File CVE-2022-43548.patch of Package nodejs10.26739
From 2b433af094fb79cf80f086038b7f36342cb6826f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Tobias=20Nie=C3=9Fen?= <tniessen@tnie.de>
Date: Sun, 25 Sep 2022 12:34:05 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] inspector: harden IP address validation again
Use inet_pton() to parse IP addresses, which restricts IP addresses
to a small number of well-defined formats. In particular, octal and
hexadecimal number formats are not allowed, and neither are leading
zeros. Also explicitly reject 0.0.0.0/8 and ::/128 as non-routable.
Refs: https://hackerone.com/reports/1710652
CVE-ID: CVE-2022-43548
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/354
Reviewed-by: Michael Dawson <midawson@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Rafael Gonzaga <rafael.nunu@hotmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Trott <rtrott@gmail.com>
---
src/inspector_socket.cc | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++------
test/cctest/test_inspector_socket.cc | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 142 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
Index: node-v10.24.1/src/inspector_socket.cc
===================================================================
--- node-v10.24.1.orig/src/inspector_socket.cc
+++ node-v10.24.1/src/inspector_socket.cc
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include "openssl/sha.h" // Sha-1 hash
+#include <algorithm>
#include <map>
#include <string.h>
@@ -165,24 +166,70 @@ static std::string TrimPort(const std::s
}
static bool IsIPAddress(const std::string& host) {
- if (host.length() >= 4 && host.front() == '[' && host.back() == ']')
- return true;
- uint_fast16_t accum = 0;
- uint_fast8_t quads = 0;
- bool empty = true;
- auto endOctet = [&accum, &quads, &empty](bool final = false) {
- return !empty && accum <= 0xff && ++quads <= 4 && final == (quads == 4) &&
- (empty = true) && !(accum = 0);
- };
- for (char c : host) {
- if (isdigit(c)) {
- if ((accum = (accum * 10) + (c - '0')) > 0xff) return false;
- empty = false;
- } else if (c != '.' || !endOctet()) {
+ // TODO(tniessen): add CVEs to the following bullet points
+ // To avoid DNS rebinding attacks, we are aware of the following requirements:
+ // * the host name must be an IP address,
+ // * the IP address must be routable, and
+ // * the IP address must be formatted unambiguously.
+
+ // The logic below assumes that the string is null-terminated, so ensure that
+ // we did not somehow end up with null characters within the string.
+ if (host.find('\0') != std::string::npos) return false;
+
+ // All IPv6 addresses must be enclosed in square brackets, and anything
+ // enclosed in square brackets must be an IPv6 address.
+ if (host.length() >= 4 && host.front() == '[' && host.back() == ']') {
+ // INET6_ADDRSTRLEN is the maximum length of the dual format (including the
+ // terminating null character), which is the longest possible representation
+ // of an IPv6 address: xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:ddd.ddd.ddd.ddd
+ if (host.length() - 2 >= INET6_ADDRSTRLEN) return false;
+
+ // Annoyingly, libuv's implementation of inet_pton() deviates from other
+ // implementations of the function in that it allows '%' in IPv6 addresses.
+ if (host.find('%') != std::string::npos) return false;
+
+ // Parse the IPv6 address to ensure it is syntactically valid.
+ char ipv6_str[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
+ std::copy(host.begin() + 1, host.end() - 1, ipv6_str);
+ ipv6_str[host.length()] = '\0';
+ unsigned char ipv6[sizeof(struct in6_addr)];
+ if (uv_inet_pton(AF_INET6, ipv6_str, ipv6) != 0) return false;
+
+ // The only non-routable IPv6 address is ::/128. It should not be necessary
+ // to explicitly reject it because it will still be enclosed in square
+ // brackets and not even macOS should make DNS requests in that case, but
+ // history has taught us that we cannot be careful enough.
+ // Note that RFC 4291 defines both "IPv4-Compatible IPv6 Addresses" and
+ // "IPv4-Mapped IPv6 Addresses", which means that there are IPv6 addresses
+ // (other than ::/128) that represent non-routable IPv4 addresses. However,
+ // this translation assumes that the host is interpreted as an IPv6 address
+ // in the first place, at which point DNS rebinding should not be an issue.
+ if (std::all_of(ipv6, ipv6 + sizeof(ipv6), [](auto b) { return b == 0; })) {
return false;
}
+
+ // It is a syntactically valid and routable IPv6 address enclosed in square
+ // brackets. No client should be able to misinterpret this.
