File torrc of Package tor

## Configuration file for a typical Tor user
## Last updated 17 December 2021 for Tor 0.4.6.8.
## (may or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.)
##
## Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines
## that begin with just "#" are disabled commands: you can enable them
## by removing the "#" symbol.
##
## See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html,
## for more options you can use in this file.
##
## Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform:
## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#torrc

## Configuration options can be imported from files or folders using the %include
## option with the value being a path. This path can have wildcards. Wildcards are 
## expanded first, using lexical order. Then, for each matching file or folder, the following 
## rules are followed: if the path is a file, the options from the file will be parsed as if 
## they were written where the %include option is. If the path is a folder, all files on that 
## folder will be parsed following lexical order. Files starting with a dot are ignored. Files 
## on subfolders are ignored.
## The %include option can be used recursively.
#%include /etc/torrc.d/*.conf

#User tor
PidFile /run/tor/tor.pid

## Tor opens a socks proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't
## configure one below. Set "SocksPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only
## as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself.
# Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections.
# these options should not be used when trying to avoid tracking
SocksPort localhost:9050 IPv6Traffic PreferIPv6 NoIsolateClientAddr NoIsolateSOCKSAuth NoIsolateClientProtocol NoIsolateDestPort NoIsolateDestAddr PreferSOCKSNoAuth
#- to be used as your LAN's gateway
#SocksPort 192.168.1.2:9050 # Bind to this address:port too.

## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address.
## First entry that matches wins. If no SocksPolicy is set, we accept
## all (and only) requests that reach a SocksPort. Untrusted users who
## can access your SocksPort may be able to learn about the connections
## you make.
#- to be used as your LAN's gateway
#SocksPolicy accept 127.0.0.1/8
#SocksPolicy reject 192.168.1.1
#SocksPolicy accept 192.168.1.0/24
#SocksPolicy reject *:*

## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as
## you want.
##
## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose
## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs.
##
## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to /var/log/tor/notices.log
#Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log
## Send every possible message to /var/log/tor/debug.log
#Log debug file /var/log/tor/debug.log
## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles
Log notice syslog
## To send all messages to stderr:
#Log debug stderr

LogTimeGranularity 3000
LogMessageDomains 1
SafeLogging relay

## Uncomment this to start the process in the background... or use
## --runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows;
## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service.
RunAsDaemon 0

## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store
## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows.
DataDirectory /var/lib/tor

## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor
## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt.
ControlPort 9051
## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these
## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it.
#HashedControlPassword 16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C
CookieAuthentication 1

############### This section is just for location-hidden services ###

## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the
## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address
## to tell people.
##
## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the
## address y:z.

#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/
#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80

#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/
#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
#HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22

################ This section is just for relays #####################
#
## See https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay for details.

## Required: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections.
ORPort 9001
## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
## ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as
## follows.  You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding
## yourself to make this work.
#ORPort 443 NoListen
#ORPort 127.0.0.1:9090 NoAdvertise

## The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your
## relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess.
#Address noname.example.com

## If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for
## outgoing traffic to use.
# OutboundBindAddress 10.0.0.5

## A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key.
Nickname HSF

## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your
## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must
## be at least 20 KB.
## Note that units for these config options are bytes per second, not bits
## per second, and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10, 2^20, etc.
RelayBandwidthRate 7168 KB
RelayBandwidthBurst 10240 KB
MaxAdvertisedBandwidth 5120 KB

## Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month.
## Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received bytes,
## not to their sum: setting "4 GB" may allow up to 8 GB total before
## hibernating.
##
## Set a maximum of 4 gigabytes each way per period.
#AccountingMax 4 GB
## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day)
#AccountingStart day 00:00
## Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax
## is per month)
#AccountingStart month 3 15:00

## Contact info to be published in the directory, so we can contact you
## if your relay is misconfigured or something else goes wrong. Google
## indexes this, so spammers might also collect it.
#ContactInfo anonymous <noone AT example.com>
## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one:
ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>

## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do
## if you have enough bandwidth.
DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections
## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
## DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as
## follows.  below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port
## forwarding yourself to make this work.
#DirPort 80 NoListen
#DirPort 127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise
## Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now you
## can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is
## contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source
## distribution for a sample.
#DirPortFrontPage /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html

## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the identity
## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on
## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid
## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See
## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays
## However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it would
## break its concealability and potentionally reveal its IP/TCP address.
#MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,...

## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first
## to last, and the first match wins. If you want to _replace_
## the default exit policy, end this with either a reject *:* or an
## accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to) the
## default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is
## described in the man page or at
## https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html
##
## Look at https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses
## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy.
##
## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your firewall,
## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor
## users will be told that those destinations are down.
##
## For security, by default Tor rejects connections to private (local)
## networks, including to your public IP address. See the man page entry
## for ExitPolicyRejectPrivate if you want to allow "exit enclaving".
##
#ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject *:* # allow irc ports but no more
#ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp as well as default exit policy
# always allow https on ipv6 ?
ExitPolicy accept6 *:443
# allow known torrent trackers to find direct-connected peers ?
ExitPolicy accept *:451
ExitPolicy accept *:1337
ExitPolicy accept *:2710
ExitPolicy accept *:2740
ExitPolicy accept *:2790
ExitPolicy accept *:6969
# allow SIP and XMPP/jabber ports ?
ExitPolicy accept *:5060-5062
ExitPolicy accept *:5222-5223
ExitPolicy reject *:* # no exits allowed
# allow many often-used non-p2p ports by default ?
ReducedExitPolicy 1
## Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the
## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even an
## ISP that filters connections to all the known Tor relays probably
## won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat you
## differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can
## be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge!
BridgeRelay 1
## By default, Tor will advertise your bridge to users through various
## mechanisms like https://bridges.torproject.org/. If you want to run
## a private bridge, for example because you'll give out your bridge
## address manually to your friends, uncomment this line:
#PublishServerDescriptor 0

