File pkinit-nss-0.5.0-1-cvs200705021211.patch of Package pkinit-nss

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File pkinit-nss-0.5.0-1-cvs200705021211.patch of Package pkinit-nss (Revision 802bc08e8f06f4d44e43e6a5db6f2c6b)

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? Makefile
? Makefile.in
? aclocal.m4
? autom4te.cache
? config.guess
? config.h
? config.h.in
? config.log
? config.status
? config.sub
? configure
? depcomp
? install-sh
? libtool
? ltmain.sh
? missing
? mkinstalldirs
? pkinit-nss-0.5.0-1-cvs200705021211.patch
? pkinit-nss.spec
? stamp-h1
? doc/Makefile
? doc/Makefile.in
? po/Makefile
? po/Makefile.in
? po/POTFILES
? src/.deps
? src/.libs
? src/Makefile
? src/Makefile.in
? src/bcmst.lo
? src/bcmsutil
? src/certs.lo
? src/commont.lo
? src/cscope.out
? src/deroid
? src/make-pkinit-san
? src/map-file.lo
? src/oakley.lo
? src/pkinit-show-cert-guid
? src/pkinit.c.gak
? src/pkinit.la
? src/pkinit.lo
? src/pkinitt.lo
? src/fragment/.deps
? src/fragment/.libs
? src/fragment/Makefile
? src/fragment/Makefile.in
? src/fragment/openmod
? src/fragment/openp12
Index: ChangeLog
===================================================================
RCS file: /usr/local/CVS/pkinit-nss/ChangeLog,v
retrieving revision 1.76
retrieving revision 1.103
diff -u -r1.76 -r1.103
--- ChangeLog	5 Feb 2007 16:38:16 -0000	1.76
+++ ChangeLog	25 Apr 2007 17:43:50 -0000	1.103
@@ -1,8 +1,144 @@
-2006-02-05 nalin
+2007-04-25 nalin
+	* src/bcmst.c: add definition/template/encoder/decoder for
+	EncryptedData.
+
+2007-04-25 nalin
+	* src/pkinitt.c: remove a few unused variables, remove an unnecessary
+	typecast.
+
+2007-04-25 nalin
+	* configure.ac,src/pkinit.c: handle cases where preauth_plugin.h
+	requires the krb5_gic_opt_pa_data data type and krb5.h didn't provide
+	it, even as a stub, yet.
+
+2007-04-25 nalin
+	* src/pkinit.c: fix argument order for the client_process() function,
+	from Jacob Berkman.  Fix arguments for client_tryagain().
+
+2007-04-25 nalin
+	* backport-1.6.1: actually commit the new files.
+
+2007-04-24 nalin
+	* configure.ac: define PKINIT_CLIENT_MISSING_GIC_OPTS instead of
+	PKINIT_DONT_USE_GIC_OPTS.
+	* src/pkinit.c: key off of PKINIT_CLIENT_MISSING_GIC_OPTS instead
+	of PKINIT_DONT_USE_GIC_OPTS.
+
+2007-04-24 nalin
+	* Makefile.am,backport-1.6.1: add headers from 1.6.1.
+	* configure.ac: check for 1.5/1.6/1.6.1.  Provide a --with-krb5-version
+	option to override autodetection.  Define PKINIT_USE_PAL_BACKPORT
+	and PKINIT_DONT_USE_GIC_OPTS instead of the more not namespaced
+	USE_PAL_BACKPORT and DONT_USE_GIC_OPTS defines.
+	* src/pkinit.c(client_gic_opts): add a stub.
+	* src/pkinit.c(client_process): expect an "opts" argument if
+	PKINIT_CLIENT_PROCESS_MISSING_OPT isn't defined.
+	* src/pkinit.c(preauthentication_client_0): point to client_gic_opts
+	if PKINIT_DONT_USE_GIC_OPTS isn't defined.
+
+2007-04-24 nalin
+	* autogen: drop --enable-debugging -- we're always debuggable now.
+
+2007-04-24 nalin
+	* src/bcmst.c(compare_issuer_and_sn,find_cert_by_issuer_and_sn): add.
+	From Jacob Berkman.
+	* src/bcmst.c(find_cert_from_rid): use find_cert_by_issuer_and_sn()
+	instead of CERT_FindCertByIssuerAndSN().  From Jacob Berkman.
+
+2007-04-23 nalin
+	* ChangeLog: er, 2007, not 2006.
+	* src/pkinitt.c: add routines specifically for decoding typed_data.
+
+2007-04-23 nalin
+	* src/pkinit.c(client_process): accept host names in various places.
+	Rename authorization_data variables to indicate that they're really
+	typed_data.
+
+2007-04-23 nalin
+	* src/certs.c(cert_get_oid_pkinit_rkey_data_oid,
+	cert_get_oid_pkinit_auth_data_oid): add.
+	* src/certs.c(check_item_in_list): factor out a routine for checking
+	for a value in a list.
+	* src/certs.c(cert_san_matches_dns_for_realm): add a check to see if
+	the certificate in question contains a commonName in its subject or a
+	dnsName subjectAltName with a value which matches the realm's
+	"trusted_servers" setting.
+	* src/certs.c(cert_is_preferred): check for a matching DNS name.
+	* src/certs.c(cert_validate_kdc_certificate): check for a matching
+	DNS name for the KDC in combination with SSL ServerAuth or KDC key
+	EKU values.
+	* doc/CONFIGURATION: note "trusted_servers"
+
+2007-02-06 nalin
+	* src/bcmst.c(external_principal_identifier_template): mark the
+	subject_key_identifier as explicit, even though it's not, so that
+	NSS will add and strip the octet-string wrapper for us, making it
+	easier to use and compare values in CERTCertificate structures.
+
+2007-02-06 nalin
+	* src/commont.c(common_generate_content_encryption_key_aes): Add.
+	* src/bcmst.c(bcms_extract_enveloped_data): Learn to parse AES
+	parameters (an IV).
+	* src/bcmsutil.c(main): add options for specifying use of
+	AES128/AES256 keys for bulk encrypting the enveloped data.
+	* src/bcmsutil.c(usage): document the new AES options, plus the old
+	DES and RC2 options.
+	* src/certs.c(cert_is_preferred): debug log when we find a banned cert
+	or one which chains up to a trusted certifiers.
+	* src/pkinit.c(client_try_again): debug log how many trusted
+	certifiers or invalid certificates the KDC told us about.
+	* src/pkinitt.c,src/bcmst.c: debug log key sizes when handling
+	enveloped data.
+
+2007-02-06 nalin
+	* src/certs.c(bcms_extract_enveloped_data): note what the unsupported
+	encryption algorithm is, for troubleshooting.
+	* src/pkinitt.c(pkinit_create_trusted_certifiers_edata): fix encoding
+	of trusted-certifiers.
+
+2007-02-06 nalin
+	* src/bcmst.c(bcms_add_signer_to_signed_data): insert the signing time
+	into the list so that the encoding comes out with the items sorted, as
+	required by CMS.
+	* src/certs.c(cert_validate_{client,kdc}_certificate): add a specific
+	log for unknown-issuer errors.
+	* src/certs.c(cert_validate_client_certificate): catch and add e-data
+	for revoked-certificate errors.  Return KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH
+	instead of KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH in the event of name a mismatch.
+
+2007-02-05 nalin
+	* src/certs.c,src/pkinit.c: certificate nicknames can be NULL; guard
+	against that.
+	* src/pkinitt.c(pkinit_encode_authorization_data): use the right
+	template, correctly pass the array to the encoder.
+	* src/pkinitt.c(pkinit_create_typed_datum): return a datum structure,
+	which the caller will have an easier time processing.
+	* src/pkinitt.c(pkinit_create_invalid_certificates_edata,
+	pkinit_create_trusted_certifiers_edata,
+	pkinit_create_dh_parameters_edata): encode the error data correctly.
+	* src/pkinitt.c(pkinit_verify_pa_pk_as_req): fix checking of the DH
+	prime length.
+	* src/pkinit.c(client_try_again): fix parsing of error data from the
+	KDC: it's a sequence of typed-data, not just one.
+	* src/certs.c(cert_validate_kdc_certificate): directly interpret some
+	of the more expected errors for the log.
+	* src/certs.c(cert_validate_client_certificate): directly interpret
+	some of the more expected errors for the log.  Report invalid cert
+	with e_data for revoked certificates.
+	* src/bcmst.c: use the subjectName, not the possibly-NULL nickname, in
+	a debug message.
+	* src/commont.c: take care that integers are encoded so that they come
+	out unsigned.
+
+2007-02-05 nalin
+	* src/pkinit.c: make the location of the client and server
+	key/cert/token database configurable.
+
+2007-02-05 nalin
 	* configure.ac: check for 1.7-specific gic_opts callback functions.
 	* configure.ac: bump version to 0.5.0.
 
-2006-02-05 nalin
+2007-02-05 nalin
 	* configure.ac: fixup logic so that we can tell the difference between
 	1.5 without preauth_plugin.h (where the backport forces changes in the
 	symbol names for safety's sake) and 1.6 without preauth_plugin.h.
@@ -42,7 +178,7 @@
 	KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE, KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE, and
 	KDC_ERR_DH_KEY_PARAMETERS_NOT_ACCEPTED.
 
-2006-01-26 nalin
+2007-01-26 nalin
 	* src/pkinitt.c(pkinit_time_from_signing_time): try to parse the raw
 	timestamp (without the type and length) as a timestamp.
 	* src/pkinitt.c(pkinit_time_from_utc_time): fix scanning of the time.
@@ -54,7 +190,7 @@
 	CAs as an external_principal_identifier list instead of an array of
 	DER-encoded certificates.
 
-2006-01-26 nalin
+2007-01-26 nalin
 	* src/pkinitt.c(pkinit_signing_time_from_time): add function to
 	convert to encoded signing time to time_t, using UTC time or
 	generalized time, as appropriate.
@@ -79,11 +215,11 @@
 	* src/bcmsutil.c: add a -v (verbosity) option to crank up debug
 	logging.
 
-2006-01-25 nalin
+2007-01-25 nalin
 	- make pkinit_debug() take a module_context and a debug priority level
 	- thread module_context pointers through many, many functions
 
-2006-01-22 nalin
+2007-01-22 nalin
 	* src/bcmst.c(bcms_make_certificate_list): take a deep copy of the
 	certificate, in case the current origin gets pulled out from under
 	us before we go to encode this list.
@@ -91,7 +227,7 @@
 	copy of the parameters field, in case the one we're using gets pulled
 	out from under us before we go to encode this list.
 
-2006-01-19 nalin
+2007-01-19 nalin
 	* src/bcmst.c, src/certs.c: use CERT_DestroyCertArray() instead of
 	a home-grown function which actually leaks the array pointer (oops).
 	* src/certs.c(cert_validate_kdc_certificate,
@@ -102,39 +238,39 @@
 	* src/pkinitt.c(pkinit_validate_kdc_certificate): provide a way to
 	pass in the pool of certs which may include intermediate CAs.
 
-2006-01-12 nalin
+2007-01-12 nalin
 	* src/bcmst.c, src/certs.c: give destroy_array_of_certs() an
 	upper-bound on the array size.
 
-2006-01-12 nalin
+2007-01-12 nalin
 	* backport: update to base off of the final 1.6 sources.
 
-2006-01-12 nalin
+2007-01-12 nalin
 	* src/pkinit.c: release slots and certificates when they're no longer
 	going to be used. Note if NSS shutdown fails.
 
-2006-01-12 nalin
+2007-01-12 nalin
 	* doc/CONFIGURATION: note which Oakley groups we know about already.
 
-2006-01-12 nalin
+2007-01-12 nalin
 	* src/show-cert-guid.c: note if NSS shutdown fails.
 
-2006-01-12 nalin
+2007-01-12 nalin
 	* src/pkinitt.c: release keys, certificates, contexts, and slots.
 
-2006-01-12 nalin
+2007-01-12 nalin
 	* src/certs.c: release certificates when they're no longer going to be
 	used.
 
-2006-01-12 nalin
+2007-01-12 nalin
 	* src/bcmsutil.c: add a -t option to allow forcing a token login.
 	* src/bcmst.c: release keys, certificates, contexts, and slots.
 
-2006-01-12 nalin
+2007-01-12 nalin
 	* src/oakley.c, src/prime2sub: add q values for the rest of the DH
 	parameter sets.
 
-2006-01-08 nalin
+2007-01-08 nalin
 	* src/bcmst.c(bcms_add_cert_chain_to_signed_data): walk the chain
 	correctly (#221917).
 
