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File torrc of Package tor
## Configuration file for a typical Tor user ## Last updated 17 December 2021 for Tor 0.4.6.8. ## (may or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.) ## ## Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines ## that begin with just "#" are disabled commands: you can enable them ## by removing the "#" symbol. ## ## See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html, ## for more options you can use in this file. ## ## Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform: ## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#torrc ## Configuration options can be imported from files or folders using the %include ## option with the value being a path. This path can have wildcards. Wildcards are ## expanded first, using lexical order. Then, for each matching file or folder, the following ## rules are followed: if the path is a file, the options from the file will be parsed as if ## they were written where the %include option is. If the path is a folder, all files on that ## folder will be parsed following lexical order. Files starting with a dot are ignored. Files ## on subfolders are ignored. ## The %include option can be used recursively. #%include /etc/torrc.d/*.conf #User tor PidFile /run/tor/tor.pid ## Tor opens a socks proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't ## configure one below. Set "SocksPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only ## as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself. # Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections. # these options should not be used when trying to avoid tracking SocksPort localhost:9050 IPv6Traffic PreferIPv6 NoIsolateClientAddr NoIsolateSOCKSAuth NoIsolateClientProtocol NoIsolateDestPort NoIsolateDestAddr PreferSOCKSNoAuth #- to be used as your LAN's gateway #SocksPort 192.168.1.2:9050 # Bind to this address:port too. ## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address. ## First entry that matches wins. If no SocksPolicy is set, we accept ## all (and only) requests that reach a SocksPort. Untrusted users who ## can access your SocksPort may be able to learn about the connections ## you make. #- to be used as your LAN's gateway #SocksPolicy accept 127.0.0.1/8 #SocksPolicy reject 192.168.1.1 #SocksPolicy accept 192.168.1.0/24 #SocksPolicy reject *:* ## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something ## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as ## you want. ## ## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose ## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs. ## ## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to /var/log/tor/notices.log #Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log ## Send every possible message to /var/log/tor/debug.log #Log debug file /var/log/tor/debug.log ## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles Log notice syslog ## To send all messages to stderr: #Log debug stderr LogTimeGranularity 3000 LogMessageDomains 1 SafeLogging relay ## Uncomment this to start the process in the background... or use ## --runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows; ## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service. RunAsDaemon 0 ## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store ## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows. DataDirectory /var/lib/tor ## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor ## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt. ControlPort 9051 ## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these ## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it. #HashedControlPassword 16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C CookieAuthentication 1 ############### This section is just for location-hidden services ### ## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the ## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address ## to tell people. ## ## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the ## address y:z. #HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/ #HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80 #HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/ #HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80 #HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22 ################ This section is just for relays ##################### # ## See https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay for details. ## Required: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections. ORPort 9001 ## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in ## ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as ## follows. You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding ## yourself to make this work. #ORPort 443 NoListen #ORPort 127.0.0.1:9090 NoAdvertise ## The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your ## relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess. #Address noname.example.com ## If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for ## outgoing traffic to use. # OutboundBindAddress 10.0.0.5 ## A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key. Nickname HSF ## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your ## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must ## be at least 20 KB. ## Note that units for these config options are bytes per second, not bits ## per second, and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10, 2^20, etc. RelayBandwidthRate 7168 KB RelayBandwidthBurst 10240 KB MaxAdvertisedBandwidth 5120 KB ## Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month. ## Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received bytes, ## not to their sum: setting "4 GB" may allow up to 8 GB total before ## hibernating. ## ## Set a maximum of 4 gigabytes each way per period. #AccountingMax 4 GB ## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day) #AccountingStart day 00:00 ## Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax ## is per month) #AccountingStart month 3 15:00 ## Contact info to be published in the directory, so we can contact you ## if your relay is misconfigured or something else goes wrong. Google ## indexes this, so spammers might also collect it. #ContactInfo anonymous <noone AT example.com> ## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one: ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com> ## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do ## if you have enough bandwidth. DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections ## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in ## DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as ## follows. below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port ## forwarding yourself to make this work. #DirPort 80 NoListen #DirPort 127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise ## Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now you ## can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is ## contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source ## distribution for a sample. #DirPortFrontPage /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html ## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the identity ## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on ## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid ## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See ## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays ## However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it would ## break its concealability and potentionally reveal its IP/TCP address. #MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,... ## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first ## to last, and the first match wins. If you want to _replace_ ## the default exit policy, end this with either a reject *:* or an ## accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to) the ## default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is ## described in the man page or at ## https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html ## ## Look at https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses ## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy. ## ## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your firewall, ## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor ## users will be told that those destinations are down. ## ## For security, by default Tor rejects connections to private (local) ## networks, including to your public IP address. See the man page entry ## for ExitPolicyRejectPrivate if you want to allow "exit enclaving". ## #ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject *:* # allow irc ports but no more #ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp as well as default exit policy # always allow https on ipv6 ? ExitPolicy accept6 *:443 # allow known torrent trackers to find direct-connected peers ? ExitPolicy accept *:451 ExitPolicy accept *:1337 ExitPolicy accept *:2710 ExitPolicy accept *:2740 ExitPolicy accept *:2790 ExitPolicy accept *:6969 # allow SIP and XMPP/jabber ports ? ExitPolicy accept *:5060-5062 ExitPolicy accept *:5222-5223 ExitPolicy reject *:* # no exits allowed # allow many often-used non-p2p ports by default ? ReducedExitPolicy 1 ## Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the ## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even an ## ISP that filters connections to all the known Tor relays probably ## won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat you ## differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can ## be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge! BridgeRelay 1 ## By default, Tor will advertise your bridge to users through various ## mechanisms like https://bridges.torproject.org/. If you want to run ## a private bridge, for example because you'll give out your bridge ## address manually to your friends, uncomment this line: #PublishServerDescriptor 0 # DNSCrypt is preferred DNSPort auto ClientUseIPv4 1 ClientUseIPv6 1 #ClientPreferIPv6ORPort 1 #ClientAutoIPv6ORPort 0 # don't activate when not in use ? good in theory but may screw with bittorent tracker access via Tor #DormantOnFirstStartup 1 DormantCanceledByStartup 1 DormantTimeoutDisabledByIdleStreams 1 # Tor shits itself to death if this is less than 10 minutes instead of clamping the value DormantClientTimeout 15 minutes ShutdownWaitLength 6 seconds # HALF of all RAM by default ?! Are they nuts ? MaxMemInQueues 512 MB # And all CPUs ?! We have better things to run than Tor NumCPUs 2 HardwareAccel 1 ConnLimit 2048 AvoidDiskWrites 1 # don't fuck with interrupts and realtime tasks for your goddamn schedulling either ! KISTSchedRunInterval 50 msec AllowNonRFC953Hostnames 1 AutomapHostsOnResolve 1 TokenBucketRefillInterval 500 msec # relax from paranoia, Tor is used for avoiding censorship, not tracking #UseEntryGuards 0 #LearnCircuitBuildTimeout 0 CircuitBuildTimeout 30 CircuitStreamTimeout 15 SocksTimeout 31 ClientBootstrapConsensusMaxInProgressTries 12 #ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0 # exclude exit nodes from your country and its accomplice countries # https://gist.github.com/pwnsdx/effd82f4791bf90d8de6 ? #ExcludeNodes {ru},{by},{kz},{cn} ExcludeExitNodes {ru},{by},{kz},{cn},{fr},{gb} # you might want to disable that in heavily censored networks GeoIPExcludeUnknown 1 #StrictNodes 1 # that's for relay server and should not be used on bridged clients # even without servers below you might want to install snowflake plugin for your browser to act as relay for users in citizen-hostile countries #ServerTransportListenAddr obfs4 [::]:8181 #ServerTransportListenAddr snowflake [::]:443 #ServerTransportPlugin snowflake exec /usr/bin/snowflake-server --acme-hostnames snowflake.example --acme-email admin@snowflake.example --log /var/log/tor/snowflake-server.log # that's for bridged clients in censored, hostile countries # this disables ExcludeNodes and relay function # ORPort and BridgeRelay relays directives need to be disabled for Tor not to kill itself when running bridged client-only, also disable DirPort in such case to avoid wasting some time # when tor fails to connect evenwhen all configuration is OK, it may be necessary to empty its /var/lib/tor data-dir to make proper reinitialization #UseBridges 1 UpdateBridgesFromAuthority 1 ExtORPort auto ExtORPortCookieAuthFileGroupReadable 1 # https://tor.stackexchange.com/questions/6370/how-to-run-an-obfs4-bridge ServerTransportPlugin meek_lite,obfs2,obfs3,obfs4,scramblesuit exec /usr/bin/obfs4proxy --enableLogging --logLevel=INFO # if -keep-local-addresses is used, make sure not to connect to localhost and get into dead loop ClientTransportPlugin snowflake exec /usr/bin/snowflake-client -unsafe-logging -log-to-state-dir -keep-local-addresses \ -url https://snowflake-broker.torproject.net.global.prod.fastly.net/ \ -front cdn.sstatic.net \ -ice stun:stun.voip.blackberry.com:3478,stun:stun.altar.com.pl:3478,stun:stun.antisip.com:3478,stun:stun.bluesip.net:3478,stun:stun.dus.net:3478,stun:stun.epygi.com:3478,stun:stun.sonetel.com:3478,stun:stun.sonetel.net:3478,stun:stun.stunprotocol.org:3478,stun:stun.uls.co.za:3478,stun:stun.voipgate.com:3478,stun:stun.voys.nl:3478 \ -max 6 # the address seems fake, so anything will do Bridge snowflake 8.8.8.8:1 # https://forum.torproject.net/t/tor-blocked-in-russia-how-to-circumvent-censorship/982 # using obfs4 bridges is largely useless as DPI blocks all their traffic as they are not obfuscated enough # send letter from GMail to bridges@torproject.org with line 'get transport obfs4' and no subject # or open https://bridges.torproject.org/bridges?transport=obfs4&lang=<desired entry node's country code> # both are easily blocked along with main tor relays #Bridge obfs4 ???
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