File CVE-2019-9947-no-ctrl-char-http.patch of Package python3.11599
--- a/Lib/http/client.py
+++ b/Lib/http/client.py
@@ -141,6 +141,16 @@ _MAXHEADERS = 100
_is_legal_header_name = re.compile(rb'[^:\s][^:\r\n]*').fullmatch
_is_illegal_header_value = re.compile(rb'\n(?![ \t])|\r(?![ \t\n])').search
+# These characters are not allowed within HTTP URL paths.
+# See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#section-3.3 and the
+# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#appendix-A pchar definition.
+# Prevents CVE-2019-9740. Includes control characters such as \r\n.
+# We don't restrict chars above \x7f as putrequest() limits us to ASCII.
+_contains_disallowed_url_pchar_re = re.compile('[\x00-\x20\x7f]')
+# Arguably only these _should_ allowed:
+# _is_allowed_url_pchars_re = re.compile(r"^[/!$&'()*+,;=:@%a-zA-Z0-9._~-]+$")
+# We are more lenient for assumed real world compatibility purposes.
+
# We always set the Content-Length header for these methods because some
# servers will otherwise respond with a 411
_METHODS_EXPECTING_BODY = {'PATCH', 'POST', 'PUT'}
@@ -1111,6 +1121,11 @@ class HTTPConnection:
self._method = method
if not url:
url = '/'
+ # Prevent CVE-2019-9740.
+ match = _contains_disallowed_url_pchar_re.search(url)
+ if match:
+ raise InvalidURL(("URL can't contain control characters. {!r} " +
+ "(found at least {!r})").format(url, match.group))
request = '%s %s %s' % (method, url, self._http_vsn_str)
# Non-ASCII characters should have been eliminated earlier
--- a/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
@@ -329,6 +329,56 @@ class urlopen_HttpTests(unittest.TestCas
finally:
self.unfakehttp()
+ def test_url_with_control_char_rejected(self):
+ for char_no in list(range(0, 0x21)) + [0x7f]:
+ char = chr(char_no)
+ schemeless_url = "//localhost:7777/test{}/".format(char)
+ self.fakehttp(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nHello.")
+ try:
+ # We explicitly test urllib.request.urlopen() instead of
+ # the top level 'def urlopen()' function defined in
+ # this... (quite ugly) test suite. They use different
+ # url opening codepaths. Plain urlopen uses
+ # FancyURLOpener which goes via a codepath that calls
+ # urllib.parse.quote() on the URL which makes all of the
+ # above attempts at injection within the url _path_
+ # safe.
+ escaped_char_repr = repr(char).replace('\\', r'\\')
+ with self.assertRaisesRegex(
+ http.client.InvalidURL, "contain control"):
+ urllib.request.urlopen("http:{}".format(schemeless_url))
+ with self.assertRaisesRegex(
+ http.client.InvalidURL, "contain control"):
+ urllib.request.urlopen("https:{}".format(schemeless_url))
+ # This code path quotes the URL so there is no injection.
+ resp = urlopen("http:{}".format(schemeless_url))
+ self.assertNotIn(char, resp.geturl())
+ finally:
+ self.unfakehttp()
+
+ def test_url_with_newline_header_injection_rejected(self):
+ self.fakehttp(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nHello.")
+ host = "localhost:7777?a=1 HTTP/1.1\r\nX-injected: header\r\nTEST: 123"
+ schemeless_url = "//" + host + ":8080/test/?test=a"
+ try:
+ # We explicitly test urllib.request.urlopen() instead of the top
+ # level 'def urlopen()' function defined in this... (quite ugly)
+ # test suite. they use different url opening codepaths. plain
+ # urlopen uses FancyURLOpener which goes via a codepath that
+ # calls urllib.parse.quote() on the URL which makes all of the
+ # above attempts at injection within the url _path_ safe.
+ with self.assertRaisesRegex(http.client.InvalidURL, r"contain control.*\\r"):
+ urllib.request.urlopen("http:{}".format(schemeless_url))
+ with self.assertRaisesRegex(http.client.InvalidURL, r"contain control.*\\n"):
+ urllib.request.urlopen("http:{}".format(schemeless_url))
+ # This code path quotes the URL so there is no injection.
+ resp = urlopen("http:{}".format(schemeless_url))
+ self.assertNotIn(' ', resp.geturl())
+ self.assertNotIn('\r', resp.geturl())
+ self.assertNotIn('\n', resp.geturl())
+ finally:
+ self.unfakehttp()
+
def test_read_0_9(self):
# "0.9" response accepted (but not "simple responses" without
# a status line)
--- a/Lib/test/test_xmlrpc.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_xmlrpc.py
@@ -949,9 +949,13 @@ class SimpleServerTestCase(BaseServerTes
def test_partial_post(self):
# Check that a partial POST doesn't make the server loop: issue #14001.
- conn = http.client.HTTPConnection(ADDR, PORT)
- conn.request('POST', '/RPC2 HTTP/1.0\r\nContent-Length: 100\r\n\r\nbye')
- conn.close()
+ with contextlib.closing(socket.create_connection((ADDR, PORT))) as conn:
+ conn.send(('POST /RPC2 HTTP/1.0\r\n' +
+ 'Content-Length: 100\r\n\r\n' +
+ 'bye HTTP/1.1\r\n' +
+ 'Host: {}:{}\r\n'.format(ADDR,PORT) +
+ 'Accept-Encoding: identity\r\n' +
+ 'Content-Length: 0\r\n\r\n').encode('ascii'))
def test_context_manager(self):
with xmlrpclib.ServerProxy(URL) as server:
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-04-10-08-53-30.bpo-36276.51E-DA.rst
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Address CVE-2019-9740 by disallowing URL paths with embedded whitespace or control characters through into the underlying http client request. Such potentially malicious header injection URLs now cause a InvalidURL to be raised.
\ No newline at end of file