Index: Makefile.am
===================================================================
RCS file: /usr/local/CVS/pkinit-nss/Makefile.am,v
retrieving revision 1.10
retrieving revision 1.11
diff -u -r1.10 -r1.11
--- Makefile.am	5 Feb 2007 16:12:40 -0000	1.10
+++ Makefile.am	24 Apr 2007 20:32:57 -0000	1.11
@@ -5,7 +5,8 @@
 	     $(top_srcdir)/backport/krb5-*pal*.patch \
 	     $(top_srcdir)/backport/krb5/*.h \
 	     $(top_srcdir)/backport/*.h \
-	     $(top_srcdir)/backport-1.6/krb5/*.h
+	     $(top_srcdir)/backport-1.6/krb5/*.h \
+	     $(top_srcdir)/backport-1.6.1/krb5/*.h
 
 VERSION=$(shell rpm -q --specfile $(top_srcdir)/pkinit-nss.spec --qf '%{version}\n' | head -n1)
 RELEASE=$(shell rpm -q --specfile $(top_srcdir)/pkinit-nss.spec --qf '%{release}\n' | head -n1)
Index: configure.ac
===================================================================
RCS file: /usr/local/CVS/pkinit-nss/configure.ac,v
retrieving revision 1.23
retrieving revision 1.27
diff -u -r1.23 -r1.27
--- configure.ac	5 Feb 2007 16:38:16 -0000	1.23
+++ configure.ac	25 Apr 2007 16:59:34 -0000	1.27
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-AC_INIT(pkinit-nss,0.5.0)
+AC_INIT(pkinit-nss,0.6.0)
 AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(foreign)
 AM_PROG_LIBTOOL
 AM_GLIB_GNU_GETTEXT
@@ -30,27 +30,61 @@
 CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $KRB5_CFLAGS"
 saved_cppflags="$CPPFLAGS"
 CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $KRB5_CFLAGS"
+
 AC_CHECK_HEADERS(krb5/krb5.h krb5/preauth_plugin.h)
 if test x$ac_cv_header_krb5_krb5_h = xno ; then
 	AC_MSG_ERROR([krb5/krb5.h not found -- do you have Kerberos development files?])
 fi
-if test x$ac_cv_header_krb5_preauth_plugin_h = xno ; then
+
+AC_CHECK_LIB(krb5,krb5_is_referral_realm,,,$KRB5_LIBS)
+AC_CHECK_LIB(krb5,krb5_get_init_creds_opt_alloc,,,$KRB5_LIBS)
+AC_CHECK_TYPE(krb5_gic_opt_pa_data,,,[#include <krb5.h>])
+AC_ARG_WITH(krb5-version,[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-krb5-version=AUTO],[Attempt to build for a specified version of MIT Kerberos.])],krb5_version=$withval,krb5_version=AUTO)
+if test "x$krb5_version" = xAUTO ; then
 	AC_MSG_RESULT([Using backport preauth plugin header support.])
-	AC_MSG_RESULT([Checking whether this is Kerberos 1.5 or 1.6])
-	AC_CHECK_LIB(krb5,krb5_is_referral_realm,,,$KRB5_LIBS)
-	if test x$ac_cv_lib_krb5_krb5_is_referral_realm = xyes ; then
-		AC_MSG_RESULT([Building for Kerberos 1.6.])
-		BACKPORT_CPPFLAGS='-I$(top_srcdir)/backport-1.6'
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether this is Kerberos 1.5, 1.6, or 1.6.1])
+	if test x$ac_cv_lib_krb5_krb5_get_init_creds_opt_alloc = xyes ; then
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([looks like 1.6.1.])
+		krb5_version=1.6.1
+	elif test x$ac_cv_lib_krb5_krb5_is_referral_realm = xyes ; then
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([looks like 1.6.])
+		krb5_version=1.6
 	else
-		AC_MSG_RESULT([Building for Kerberos 1.5.])
-		BACKPORT_CPPFLAGS='-I$(top_srcdir)/backport'
-		AC_DEFINE(USE_PAL_BACKPORT,1,[Define if you're using the bundled backport patch and error header.])
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([can't tell, guessing 1.5.])
+		krb5_version=1.5
 	fi
+else
+	AC_MSG_RESULT([Requested build for $krb5_version.])
 fi
-AC_CHECK_LIB(krb5,krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_pkinit,,,$KRB5_LIBS)
-if test x$ac_cv_lib_krb5_krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_pkinit != xyes ; then
-	AC_DEFINE(DONT_USE_GIC_OPTS,1,[Define if your PAL doesn't provide an option for a preauth_client_supply_gic_opts_proc callback function.])
-fi
+case "$krb5_version" in
+	1.6.1)
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([Building for Kerberos 1.6.1.])
+		if test x$ac_cv_header_krb5_preauth_plugin_h = xno ; then
+			BACKPORT_CPPFLAGS='-I$(top_srcdir)/backport-1.6.1'
+		fi
+		;;
+	1.6)
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([Building for Kerberos 1.6.])
+		if test x$ac_cv_header_krb5_preauth_plugin_h = xno ; then
+			BACKPORT_CPPFLAGS='-I$(top_srcdir)/backport-1.6'
+		fi
+		AC_DEFINE(PKINIT_CLIENT_PROCESS_MISSING_OPT,1,[Define if your client_process() signature doesn't include an "opt" parameter.])
+		AC_DEFINE(PKINIT_CLIENT_MISSING_GIC_OPTS,1,[Define if your PAL doesn't provide an option for a supply_gic_opts_proc callback function.])
+		;;
+	1.5)
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([Building for Kerberos 1.5.])
+		if test x$ac_cv_header_krb5_preauth_plugin_h = xno ; then
+			BACKPORT_CPPFLAGS='-I$(top_srcdir)/backport'
+		fi
+		AC_DEFINE(PKINIT_USE_PAL_BACKPORT,1,[Define if you're using the bundled backport patch and error header.])
+		AC_DEFINE(PKINIT_CLIENT_PROCESS_MISSING_OPT,1,[Define if your client_process() signature doesn't include an "opt" parameter.])
+		AC_DEFINE(PKINIT_CLIENT_MISSING_GIC_OPTS,1,[Define if your PAL doesn't provide an option for a supply_gic_opts_proc callback function.])
+		;;
+	*)
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([Don't know how to build for $krb5_version (yet).])
+		;;
+esac
+
 CFLAGS="$saved_cflags"
 CPPFLAGS="$saved_cppflags"
 
Index: pkinit-nss.spec.in
===================================================================
RCS file: /usr/local/CVS/pkinit-nss/pkinit-nss.spec.in,v
retrieving revision 1.23
retrieving revision 1.24
diff -u -r1.23 -r1.24
--- pkinit-nss.spec.in	5 Feb 2007 16:38:38 -0000	1.23
+++ pkinit-nss.spec.in	6 Feb 2007 02:20:26 -0000	1.24
@@ -36,6 +36,10 @@
 %{_libdir}/krb5
 
 %changelog
+* Mon Feb  5 2007 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 0.6.0-1
+- fix encoding/interpreting of e_data, encoding of DH parameters, error
+  reporting for revoked certificates
+
 * Mon Feb  5 2007 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 0.5.0-1
 - add protocol-level error reporting and handling
 
