File xsa435-0-45.patch of Package xen.32200
From 36525a964fb629d0bd26e5a1c42de467af7a42a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Date: Thu, 25 May 2023 20:31:22 +0100
Subject: x86/spec-ctrl: Fix up the RSBA/RRSBA bits as appropriate
In order to level a VM safely for migration, the toolstack needs to know the
RSBA/RRSBA properties of the CPU, whether or not they happen to be enumerated.
See the code comment for details.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Also minimal fragments from:
c/s 0bf9efb9ee4c ("xen/arm: Sanitize cpuinfo ID registers fields")
to introduce TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC.
--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
@@ -587,7 +587,10 @@ static bool __init check_smt_enabled(voi
return false;
}
-/* Calculate whether Retpoline is known-safe on this CPU. */
+/*
+ * Calculate whether Retpoline is known-safe on this CPU. Fix up the
+ * RSBA/RRSBA bits as necessary.
+ */
static bool __init retpoline_calculations(void)
{
unsigned int ucode_rev = this_cpu(ucode_cpu_info).cpu_sig.rev;
@@ -601,15 +604,93 @@ static bool __init retpoline_calculation
return false;
/*
- * RSBA may be set by a hypervisor to indicate that we may move to a
- * processor which isn't retpoline-safe.
+ * The meaning of the RSBA and RRSBA bits have evolved over time. The
+ * agreed upon meaning at the time of writing (May 2023) is thus:
*
+ * - RSBA (RSB Alternative) means that an RSB may fall back to an
+ * alternative predictor on underflow. Skylake uarch and later all have
+ * this property. Broadwell too, when running microcode versions prior
+ * to Jan 2018.
+ *
+ * - All eIBRS-capable processors suffer RSBA, but eIBRS also introduces
+ * tagging of predictions with the mode in which they were learned. So
+ * when eIBRS is active, RSBA becomes RRSBA (Restricted RSBA).
+ *
+ * - CPUs are not expected to enumerate both RSBA and RRSBA.
+ *
+ * Some parts (Broadwell) are not expected to ever enumerate this
+ * behaviour directly. Other parts have differing enumeration with
+ * microcode version. Fix up Xen's idea, so we can advertise them safely
+ * to guests, and so toolstacks can level a VM safety for migration.
+ *
+ * The following states exist:
+ *
+ * | | RSBA | EIBRS | RRSBA | Notes | Action (in principle) |
+ * |---+------+-------+-------+--------------------+-----------------------|
+ * | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | OK (older parts) | Maybe +RSBA |
+ * | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Broken | (+RSBA, -RRSBA) |
+ * | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | OK (pre-Aug ucode) | +RRSBA |
+ * | 4 | 0 | 1 | 1 | OK | |
+ * | 5 | 1 | 0 | 0 | OK | |
+ * | 6 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Broken | (-RRSBA) |
+ * | 7 | 1 | 1 | 0 | Broken | (-RSBA, +RRSBA) |
+ * | 8 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Broken | (-RSBA) |
+ *
+ * However, we don't need perfect adherence to the spec. We only need
+ * RSBA || RRSBA to indicate "alternative predictors potentially in use".
+ * Rows 1 & 3 are fixed up by later logic, as they're known configurations
+ * which exist in the world.
+ *
+ * Complain loudly at the broken cases. They're safe for Xen to use (so we
+ * don't attempt to correct), and may or may not exist in reality, but if
+ * we ever encounter them in practice, something is wrong and needs
+ * further investigation.
+ */
+ if ( cpu_has_eibrs ? cpu_has_rsba /* Rows 7, 8 */
+ : cpu_has_rrsba /* Rows 2, 6 */ )
+ {
+ printk(XENLOG_ERR
+ "FIRMWARE BUG: CPU %02x-%02x-%02x, ucode 0x%08x: RSBA %u, EIBRS %u, RRSBA %u\n",
+ boot_cpu_data.x86, boot_cpu_data.x86_model,
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_mask, ucode_rev,
+ cpu_has_rsba, cpu_has_eibrs, cpu_has_rrsba);
+ add_taint(TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC);
+ }
+
+ /*
* Processors offering Enhanced IBRS are not guarenteed to be
* repoline-safe.
