File 1349-Fix-typos-in-lib-public_key.patch of Package erlang

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File 1349-Fix-typos-in-lib-public_key.patch of Package erlang (Revision 13808be221626a875b26c001c1f2ed61)

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From f816eeec5b74d54c87d7cab54d55a77adf69c5d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Kian-Meng, Ang" <kianmeng@cpan.org>
Date: Sun, 26 Dec 2021 15:48:35 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] Fix typos in lib/public_key

---
 lib/public_key/asn1/ECPrivateKey.asn1         |  2 +-
 lib/public_key/doc/src/notes.xml              | 16 +++++++--------
 lib/public_key/doc/src/public_key.xml         |  2 +-
 lib/public_key/doc/src/using_public_key.xml   | 20 +++++++++----------
 lib/public_key/src/pubkey_cert.erl            |  6 +++---
 lib/public_key/src/pubkey_cert_records.erl    |  2 +-
 lib/public_key/src/pubkey_crl.erl             |  2 +-
 lib/public_key/src/pubkey_ssh.erl             |  2 +-
 lib/public_key/src/public_key.erl             |  4 ++--
 lib/public_key/test/erl_make_certs.erl        |  4 ++--
 lib/public_key/test/pkits_SUITE.erl           | 10 +++++-----
 .../ssh_rsa_long_comment_pub                  |  2 +-
 .../ssh_rsa_long_header_pub                   |  2 +-
 lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE.erl      | 10 +++++-----
 14 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/public_key/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/public_key/doc/src/notes.xml
index fed7505aba..8199277e25 100644
--- a/lib/public_key/doc/src/notes.xml
+++ b/lib/public_key/doc/src/notes.xml
@@ -873,7 +873,7 @@
 </item>
 <item>
 
-	 Add different upper bounds for diffrent string types as
+	 Add different upper bounds for different string types as
 	 suggested by comment in PKIX1Explicit88.
 
 	 Own Id: OTP-13132
@@ -1077,7 +1077,7 @@
 <item>
 
 	 Add support for ISO oids 1.3.14.3.2.29 and 1.3.14.3.2.27
-	 that are somtimes used instead of the PKCS defined oids
+	 that are sometimes used instead of the PKCS defined oids
 	 1.2.840.113549.1.1.5 and 1.2.840.10040.4.3. Add function
 	 pkix_sign_types:/1 that translates oids to to algorithm
 	 atoms ex:
@@ -1170,7 +1170,7 @@
 <item>
 
 	 ssh_decode now handles comments, at the end of the line,
-	 containing withe spaces correctly
+	 containing with spaces correctly
 
 	 Own Id: OTP-9361
 </item>
@@ -1188,7 +1188,7 @@
 <list>
 <item>
 
-	 public_key now supports PKCS-10 and includes exprimental
+	 public_key now supports PKCS-10 and includes experimental
 	 support for PKCS-7
 
 	 Own Id: OTP-10509 Aux Id: kunagi-291 [202] 
diff --git a/lib/public_key/doc/src/using_public_key.xml b/lib/public_key/doc/src/using_public_key.xml
index b783785347..1261971401 100644
--- a/lib/public_key/doc/src/using_public_key.xml
+++ b/lib/public_key/doc/src/using_public_key.xml
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@
 An RSA private key encrypted with a password can look as follows:
 
 <code>1> {ok, PemBin} = file:read_file("rsa.pem").
-{ok,&lt;&lt;"Bag Attribut"...&gt;&gt;}</code>
+{ok,&lt;&lt;"Bag Attribute"...&gt;&gt;}</code>
 
 The following PEM file has only one entry, a private RSA key:
 <code>2>[RSAEntry] = public_key:pem_decode(PemBin).
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ Msg = public_key:decrypt_public(RsaEncrypted, PublicKey),</code>
 Msg = public_key:decrypt_private(RsaEncrypted, PrivateKey),</code>
 
 <note>You normally do only one of the encrypt or decrypt operations, 
- and the peer does the other. This normaly used in legacy applications
+ and the peer does the other. This normally used in legacy applications
 as a primitive digital signature.
 </note>
 
@@ -426,12 +426,12 @@ true = public_key:verify(Digest, none, Signature, PublicKey),</code>
 checks that the certificate is not revoked, not forged or not out-of-date.
 