Index: backport-1.6.1/krb5/preauth_plugin.h
===================================================================
RCS file: backport-1.6.1/krb5/preauth_plugin.h
diff -N backport-1.6.1/krb5/preauth_plugin.h
--- /dev/null	1 Jan 1970 00:00:00 -0000
+++ backport-1.6.1/krb5/preauth_plugin.h	25 Apr 2007 15:58:37 -0000	1.1
@@ -0,0 +1,372 @@
+/*
+ * <krb5/preauth_plugin.h>
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Red Hat, Inc.
+ * Portions copyright (c) 2006 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
+ * All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+ *
+ *  * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *  * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *  * Neither the name of Red Hat, Inc., nor the names of its
+ *    contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
+ *    from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS
+ * IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
+ * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
+ * PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER
+ * OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL,
+ * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
+ * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR
+ * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
+ * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
+ * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * Preauthentication plugin definitions for Kerberos 5.
+ */
+
+#ifndef KRB5_PREAUTH_PLUGIN_H_INCLUDED
+#define KRB5_PREAUTH_PLUGIN_H_INCLUDED
+#include <krb5/krb5.h>
+
+/*
+ * While arguments of these types are passed-in, for the most part a preauth
+ * module can treat them as opaque.  If we need keying data, we can ask for
+ * it directly.
+ */
+struct _krb5_db_entry_new;
+struct _krb5_key_data;
+struct _krb5_preauth_client_rock;
+
+/*
+ * Preauth mechanism property flags, unified from previous definitions in the
+ * KDC and libkrb5 sources.
+ */
+
+/* Provides a real answer which we can send back to the KDC (client-only).  The
+ * client assumes that one real answer will be enough. */
+#define PA_REAL		0x00000001
+
+/* Doesn't provide a real answer, but must be given a chance to run before any
+ * REAL mechanism callbacks (client-only). */
+#define PA_INFO		0x00000002
+
+/* Causes the KDC to include this mechanism in a list of supported preauth
+ * types if the user's DB entry flags the user as requiring hardware-based
+ * preauthentication (server-only). */
+#define PA_HARDWARE	0x00000004
+
+/* Causes the KDC to include this mechanism in a list of supported preauth
+ * types if the user's DB entry flags the user as requiring preauthentication,
+ * and to fail preauthentication if we can't verify the client data.  The
+ * flipside of PA_SUFFICIENT (server-only). */
+#define PA_REQUIRED	0x00000008
+
+/* Causes the KDC to include this mechanism in a list of supported preauth
+ * types if the user's DB entry flags the user as requiring preauthentication,
+ * and to mark preauthentication as successful if we can verify the client
+ * data.  The flipside of PA_REQUIRED (server-only). */
+#define PA_SUFFICIENT	0x00000010
+
+/* Marks this preauthentication mechanism as one which changes the key which is
+ * used for encrypting the response to the client.  Modules which have this
+ * flag have their server_return_proc called before modules which do not, and
+ * are passed over if a previously-called module has modified the encrypting
+ * key (server-only). */
+#define PA_REPLACES_KEY	0x00000020
+
+/* Causes the KDC to check with this preauthentication module even if the
+ * client has no entry in the realm database.  If the module returns a success
+ * code, continue processing and assume that its return_padata callback will
+ * supply us with a key for encrypting the AS reply (server-only). */
+/* #define PA_VIRTUAL	(0x00000040 | PA_REPLACES_KEY) */
+
+/* Not really a padata type, so don't include it in any list of preauth types
+ * which gets sent over the wire. */
+#define PA_PSEUDO	0x00000080
+
+/*
+ * A server module's callback functions are allowed to request specific types
+ * of information about the given client or server record or request, even
+ * though the database records themselves are opaque to the module.
+ */
+enum krb5plugin_preauth_entry_request_type {
+    /* The returned krb5_data item holds a DER-encoded X.509 certificate. */
+    krb5plugin_preauth_entry_request_certificate = 1,
+    /* The returned krb5_data_item holds a krb5_deltat. */
+    krb5plugin_preauth_entry_max_time_skew = 2,
+    /* The returned krb5_data_item holds an array of krb5_keyblock structures,
+     * terminated by an entry with key type = 0.
+     * Each keyblock should have its contents freed in turn, and then the data
+     * item itself should be freed. */
+    krb5plugin_preauth_keys = 3,
+    /* The returned krb5_data_item holds the request structure, re-encoded
+     * using DER.  Unless the client implementation is the same as the server
+     * implementation, there's a good chance that the result will not match
+     * what the client sent, so don't go creating any fatal errors if it
+     * doesn't match up. */
+    krb5plugin_preauth_request_body = 4
+};
+typedef krb5_error_code
+(*preauth_get_entry_data_proc)(krb5_context,
+			       krb5_kdc_req *,
+			       struct _krb5_db_entry_new *,
+			       krb5_int32 request_type,
+			       krb5_data **);
+
+/*
+ * A client module's callback functions are allowed to request various
+ * information to enable it to process a request.
+ */
+enum krb5plugin_preauth_client_request_type {
+    /* The returned krb5_data item holds the enctype used to encrypt the
+     * encrypted portion of the AS_REP packet. */
+    krb5plugin_preauth_client_get_etype = 1,
+    /* Free the data returned from krb5plugin_preauth_client_req_get_etype */
+    krb5plugin_preauth_client_free_etype = 2
+};
+typedef krb5_error_code
+(*preauth_get_client_data_proc)(krb5_context,
+				struct _krb5_preauth_client_rock *,
+				krb5_int32 request_type,
+				krb5_data **);
+
+/*
+ * A callback which will obtain the user's long-term AS key by prompting the
+ * user for the password, then salting it properly, and so on.  For the moment,
+ * it's identical to the get_as_key callback used inside of libkrb5, but we
+ * define a new typedef here instead of making the existing one public to
+ * isolate ourselves from potential future changes.
+ */
+typedef krb5_error_code
+(*preauth_get_as_key_proc)(krb5_context,
+			   krb5_principal,
+			   krb5_enctype,
+			   krb5_prompter_fct,
+			   void *prompter_data,
+			   krb5_data *salt,
+			   krb5_data *s2kparams,
+			   krb5_keyblock *as_key,
+			   void *gak_data);
+
+/*
+ * Client function which receives krb5_get_init_creds_opt information.
+ * The attr and value information supplied should be copied locally by
+ * the module if it wishes to reference it after returning from this call.
+ */
+typedef krb5_error_code
+(*supply_gic_opts_proc)(krb5_context context,
+			void *plugin_context,
+			krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt,
+			const char *attr,
+			const char *value);
+/*
+ * The function table / structure which a preauth client module must export as
+ * "preauthentication_client_0".  If the interfaces work correctly, future
+ * versions of the table will add either more callbacks or more arguments to
+ * callbacks, and in both cases we'll be able to wrap the v0 functions.
+ */
+typedef struct krb5plugin_preauth_client_ftable_v0 {
+    /* Not-usually-visible name. */
+    char *name;
+
+    /* Pointer to zero-terminated list of pa_types which this module can
+     * provide services for. */
+    krb5_preauthtype *pa_type_list;
+
+    /* Pointer to zero-terminated list of enc_types which this module claims
+     * to add support for. */
+    krb5_enctype *enctype_list;
+
+    /* Per-plugin initialization/cleanup.  The init function is called
+     * by libkrb5 when the plugin is loaded, and the fini function is
+     * called before the plugin is unloaded.  Both are optional and
+     * may be called multiple times in case the plugin is used in
+     * multiple contexts.  The returned context lives the lifetime of
+     * the krb5_context */
+    krb5_error_code (*init)(krb5_context context, void **plugin_context);
+    void (*fini)(krb5_context context, void *plugin_context);
+    /* A callback which returns flags indicating if the module is a "real" or
+     * an "info" mechanism, and so on.  This function is called for each entry
+     * in the client_pa_type_list. */
+    int (*flags)(krb5_context context, krb5_preauthtype pa_type);
+    /* Per-request initialization/cleanup.  The request_init function is
+     * called when beginning to process a get_init_creds request and the
+     * request_fini function is called when processing of the request is
+     * complete.  This is optional.  It may be called multiple times in
+     * the lifetime of a krb5_context. */
+    void (*request_init)(krb5_context context, void *plugin_context,
+		    void **request_context);
+    void (*request_fini)(krb5_context context, void *plugin_context,
+		    void *request_context);
+    /* Client function which processes server-supplied data in pa_data,
+     * returns created data in out_pa_data, storing any of its own state in
+     * client_context if data for the associated preauthentication type is
+     * needed.  It is also called after the AS-REP is received if the AS-REP
+     * includes preauthentication data of the associated type.
+     * NOTE! the encoded_previous_request will be NULL the first time this
+     * function is called, because it is expected to only ever contain the data
+     * obtained from a previous call to this function. */
+    krb5_error_code (*process)(krb5_context context,
+			       void *plugin_context,
+			       void *request_context,
+			       krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt,
+			       preauth_get_client_data_proc get_data_proc,
+			       struct _krb5_preauth_client_rock *rock,
+			       krb5_kdc_req *request,
+			       krb5_data *encoded_request_body,
+			       krb5_data *encoded_previous_request,
+			       krb5_pa_data *pa_data,
+			       krb5_prompter_fct prompter,
+			       void *prompter_data,
+			       preauth_get_as_key_proc gak_fct,
+			       void *gak_data,
+			       krb5_data *salt, krb5_data *s2kparams,
+			       krb5_keyblock *as_key,
+			       krb5_pa_data **out_pa_data);
+    /* Client function which can attempt to use e-data in the error response to
+     * try to recover from the given error.  If this function is not NULL, and
+     * it stores data in out_pa_data which is different data from the contents
+     * of in_pa_data, then the client library will retransmit the request. */
+    krb5_error_code (*tryagain)(krb5_context context,
+				void *plugin_context,
+				void *request_context,
+				krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt,
+				preauth_get_client_data_proc get_data_proc,
+				struct _krb5_preauth_client_rock *rock,
+				krb5_kdc_req *request,
+				krb5_data *encoded_request_body,
+				krb5_data *encoded_previous_request,
+				krb5_pa_data *in_pa_data,
+				krb5_error *error,
+				krb5_prompter_fct prompter,
+				void *prompter_data,
+				preauth_get_as_key_proc gak_fct,
+				void *gak_data,
+				krb5_data *salt, krb5_data *s2kparams,
+				krb5_keyblock *as_key,
+				krb5_pa_data **out_pa_data);
+    /*
+     * Client function which receives krb5_get_init_creds_opt information.
+     * The attr and value information supplied should be copied locally by
+     * the module if it wishes to reference it after returning from this call.
+     */
+    supply_gic_opts_proc gic_opts;
+} krb5plugin_preauth_client_ftable_v0;
+
+/*
+ * The function table / structure which a preauth server module must export as
+ * "preauthentication_server_0".  NOTE: replace "0" with "1" for the type and
+ * variable names if this gets picked up by upstream.  If the interfaces work
+ * correctly, future versions of the table will add either more callbacks or
+ * more arguments to callbacks, and in both cases we'll be able to wrap the v0
+ * functions.
+ */
+typedef struct krb5plugin_preauth_server_ftable_v0 {
+    /* Not-usually-visible name. */
+    char *name;
+
+    /* Pointer to zero-terminated list of pa_types which this module can
+     * provide services for. */
+    krb5_preauthtype *pa_type_list;
+
+    /* Per-plugin initialization/cleanup.  The init function is called by the
+     * KDC when the plugin is loaded, and the fini function is called before
+     * the plugin is unloaded.  Both are optional. */
+    krb5_error_code (*init_proc)(krb5_context, void **);
+    void (*fini_proc)(krb5_context, void *);
+    /* Return the flags which the KDC should use for this module.  This is a
+     * callback instead of a static value because the module may or may not
+     * wish to count itself as a hardware preauthentication module (in other
+     * words, the flags may be affected by the configuration, for example if a
+     * site administrator can force a particular preauthentication type to be
+     * supported using only hardware).  This function is called for each entry
+     * entry in the server_pa_type_list. */
+    int (*flags_proc)(krb5_context, krb5_preauthtype);
+    /* Get preauthentication data to send to the client as part of the "you
+     * need to use preauthentication" error.  The module doesn't need to
+     * actually provide data if the protocol doesn't require it, but it should
+     * return either zero or non-zero to control whether its padata type is
+     * included in the list which is sent back to the client.  Is not allowed
+     * to create a context because we have no guarantee that the client will
+     * ever call again (or that it will hit this server if it does), in which
+     * case a context might otherwise hang around forever. */
+    krb5_error_code (*edata_proc)(krb5_context, krb5_kdc_req *request,
+				  struct _krb5_db_entry_new *client,
+				  struct _krb5_db_entry_new *server,
+				  preauth_get_entry_data_proc,
+				  void *pa_module_context,
+				  krb5_pa_data *data);
+    /* Verify preauthentication data sent by the client, setting the
+     * TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH or TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH flag in the enc_tkt_reply's "flags"
+     * field as appropriate, and returning nonzero on failure.  Can create
+     * context data for consumption by the return_proc or freepa_proc below. */
+    krb5_error_code (*verify_proc)(krb5_context,
+   				   struct _krb5_db_entry_new *client,
+				   krb5_data *req_pkt,
+				   krb5_kdc_req *request,
+				   krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_reply,
+				   krb5_pa_data *data,
+				   preauth_get_entry_data_proc,
+				   void *pa_module_context,
+				   void **pa_request_context,
+				   krb5_data **e_data);
+    /* Generate preauthentication response data to send to the client as part
+     * of the AS-REP.  If it needs to override the key which is used to encrypt
+     * the response, it can do so.  The module is expected (but not required,
+     * if a freepa_proc is also provided) to free any context data it saved in
+     * "request_pa_context". */
+    krb5_error_code (*return_proc)(krb5_context, krb5_pa_data * padata,
+				   struct _krb5_db_entry_new *client,
+				   krb5_data *req_pkt,
+				   krb5_kdc_req *request,
+				   krb5_kdc_rep *reply,
+				   struct _krb5_key_data *client_keys,
+				   krb5_keyblock *encrypting_key,
+				   krb5_pa_data **send_pa,
+				   preauth_get_entry_data_proc,
+				   void *pa_module_context,
+				   void **pa_request_context);
+    /* Free up the server-side per-request context, in cases where
+     * server_return_proc() didn't or for whatever reason was not called.  Can
+     * be NULL. */
+    krb5_error_code (*freepa_reqcontext_proc)(krb5_context,
+   					      void *pa_module_context,
+					      void **request_pa_context);
+} krb5plugin_preauth_server_ftable_v0;
+
+
+/*
+ * This function allows a preauth plugin to obtain preauth
+ * options.  The preauth_data returned from this function
+ * should be freed by calling krb5_get_init_creds_opt_free_pa().
+ *
+ * The 'opt' pointer supplied to this function must have been
+ * obtained using krb5_get_init_creds_opt_alloc()
+ */
+krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
+krb5_get_init_creds_opt_get_pa
+		(krb5_context context,
+		krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt,
+		int *num_preauth_data,
+		krb5_gic_opt_pa_data **preauth_data);
+
+/*
+ * This function frees the preauth_data that was returned by
+ * krb5_get_init_creds_opt_get_pa().
+ */
+void KRB5_CALLCONV
+krb5_get_init_creds_opt_free_pa
+		(krb5_context context,
+		 int num_preauth_data,
+		 krb5_gic_opt_pa_data *preauth_data);
+
+#endif /* KRB5_PREAUTH_PLUGIN_H_INCLUDED */
Index: doc/CONFIGURATION
===================================================================
RCS file: /usr/local/CVS/pkinit-nss/doc/CONFIGURATION,v
retrieving revision 1.9
retrieving revision 1.12
diff -u -r1.9 -r1.12
--- doc/CONFIGURATION	5 Feb 2007 16:27:27 -0000	1.9
+++ doc/CONFIGURATION	23 Apr 2007 21:45:43 -0000	1.12
@@ -1,34 +1,41 @@
 In appdefaults:
   allow_pkinit     - Enable or disable the module.  Default is "yes".
   allow_pkinit_server - Enable or disable the module for KDCs.  Default is
-  			to take the value of the "allow_pkinit" option.
+			to take the value of the "allow_pkinit" option.
 			Overrides "allow_pkinit".
   allow_pkinit_client - Enable or disable the module for clients.  Default is
-  			to take the value of the "allow_pkinit" option.
+			to take the value of the "allow_pkinit" option.
 			Overrides "allow_pkinit".
   trusted_guid     - GUID extension value which the client will trust if the
-                     KDC's cert has no subjectAltName value which can be used.
-                     No default.
+		     KDC's cert has no subjectAltName value which can be used.
+		     No default.
   ocsp_checking    - Enable or disable OCSP checking.  Default is "yes" for
-                     KDCs, "no" for clients.
-  is_hw            - Assume that a PKINIT client also satisfies requires_hwauth
-                     requirements.  Default is "no".
-  try_dh           - Enable DH instead of enckey-based kinit.  Default is "yes".
+		     KDCs, "no" for clients.
+  is_hw	    - Assume that a PKINIT client also satisfies requires_hwauth
+		     requirements.  Default is "no".
+  try_dh	   - Enable DH instead of enckey-based kinit.  Default is "yes".
   minimum_dh_prime_size - Minimum acceptable size for DH primes.  Default 1024.
   preferred_group  - Preferred Oakley group when using DH.  The default
-                     moduli included with Heimdal correspond to "2".  Default
+		     moduli included with Heimdal correspond to 14.  Default
 		     is "2".  Valid values include 1, 2, 5, 14, 15, 16.
   mappings_file    - Name of a principal-name-to-subject-DN mapping file.  No
-                     default setting.
+		     default setting.
   trust_pkinit_san - Whether or not to trust PKINIT-style subjectAltName values
-                     in certificates.  Default is "yes".
+		     in certificates.  Default is "yes".
   trust_upn_san    - Whether or not to trust userPrincipalName subjectAltName
-                     values in certificates.  Default is "yes".
+		     values in certificates.  Default is "yes".
+  client_database  - Location of the certificate/key/token database used by the
+		     client.  Default is set at compile-time.
+  server_database  - Location of the certificate/key/token database used by the
+		     KDC.  Default is set at compile-time.
   debug_level      - Logging level.  Default is "0".
   debug_syslog     - Whether or not to send debug messages to syslog.  Default
-  		     is "yes".
+		     is "yes".
   debug_stderr     - Whether or not to send debug messages to stderr.  Default
-  		     is "no".
+		     is "no".
+  trusted_servers  - DNS names which, if found in a KDC's certificate, will
+		     make it acceptable as an alternate to having a matching
+		     principal name or GUID.
 
 [appdefaults]
  allow_pkinit = no
Index: doc/TODO
===================================================================
RCS file: /usr/local/CVS/pkinit-nss/doc/TODO,v
retrieving revision 1.10
retrieving revision 1.12
diff -u -r1.10 -r1.12
--- doc/TODO	6 Nov 2006 23:46:23 -0000	1.10
+++ doc/TODO	6 Feb 2007 01:37:18 -0000	1.12
@@ -12,13 +12,17 @@
     (well, hopefully not).
   - Less code to maintain (at some point).
 - Implement reading of OpenSSL-style PEM-formatted keys and certificates.
+  - Should be doable.  Might be tricky importing keys, if there's no in-memory
+    database in which to store them.
 - Implement reading of directories filled with OpenSSL-style PEM-formatted keys
   and certificates.
 - Implement reading of client creds directly from a PKCS12 file.
+  - Can't be done just now.  Using a key from a PKCS12 bag requires that it be
+    imported into a database, and at that point your side-effect is pk12util's
+    job.
 - Implement direct loading and use of PKCS11 modules.
-- Implement retrying guided by typed-data returned with CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE
-  and INVALID_CERTIFICIATE errors.
-  - Report TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS e-data for KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE.
-  - Report TD-INVALID-CERTIFICATES e-data for KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE.
-  - Report TD-DH-PARAMETERS e-data for KDC_ERR_DH_KEY_PARAMETERS_NOT_ACCEPTED.
+  - Having trouble using modules which aren't already in the secmod database.
+- Implement RFC4557 "stapling" of OCSP responses into the AS exchange, to
+  maybe cut down on client lag and OCSP responder load.  Requires newer NSS
+  than exists as of 20070205.
 - Implement a Windows-compatible server.
Index: doc/openssl/make-certs.sh
===================================================================
RCS file: /usr/local/CVS/pkinit-nss/doc/openssl/make-certs.sh,v
retrieving revision 1.2
retrieving revision 1.4
diff -u -r1.2 -r1.4
--- doc/openssl/make-certs.sh	6 Nov 2006 23:46:05 -0000	1.2
+++ doc/openssl/make-certs.sh	6 Feb 2007 01:37:18 -0000	1.4
@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@
 
 # Choose a user name part for email attributes.
 GIVENUSER=$2
-test x$GIVENUSER = x && GIVENUSER=$USER
-echo $GIVENUSER | grep -q @ || GIVENUSER=$GIVENUSER@$DOMAIN
+test x"$GIVENUSER" = x && GIVENUSER=$USER
+echo "$GIVENUSER" | grep -q @ || GIVENUSER="$GIVENUSER"@$DOMAIN
 DOMAIN=`echo "$GIVENUSER" | cut -f2- -d@`
 