*/
- if ( cpu_has_rsba || cpu_has_eibrs )
+ if ( cpu_has_eibrs )
+ {
+ /*
+ * Prior to the August 2023 microcode, many eIBRS-capable parts did
+ * not enumerate RRSBA.
+ */
+ if ( !cpu_has_rrsba )
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RRSBA);
+
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * RSBA is explicitly enumerated in some cases, but may also be set by a
+ * hypervisor to indicate that we may move to a processor which isn't
+ * retpoline-safe.
+ */
+ if ( cpu_has_rsba )
return false;
+ /*
+ * At this point, we've filtered all the legal RSBA || RRSBA cases (or the
+ * known non-ideal cases). If ARCH_CAPS is visible, trust the absence of
+ * RSBA || RRSBA. There's no known microcode which advertises ARCH_CAPS
+ * without RSBA or EIBRS, and if we're virtualised we can't rely the model
+ * check anyway.
+ */
+ if ( cpu_has_arch_caps )
+ return true;
+
switch ( boot_cpu_data.x86_model )
{
case 0x17: /* Penryn */
@@ -697,6 +778,15 @@ static bool __init retpoline_calculation
break;
}
+ if ( !safe )
+ {
+ /*
+ * Note: the eIBRS-capable parts are filtered out earlier, so the
+ * remainder here are the ones which suffer RSBA behaviour.
+ */
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSBA);
+ }
+
return safe;
}
@@ -1108,7 +1198,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations
has_spec_ctrl = (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) ||
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS));
- /* Determine if retpoline is safe on this CPU. */
+ /* Determine if retpoline is safe on this CPU. Fix up RSBA/RRSBA enumerations. */
retpoline_safe = retpoline_calculations();
/*
--- a/xen/common/kernel.c
+++ b/xen/common/kernel.c
@@ -341,6 +341,7 @@ unsigned int tainted;
* 'E' - An error (e.g. a machine check exceptions) has been injected.
* 'H' - HVM forced emulation prefix is permitted.
* 'M' - Machine had a machine check experience.
+ * 'S' - Out of spec CPU (Incompatible features on one or more cores).
*
* The string is overwritten by the next call to print_taint().
*/
@@ -348,11 +349,12 @@ char *print_tainted(char *str)
{
if ( tainted )
{
- snprintf(str, TAINT_STRING_MAX_LEN, "Tainted: %c%c%c%c",
+ snprintf(str, TAINT_STRING_MAX_LEN, "Tainted: %c%c%c%c%c",
tainted & TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK ? 'M' : ' ',
tainted & TAINT_SYNC_CONSOLE ? 'C' : ' ',
tainted & TAINT_ERROR_INJECT ? 'E' : ' ',
- tainted & TAINT_HVM_FEP ? 'H' : ' ');
+ tainted & TAINT_HVM_FEP ? 'H' : ' ',
+ tainted & TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC ? 'S' : ' ');
}
else
{
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h
@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@
#define cpu_has_tsx_ctrl boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSX_CTRL)
#define cpu_has_taa_no boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TAA_NO)
#define cpu_has_fb_clear boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FB_CLEAR)
+#define cpu_has_rrsba boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RRSBA)
/* Synthesized. */
#define cpu_has_arch_perfmon boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON)
--- a/xen/include/xen/lib.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/lib.h
@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ uint64_t muldiv64(uint64_t a, uint32_t b
#define TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK (1u << 1)
#define TAINT_ERROR_INJECT (1u << 2)
#define TAINT_HVM_FEP (1u << 3)
+#define TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC (1u << 5)
extern unsigned int tainted;
#define TAINT_STRING_MAX_LEN 20
extern char *print_tainted(char *str);
