File CVE-2012-0884.patch of Package compat-openssl098.28468
Index: openssl-0.9.8j/apps/cms.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-0.9.8j.orig/apps/cms.c
+++ openssl-0.9.8j/apps/cms.c
@@ -226,6 +226,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
else if (!strcmp(*args,"-camellia256"))
cipher = EVP_camellia_256_cbc();
#endif
+ else if (!strcmp (*args, "-debug_decrypt"))
+ flags |= CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT;
else if (!strcmp (*args, "-text"))
flags |= CMS_TEXT;
else if (!strcmp (*args, "-nointern"))
@@ -1013,6 +1015,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
ret = 4;
if (operation == SMIME_DECRYPT)
{
+ if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT)
+ CMS_decrypt(cms, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, flags);
if (secret_key)
{
Index: openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/cms/cms.h
===================================================================
--- openssl-0.9.8j.orig/crypto/cms/cms.h
+++ openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/cms/cms.h
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(CMS_Receipt
#define CMS_PARTIAL 0x4000
#define CMS_REUSE_DIGEST 0x8000
#define CMS_USE_KEYID 0x10000
+#define CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT 0x20000
const ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_type(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
Index: openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-0.9.8j.orig/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
+++ openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_E
const EVP_CIPHER *ciph;
X509_ALGOR *calg = ec->contentEncryptionAlgorithm;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], *piv = NULL;
+ unsigned char *tkey = NULL;
+ size_t tkeylen;
int ok = 0;
@@ -137,32 +139,57 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_E
CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
goto err;
}
-
-
- if (enc && !ec->key)
+ /* Generate random session key */
+ if (!enc || !ec->key)
{
- /* Generate random key */
- if (!ec->keylen)
- ec->keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
- ec->key = OPENSSL_malloc(ec->keylen);
- if (!ec->key)
+ tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+ tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen);
+ if (!tkey)
{
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, ec->key) <= 0)
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, tkey) <= 0)
goto err;
- keep_key = 1;
}
- else if (ec->keylen != (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx))
+
+ if (!ec->key)
+ {
+ ec->key = tkey;
+ ec->keylen = tkeylen;
+ tkey = NULL;
+ if (enc)
+ keep_key = 1;
+ else
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ }
+
+ if (ec->keylen != tkeylen)
{
/* If necessary set key length */
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, ec->keylen) <= 0)
{
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
- CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
- goto err;
+ /* Only reveal failure if debugging so we don't
+ * leak information which may be useful in MMA.
+ */
+ if (ec->debug)
+ {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
+ CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Use random key */
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
+ OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
+ ec->key = tkey;
+ ec->keylen = tkeylen;
+ tkey = NULL;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
}
}
@@ -198,6 +225,11 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_E
OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
ec->key = NULL;
}
+ if (tkey)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tkey, tkeylen);
+ OPENSSL_free(tkey);
+ }
if (ok)
return b;
BIO_free(b);
Index: openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-0.9.8j.orig/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
+++ openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
@@ -352,6 +352,8 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decryp
unsigned char *ek = NULL;
int eklen;
int ret = 0;
+ CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
+ ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
if (ktri->pkey == NULL)
{
@@ -382,8 +384,14 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decryp
ret = 1;
- cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->key = ek;
- cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->keylen = eklen;
+ if (ec->key)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
+ OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
+ }
+
+ ec->key = ek;
+ ec->keylen = eklen;
err:
if (!ret && ek)
Index: openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h
===================================================================
--- openssl-0.9.8j.orig/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h
+++ openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h
@@ -175,6 +175,8 @@ struct CMS_EncryptedContentInfo_st
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
unsigned char *key;
size_t keylen;
+ /* Set to 1 if we are debugging decrypt and don't fake keys for MMA */
+ int debug;
};
struct CMS_RecipientInfo_st
Index: openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-0.9.8j.orig/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
+++ openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
@@ -622,7 +622,10 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInf
STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *ris;
CMS_RecipientInfo *ri;
int i, r;
+ int debug = 0;
ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms);
+ if (ris)
+ debug = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug;
for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(ris); i++)
{
ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(ris, i);
@@ -636,17 +639,38 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInf
CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, pk);
r = CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(cms, ri);
CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, NULL);
- if (r > 0)
- return 1;
if (cert)
{
+ /* If not debugging clear any error and
+ * return success to avoid leaking of
+ * information useful to MMA
+ */
+ if (!debug)
+ {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (r > 0)
+ return 1;
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY,
CMS_R_DECRYPT_ERROR);
return 0;
}
- ERR_clear_error();
+ /* If no cert and not debugging don't leave loop
+ * after first successful decrypt. Always attempt
+ * to decrypt all recipients to avoid leaking timing
+ * of a successful decrypt.