 # Default to generating a key/cert pair for the current host.
@@ -106,14 +106,14 @@
 done=echo
 fi
 
-# Generate another key.
-if ! test -f "$commonname.key" ; then
+# Generate another key, unless we have a key or CSR.
+if ! test -f "$commonname.key" && ! test -f "$commonname.csr" ; then
 umask=`umask -p`
 umask 077
 openssl genrsa 1024 -nodes > "$commonname.key" 2> /dev/null
 $umask
 else
-echo "You already have a $commonname.key file; not replacing."
+echo "You already have a $commonname.key or $commonname.csr file; not replacing."
 done=echo
 fi
 
@@ -175,13 +175,13 @@
 			eku="$eku,$ekuval"
 		fi
 		;;
-	*@*COM)
+	*@*.COM|*@*.EDU|*@*.NET|*@*.ORG)
 		type="otherName:1.3.6.1.5.2.2;SEQUENCE:$1,otherName:1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.3;UTF8"
 		principals="$principals $1"
 		;;
-	*@*com|copy)                 type=email;;
-	[0-9]*.[0-9]*.[0-9]*.[0-9]*) type=IP;;
-	*)                           type=DNS;;
+	*@*.com|*@*.edu|*@*.net|*@*.org|copy)        type=email;;
+	[0-9]*.[0-9]*.[0-9]*.[0-9]*)                 type=IP;;
+	*)                                           type=DNS;;
 	esac
 	if test -n "$type" ; then
 		newvalue="${type}:$1"
@@ -231,7 +231,11 @@
 	done
 done
 
-openssl req -config `pwd`/openssl.cnf -new -key "$commonname.key" > host.csr 2> /dev/null
+if test -f "$commonname.csr" ; then
+	cp "$commonname.csr" host.csr
+else
+	openssl req -config `pwd`/openssl.cnf -new -key "$commonname.key" > host.csr 2> /dev/null
+fi
 openssl x509 -req -extfile `pwd`/openssl.cnf -extensions v3_issued -CA ca.crt -CAkey ca.key -CAserial ca.srl -in host.csr -days $DAYS > "$commonname.crt" 2> /dev/null
 else
 echo "You already have a $commonname.crt file; not replacing."
Index: po/Makefile.in.in
===================================================================
RCS file: /usr/local/CVS/pkinit-nss/po/Makefile.in.in,v
retrieving revision 1.4
diff -u -r1.4 Makefile.in.in
--- po/Makefile.in.in	25 Jan 2007 21:32:03 -0000	1.4
+++ po/Makefile.in.in	2 May 2007 16:06:10 -0000
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@
 
 prefix = @prefix@
 exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@
-datarootdir = @datarootdir@
 datadir = @datadir@
 libdir = @libdir@
 localedir = $(libdir)/locale
@@ -35,7 +34,6 @@
 
 INSTALL = @INSTALL@
 INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@
-MKINSTALLDIRS = $(top_srcdir)/@MKINSTALLDIRS@
 
 CC = @CC@
 GENCAT = @GENCAT@
@@ -119,11 +117,7 @@
 install-data: install-data-@USE_NLS@
 install-data-no: all
 install-data-yes: all
-	if test -r "$(MKINSTALLDIRS)"; then \
-	  $(MKINSTALLDIRS) $(DESTDIR)$(datadir); \
-	else \
-	  $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(datadir); \
-	fi
+	@mkdir_p@ $(DESTDIR)$(datadir)
 	@catalogs='$(CATALOGS)'; \
 	for cat in $$catalogs; do \
 	  cat=`basename $$cat`; \
@@ -133,11 +127,7 @@
 	  esac; \
 	  lang=`echo $$cat | sed 's/\$(CATOBJEXT)$$//'`; \
 	  dir=$(DESTDIR)$$destdir/$$lang/LC_MESSAGES; \
-	  if test -r "$(MKINSTALLDIRS)"; then \
-	    $(MKINSTALLDIRS) $$dir; \
-	  else \
-	    $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $$dir; \
-	  fi; \
+	  @mkdir_p@ $$dir; \
 	  if test -r $$cat; then \
 	    $(INSTALL_DATA) $$cat $$dir/$(GETTEXT_PACKAGE)$(INSTOBJEXT); \
 	    echo "installing $$cat as $$dir/$(GETTEXT_PACKAGE)$(INSTOBJEXT)"; \
@@ -161,11 +151,7 @@
 	  fi; \
 	done
 	if test "$(PACKAGE)" = "glib"; then \
-	  if test -r "$(MKINSTALLDIRS)"; then \
-	    $(MKINSTALLDIRS) $(DESTDIR)$(gettextsrcdir); \
-	  else \
-	    $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(gettextsrcdir); \
-	  fi; \
+	  @mkdir_p@ $(DESTDIR)$(gettextsrcdir); \
 	  $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/Makefile.in.in \
 			  $(DESTDIR)$(gettextsrcdir)/Makefile.in.in; \
 	else \
Index: src/bcmst.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /usr/local/CVS/pkinit-nss/src/bcmst.c,v
retrieving revision 1.16
retrieving revision 1.25
diff -u -r1.16 -r1.25
--- src/bcmst.c	5 Feb 2007 16:14:44 -0000	1.16
+++ src/bcmst.c	25 Apr 2007 17:43:50 -0000	1.25
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
  *   USA.
  */
 
-#ident "$Id: bcmst.c,v 1.16 2007/02/05 16:14:44 nalin Exp $"
+#ident "$Id: bcmst.c,v 1.25 2007/04/25 17:43:50 nalin Exp $"
 
 #include "../config.h"
 
@@ -391,7 +391,9 @@
 	.size = sizeof(SECItem),
 	},
 	{
-	.kind = SEC_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 2 |
+	/* This is supposed to be implicit, but we use an explicit tag here to
+	 * avoid having to wrap and unwrap the raw data which NSS gives us. */
+	.kind = SEC_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 2 | SEC_ASN1_EXPLICIT |
 		SEC_ASN1_OPTIONAL,
 	.offset = offsetof(struct external_principal_identifier,
 			   subject_key_identifier),
@@ -589,6 +591,39 @@
 	{0, 0, NULL, 0},
 };
 
+/* EncryptedData: RFC 3852, 8. */
+const SEC_ASN1Template
+bcms_encrypted_data_template[] = {
+	{
+	.kind = SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE,
+	.offset = 0,
+	.sub = NULL,
+	.size = sizeof(struct encrypted_data),
+	},
+	{
+	.kind = SEC_ASN1_INTEGER,
+	.offset = offsetof(struct encrypted_data, version),
+	.sub = &SEC_IntegerTemplate,
+	/* CMSVersion == Integer */
+	.size = sizeof(SECItem),
+	},
+	{
+	.kind = SEC_ASN1_INLINE,
+	.offset = offsetof(struct encrypted_data, encrypted_content_info),
+	.sub = &bcms_encrypted_content_info_template,
+	.size = sizeof(struct encrypted_content_info),
+	},
+	{
+	.kind = SEC_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 1 |
+		SEC_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
+		SEC_ASN1_OPTIONAL,
+	.offset = offsetof(struct encrypted_data, der_unsigned_attrs),
+	.sub = &SEC_AnyTemplate,
+	.size = sizeof(SECItem),
+	},
+	{0, 0, NULL, 0},
+};
+
 struct attribute **
 bcms_decode_set_of_attributes(struct module_context *mcontext,
 			      PLArenaPool *pool, SECItem *item)
@@ -781,6 +816,38 @@
 	return NULL;
 }
 
+struct encrypted_data *
+bcms_decode_encrypted_data(struct module_context *mcontext,
+			   PLArenaPool *pool, SECItem *item)
+{
+	struct encrypted_data *ed;
+
+	ed = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(pool, sizeof(*ed));
+	if (ed == NULL) {
+		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 0, "Out of memory.\n");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(pool, ed, bcms_encrypted_data_template,
+			       item) != SECSuccess) {
+		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1, "Error decoding encrypted-data.\n");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return ed;
+}
+
+SECItem *
+bcms_encode_encrypted_data(struct module_context *mcontext,
+			   PLArenaPool *pool, struct encrypted_data *ed)
+{
+	SECItem encoded;
+	if (SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(pool, &encoded, ed,
+			       bcms_encrypted_data_template) == &encoded) {
+		return SECITEM_ArenaDupItem(pool, &encoded);
+	}
+	pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1, "Error encoding encrypted-data.\n");
+	return NULL;
+}
+
 struct content_info *
 bcms_build_content_info(PLArenaPool *pool, SECOidTag content_type_tag,
 			SECItem *content_data)
@@ -1321,7 +1388,7 @@
 	PK11Context *ctx;
 	int signer_count, i;
 	unsigned char digest_buf[64];
-	unsigned int digest_length;
+	unsigned int digest_length, attribute;
 
 	/* Double-check that we actually have something to sign. */
 	if (sig->encap_content_info.content.len == 0) {
@@ -1449,11 +1516,15 @@
 	digest_attr.attr_type = oid->oid;
 	digest_attr.attr_values = digest_values;
 
-	signing_times[0] = NULL;
-	signing_times[1] = NULL;
 	if (pkinit_signing_time_from_time(mcontext, pool, NULL,
 					  &signing_time_item) == SECSuccess) {
 		signing_times[0] = &signing_time_item;
+		signing_times[1] = NULL;
+		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2, "Including signing time.\n");
+	} else {
+		signing_times[0] = NULL;
+		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2, "Unable to including signing "
+			     "time.\n");
 	}
 	oid = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(SEC_OID_PKCS9_SIGNING_TIME);
 	if (oid == NULL) {
@@ -1465,14 +1536,13 @@
 	signing_time_attr.attr_type = oid->oid;
 	signing_time_attr.attr_values = signing_times;
 
-	attributes[0] = &content_type_attr;
-	attributes[1] = &digest_attr;
+	attribute = 0;
+	attributes[attribute++] = &content_type_attr;
 	if (signing_times[0] != NULL) {
-		attributes[2] = &signing_time_attr;
-		attributes[3] = NULL;
-	} else {
-		attributes[2] = NULL;
+		attributes[attribute++] = &signing_time_attr;
 	}
+	attributes[attribute++] = &digest_attr;
+	attributes[attribute++] = NULL;
 	sign_content = bcms_encode_set_of_attributes(mcontext, pool,
 						     attributes);
 
@@ -1501,13 +1571,13 @@
 		return SECFailure;
 	} else {
 		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2,
-			     "Generating signature: %s.\n", sigoid->desc);
+			     "Generating %s signature over %d bytes.\n",
+			     sigoid->desc, sign_content->len);
 	}
-
 	signer_info->signature_algorithm.algorithm = sigoid->oid;
 	signer_info->signature_algorithm.parameters = null_item;
 
-	/* Create a PKCS1 signature using the selected digest. */
+	/* Create a PKCS#1 signature using the selected digest. */
 	status = SEC_SignData(&signer_info->signature,
 			      sign_content->data,
 			      sign_content->len,
@@ -1605,11 +1675,11 @@
 
 	issuer = NULL;
 	pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2, "Walking certifying chain for \"%s\".\n",
-		     cert->nickname);
+		     cert->subjectName);
 	issuer = CERT_FindCertIssuer(cert, 0, 0);
 	while ((issuer != NULL) && (!issuer->isRoot)) {
 		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2, "Adding chain link \"%s\".\n",
-			     issuer->nickname);
+			     issuer->subjectName);
 		if (bcms_add_cert_to_signed_data(mcontext, pool, sig,
 						 issuer) != SECSuccess) {
 			CERT_DestroyCertificate(issuer);
@@ -1622,12 +1692,12 @@
 	if (issuer == NULL) {
 		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2,
 			     "No more links in \"%s\"'s cert chain found.\n",
-			     cert->nickname);
+			     cert->subjectName);
 		return SECFailure;
 	} else {
 		if (issuer->isRoot) {
 			pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2, "Stopping at root \"%s\".\n",
-				     issuer->nickname);
+				     issuer->subjectName);
 		}
 		CERT_DestroyCertificate(issuer);
 	}
@@ -1829,11 +1899,62 @@
 	return nlist;
 }
 
