ipath = -1;
+ int dfd_pptrdir = -1;
int newdir = 1;
- char *inst_dir = NULL;
- char *instname = NULL;
- struct stat statbuf;
+ char s_ipath[MAGIC_LNK_FD_SIZE];
+ char s_pptrdir[MAGIC_LNK_FD_SIZE];
+ struct stat statbuf;
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
security_context_t instcontext = NULL, origcontext = NULL;
#endif
@@ -1451,56 +1622,66 @@ static int ns_setup(struct polydir_s *po
pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"Set namespace for directory %s", polyptr->dir);
- retval = protect_dir(polyptr->dir, 0, 0, idata);
-
- if (retval < 0 && errno != ENOENT) {
- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Polydir %s access error: %m",
- polyptr->dir);
- return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
- }
+ dfd_pptrdir = secure_opendir(polyptr->dir, SECURE_OPENDIR_PROTECT, 0, idata);
- if (retval < 0) {
- if ((polyptr->flags & POLYDIR_CREATE) &&
- create_polydir(polyptr, idata) != PAM_SUCCESS)
- return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
- } else {
- close(retval);
+ if (dfd_pptrdir < 0) {
+ if (errno != ENOENT || !(polyptr->flags & POLYDIR_CREATE)) {
+ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Polydir %s access error: %m",
+ polyptr->dir);
+ return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+ }
+ dfd_pptrdir = create_polydir(polyptr, idata);
+ if (dfd_pptrdir < 0)
+ return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
if (polyptr->method == TMPFS) {
- if (mount("tmpfs", polyptr->dir, "tmpfs", 0, polyptr->mount_opts) < 0) {
- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error mounting tmpfs on %s, %m",
- polyptr->dir);
- return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
- }
+ /*
+ * There is no function mount() that operate on a fd, so instead, we
+ * get the magic link corresponding to the fd and give it to mount().
+ * This protects against potential races exploitable by an unpriv user.
+ */
+ if (pam_sprintf(s_pptrdir, "/proc/self/fd/%d", dfd_pptrdir) < 0) {
+ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error pam_sprintf s_pptrdir");
+ goto error_out;
+ }
- if (polyptr->flags & POLYDIR_NOINIT)
- return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ if (mount("tmpfs", s_pptrdir, "tmpfs", 0, polyptr->mount_opts) < 0) {
+ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error mounting tmpfs on %s, %m",
+ polyptr->dir);
+ goto error_out;
+ }
- return inst_init(polyptr, "tmpfs", idata, 1);
- }
+ if (polyptr->flags & POLYDIR_NOINIT) {
+ retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
- if (stat(polyptr->dir, &statbuf) < 0) {
- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error stating %s: %m",
- polyptr->dir);
- return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+ retval = inst_init(polyptr, "tmpfs", idata, 1);
+ goto cleanup;
}
+ if (fstat(dfd_pptrdir, &statbuf) < 0) {
+ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error stating %s: %m", polyptr->dir);
+ goto error_out;
+ }
+
/*
* Obtain the name of instance pathname based on the
* polyinstantiation method and instance context returned by
* security policy.
*/
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- retval = poly_name(polyptr, &instname, &instcontext,
- &origcontext, idata);
+ retval = poly_name(polyptr, &instcontext, &origcontext, idata);
#else
- retval = poly_name(polyptr, &instname, idata);
+ retval = poly_name(polyptr, idata);
#endif
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
- if (retval != PAM_IGNORE)
- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error getting instance name");
+ if (retval != PAM_IGNORE) {
+ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error getting instance name");
+ goto error_out;
+ }
goto cleanup;
} else {
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
@@ -1511,22 +1692,33 @@ static int ns_setup(struct polydir_s *po
#endif
}
- if (asprintf(&inst_dir, "%s%s", polyptr->instance_prefix, instname) < 0)
- goto error_out;
-
- if (idata->flags & PAMNS_DEBUG)
- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "instance_dir %s",
- inst_dir);
-
/*
+ * Gets a fd in a secure manner (we may be operating on a path under
+ * user control), and check it's compliant.
+ * Then, we should *always* operate on *this* fd and a relative path
+ * to be protected against race conditions.