 There are however attacks that are not detected by those checks. Suppose a bad guy has
- succeded with a DNS infection. Then the client could belive it is connecting to one host but
+ succeeded with a DNS infection. Then the client could believe it is connecting to one host but
 ends up at another but evil one. Though it is evil, it could have a perfectly legal
 certificate! The certificate has a valid signature, it is not revoked, the certificate chain
 is not faked and has a trusted root and so on.
 
- To detect that the server is not the intended one, the client must additionaly perform
+ To detect that the server is not the intended one, the client must additionally perform
 a hostname verification. This procedure is described in
 <url href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125">RFC 6125</url>. The idea is that the certificate
 lists the hostnames it could be fetched from. This is checked by the certificate issuer when
@@ -447,13 +447,13 @@ true = public_key:verify(Digest, none, Signature, PublicKey),</code>
 It is possible for a client to hook in modified rules using the options list.
 
 Some terminology is needed: the certificate presents hostname(s) on which it is valid.
- Those are called Presented IDs. The hostname(s) the client belives it connects to
+ Those are called Presented IDs. The hostname(s) the client believes it connects to
 are called Reference IDs. The matching rules aims to verify that there is at least
 one of the Reference IDs that matches one of the Presented IDs. If not, the verification fails.
 
 The IDs contains normal fully qualified domain names like e.g <c>foo.example.com</c>,
 but IP addresses are not recommended. The rfc describes why this is not recommended as well
- as security considerations about how to aquire the Reference IDs.
+ as security considerations about how to acquire the Reference IDs.
 
 Internationalized domain names are not supported.
 
@@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ true = public_key:verify(Digest, none, Signature, PublicKey),</code>
 field, the <c>Subject</c> field MUST NOT be used for host name checking, even if it contains
 valid CN names.
 Therefore only <c>kb.example.org</c> and <c>https://www.example.org</c> matches. The match fails
- both for <c>example.com</c> and <c>foo.example.com</c> becuase they are in the <c>Subject</c>
+ both for <c>example.com</c> and <c>foo.example.com</c> because they are in the <c>Subject</c>
 field which is not checked because the <c>Subject Alternate Name</c> field is present.
 
 </section>
@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ true = public_key:verify(Digest, none, Signature, PublicKey),</code>
 <section>
 <title>Re-defining the match operations</title>
 The default matching handles dns_id and uri_id. In an uri_id the value is tested for
- equality with a value from the <c>Subject Alternate Name</c>. If som other kind of matching
+ equality with a value from the <c>Subject Alternate Name</c>. If some other kind of matching
 is needed, use the <c>match_fun</c> option.
 
 The <c>match_fun</c> takes two arguments and returns either <c>true</c>,
@@ -626,8 +626,8 @@ true = public_key:verify(Digest, none, Signature, PublicKey),</code>
 field and from the <c>Subject Alternate Name</c> field.
 
 The default matching transformes the ascii values in strings to lowercase before comparing.
- The <c>match_fun</c> is however called without any transfomation applied to the strings. The
- reason is to enable the user to do unforseen handling of the strings where the original format
+ The <c>match_fun</c> is however called without any transformation applied to the strings. The
+ reason is to enable the user to do unforeseen handling of the strings where the original format
 is needed.
 
