File openssl-fipslocking.patch of Package openssl-1_0_0.24561
Index: openssl-1.0.2n/crypto/fips/fips_drbg_rand.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-1.0.2n.orig/crypto/fips/fips_drbg_rand.c 2017-12-08 13:31:56.267746606 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.2n/crypto/fips/fips_drbg_rand.c 2017-12-08 13:31:56.307747247 +0100
@@ -82,7 +82,8 @@ static int fips_drbg_bytes(unsigned char
if (count > dctx->min_entropy)
RAND_load_file("/dev/urandom", count - dctx->min_entropy);
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ int locked;
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
do {
size_t rcnt;
if (count > (int)dctx->max_request)
@@ -111,7 +112,8 @@ static int fips_drbg_bytes(unsigned char
while (count);
rv = 1;
err:
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
return rv;
}
@@ -126,34 +128,50 @@ static int fips_drbg_status(void)
{
DRBG_CTX *dctx = &ossl_dctx;
int rv;
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ int locked;
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
rv = dctx->status == DRBG_STATUS_READY ? 1 : 0;
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
return rv;
}
static void fips_drbg_cleanup(void)
{
DRBG_CTX *dctx = &ossl_dctx;
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ int locked;
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
FIPS_drbg_uninstantiate(dctx);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
}
static int fips_drbg_seed(const void *seed, int seedlen)
{
DRBG_CTX *dctx = &ossl_dctx;
+ int locked;
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
if (dctx->rand_seed_cb)
- return dctx->rand_seed_cb(dctx, seed, seedlen);
- return 1;
+ ret = dctx->rand_seed_cb(dctx, seed, seedlen);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
+ return ret;
}
static int fips_drbg_add(const void *seed, int seedlen, double add_entropy)
{
DRBG_CTX *dctx = &ossl_dctx;
+ int locked;
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
if (dctx->rand_add_cb)
- return dctx->rand_add_cb(dctx, seed, seedlen, add_entropy);
- return 1;
+ ret = dctx->rand_add_cb(dctx, seed, seedlen, add_entropy);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
+ return ret;
}
static const RAND_METHOD rand_drbg_meth = {
Index: openssl-1.0.2n/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-1.0.2n.orig/crypto/rand/md_rand.c 2017-12-08 13:31:56.267746606 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.2n/crypto/rand/md_rand.c 2017-12-08 13:31:56.311747311 +0100
@@ -144,13 +144,6 @@ static long md_count[2] = { 0, 0 };
static double entropy = 0;
static int initialized = 0;
-static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread
- * holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND (to
- * prevent double locking) */
-/* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */
-/* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
-static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid;
-
#ifdef PREDICT
int rand_predictable = 0;
#endif
@@ -196,7 +189,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
long md_c[2];
unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_MD_CTX m;
- int do_not_lock;
+ int locked;
if (!num)
return;
@@ -216,18 +209,8 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
* hash function.
*/
- /* check if we already have the lock */
- if (crypto_lock_rand) {
- CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- } else
- do_not_lock = 0;
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
- if (!do_not_lock)
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
st_idx = state_index;
/*
@@ -258,8 +241,8 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0);
- if (!do_not_lock)
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m);
for (i = 0; i < num; i += MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
@@ -311,8 +294,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
}
}
- if (!do_not_lock)
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
/*
* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that other
* thread's seeding remains without effect (except for the incremented
@@ -324,8 +306,8 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
}
if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */
entropy += add;
- if (!do_not_lock)
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
#if !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]);
@@ -353,6 +335,7 @@ int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf
pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
#endif
int do_stir_pool = 0;
+ int locked;
#ifdef PREDICT
if (rand_predictable) {
@@ -394,13 +377,7 @@ int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf
* global 'md'.
*/
if (lock)
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-
- /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- crypto_lock_rand = 1;
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
/* always poll for external entropy in FIPS mode, drbg provides the
* expansion
@@ -475,9 +452,8 @@ int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf
md_count[0] += 1;
/* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
- crypto_lock_rand = 0;
- if (lock)
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (lock && locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
while (num > 0) {
/* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
@@ -535,15 +511,15 @@ int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf
!MD_Update(&m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
goto err;
if (lock)
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
if (!MD_Update(&m, md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) ||
!MD_Final(&m, md)) {
- if (lock)
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (lock && locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
goto err;
}
- if (lock)
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (lock && locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
if (ok)
@@ -577,33 +553,10 @@ static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsi
static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
{
- CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
int ret;
- int do_not_lock;
-
- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
- /*
- * check if we already have the lock (could happen if a RAND_poll()
- * implementation calls RAND_status())
- */
- if (crypto_lock_rand) {
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- } else
- do_not_lock = 0;
+ int locked;
- if (!do_not_lock) {
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-
- /*
- * prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again
- */
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- crypto_lock_rand = 1;
- }
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
if (!initialized) {
RAND_poll();
@@ -612,12 +565,8 @@ static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED;
- if (!do_not_lock) {
- /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
- crypto_lock_rand = 0;
-
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
- }
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
return ret;
}
Index: openssl-1.0.2n/crypto/rand/rand.h
===================================================================
--- openssl-1.0.2n.orig/crypto/rand/rand.h 2017-12-08 13:31:56.143744621 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.2n/crypto/rand/rand.h 2017-12-08 13:31:56.311747311 +0100
@@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ void RAND_set_fips_drbg_type(int type, i
int RAND_init_fips(void);
# endif
+int private_RAND_lock(int lock);
+
/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
/*
* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
Index: openssl-1.0.2n/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-1.0.2n.orig/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c 2017-12-08 13:31:56.267746606 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.2n/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c 2017-12-08 13:32:55.968702015 +0100
@@ -176,6 +176,41 @@ int RAND_status(void)
return 0;
}
+int private_RAND_lock(int lock)
+ {
+ static int crypto_lock_rand;
+ static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid;
+ int do_lock;
+
+ if (!lock)
+ {
+ crypto_lock_rand = 0;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* check if we already have the lock */
+ if (crypto_lock_rand)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ do_lock = !!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ }
+ else
+ do_lock = 1;
+ if (do_lock)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ crypto_lock_rand = 1;
+ }
+ return do_lock;
+ }
+
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
/*
@@ -237,9 +272,10 @@ static int drbg_rand_add(DRBG_CTX *ctx,
{
RAND_SSLeay()->add(in, inlen, entropy);
if (FIPS_rand_status()) {
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ int locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
FIPS_drbg_reseed(ctx, in, inlen);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
}
return 1;
}
@@ -248,9 +284,10 @@ static int drbg_rand_seed(DRBG_CTX *ctx,
{
RAND_SSLeay()->seed(in, inlen);
if (FIPS_rand_status()) {
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ int locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
FIPS_drbg_reseed(ctx, NULL, 0);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
}
return 1;
}