+ */
+ dfd_iparent = secure_opendir(polyptr->instance_parent,
+ SECURE_OPENDIR_PROTECT | SECURE_OPENDIR_MKDIR, 0, idata);
+ if (dfd_iparent == -1) {
+ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "polyptr->instance_parent %s access error",
+ polyptr->instance_parent);
+ goto error_out;
+ }
+ if (check_inst_parent(dfd_iparent, idata)) {
+ goto error_out;
+ }
+
+ /*
* Create instance directory with appropriate security
* contexts, owner, group and mode bits.
*/
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- retval = create_instance(polyptr, inst_dir, &statbuf, instcontext,
- origcontext, idata);
+ retval = create_instance(polyptr, dfd_iparent, &statbuf, instcontext,
+ origcontext, idata);
#else
- retval = create_instance(polyptr, inst_dir, &statbuf, idata);
+ retval = create_instance(polyptr, dfd_iparent, &statbuf, idata);
#endif
if (retval == PAM_IGNORE) {
@@ -1539,18 +1731,47 @@ static int ns_setup(struct polydir_s *po
}
/*
+ * Instead of getting a new secure fd, we reuse the fd opened on directory
+ * polyptr->instance_parent to ensure we are working on the same dir as
+ * previously, and thus ensure that previous checks (e.g. check_inst_parent())
+ * are still relevant.
+ */
+ dfd_ipath = openat(dfd_iparent, polyptr->instname,
+ O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
+ if (dfd_ipath == -1) {
+ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error openat on %s, %m",
+ polyptr->instname);
+ goto error_out;
+ }
+
+ if (pam_sprintf(s_ipath, "/proc/self/fd/%d", dfd_ipath) < 0) {
+ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error pam_sprintf s_ipath");
+ goto error_out;
+ }
+
+ if (pam_sprintf(s_pptrdir, "/proc/self/fd/%d", dfd_pptrdir) < 0) {
+ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error pam_sprintf s_pptrdir");
+ goto error_out;
+ }
+
+ /*
* Bind mount instance directory on top of the polyinstantiated
* directory to provide an instance of polyinstantiated directory
* based on polyinstantiated method.
+ *
+ * Operates on magic links created from two fd obtained securely
+ * to protect against race conditions and symlink attacks. Indeed,
+ * the source and destination can be in a user controled path.
*/
- if (mount(inst_dir, polyptr->dir, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) {
- pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error mounting %s on %s, %m",
- inst_dir, polyptr->dir);
+ if(mount(s_ipath, s_pptrdir, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) {
+ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "Error mounting %s on %s (%s on %s), %m",
+ s_ipath, s_pptrdir, polyptr->instance_absolute, polyptr->dir);
goto error_out;
}
if (!(polyptr->flags & POLYDIR_NOINIT))
- retval = inst_init(polyptr, inst_dir, idata, newdir);
+ retval = inst_init(polyptr, polyptr->instance_absolute, idata, newdir);
goto cleanup;
@@ -1562,8 +1783,12 @@ error_out:
retval = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
cleanup:
- free(inst_dir);
- free(instname);
+ if (dfd_iparent != -1)
+ close(dfd_iparent);
+ if (dfd_ipath != -1)
+ close(dfd_ipath);
+ if (dfd_pptrdir != -1)
+ close(dfd_pptrdir);
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
freecon(instcontext);
freecon(origcontext);
@@ -1602,6 +1826,7 @@ static int cleanup_tmpdirs(struct instan
{
struct polydir_s *pptr;
pid_t rc, pid;
+ int dfd = -1;
struct sigaction newsa, oldsa;
int status;
@@ -1613,7 +1838,16 @@ static int cleanup_tmpdirs(struct instan
}
for (pptr = idata->polydirs_ptr; pptr; pptr = pptr->next) {
- if (pptr->method == TMPDIR && access(pptr->instance_prefix, F_OK) == 0) {
+ if (pptr->method == TMPDIR) {
+
+ dfd = secure_opendir_stateless(pptr->instance_parent);
+ if (dfd == -1)
+ continue;
+
+ if (faccessat(dfd, pptr->instname, F_OK, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) != 0) {