+ */
+ else if (r > 0 && debug)
+ return 1;
}
}
+ /* If no cert and not debugging always return success */
+ if (!cert && !debug)
+ {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ return 1;
+ }
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT);
return 0;
@@ -705,6 +729,12 @@ int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EV
}
if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
return 0;
+ if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT)
+ cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 1;
+ else
+ cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 0;
+ if (!pk && !cert && !dcont && !out)
+ return 1;
if (pk && !CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(cms, pk, cert))
return 0;
Index: openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-0.9.8j.orig/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
+++ openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
@@ -423,6 +423,8 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
int max;
X509_OBJECT ret;
#endif
+ unsigned char *tkey = NULL;
+ int tkeylen;
int jj;
if ((etmp=BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher())) == NULL)
@@ -464,36 +466,42 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
if (pcert == NULL)
{
+ /* Temporary storage in case EVP_PKEY_decrypt
+ * overwrites output buffer on error.
+ */
+ unsigned char *tmp2;
+ tmp2 = OPENSSL_malloc(jj);
+ if (!tmp2)
+ goto err;
+ jj = -1;
+ /* Always attempt to decrypt all cases to avoid
+ * leaking timing information about a successful
+ * decrypt.
+ */
for (i=0; i<sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++)
{
+ int tret;
ri=sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk,i);
- jj=EVP_PKEY_decrypt(tmp,
+ tret=EVP_PKEY_decrypt(tmp2,
M_ASN1_STRING_data(ri->enc_key),
M_ASN1_STRING_length(ri->enc_key),
pkey);
- if (jj > 0)
- break;
+ if (tret > 0)
+ {
+ memcpy(tmp, tmp2, tret);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2, tret);
+ jj = tret;
+ }
ERR_clear_error();
- ri = NULL;
- }
- if (ri == NULL)
- {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
- PKCS7_R_NO_RECIPIENT_MATCHES_KEY);
- goto err;
}
+ OPENSSL_free(tmp2);
}
else
{
jj=EVP_PKEY_decrypt(tmp,
M_ASN1_STRING_data(ri->enc_key),
M_ASN1_STRING_length(ri->enc_key), pkey);
- if (jj <= 0)
- {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
- ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
+ ERR_clear_error();
}
evp_ctx=NULL;
@@ -502,23 +510,47 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
goto err;
if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(evp_ctx,enc_alg->parameter) < 0)
goto err;
+ /* Generate random key to counter MMA */
+ tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx);
+ tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen);
+ if (!tkey)
+ goto err;
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(evp_ctx, tkey) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ /* If we have no key use random key */
+ if (jj <= 0)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+ jj = tkeylen;
+ tmp = tkey;
+ tkey = NULL;
+ }
- if (jj != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx)) {
+ if (jj != tkeylen) {
/* Some S/MIME clients don't use the same key
* and effective key length. The key length is
* determined by the size of the decrypted RSA key.
*/
if(!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(evp_ctx, jj))
{
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
- PKCS7_R_DECRYPTED_KEY_IS_WRONG_LENGTH);
- goto err;
+ /* As MMA defence use random key instead */
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, jj);
+ OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+ jj = tkeylen;
+ tmp = tkey;
+ tkey = NULL;
}
}
+ ERR_clear_error();
if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx,NULL,NULL,tmp,NULL,0) <= 0)
goto err;
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp,jj);
+ if (tkey)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tkey, tkeylen);
+ OPENSSL_free(tkey);
+ }
if (out == NULL)
out=etmp;