+/* Like CERT_FindCertByIssuerAndSN(), but explicitly search all slots. */
+struct issuer_and_sn_data {
+	struct module_context *mcontext;
+	CERTIssuerAndSN *isn;
+	CERTCertificate *cert;
+};
+
+/* If the isuer and serial number of the given certificate matches the ones
+ * passed in with the data, save a copy of the certificate. */
+static SECStatus
+compare_issuer_and_sn(CERTCertificate *cert, SECItem *unused_der_cert,
+		      void *cb_data)
+{
+	struct issuer_and_sn_data *data;
+
+	data = cb_data;
+	if (data->cert != NULL) {
+		return SECSuccess;
+	}
+	if (SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(&cert->derIssuer,
+				  &data->isn->derIssuer) &&
+	    SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(&cert->serialNumber,
+				  &data->isn->serialNumber)) {
+		data->cert = CERT_DupCertificate(cert);
+	}
+	return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Search the cache of loaded certs, and then go out to all tokens. */
+static CERTCertificate *
+find_cert_by_issuer_and_sn(struct module_context *mcontext,
+			   CERTCertDBHandle *certdb,
+			   CERTIssuerAndSN *isn,
+			   struct pkinit_pwcb_args *pwcb_args)
+{
+	struct issuer_and_sn_data data;
+
+	data.cert = CERT_FindCertByIssuerAndSN(certdb, isn);
+	if (data.cert != NULL) {
+		return data.cert;
+	}
+
+	data.mcontext = mcontext;
+	data.isn = isn;
+
+	PK11_TraverseSlotCerts(compare_issuer_and_sn, &data, pwcb_args);
+
+	return data.cert;
+}
+
 /* Find the certificate in the database which matches the recipient_identifier.
  * The returned certificate must be destroyed by the caller. */
 static CERTCertificate *
-find_cert_from_rid(struct module_context *unused_mcontext,
-		   CERTCertDBHandle *certdb, struct recipient_identifier *rid)
+find_cert_from_rid(struct module_context *mcontext,
+		   CERTCertDBHandle *certdb, struct recipient_identifier *rid,
+		   struct pkinit_pwcb_args *pwcb_args)
 {
 	struct issuer_and_serial_number *is;
 	SECItem *spki;
@@ -1846,7 +1967,8 @@
 		memset(&isn, 0, sizeof(isn));
 		isn.derIssuer = is->issuer;
 		isn.serialNumber = is->serial;
-		return CERT_FindCertByIssuerAndSN(certdb, &isn);
+		return find_cert_by_issuer_and_sn(mcontext, certdb,
+						  &isn, pwcb_args);
 		break;
 	case recipient_identifier_type_subject_key_identifier:
 		/* The recipient is identified by the key identifier. */
@@ -1916,7 +2038,8 @@
 			break;
 		}
 		/* try to find a matching cert/key pair */
-		cert = find_cert_from_rid(mcontext, certdb, &ktri->rid);
+		cert = find_cert_from_rid(mcontext, certdb, &ktri->rid,
+					  pwcb_args);
 		if (cert == NULL) {
 			pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1,
 				     "Couldn't find certificate for "
@@ -2037,6 +2160,7 @@
 	struct algorithm_identifier *enc_alg;
 	struct rc2_cbc_parameters rc2_params;
 	unsigned long rc2_version;
+	SECItem aes_params;
 	SECItem des3_params;
 	CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS rc2_cbc_params;
 	CK_MECHANISM mech;
@@ -2076,6 +2200,8 @@
 			     "Unrecognized encryption algorithm.\n");
 		return NULL;
 	}
+	pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2, "Recovered %d-bit CEK for use with %s.\n",
+		     key->len * 8, oid->desc);
 	memset(&mech, 0, sizeof(mech));
 	switch (oid->offset) {
 	case SEC_OID_RC2_CBC:
@@ -2144,9 +2270,38 @@
 		mech.pParameter = des3_params.data;
 		mech.ulParameterLen = des3_params.len;
 		break;
+	case SEC_OID_AES_128_CBC:
+	case SEC_OID_AES_192_CBC:
+	case SEC_OID_AES_256_CBC:
+		block_size = 16;
+		ublock_size = 16;
+		if (enc_alg->parameters == NULL) {
+			pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1,
+				     "Expected AES parameters, got none.\n");
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		if (SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(pool, &aes_params,
+				       SEC_OctetStringTemplate,
+				       enc_alg->parameters) != SECSuccess) {
+			pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1,
+				     "Error parsing AES parameters.\n");
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		if (aes_params.len != ublock_size) {
+			pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1,
+				     "AES-CBC IV is of unexpected size "
+				     "(expected %d bits, got %d).\n",
+				     ublock_size * 8, aes_params.len * 8);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		mech.mechanism = CKM_AES_CBC;
+		mech.pParameter = aes_params.data;
+		mech.ulParameterLen = aes_params.len;
+		break;
 	default:
 		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1,
-			     "Unsupported encryption algorithm.\n");
+			     "Unsupported encryption algorithm \"%s\".\n",
+			     oid->desc);
 		return NULL;
 	}
 
@@ -2267,7 +2422,7 @@
 	/* Encrypt the content-encryption key. */
 	pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2,
 		     "Encrypting %d bytes of CEK data for \"%s\".\n",
-		     content_enc_key->len, recipient->nickname);
+		     content_enc_key->len, recipient->subjectName);
 	enc = SECITEM_AllocItem(pool, NULL, key->u.rsa.modulus.len);
 	if (PK11_PubEncryptPKCS1(key, enc->data,
 				 content_enc_key->data, content_enc_key->len,
Index: src/bcmst.h
===================================================================
RCS file: /usr/local/CVS/pkinit-nss/src/bcmst.h,v
retrieving revision 1.8
retrieving revision 1.9
diff -u -r1.8 -r1.9
--- src/bcmst.h	5 Feb 2007 16:14:44 -0000	1.8
+++ src/bcmst.h	25 Apr 2007 17:43:50 -0000	1.9
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 
 #ifndef bcmst_h
 #define bcmst_h
-#ident "$Id: bcmst.h,v 1.8 2007/02/05 16:14:44 nalin Exp $"
+#ident "$Id: bcmst.h,v 1.9 2007/04/25 17:43:50 nalin Exp $"
 
 #include <nspr.h>
 #include <nss.h>
@@ -128,11 +128,18 @@
 	SECItem der_unsigned_attrs;
 };
 
+struct encrypted_data {
+	SECItem version;
+	struct encrypted_content_info encrypted_content_info;
+	SECItem der_unsigned_attrs;
+};
+
 /* ASN.1 templates */
 extern const SEC_ASN1Template bcms_content_info_template[];
 extern const SEC_ASN1Template bcms_primitive_content_info_template[];
 extern const SEC_ASN1Template bcms_encrypted_content_info_template[];
 extern const SEC_ASN1Template bcms_enveloped_data_template[];
+extern const SEC_ASN1Template bcms_encrypted_data_template[];
 extern const SEC_ASN1Template bcms_external_principal_identifiers_template[];
 extern const SEC_ASN1Template bcms_key_trans_recipient_info_template[];
 extern const SEC_ASN1Template bcms_recipient_identifier_template[];
@@ -165,6 +172,9 @@
 SECItem *bcms_encode_enveloped_data(struct module_context *mcontext,
 				    PLArenaPool *pool,
 				    struct enveloped_data *ed);
+SECItem *bcms_encode_encrypted_data(struct module_context *mcontext,
+				    PLArenaPool *pool,
+				    struct encrypted_data *ed);
 struct attribute **bcms_decode_set_of_attributes(struct module_context *mcontext,
 						 PLArenaPool *pool,
 						 SECItem *item);
@@ -178,6 +188,9 @@
 struct external_principal_identifier **bcms_decode_sequence_of_external_principal_identifier(struct module_context *mcontext,
 											     PLArenaPool *pool, SECItem *item);
 struct enveloped_data *bcms_decode_enveloped_data(struct module_context *mcontext,
+						  PLArenaPool *pool,
+						  SECItem *item);
+struct encrypted_data *bcms_decode_encrypted_data(struct module_context *mcontext,
 						  PLArenaPool *pool,
 						  SECItem *item);
 
Index: src/bcmsutil.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /usr/local/CVS/pkinit-nss/src/bcmsutil.c,v
retrieving revision 1.7
retrieving revision 1.8
diff -u -r1.7 -r1.8
--- src/bcmsutil.c	26 Jan 2007 21:13:47 -0000	1.7
+++ src/bcmsutil.c	7 Feb 2007 00:20:12 -0000	1.8
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
  *   USA.
  */
 
-#ident "$Id: bcmsutil.c,v 1.7 2007/01/26 21:13:47 nalin Exp $"
+#ident "$Id: bcmsutil.c,v 1.8 2007/02/07 00:20:12 nalin Exp $"
 
 #include "../config.h"
 
@@ -185,6 +185,10 @@
 		"\t-t Attempt to log in to named token first\n"
 		"\t-s Sign using named certificate\n"
 		"\t-e Envelope for recipient with named certificate\n"
+		"\t -R Use RC2 for enveloped data key transport\n"
+		"\t -D Use DES3 for enveloped data key transport\n"
+		"\t -a Use AES128 for enveloped data key transport\n"
+		"\t -A Use AES256 for enveloped data key transport\n"
 		"\t-u Unwrap data (recursively)\n"
 		"\t-n Suppress data output\n"
 		"\t-i Input file\n"
@@ -256,7 +260,7 @@
 	token = NULL;
 	slot = NULL;
 	preferred_cek = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
-	while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "d:e:i:s:t:vwunRD")) != -1) {
+	while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "d:e:i:s:t:vwunRDaA")) != -1) {
 		switch (c) {
 		case 'd':
 			directory = optarg;
@@ -290,6 +294,12 @@
 			break;
 		case 'D':
 			preferred_cek = SEC_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC;
+			break;
+		case 'a':
+			preferred_cek = SEC_OID_AES_128_CBC;
+			break;
+		case 'A':
+			preferred_cek = SEC_OID_AES_256_CBC;
 			break;
 		default:
 			usage(command);
Index: src/certs.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /usr/local/CVS/pkinit-nss/src/certs.c,v
retrieving revision 1.26
diff -u -r1.26 certs.c
--- src/certs.c	5 Feb 2007 16:19:40 -0000	1.26
+++ src/certs.c	2 May 2007 16:06:11 -0000
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
  *   USA.
  */
 
-#ident "$Id: certs.c,v 1.26 2007/02/05 16:19:40 nalin Exp $"
+#ident "$Id: certs.c,v 1.32 2007/04/23 21:45:43 nalin Exp $"
 
 #include "../config.h"
 
@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@
 #include "backport-errors.h"
 #endif
 
+#define APPDEFAULT_LIST_SEPARATORS " \t,"
+
 static unsigned char oid_ms_sc_login_data[] = {0x2b, 0x06, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x82, 0x37, 0x14, 0x02, 0x02};
 static const SECOidData
 oid_ms_sc_login = {
@@ -324,11 +326,21 @@
 {
 	return &oid_pkinit_auth_data.oid;
 }
+const SECOidData *
+cert_get_oid_pkinit_auth_data_oid(void)
+{
+	return &oid_pkinit_auth_data;
+}
 const SECItem *
 cert_get_oid_pkinit_rkey_data(void)
 {
 	return &oid_pkinit_rkey_data.oid;
 }
+const SECOidData *
+cert_get_oid_pkinit_rkey_data_oid(void)
+{
+	return &oid_pkinit_rkey_data;
+}
 const SECItem *
 cert_get_oid_pkinit_dhkey_data(void)
 {
@@ -529,6 +541,122 @@
 	return SECSuccess;
 }
 
+static void
+tolower_secitem (SECItem *item)
+{
+    unsigned int i;
+    for (i = 0; i < item->len; i++) {
+        item->data[i] = tolower (item->data[i]);
+    }
+}
+
+static PRBool
+check_item_in_list(const SECItem *item, const char *list)
+{
+	const char *p, *q;
+	p = list;
+	p += strspn(p, APPDEFAULT_LIST_SEPARATORS);
+	while ((p != NULL) && (*p != '\0')) {
+		q = p + strcspn(p, APPDEFAULT_LIST_SEPARATORS);
+		if ((item->len == q - p) &&
+	    	    (memcmp(item->data, p, q - p) == 0)) {
+			return PR_TRUE;
+		}
+		p = q + strspn(q, APPDEFAULT_LIST_SEPARATORS);
+	}
+	return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+/* Check if the certificate has a subjectAltName value matching the DNS name. */
+static SECStatus
+cert_san_matches_dns_for_realm(struct module_context *mcontext,
+			       CERTCertificate *cert,
+			       krb5_context kcontext, krb5_principal server,
+			       PRBool *matches)
+{
+	struct subject_alt_name **names;
+	SECItem san_value, unparsed_name, name;
+	SECOidData *oid;
+	CERTName *subject;
+	CERTRDN *rdn;
+	CERTAVA *ava;
+	char *unparsed, *trusted_servers;
+	int i, j;
+
+	/* Read the list of trusted servers. */
+	krb5_appdefault_string(kcontext, "pkinit",
+			       krb5_princ_realm(kcontext, server),
+			       "trusted_servers", "", &trusted_servers);
+
+	/* Pick apart the name.  Windows accepts a host name in the CN part of
+	 * the subject name, so we should do the same. */
+	subject = &cert->subject;
+	for (i = 0;
+	     (subject->rdns != NULL) && (subject->rdns[i] != NULL);
+	     i++) {
+		rdn = subject->rdns[i];
+		for (j = 0;
+		     (rdn->avas != NULL) && (rdn->avas[j] != NULL);
+		     j++) {
+			ava = rdn->avas[j];
+			oid = SECOID_FindOID(&ava->type);
+			if ((oid != NULL) &&
+			    (oid->offset == SEC_OID_AVA_COMMON_NAME)) {
+				if (check_item_in_list(&ava->value,
+						       trusted_servers)) {
+					pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2,
+						     "Found CN=%.*s in "
+						     "subject name.\n",
+						     ava->value.len,
+						     ava->value.data);
+					*matches = PR_TRUE;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Find the subjectAltName extension. */
+	if (CERT_FindCertExtension(cert, SEC_OID_X509_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME,
+				   &san_value) != SECSuccess) {
+		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2,
+			     "No subjectAltName extension in cert while "
+			     "checking for matching DNS name.\n");
+		return SECFailure;
+	}
+
+	/* Split up the subjectAltName sequence. */
+	names = NULL;
+	if (SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(cert->arena, &names,
+			       san_template, &san_value) != SECSuccess) {
+		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2,
+			     "Error parsing subjectAltName extension.\n");
+		return SECFailure;
+	}
+
+	/* Iterate over all of the values. */
+	*matches = PR_FALSE;
+	for (i = 0; (names != NULL) && (names[i] != NULL) && !(*matches); i++) {
+		switch (names[i]->subject_alt_name_type) {
+		case subject_alt_name_dnsname:
+			name = names[i]->subject_alt_name_value.dnsname;
+			pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2, "SAN %d is DNS: \"%.*s\".\n",
+				     i + 1, name.len, name.data);
+			if (check_item_in_list(&name, trusted_servers)) {
+				*matches = PR_TRUE;
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2,
+				     "SAN %d is type %d, not an otherName.\n",
+				     i + 1, names[i]->subject_alt_name_type);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2, "%d subjectAltName values found\n", i);
+	return SECSuccess;
+}
+
 /* Check if the certificate subjectAltName UPN value matches the principal. */
 static SECStatus
 cert_san_matches_upn(struct module_context *mcontext, CERTCertificate *cert,
@@ -536,7 +664,7 @@
 		     PRBool *matches)
 {
 	struct subject_alt_name **names;
-	SECItem san_value, unparsed_name, ms_upn_name;
+	SECItem san_value, unparsed_name, ms_upn_name, unparsed_name_lower;
 	char *unparsed;
 	int i;
 