+ close(dfd);
+ continue;
+ }
pid = fork();
if (pid == 0) {
static char *envp[] = { NULL };
@@ -1623,9 +1857,19 @@ static int cleanup_tmpdirs(struct instan
_exit(1);
}
#endif
- if (execle("/bin/rm", "/bin/rm", "-rf", pptr->instance_prefix, NULL, envp) < 0)
+ if (fchdir(dfd) == -1) {
+ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Failed fchdir to %s: %m",
+ pptr->instance_absolute);
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+
+ if (execle("/bin/rm", "/bin/rm", "-rf", pptr->instname, NULL, envp) < 0)
_exit(1);
} else if (pid > 0) {
+
+ if (dfd != -1)
+ close(dfd);
+
while (((rc = waitpid(pid, &status, 0)) == (pid_t)-1) &&
(errno == EINTR));
if (rc == (pid_t)-1) {
@@ -1638,6 +1882,10 @@ static int cleanup_tmpdirs(struct instan
"Error removing %s", pptr->instance_prefix);
}
} else if (pid < 0) {
+
+ if (dfd != -1)
+ close(dfd);
+
pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
"Cannot fork to run namespace init script, %m");
rc = PAM_SESSION_ERR;
@@ -1661,6 +1909,7 @@ out:
static int setup_namespace(struct instance_data *idata, enum unmnt_op unmnt)
{
int retval = 0, need_poly = 0, changing_dir = 0;
+ int dfd = -1;
char *cptr, *fptr, poly_parent[PATH_MAX];
struct polydir_s *pptr;
@@ -1776,13 +2025,21 @@ static int setup_namespace(struct instan
strcpy(poly_parent, "/");
else if (cptr)
*cptr = '\0';
- if (chdir(poly_parent) < 0) {
+
+ dfd = secure_opendir_stateless(poly_parent);
+ if (dfd == -1) {
+ pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "Failed opening %s to fchdir: %m", poly_parent);
+ }
+ else if (fchdir(dfd) == -1) {
pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR,
- "Can't chdir to %s, %m", poly_parent);
+ "Failed fchdir to %s: %m", poly_parent);
}
+ if (dfd != -1)
+ close(dfd);
}
- if (umount(pptr->rdir) < 0) {
+ if (secure_umount(pptr->rdir) < 0) {
int saved_errno = errno;
pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Unmount of %s failed, %m",
pptr->rdir);
@@ -1852,7 +2109,7 @@ static int orig_namespace(struct instanc
"Unmounting instance dir for user %d & dir %s",
idata->uid, pptr->dir);
- if (umount(pptr->dir) < 0) {
+ if (secure_umount(pptr->dir) < 0) {
pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Unmount of %s failed, %m",
pptr->dir);
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
Index: Linux-PAM-1.3.0/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.h
===================================================================
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.0.orig/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.h
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.0/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.h
@@ -124,6 +124,13 @@
#define NAMESPACE_PROTECT_DATA "pam_namespace:protect_data"
/*
+ * Operation mode for function secure_opendir()
+ */
+#define SECURE_OPENDIR_PROTECT 0x00000001
+#define SECURE_OPENDIR_MKDIR 0x00000002
+#define SECURE_OPENDIR_FULL_FD 0x00000004
+
+/*
* Polyinstantiation method options, based on user, security context
* or both
*/
@@ -160,7 +167,10 @@ struct polydir_s {
char dir[PATH_MAX]; /* directory to polyinstantiate */
char rdir[PATH_MAX]; /* directory to unmount (based on RUSER) */
char instance_prefix[PATH_MAX]; /* prefix for instance dir path name */
- enum polymethod method; /* method used to polyinstantiate */
+ char instance_absolute[PATH_MAX]; /* absolute path to the instance dir (instance_parent + instname) */
+ char instance_parent[PATH_MAX]; /* parent dir of the instance dir */
+ char *instname; /* last segment of the path to the instance dir */
+ enum polymethod method; /* method used to polyinstantiate */
unsigned int num_uids; /* number of override uids */
uid_t *uid; /* list of override uids */
unsigned int flags; /* polydir flags */