+ return true;
}
- return endOctet(true);
+
+ // Anything not enclosed in square brackets must be an IPv4 address. It is
+ // important here that inet_pton() accepts only the so-called dotted-decimal
+ // notation, which is a strict subset of the so-called numbers-and-dots
+ // notation that is allowed by inet_aton() and inet_addr(). This subset does
+ // not allow hexadecimal or octal number formats.
+ unsigned char ipv4[sizeof(struct in_addr)];
+ if (uv_inet_pton(AF_INET, host.c_str(), ipv4) != 0) return false;
+
+ // The only strictly non-routable IPv4 address is 0.0.0.0, and macOS will make
+ // DNS requests for this IP address, so we need to explicitly reject it. In
+ // fact, we can safely reject all of 0.0.0.0/8 (see Section 3.2 of RFC 791 and
+ // Section 3.2.1.3 of RFC 1122).
+ // Note that inet_pton() stores the IPv4 address in network byte order.
+ if (ipv4[0] == 0) return false;
+
+ // It is a routable IPv4 address in dotted-decimal notation.
+ return true;
}
// Constants for hybi-10 frame format.
Index: node-v10.24.1/test/cctest/test_inspector_socket.cc
===================================================================
--- node-v10.24.1.orig/test/cctest/test_inspector_socket.cc
+++ node-v10.24.1/test/cctest/test_inspector_socket.cc
@@ -924,4 +924,85 @@ TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIpTooMan
expect_handshake_failure();
}
+TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIpInvalidOctalOctetStartChecked) {
+ const std::string INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST = "GET /json HTTP/1.1\r\n"
+ "Host: 08.1.1.1:9229\r\n\r\n";
+ send_in_chunks(INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.c_str(),
+ INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.length());
+ expect_handshake_failure();
+}
+
+TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIpInvalidOctalOctetMidChecked) {
+ const std::string INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST = "GET /json HTTP/1.1\r\n"
+ "Host: 1.09.1.1:9229\r\n\r\n";
+ send_in_chunks(INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.c_str(),
+ INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.length());
+ expect_handshake_failure();
+}
+
+TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIpInvalidOctalOctetEndChecked) {
+ const std::string INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST = "GET /json HTTP/1.1\r\n"
+ "Host: 1.1.1.009:9229\r\n\r\n";
+ send_in_chunks(INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.c_str(),
+ INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.length());
+ expect_handshake_failure();
+}
+
+TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIpLeadingZeroStartChecked) {
+ const std::string INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST = "GET /json HTTP/1.1\r\n"
+ "Host: 01.1.1.1:9229\r\n\r\n";
+ send_in_chunks(INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.c_str(),
+ INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.length());
+ expect_handshake_failure();
+}
+
+TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIpLeadingZeroMidChecked) {
+ const std::string INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST = "GET /json HTTP/1.1\r\n"
+ "Host: 1.1.001.1:9229\r\n\r\n";
+ send_in_chunks(INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.c_str(),
+ INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.length());
+ expect_handshake_failure();
+}
+
+TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIpLeadingZeroEndChecked) {
+ const std::string INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST = "GET /json HTTP/1.1\r\n"
+ "Host: 1.1.1.01:9229\r\n\r\n";
+ send_in_chunks(INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.c_str(),
+ INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.length());
+ expect_handshake_failure();
+}
+
+
+TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIPv6NonRoutable) {
+ const std::string INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST = "GET /json HTTP/1.1\r\n"
+ "Host: [::]:9229\r\n\r\n";
+ send_in_chunks(INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.c_str(),
+ INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.length());
+ expect_handshake_failure();
+}
+
+TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIPv6NonRoutableDual) {
+ const std::string INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST = "GET /json HTTP/1.1\r\n"
+ "Host: [::0.0.0.0]:9229\r\n\r\n";
+ send_in_chunks(INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.c_str(),
+ INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.length());
+ expect_handshake_failure();
+}
+
+TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIPv4InSquareBrackets) {
+ const std::string INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST = "GET /json HTTP/1.1\r\n"
+ "Host: [127.0.0.1]:9229\r\n\r\n";
+ send_in_chunks(INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.c_str(),
+ INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.length());
+ expect_handshake_failure();
+}
+
+TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIPv6InvalidAbbreviation) {
+ const std::string INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST = "GET /json HTTP/1.1\r\n"
+ "Host: [:::1]:9229\r\n\r\n";
+ send_in_chunks(INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.c_str(),
+ INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.length());
+ expect_handshake_failure();
+}
+
} // anonymous namespace