# DNSCrypt is preferred
DNSPort auto
ClientUseIPv4 1
ClientUseIPv6 1
#ClientPreferIPv6ORPort 1
#ClientAutoIPv6ORPort 0
# don't activate when not in use ? good in theory but may screw with bittorent tracker access via Tor
#DormantOnFirstStartup 1
DormantCanceledByStartup 1
DormantTimeoutDisabledByIdleStreams 1
# Tor shits itself to death if this is less than 10 minutes instead of clamping the value
DormantClientTimeout 15 minutes
ShutdownWaitLength 6 seconds
# HALF of all RAM by default ?! Are they nuts ?
MaxMemInQueues 512 MB
# And all CPUs ?! We have better things to run than Tor
NumCPUs 2
HardwareAccel 1
ConnLimit 2048
AvoidDiskWrites 1
# don't fuck with interrupts and realtime tasks for your goddamn schedulling either !
KISTSchedRunInterval 50 msec
AllowNonRFC953Hostnames 1
AutomapHostsOnResolve 1
TokenBucketRefillInterval 500 msec
# relax from paranoia, Tor is used for avoiding censorship, not tracking
#UseEntryGuards 0
#LearnCircuitBuildTimeout 0
CircuitBuildTimeout 30
CircuitStreamTimeout 15
SocksTimeout 31
ClientBootstrapConsensusMaxInProgressTries 12
#ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0

# exclude exit nodes from your country and its accomplice countries
# https://gist.github.com/pwnsdx/effd82f4791bf90d8de6 ?
#ExcludeNodes {ru},{by},{kz},{cn}
ExcludeExitNodes {ru},{by},{kz},{cn},{fr},{gb}
# you might want to disable that in heavily censored networks
GeoIPExcludeUnknown 1
#StrictNodes 1

# that's for relay server and should not be used on bridged clients
# even without servers below you might want to install snowflake plugin for your browser to act as relay for users in citizen-hostile countries
#ServerTransportListenAddr obfs4 [::]:8181
#ServerTransportListenAddr snowflake [::]:443
#ServerTransportPlugin snowflake exec /usr/bin/snowflake-server --acme-hostnames snowflake.example --acme-email admin@snowflake.example --log /var/log/tor/snowflake-server.log

# that's for bridged clients in censored, hostile countries
# this disables ExcludeNodes and relay function
# ORPort and BridgeRelay relays directives need to be disabled for Tor not to kill itself when running bridged client-only, also disable DirPort in such case to avoid wasting some time
# when tor fails to connect evenwhen all configuration is OK, it may be necessary to empty its /var/lib/tor data-dir to make proper reinitialization
#UseBridges 1
UpdateBridgesFromAuthority 1
ExtORPort auto
ExtORPortCookieAuthFileGroupReadable 1
# https://tor.stackexchange.com/questions/6370/how-to-run-an-obfs4-bridge
ServerTransportPlugin meek_lite,obfs2,obfs3,obfs4,scramblesuit exec /usr/bin/obfs4proxy --enableLogging --logLevel=INFO
# if -keep-local-addresses is used, make sure not to connect to localhost and get into dead loop
ClientTransportPlugin snowflake exec /usr/bin/snowflake-client -unsafe-logging -log-to-state-dir -keep-local-addresses \
-url https://snowflake-broker.torproject.net.global.prod.fastly.net/ \
-front cdn.sstatic.net \
-ice stun:stun.voip.blackberry.com:3478,stun:stun.altar.com.pl:3478,stun:stun.antisip.com:3478,stun:stun.bluesip.net:3478,stun:stun.dus.net:3478,stun:stun.epygi.com:3478,stun:stun.sonetel.com:3478,stun:stun.sonetel.net:3478,stun:stun.stunprotocol.org:3478,stun:stun.uls.co.za:3478,stun:stun.voipgate.com:3478,stun:stun.voys.nl:3478 \
-max 6
# the address seems fake, so anything will do
Bridge snowflake 8.8.8.8:1
# https://forum.torproject.net/t/tor-blocked-in-russia-how-to-circumvent-censorship/982
# using obfs4 bridges is largely useless as DPI blocks all their traffic as they are not obfuscated enough
# send letter from GMail to bridges@torproject.org with line 'get transport obfs4' and no subject
# or open https://bridges.torproject.org/bridges?transport=obfs4&lang=<desired entry node's country code>
# both are easily blocked along with main tor relays
#Bridge obfs4 ???