 </section>
diff --git a/lib/public_key/src/pubkey_cert.erl b/lib/public_key/src/pubkey_cert.erl
index 9e3cc52d24..cf2a0cffd2 100644
--- a/lib/public_key/src/pubkey_cert.erl
+++ b/lib/public_key/src/pubkey_cert.erl
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ verify_data(DerCert) ->
 -spec init_validation_state(#'OTPCertificate'{}, integer(), list()) ->
 				 #path_validation_state{}.
 %%
-%% Description: Creates inital version of path_validation_state for
+%% Description: Creates initial version of path_validation_state for
 %% basic path validation of x509 certificates.
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------	 
 init_validation_state(#'OTPCertificate'{} = OtpCert, DefaultPathLen, 
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ validate_extensions(OtpCert, ValidationState, UserState, VerifyFun) ->
 -spec normalize_general_name({rdnSequence, term()}) -> {rdnSequence, term()}. 
 %%
 %% Description: Normalizes a general name so that it can be easily
-%% compared to another genral name. 
+%% compared to another general name. 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------	
 normalize_general_name({rdnSequence, Issuer}) ->
 NormIssuer = do_normalize_general_name(Issuer),
diff --git a/lib/public_key/src/pubkey_cert_records.erl b/lib/public_key/src/pubkey_cert_records.erl
index 592bd4c938..d837d8cf7b 100644
--- a/lib/public_key/src/pubkey_cert_records.erl
+++ b/lib/public_key/src/pubkey_cert_records.erl
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ decode_cert(DerCert) ->
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec transform(term(), encode | decode) ->term().
 %%
-%% Description: Transforms between encoded and decode otp formated
+%% Description: Transforms between encoded and decode otp formatted
 %% certificate parts.
 %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
diff --git a/lib/public_key/src/pubkey_crl.erl b/lib/public_key/src/pubkey_crl.erl
index 7115424863..53c006ff13 100644
--- a/lib/public_key/src/pubkey_crl.erl
+++ b/lib/public_key/src/pubkey_crl.erl
@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ is_all_reasons(Mask, AllReasonsFun) ->
 	 %% As the "uspecified" reason should not
 	 %% be explicitly used according to RFC 3280
 	 %% and the conformance tests have test cases
-	 %% that should succed, and that does not specify
+	 %% that should succeed, and that does not specify
 	 %% "unspecified", we tolorate that it is not included.
 	 sets:is_subset(sets:del_element(unspecified, AllReasons), Mask)
 end.
diff --git a/lib/public_key/src/pubkey_ssh.erl b/lib/public_key/src/pubkey_ssh.erl
index 9a9505f558..2b802163aa 100644
--- a/lib/public_key/src/pubkey_ssh.erl
+++ b/lib/public_key/src/pubkey_ssh.erl
@@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ split_n(N, Bin, Acc) ->
 	 split_n(0, <<>>, [Last | Acc])
 end.
 %% large integer in a binary with 32bit length
-%% MP representaion (SSH2)
+%% MP representation (SSH2)
 mpint(X) when X < 0 -> mpint_neg(X);
 mpint(X) -> mpint_pos(X).
 
diff --git a/lib/public_key/src/public_key.erl b/lib/public_key/src/public_key.erl
index 0b5061f695..8352bc3802 100644
--- a/lib/public_key/src/public_key.erl
+++ b/lib/public_key/src/public_key.erl
@@ -2043,8 +2043,8 @@ match_wild(_, _) -> false.
 %% Match the parts after the only wildcard by comparing them from the end
 match_wild_suffixes(A, B) -> match_wild_sfx(lists:reverse(A), lists:reverse(B)).
 