@@ -567,7 +695,19 @@
 		return SECFailure;
 	}
 	unparsed_name.data = (unsigned char *) unparsed;
-	unparsed_name.len = strlen(unparsed);
+	unparsed_name.len = strlen(unparsed) + 1;
+
+        if (SECITEM_CopyItem (cert->arena, &unparsed_name_lower, 
+                              &unparsed_name) != SECSuccess) {
+            pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2,
+                         "Error copying unparsed_name SECItem.\n");
+            krb5_free_unparsed_name(kcontext, unparsed);
+            return SECFailure;
+        }
+
+        tolower_secitem (&unparsed_name_lower);
+        --unparsed_name.len;
+        --unparsed_name_lower.len;
 
 	/* Iterate over all of the values. */
 	*matches = PR_FALSE;
@@ -590,6 +730,11 @@
 						pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2,
 							     "UPN Matched.\n");
 						*matches = PR_TRUE;
+                                        } else if (SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual (&ms_upn_name,
+                                                                          &unparsed_name_lower)) {
+                                                pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2,
+                                                             "UPN Matched (lower).\n");
+                                                *matches = PR_TRUE;
 					} else {
 						pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2,
 							     "\"%.*s\" != "
@@ -766,7 +911,11 @@
 	     i++) {
 		if (cert_matches_epi(mcontext, pool, candidate,
 				     banned_cert_list[i])) {
+			pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2,
+				     "Certificate \"%s\" is not to be used.\n",
+				     issuer->subjectName);
 			saw_banned_cert = PR_TRUE;
+			break;
 		}
 	}
 	/* Now walk the certifying chain, checking for restricted and banned CA
@@ -803,6 +952,10 @@
 			     i++) {
 				if (cert_matches_epi(mcontext, pool, issuer,
 						     banned_cert_list[i])) {
+					pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2,
+						     "Issuer \"%s\" is not to "
+						     "be used.\n",
+						     issuer->subjectName);
 					saw_banned_cert = PR_TRUE;
 				}
 			}
@@ -821,10 +974,13 @@
 	}
 	/* Banned cert somewhere = don't use. */
 	if (saw_banned_cert) {
+		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2, "Marking certificate as not-okay.\n");
 		return PR_FALSE;
 	}
 	/* If we had a list of valid CAs, and we didn't see one, don't use. */
 	if ((restricted_ca_list != NULL) && !saw_restricted_ca) {
+		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2,
+			     "Certificate was not issued by a given CA.\n");
 		return PR_FALSE;
 	}
 	/* The PKINIT certificate will have our principal name encoded as a
@@ -867,6 +1023,25 @@
 			cert_flags &= ~CERT_NAME_MASK;
 		}
 	}
+	/* A Domain Controller certificate may only have a trusted server's DNS
+	 * name encoded in it. */
+	if (cert_flags & CERT_MATCHES_TRUSTED_SERVERS) {
+		cert_flags &= ~CERT_MATCHES_TRUSTED_SERVERS;
+		if ((cert_san_matches_dns_for_realm(mcontext, candidate,
+						    kcontext, principal,
+						    &match) != SECSuccess) ||
+		    !match) {
+			if (!(cert_flags & CERT_NAME_MASK)) {
+				/* Return the error if we have no more name
+				 * types to try matching. */
+				return PR_FALSE;
+			}
+		} else {
+			/* No need to check other name types. */
+			pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2, "DNS name matched.\n");
+			cert_flags &= ~CERT_NAME_MASK;
+		}
+	}
 	/* The certificate may not have a principal name included as a SAN
 	 * value, so check the (potentially very long) list for a match. */
 	if (cert_flags & CERT_MATCHES_DN_LIST) {
@@ -984,13 +1159,19 @@
 			continue;
 		}
 
-		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2, "Checking \"%s\".\n", cert->nickname);
+		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2, "Checking \"%s\" (\"%s\").\n",
+			     cert->nickname ?  cert->nickname : "(NULL)",
+			     cert->subjectName);
 		if (cert_is_preferred(mcontext, pool, cert,
 				      restricted_ca_list, banned_cert_list,
 				      additional_dn_list,
 				      kcontext, principal, cert_flags)) {
 			pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2,
-				     "Using \"%s\"\n", cert->nickname);
+				     "Certificate \"%s\" (\"%s\") "
+				     "looks okay.\n",
+				     cert->nickname ?
+				     cert->nickname : "(NULL)",
+				     cert->subjectName);
 			/* CERT_DestroyCertList will free 'cert', so we need
 			 * to make a copy of it. */
 			ret = CERT_DupCertificate(cert);
@@ -1386,11 +1567,46 @@
 		     verify_node != NULL;
 		     verify_node = verify_node->next) {
 			if (verify_node->error != 0) {
-				pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1,
-					     "Error at \"%s\": %s\n",
-					     verify_node->cert->subjectName,
-					     PR_ErrorToString(verify_node->error,
-					     		      PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT));
+				switch (verify_node->error) {
+				case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+					pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1,
+						     "Error at \"%s\": %s\n",
+						     verify_node->cert->subjectName,
+						     "certificate expired");
+					break;
+				case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_SIGNER:
+					pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1,
+						     "Error at \"%s\": %s\n",
+						     verify_node->cert->subjectName,
+						     "unknown signer");
+					break;
+				case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+					pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1,
+						     "Error at \"%s\": %s\n",
+						     verify_node->cert->subjectName,
+						     "untrusted issuer");
+				case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE:
+					pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1,
+						     "Error at \"%s\": %s\n",
+						     verify_node->cert->subjectName,
+						     "inadequate key usage");
+					break;
+				case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE:
+				case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE_CRL:
+				case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE_OCSP:
+					pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1,
+						     "Error at \"%s\": %s\n",
+						     verify_node->cert->subjectName,
+						     "certificate revoked");
+					break;
+				default:
+					pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1,
+						     "Error at \"%s\": %s\n",
+						     verify_node->cert->subjectName,
+						     PR_ErrorToString(verify_node->error,
+								      PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT));
+					break;
+				}
 			}
 		}
 		CERT_DestroyCertArray(other_certs, n_other_certs);
@@ -1493,6 +1709,27 @@
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	/* Try it the new way. */
+	if ((cert_san_matches_dns_for_realm(mcontext, kdc,
+					    kcontext, server,
+					    &matches) == SECSuccess) &&
+	    matches == PR_TRUE) {
+		if (((cert_eku_matches_tag(mcontext, kdc,
+					   SEC_OID_EXT_KEY_USAGE_SERVER_AUTH,
+					   &matches) == SECSuccess) &&
+		      matches) ||
+		    ((cert_eku_matches_oid(mcontext, kdc,
+					   &oid_pkinit_key_purpose_kdc.oid,
+					   &matches) == SECSuccess) &&
+		      matches)) {
+			pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2,
+				     "KDC certificate has DNS name which is "
+				     "trusted for realm, and has correct EKU "
+				     "value.\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
 	/* Otherwise do the best we can to see if it's a valid Windows
 	 * domain controller certificate.  First, check if the
 	 * certificateTemplateName has a good value. */
@@ -1613,11 +1850,47 @@
 		     vnode != NULL;
 		     vnode = vnode->next) {
 			if (vnode->error != 0) {
-				pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1,
-					     "Error at \"%s\": %s\n",
-					     vnode->cert->subjectName,
-					     PR_ErrorToString(vnode->error,
-					     		      PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT));
+				switch (vnode->error) {
+				case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+					pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1,
+						     "Error at \"%s\": %s\n",
+						     vnode->cert->subjectName,
+						     "certificate expired");
+					break;
+				case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_SIGNER:
+					pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1,
+						     "Error at \"%s\": %s\n",
+						     vnode->cert->subjectName,
+						     "unknown signer");
+					break;
+				case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+					pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1,
+						     "Error at \"%s\": %s\n",
+						     vnode->cert->subjectName,
+						     "untrusted issuer");
+					break;
+				case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE:
+					pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1,
+						     "Error at \"%s\": %s\n",
+						     vnode->cert->subjectName,
+						     "inadequate key usage");
+					break;
+				case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE:
+				case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE_CRL:
+				case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE_OCSP:
+					pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1,
+						     "Error at \"%s\": %s\n",
+						     vnode->cert->subjectName,
+						     "certificate revoked");
+					break;
+				default:
+					pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1,
+						     "Error at \"%s\": %s\n",
+						     vnode->cert->subjectName,
+						     PR_ErrorToString(vnode->error,
+								      PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT));
+					break;
+				}
 			}
 		}
 		CERT_DestroyCertArray(other_certs, n_other_certs);
@@ -1639,6 +1912,76 @@
 			*error_epis = epi;
 			return KRB5KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE;
 			break;
+		case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_RESPONSE_TYPE:
+		case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_BAD_HTTP_RESPONSE:
+		case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_MALFORMED_REQUEST:
+		case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_SERVER_ERROR:
+		case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_TRY_SERVER_LATER:             
+		case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_REQUEST_NEEDS_SIG:            
+		case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_UNAUTHORIZED_REQUEST:
+		case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_RESPONSE_STATUS:
+		case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT:
+		case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_NOT_ENABLED:
+		case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_NO_DEFAULT_RESPONDER:
+		case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_MALFORMED_RESPONSE:
+		case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_UNAUTHORIZED_RESPONSE:
+		case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_FUTURE_RESPONSE:
+		case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE:
+		case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_INVALID_SIGNING_CERT:
+			/* encode the invalid certificate list */
+			epi = NULL;
+			for (vnode = verify_log.head;
+			     vnode != NULL;
+			     vnode = vnode->next) {
+				switch (vnode->error) {
+				case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_RESPONSE_TYPE:
+				case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_BAD_HTTP_RESPONSE:
+				case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_MALFORMED_REQUEST:
+				case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_SERVER_ERROR:
+				case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_TRY_SERVER_LATER:             
+				case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_REQUEST_NEEDS_SIG:            
+				case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_UNAUTHORIZED_REQUEST:
+				case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_RESPONSE_STATUS:
+				case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT:
+				case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_NOT_ENABLED:
+				case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_NO_DEFAULT_RESPONDER:
+				case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_MALFORMED_RESPONSE:
+				case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_UNAUTHORIZED_RESPONSE:
+				case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_FUTURE_RESPONSE:
+				case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE:
+				case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_INVALID_SIGNING_CERT:
+					epi = bcms_make_external_principal_identifier_list(mcontext, pool, epi, vnode->cert);
+					break;
+				default:
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+			*error_epis = epi;
+			return KRB5KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN;
+			break;
+		case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE:
+		case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE_CRL:
+		case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE_OCSP:
+			/* encode the invalid certificate list */
+			epi = NULL;
+			for (vnode = verify_log.head;
+			     vnode != NULL;
+			     vnode = vnode->next) {
+				switch (vnode->error) {
+				case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE:
+				case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE_CRL:
+				case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE_OCSP:
+					epi = bcms_make_external_principal_identifier_list(mcontext, pool, epi, vnode->cert);
+					break;
+				default:
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+			*error_epis = epi;
+			return KRB5KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE;
+			break;
+		case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+		case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_SIGNER:
 		case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
 		case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
 		default:
@@ -1662,8 +2005,9 @@
 			       NULL, NULL, additional_dn_list,
 			       kcontext, client, cert_flags)) {
 		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1,
-			     "Client certificate didn't match client name.\n");
-		return KRB5KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH;
+			     "Client certificate for \"%s\" didn't match "
+			     "client name.\n", client_cert->subjectName);
+		return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
 	}
 
 	/* Check that it matches the desired EKU. */
Index: src/certs.h
===================================================================
RCS file: /usr/local/CVS/pkinit-nss/src/certs.h,v
retrieving revision 1.16
retrieving revision 1.17
diff -u -r1.16 -r1.17
--- src/certs.h	5 Feb 2007 16:19:40 -0000	1.16
+++ src/certs.h	23 Apr 2007 21:45:43 -0000	1.17
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
 #ifndef certs_h
 #define certs_h
 
-#ident "$Id: certs.h,v 1.16 2007/02/05 16:19:40 nalin Exp $"
+#ident "$Id: certs.h,v 1.17 2007/04/23 21:45:43 nalin Exp $"
 #include "bcmst.h"
 #include "pkinit.h"
 
@@ -60,21 +60,23 @@
 #define	CERT_MATCHES_UPN_SAN		(1 << 0)
 #define	CERT_MATCHES_KRB_SAN		(1 << 1)
 #define	CERT_MATCHES_DN_LIST		(1 << 2)
+#define	CERT_MATCHES_TRUSTED_SERVERS	(1 << 3)
 #define CERT_NAME_MASK			(CERT_MATCHES_UPN_SAN |\
 					 CERT_MATCHES_KRB_SAN |\
-					 CERT_MATCHES_DN_LIST)
-#define	CERT_MATCHES_CLIENT_AUTH_EKU	(1 << 3)
-#define	CERT_MATCHES_SERVER_AUTH_EKU	(1 << 4)
-#define	CERT_MATCHES_PKINIT_CLIENT_EKU	(1 << 5)
-#define	CERT_MATCHES_PKINIT_KDC_EKU	(1 << 6)
-#define	CERT_MATCHES_MS_SMARTCARD_EKU	(1 << 7)
+					 CERT_MATCHES_DN_LIST |\
+					 CERT_MATCHES_TRUSTED_SERVERS)
+#define	CERT_MATCHES_CLIENT_AUTH_EKU	(1 << 4)
+#define	CERT_MATCHES_SERVER_AUTH_EKU	(1 << 5)
+#define	CERT_MATCHES_PKINIT_CLIENT_EKU	(1 << 6)
+#define	CERT_MATCHES_PKINIT_KDC_EKU	(1 << 7)
+#define	CERT_MATCHES_MS_SMARTCARD_EKU	(1 << 8)
 #define CERT_EKU_MASK			(CERT_MATCHES_CLIENT_AUTH_EKU |\
 					 CERT_MATCHES_PKINIT_CLIENT_EKU |\
 					 CERT_MATCHES_PKINIT_KDC_EKU |\
 					 CERT_MATCHES_MS_SMARTCARD_EKU)
 
