File xsa400-01.patch of Package xen.31431

VT-d: fix (de)assign ordering when RMRRs are in use

In the event that the RMRR mappings are essential for device operation,
they should be established before updating the device's context entry,
while they should be torn down only after the device's context entry was
successfully updated.

Also adjust a related log message.

This is part of XSA-400.

Fixes: 8b99f4400b69 ("VT-d: fix RMRR related error handling")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>

--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
@@ -2442,6 +2442,10 @@ static int reassign_device_ownership(
 {
     int ret;
 
+    ret = domain_context_unmap(source, devfn, pdev);
+    if ( ret )
+        return ret;
+
     /*
      * Devices assigned to untrusted domains (here assumed to be any domU)
      * can attempt to send arbitrary LAPIC/MSI messages. We are unprotected
@@ -2478,10 +2482,6 @@ static int reassign_device_ownership(
             }
     }
 
-    ret = domain_context_unmap(source, devfn, pdev);
-    if ( ret )
-        return ret;
-
     if ( devfn == pdev->devfn && pdev->domain != dom_io )
     {
         list_move(&pdev->domain_list, &dom_io->arch.pdev_list);
@@ -2558,9 +2558,8 @@ static int intel_iommu_assign_device(
         }
     }
 
-    ret = reassign_device_ownership(s, d, devfn, pdev);
-    if ( ret || d == dom_io )
-        return ret;
+    if ( d == dom_io )
+        return reassign_device_ownership(s, d, devfn, pdev);
 
     /* Setup rmrr identity mapping */
     for_each_rmrr_device( rmrr, bdf, i )
@@ -2573,20 +2572,37 @@ static int intel_iommu_assign_device(
                                          rmrr->end_address, flag);
             if ( ret )
             {
-                int rc;
-
-                rc = reassign_device_ownership(d, s, devfn, pdev);
                 printk(XENLOG_G_ERR VTDPREFIX
-                       " cannot map reserved region (%"PRIx64",%"PRIx64"] for Dom%d (%d)\n",
-                       rmrr->base_address, rmrr->end_address,
-                       d->domain_id, ret);
-                if ( rc )
-                {
-                    printk(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX
-                           " failed to reclaim %04x:%02x:%02x.%u from %pd (%d)\n",
-                           seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn), d, rc);
-                    domain_crash(d);
-                }
+                       "%pd: cannot map reserved region [%"PRIx64",%"PRIx64"]: %d\n",
+                       d, rmrr->base_address, rmrr->end_address, ret);
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if ( !ret )
+        ret = reassign_device_ownership(s, d, devfn, pdev);
+
+    /* See reassign_device_ownership() for the hwdom aspect. */
+    if ( !ret || is_hardware_domain(d) )
+        return ret;
+
+    for_each_rmrr_device( rmrr, bdf, i )
+    {
+        if ( rmrr->segment == seg &&
+             PCI_BUS(bdf) == bus &&
+             PCI_DEVFN2(bdf) == devfn )
+        {
+            int rc = iommu_identity_mapping(d, p2m_access_x,
+                                            rmrr->base_address,
+                                            rmrr->end_address, 0);
+
+            if ( rc && rc != -ENOENT )
+            {
+                printk(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX
+                       "%pd: cannot unmap reserved region [%"PRIx64",%"PRIx64"]: %d\n",
+                       d, rmrr->base_address, rmrr->end_address, rc);
+                domain_crash(d);
                 break;
             }
         }