-match_wild_sfx([$*|_], _) -> false; % Bad name (no wildcards alowed)
-match_wild_sfx(_, [$*|_]) -> false; % Bad pattern (no more wildcards alowed)
+match_wild_sfx([$*|_], _) -> false; % Bad name (no wildcards allowed)
+match_wild_sfx(_, [$*|_]) -> false; % Bad pattern (no more wildcards allowed)
 match_wild_sfx([A|Ar], [A|Br]) -> match_wild_sfx(Ar, Br);
 match_wild_sfx(Ar, []) -> not lists:member($*, Ar); % Chk for bad name (= wildcards)
 match_wild_sfx(_, _) -> false.
diff --git a/lib/public_key/test/erl_make_certs.erl b/lib/public_key/test/erl_make_certs.erl
index e2a94dd886..a56c8e3691 100644
--- a/lib/public_key/test/erl_make_certs.erl
+++ b/lib/public_key/test/erl_make_certs.erl
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@
 %% {title, Title}
 %% {dnQualifer, DnQ}
 %% issuer = {Issuer, IssuerKey} true (i.e. a ca cert is created) 
-%% (obs IssuerKey migth be {Key, Password}
+%% (obs IssuerKey might be {Key, Password}
 %% key = KeyFile|KeyBin|rsa|dsa|ec Subject PublicKey rsa, dsa or ec generates key
 %% 
 %%
diff --git a/lib/public_key/test/pkits_SUITE.erl b/lib/public_key/test/pkits_SUITE.erl
index ba3efdba09..9cd71adce1 100644
--- a/lib/public_key/test/pkits_SUITE.erl
+++ b/lib/public_key/test/pkits_SUITE.erl
@@ -300,24 +300,24 @@ end_per_testcase(_Func, Config) ->
 
 %%--------------------------- signature_verification--------------------------------------------------
 valid_rsa_signature() ->
- [{doc, "Test rsa signatur verification"}].
+ [{doc, "Test rsa signature verification"}].
 valid_rsa_signature(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
 run([{ "4.1.1", "Valid Certificate Path Test1 EE", ok}]).
 
 invalid_rsa_signature() ->
- [{doc,"Test rsa signatur verification"}].
+ [{doc,"Test rsa signature verification"}].
 invalid_rsa_signature(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
 run([{ "4.1.2", "Invalid CA Signature Test2 EE", {bad_cert,invalid_signature}},
 	 { "4.1.3", "Invalid EE Signature Test3 EE", {bad_cert,invalid_signature}}]).
 
 valid_dsa_signature() ->
- [{doc,"Test dsa signatur verification"}].
+ [{doc,"Test dsa signature verification"}].
 valid_dsa_signature(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
 run([{ "4.1.4", "Valid DSA Signatures Test4 EE", ok},
 	 { "4.1.5", "Valid DSA Parameter Inheritance Test5 EE", ok}]).
 
 invalid_dsa_signature() ->
- [{doc,"Test dsa signatur verification"}].
+ [{doc,"Test dsa signature verification"}].
 invalid_dsa_signature(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
 run([{ "4.1.6", "Invalid DSA Signature Test6 EE",{bad_cert,invalid_signature}}]).
 
@@ -805,7 +805,7 @@ invalid_crl_issuer(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
 	]).
 
 %% Although this test is valid it has a circular dependency. As a result
-%% an attempt is made to reursively checks a CRL path and rejected due to
+%% an attempt is made to recursively checks a CRL path and rejected due to
 %% a CRL path validation error. PKITS notes suggest this test does not
 %% need to be run due to this issue.
 %%	 { "4.14.30", "Valid cRLIssuer Test30", 54 }
diff --git a/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE.erl b/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE.erl
index b176cbef6a..c9ba3e8c7e 100644
--- a/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE.erl
+++ b/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE.erl
@@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ pkix(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
 
 true = lists:member(IssuerId, CaIds),
 
- %% Should be normalized allready
+ %% Should be normalized already
 TestStr = {rdnSequence, 
 		 [[{'AttributeTypeAndValue', {2,5,4,3},{printableString,"ERLANGCA"}}],
 		 [{'AttributeTypeAndValue', {2,5,4,3},{printableString," erlang ca "}}]]},
-- 
2.31.1

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File 1349-Fix-typos-in-lib-public_key.patch of Package erlang (Revision 13808be221626a875b26c001c1f2ed61)

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