-#define CERT_MATCHES_DC_CERT_TEMPLATE	(1 << 8)
-#define CERT_MATCHES_TRUSTED_GUID	(1 << 9)
+#define CERT_MATCHES_DC_CERT_TEMPLATE	(1 << 9)
+#define CERT_MATCHES_TRUSTED_GUID	(1 << 10)
 
 CERTCertificate *cert_find_preferred_cert(struct module_context *mcontext,
 					  PLArenaPool *pool,
@@ -111,7 +113,9 @@
 const SECItem *cert_get_oid_dh_public_number(void);
 const SECItem *cert_get_oid_dh_key_agreement(void);
 const SECItem *cert_get_oid_pkinit_auth_data(void);
+const SECOidData *cert_get_oid_pkinit_auth_data_oid(void);
 const SECItem *cert_get_oid_pkinit_rkey_data(void);
+const SECOidData *cert_get_oid_pkinit_rkey_data_oid(void);
 const SECItem *cert_get_oid_pkinit_dhkey_data(void);
 
 SECItem **cert_get_guids(struct module_context *mcontext,
Index: src/commont.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /usr/local/CVS/pkinit-nss/src/commont.c,v
retrieving revision 1.16
retrieving revision 1.18
diff -u -r1.16 -r1.18
--- src/commont.c	5 Feb 2007 16:20:29 -0000	1.16
+++ src/commont.c	7 Feb 2007 00:17:26 -0000	1.18
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
  *   USA.
  */
 
-#ident "$Id: commont.c,v 1.16 2007/02/05 16:20:29 nalin Exp $"
+#ident "$Id: commont.c,v 1.18 2007/02/07 00:17:26 nalin Exp $"
 
 #include "../config.h"
 
@@ -314,6 +314,16 @@
 };
 
 const SEC_ASN1Template
+common_aes_cbc_parameters_template[] = {
+	{
+	.kind = SEC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+	.offset = offsetof(struct aes_cbc_parameters, iv),
+	.sub = &SEC_OctetStringTemplate,
+	.size = sizeof(SECItem),
+	},
+};
+
+const SEC_ASN1Template
 common_sequence_of_any_template[] = {
 	{
 	.kind = SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF,
@@ -430,11 +440,24 @@
 }
 
 SECItem *
-common_encode_integer(struct module_context *mcontext,
-		      PLArenaPool *pool, SECItem *bits)
+common_encode_unsigned_integer(struct module_context *mcontext,
+			       PLArenaPool *pool, SECItem *bits)
 {
-	SECItem encoded;
-	if (SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(pool, &encoded, bits,
+	SECItem encoded, *unsigned_raw;
+	if (bits->data[0] & 0x80) {
+		/* We want an unsigned number, but the high bit is set, so if
+		 * we just treat it as an integer, it'll appear to be signed
+		 * and negative. */
+		unsigned_raw = SECITEM_AllocItem(pool, NULL, bits->len + 1);
+		if (unsigned_raw == NULL) {
+			pkinit_debug(mcontext, 0, "Out of memory.\n");
+		}
+		unsigned_raw->data[0] = 0;
+		memcpy(unsigned_raw->data + 1, bits->data, bits->len);
+	} else {
+		unsigned_raw = bits;
+	}
+	if (SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(pool, &encoded, unsigned_raw,
 			       SEC_IntegerTemplate) == &encoded) {
 		return SECITEM_ArenaDupItem(pool, &encoded);
 	}
@@ -560,7 +583,7 @@
 common_decode_sequence_of_algorithm_identifier(struct module_context *mcontext,
 					       PLArenaPool *pool, SECItem *item)
 {
-	struct algorthm_identifier **ai;
+	struct algorithm_identifier **ai;
 
 	ai = NULL;
 	if (SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(pool, &ai,
@@ -974,6 +997,153 @@
 	return SECSuccess;
 }
 
+static SECStatus
+common_generate_content_encryption_key_aes(struct module_context *mcontext,
+					   PLArenaPool *pool,
+					   int key_size_bits,
+					   krb5_context kcontext,
+					   struct algorithm_identifier *alg,
+					   SECItem *content_enc_key,
+					   CK_MECHANISM *mech,
+					   int *block_size)
+{
+	SECOidData *oid;
+	SECItem encoded;
+	krb5_data octets;
+	struct aes_cbc_parameters params;
+	char *pk_params;
+	unsigned int i, parity;
+
+	/* Generate a key. */
+	content_enc_key->len = key_size_bits / 8;
+	content_enc_key->data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(pool, content_enc_key->len);
+	if (content_enc_key->data == NULL) {
+		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 0, "Out of memory.\n");
+		return SECFailure;
+	}
+	octets.length = content_enc_key->len;
+	octets.data = (char *) content_enc_key->data;
+	if (krb5_c_random_make_octets(kcontext, &octets) != 0) {
+		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 0, "Out of entropy.\n");
+		return SECFailure;
+	}
+
+	/* Set up some parameters: first, the OID of the algorithm. */
+	switch (key_size_bits) {
+	case 128:
+		oid = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(SEC_OID_AES_128_CBC);
+		break;
+	case 192:
+		oid = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(SEC_OID_AES_192_CBC);
+		break;
+	case 256:
+		oid = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(SEC_OID_AES_256_CBC);
+		break;
+	default:
+		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 0, "Internal error: no knowledge of the "
+			     "AES encryption algorithm (%d bits).\n",
+			     key_size_bits);
+		return SECFailure;
+	}
+	if (oid == NULL) {
+		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 0, "Internal error: no knowledge of the "
+			     "AES-%d encryption algorithm.\n", key_size_bits);
+		return SECFailure;
+	}
+	alg->algorithm = oid->oid;
+
+	/* Generate an IV. */
+	params.iv.len = 16;
+	params.iv.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(pool, params.iv.len);
+	if (params.iv.data == NULL) {
+		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 0, "Out of memory.\n");
+		return SECFailure;
+	}
+	octets.length = params.iv.len;
+	octets.data = (char *) params.iv.data;
+	if (krb5_c_random_make_octets(kcontext, &octets) != 0) {
+		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 0, "Out of entropy.\n");
+		return SECFailure;
+	}
+
+	/* Encode the parameters structure. */
+	if (SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(pool, &encoded, &params,
+			       common_aes_cbc_parameters_template) != &encoded) {
+		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 0, "Error encoding parameters.\n");
+		return SECFailure;
+	}
+	alg->parameters = SECITEM_ArenaDupItem(pool, &encoded);
+	if (alg->parameters == NULL) {
+		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 0, "Out of memory.\n");
+		return SECFailure;
+	}
+
+	/* Build the parameter block for the PKCS11 layer. */
+	mech->mechanism = CKM_AES_CBC;
+	pk_params = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(pool, 16);
+	if (pk_params == NULL) {
+		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 0, "Out of memory.\n");
+		return SECFailure;
+	}
+	memcpy(&pk_params[0], params.iv.data, 16);
+	mech->pParameter = pk_params;
+	mech->ulParameterLen = 16;
+
+	/* The consumer of the key is going to need to know how to pad the
+	 * data for encryption. */
+	*block_size = 16;
+
+	return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+common_generate_content_encryption_key_aes128(struct module_context *mcontext,
+					      PLArenaPool *pool,
+					      krb5_context kcontext,
+					      struct algorithm_identifier *alg,
+					      SECItem *content_enc_key,
+					      CK_MECHANISM *mech,
+					      int *block_size)
+{
+	return common_generate_content_encryption_key_aes(mcontext, pool, 128,
+							  kcontext,
+							  alg,
+							  content_enc_key,
+							  mech, block_size);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+common_generate_content_encryption_key_aes192(struct module_context *mcontext,
+					      PLArenaPool *pool,
+					      krb5_context kcontext,
+					      struct algorithm_identifier *alg,
+					      SECItem *content_enc_key,
+					      CK_MECHANISM *mech,
+					      int *block_size)
+{
+	return common_generate_content_encryption_key_aes(mcontext, pool, 192,
+							  kcontext,
+							  alg,
+							  content_enc_key,
+							  mech, block_size);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+common_generate_content_encryption_key_aes256(struct module_context *mcontext,
+					      PLArenaPool *pool,
+					      krb5_context kcontext,
+					      struct algorithm_identifier *alg,
+					      SECItem *content_enc_key,
+					      CK_MECHANISM *mech,
+					      int *block_size)
+{
+	return common_generate_content_encryption_key_aes(mcontext, pool, 256,
+							  kcontext,
+							  alg,
+							  content_enc_key,
+							  mech, block_size);
+}
+
 SECStatus
 common_generate_content_encryption_key(struct module_context *mcontext,
 				       PLArenaPool *pool,
@@ -1011,6 +1181,42 @@
 			return status;
 		}
 		break;
+	case SEC_OID_AES_128_CBC:
+		status = common_generate_content_encryption_key_aes128(mcontext,
+								       pool,
+								       kcontext,
+								       algorithm,
+								       content_enc_key,
+								       mech,
+								       block_size);
+		if (status == SECSuccess) {
+			return status;
+		}
+		break;
+	case SEC_OID_AES_192_CBC:
+		status = common_generate_content_encryption_key_aes192(mcontext,
+								       pool,
+								       kcontext,
+								       algorithm,
+								       content_enc_key,
+								       mech,
+								       block_size);
+		if (status == SECSuccess) {
+			return status;
+		}
+		break;
+	case SEC_OID_AES_256_CBC:
+		status = common_generate_content_encryption_key_aes256(mcontext,
+								       pool,
+								       kcontext,
+								       algorithm,
+								       content_enc_key,
+								       mech,
+								       block_size);
+		if (status == SECSuccess) {
+			return status;
+		}
+		break;
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -1032,6 +1238,16 @@
 							    content_enc_key,
 							    mech,
 							    block_size);
+	if (status == SECSuccess) {
+		return status;
+	}
+	status = common_generate_content_encryption_key_aes256(mcontext,
+							       pool,
+							       kcontext,
+							       algorithm,
+							       content_enc_key,
+							       mech,
+							       block_size);
 	if (status == SECSuccess) {
 		return status;
 	}
Index: src/commont.h
===================================================================
RCS file: /usr/local/CVS/pkinit-nss/src/commont.h,v
retrieving revision 1.13
retrieving revision 1.15
diff -u -r1.13 -r1.15
--- src/commont.h	5 Feb 2007 16:20:29 -0000	1.13
+++ src/commont.h	7 Feb 2007 00:17:26 -0000	1.15
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
 #ifndef commont_h
 #define commont_h
 
-#ident "$Id: commont.h,v 1.13 2007/02/05 16:20:29 nalin Exp $"
+#ident "$Id: commont.h,v 1.15 2007/02/07 00:17:26 nalin Exp $"
 
 #include <krb5.h>
 #include <nspr.h>
@@ -68,6 +68,10 @@
 	SECItem iv;
 };
 
+struct aes_cbc_parameters {
+	SECItem iv;
+};
+
 extern const SEC_ASN1Template common_general_string_template[];
 extern const SEC_ASN1Template common_sequence_of_any_template[];
 
@@ -93,8 +97,8 @@
 					 struct domain_parameters *info);
 SECItem *common_encode_bitstring(struct module_context *mcontext,
 				 PLArenaPool *pool, SECItem *bits);
-SECItem *common_encode_integer(struct module_context *mcontext,
-			       PLArenaPool *pool, SECItem *bits);
+SECItem *common_encode_unsigned_integer(struct module_context *mcontext,
+					PLArenaPool *pool, SECItem *bits);
 SECItem *common_encode_octetstring(struct module_context *mcontext,
 				   PLArenaPool *pool, SECItem *bits);
 SECItem *common_encode_objectid(struct module_context *mcontext,
Index: src/oakley.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /usr/local/CVS/pkinit-nss/src/oakley.c,v
retrieving revision 1.6
retrieving revision 1.7
diff -u -r1.6 -r1.7
--- src/oakley.c	5 Feb 2007 16:23:16 -0000	1.6
+++ src/oakley.c	6 Feb 2007 01:58:10 -0000	1.7
@@ -20,13 +20,34 @@
  *   USA.
  */
 
-#ident "$Id: oakley.c,v 1.6 2007/02/05 16:23:16 nalin Exp $"
+#ident "$Id: oakley.c,v 1.7 2007/02/06 01:58:10 nalin Exp $"
 
 #include "../config.h"
 #include <keythi.h>
 #include "oakley.h"
 #include "pkinit.h"
 
+static void
+derdump(const char *text, SECItem *item)
+{
+#if DEBUG
+	FILE *pp;
+	unsigned int i;
+	pp = popen("derdump", "w");
+	if (pp) {
+		if (text) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "%s: dumping %d bytes.\n", text,
+				item->len);
+		} else {
+			fprintf(stderr, "Dumping %d bytes.\n", item->len);
+		}
+		for (i = 0; i < item->len; i++) {
+			fputc(item->data[i] & 0xff, pp);
+		}
+		pclose(pp);
+	}
+#endif
+}
 struct oakley_group {
 	int identifier;
 	unsigned int bits;
@@ -365,6 +386,7 @@
 			encoded_params = common_encode_domain_parameters(mcontext,
 									 pool,
 									 params);
+			derdump("DH Parameters", encoded_params);
 			ident.algorithm = oid->oid;
 			ident.parameters = encoded_params;
 			idents = common_make_algorithm_identifier_list(mcontext,
Index: src/pkinit.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /usr/local/CVS/pkinit-nss/src/pkinit.c,v
retrieving revision 1.43
diff -u -r1.43 pkinit.c
--- src/pkinit.c	5 Feb 2007 16:27:27 -0000	1.43
+++ src/pkinit.c	2 May 2007 16:06:11 -0000
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
  *   USA.
  */
 
-#ident "$Id: pkinit.c,v 1.43 2007/02/05 16:27:27 nalin Exp $"
+#ident "$Id: pkinit.c,v 1.52 2007/04/25 16:59:34 nalin Exp $"
 
 #include "../config.h"
 
@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@
 #include <unistd.h>
 
 #include <krb5/krb5.h>
+#ifndef HAVE_KRB5_GIC_OPT_PA_DATA
+typedef struct _krb5_gic_opt_pa_data krb5_gic_opt_pa_data;
+#endif
 #include <krb5/preauth_plugin.h>
 
 #include <nss.h>
@@ -46,7 +49,7 @@
 #include "map-file.h"
 #include "pkinit.h"
 
-#ifdef USE_PAL_BACKPORT
+#ifdef PKINIT_USE_PAL_BACKPORT
 #include "backport-errors.h"
 #define preauthentication_client_0 preauthentication_client_0_backport_1_6
 #define preauthentication_server_0 preauthentication_server_0_backport_1_6
@@ -70,6 +73,48 @@
 #define _(_x) _x
 #endif
 
+static void
+derdump(const char *text, SECItem *item)
+{
+#if DEBUG
+	FILE *pp;
+	unsigned int i;
+	pp = popen("derdump", "w");
+	if (pp) {
+		if (text) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "%s: dumping %d bytes.\n", text,
+				item->len);
+		} else {
+			fprintf(stderr, "Dumping %d bytes.\n", item->len);
+		}
+		for (i = 0; i < item->len; i++) {
+			fputc(item->data[i] & 0xff, pp);
+		}
+		pclose(pp);
+	}
+#endif
+}
+static void
+dump(const char *text, SECItem *item)
+{
+#if DEBUG
+	FILE *pp;
+	unsigned int i;
+	pp = popen("od -t x1c", "w");
+	if (pp) {
+		if (text) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "%s: dumping %d bytes.\n", text,
+				item->len);
+		} else {
+			fprintf(stderr, "Dumping %d bytes.\n", item->len);
+		}
+		for (i = 0; i < item->len; i++) {
+			fputc(item->data[i] & 0xff, pp);
+		}
+		pclose(pp);
+	}
+#endif
+}
 static krb5_preauthtype supported_client_pa_types[] = {
 	KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD,
 	KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ, KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP,
@@ -134,7 +179,7 @@
 	int pkinit, ocsp, try_dh, is_hw, preferred_group, minimum_dh_prime_size;
 	int trust_pkinit_san, trust_upn_san;
 	int debug_level, debug_syslog, debug_stderr;
-	char *p, *mappings_file;
+	char *p, *mappings_file, *dbdir;
 	PRBool owns_nss;
 	struct module_context *context;
 	krb5_data *default_realm = NULL;
@@ -167,10 +212,22 @@
 	owns_nss = !NSS_IsInitialized();
 	if (owns_nss) {
 		if (server) {
-			ret = NSS_Init(DEFAULT_PKINIT_SERVER_DBDIR);
+			dbdir = DEFAULT_PKINIT_SERVER_DBDIR;
+			krb5_appdefault_string(kcontext, "pkinit",
+					       default_realm,
+					       "server_database",
+					       DEFAULT_PKINIT_SERVER_DBDIR,
+					       &dbdir);
 		} else {
-			ret = NSS_Init(DEFAULT_PKINIT_CLIENT_DBDIR);
+			dbdir = DEFAULT_PKINIT_CLIENT_DBDIR;
+			krb5_appdefault_string(kcontext, "pkinit",
+					       default_realm,
+					       "client_database",
+					       DEFAULT_PKINIT_CLIENT_DBDIR,
+					       &dbdir);
 		}
+		pkinit_debug(NULL, 2, "Using database in \"%s\".\n", dbdir);
+		ret = NSS_Init(dbdir);
 		if (ret != SECSuccess) {
 			char *err = NULL;
 			PRInt32 errlen = PR_GetErrorTextLength();
@@ -377,7 +434,21 @@
 			     "Prompter callback called with no pool.\n");
 		return NULL;
 	}
-
+#if 0
+        if (args->gak_data != NULL &&
+            args->gak_data->data != NULL &&
+            args->gak_data->data[0] != '\0') {
+                int answer_len;
+                pkinit_debug(args->mcontext, 2, "We have some gak_data.\n");
+                answer_len = strnlen (args->gak_data->data, args->gak_data->length) + 1;
+                answer = PR_Malloc(answer_len);
+                if (answer != NULL) {
+                    memcpy(answer, args->gak_data->data, answer_len);
+                    answer[answer_len - 1] = '\0';
+                }
+                return answer;
+        }
+#endif
 	/* Get the name of the token. */
 	name = PK11_GetTokenName(slot);
 	if (name == NULL) {
@@ -449,9 +520,24 @@
 }
 
 static krb5_error_code
+client_gic_opts(krb5_context kcontext, void *plugin_context,
+		krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt,
+		const char *attr, const char *value)
+{
+	struct module_context *context;
+	context = plugin_context;
+	pkinit_debug(context, 2, "get_init_creds_opt(\"%s\") = \"%s\"\n",
+		     attr, value);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code
 client_process(krb5_context kcontext,
 	       void *plugin_context,
 	       void *unused_request_context,
+#ifndef PKINIT_CLIENT_PROCESS_MISSING_OPT
+	       krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt,
+#endif
 	       preauth_get_client_data_proc unused_get_data_proc,
 	       struct _krb5_preauth_client_rock *unused_rock,
 	       krb5_kdc_req *request,
@@ -461,11 +547,14 @@
 	       krb5_prompter_fct prompter,
 	       void *prompter_data,
 	       preauth_get_as_key_proc unused_gak_fct,
-	       void *unused_gak_data,
+	       void *gak_data,
 	       krb5_data *unused_salt, krb5_data *unused_s2kparams,
 	       krb5_keyblock *as_key,
 	       krb5_pa_data **out_pa_data)
 {
+#ifdef PKINIT_CLIENT_PROCESS_MISSING_OPT
+	krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt = NULL;
+#endif
 	krb5_data *req, rep;
 	krb5_pa_data *pa_req;
 	krb5_error_code ret;
@@ -494,6 +583,7 @@
 	pwcb_args.fct = prompter;
 	pwcb_args.fct_data = prompter_data;
 	pwcb_args.pool = context->pool;
+        pwcb_args.gak_data = gak_data;
 
 	/* If we have a preferred slot, try to get a handle for it. */
 	preferred_slot_name = getenv("PKCS11_LOGIN_TOKEN_NAME");
@@ -517,7 +607,7 @@
 					kcontext, request->client,
 					CERT_MATCHES_DN_LIST |
 					(context->trust_pkinit_san ?
-					 CERT_MATCHES_KRB_SAN : 0 ) |
+					 CERT_MATCHES_KRB_SAN : 0) |
 					(context->trust_upn_san ?
 					 CERT_MATCHES_UPN_SAN : 0));
 	if (cert == NULL) {
@@ -527,7 +617,9 @@
 		}
 		return KRB5KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP;
 	}
-	pkinit_debug(context, 1, "Using \"%s\".\n", cert->nickname);
+	pkinit_debug(context, 1, "Using \"%s\" (\"%s\").\n",
+		     cert->nickname ? cert->nickname : "(NULL)",
+		     cert->subjectName);
 
 	switch (pa_data->pa_type) {
 	case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
@@ -594,7 +686,8 @@
 							       (context->trust_pkinit_san ?
 							        CERT_MATCHES_KRB_SAN : 0) |
 							       (context->trust_upn_san ?
-							        CERT_MATCHES_UPN_SAN : 0),
+							        CERT_MATCHES_UPN_SAN : 0) |
+							       CERT_MATCHES_TRUSTED_SERVERS,
 							       kcontext,
 							       request,
 							       &rep,
@@ -667,7 +760,8 @@
 						 (context->trust_pkinit_san ?
 						  CERT_MATCHES_KRB_SAN : 0) |
 						 (context->trust_upn_san ?
-						  CERT_MATCHES_UPN_SAN : 0),
+						  CERT_MATCHES_UPN_SAN : 0) |
+						 CERT_MATCHES_TRUSTED_SERVERS,
 						 kcontext,
 						 request,
 						 encoded_previous_request,
@@ -699,6 +793,9 @@
 client_try_again(krb5_context kcontext,
 	         void *plugin_context,
 	         void *unused_request_context,
+#ifndef PKINIT_CLIENT_PROCESS_MISSING_OPT
+		 krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt,
+#endif
 	         preauth_get_client_data_proc unused_get_data_proc,
 	         struct _krb5_preauth_client_rock *unused_rock,
 	         krb5_kdc_req *request,
@@ -709,15 +806,18 @@
 	         krb5_prompter_fct prompter,
 	         void *prompter_data,
 	         preauth_get_as_key_proc unused_gak_fct,
-	         void *unused_gak_data,
+	         void *gak_data,
 	         krb5_data *unused_salt, krb5_data *unused_s2kparams,
 	         krb5_keyblock *as_key,
 	         krb5_pa_data **out_pa_data)
 {
+#ifdef PKINIT_CLIENT_PROCESS_MISSING_OPT
+	krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt = NULL;
+#endif
 	krb5_data *req, rep;
 	krb5_pa_data *pa_req;
 	krb5_error_code ret;
-	SECItem e_data;
+	SECItem e_data, *td_data;
 	SECOidData *oid;
 	SECStatus status;
 	CERTCertificate *cert = NULL;
@@ -728,11 +828,11 @@
 	struct external_principal_identifier **restricted_cas, **banned_certs;
 	struct algorithm_identifier **allowed_algorithms;
 	struct domain_parameters **allowed_dh_params, *dh_params;
-	struct authorization_datum *typed_error;
+	struct typed_datum **typed_errors;
 	char *unparsed_name;
 	struct module_context *context;
 	unsigned long td_type;
-	int i, j;
+	int i, j, k;
 
 	*out_pa_data = NULL;
 	preferred_slot = NULL;
@@ -746,6 +846,7 @@
 	pwcb_args.fct = prompter;
 	pwcb_args.fct_data = prompter_data;
 	pwcb_args.pool = context->pool;
+        pwcb_args.gak_data = gak_data;
 
 	/* Parse the error data. */
 	restricted_cas = NULL;
@@ -754,103 +855,95 @@
 	memset(&e_data, 0, sizeof(e_data));
 	e_data.data = (unsigned char *) error->e_data.data;
 	e_data.len = error->e_data.length;
-	typed_error = pkinit_decode_authorization_datum(context,
-							context->pool,
-							&e_data);
-	if (typed_error != NULL) {
-		status = SEC_ASN1DecodeInteger(&typed_error->ad_type,
+	typed_errors = pkinit_decode_typed_data(context,
+						context->pool,
+						&e_data);
+	if (typed_errors == NULL) {
+		pkinit_debug(context, 1, "Error parsing typed-data from the "
+			     "KDC, not retrying.\n");
+		derdump("e-data", &e_data);
+		return error->error;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; (typed_errors[i] != NULL); i++) {
+		status = SEC_ASN1DecodeInteger(&typed_errors[i]->td_type,
 					       &td_type);
 		if (status != SECSuccess) {
 			pkinit_debug(context, 1,
-				     "Error parsing typed data.\n");
+				     "Error parsing typed data type.\n");
 			return error->error;
 		}
-	}
-	switch (error->error + KRB5KDC_ERR_NONE) {
-	case KRB5KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE:
-		if (typed_error != NULL) {
-			if (td_type == 104) {
-				restricted_cas = bcms_decode_sequence_of_external_principal_identifier(context, context->pool, &typed_error->ad_data);
-			} else {
-				pkinit_debug(context, 1,
-					     "Error data type mismatch.\n");
-				return error->error;
+		pkinit_debug(context, 2, "Received typed-data %d.\n", td_type);
+		td_data = &typed_errors[i]->td_data;
+		switch (td_type) {
+		case 104:
+			restricted_cas = bcms_decode_sequence_of_external_principal_identifier(context, context->pool, td_data);
+			derdump("Trusted certifiers", td_data);
+			for (j = 0;
+			     (restricted_cas != NULL) &&
+			     (restricted_cas[j] != NULL);
+			     j++) {
+				continue;
 			}
-		} else {
-			pkinit_debug(context, 1, "Error data missing.\n");
-			return error->error;
-		}
-		break;
-	case KRB5KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE:
-		if (typed_error != NULL) {
-			if (td_type == 105) {
-				banned_certs = bcms_decode_sequence_of_external_principal_identifier(context, context->pool, &typed_error->ad_data);
-			} else {
-				pkinit_debug(context, 1,
-					     "Error data type mismatch.\n");
-				return error->error;
+			pkinit_debug(context, 2,
+				     "KDC sent list of %d trusted "
+				     "certifiers.\n", j);
+			break;
+		case 105:
+			banned_certs = bcms_decode_sequence_of_external_principal_identifier(context, context->pool, td_data);
+			derdump("Invalid certificates", td_data);
+			for (j = 0;
+			     (banned_certs != NULL) &&
+			     (banned_certs[j] != NULL);
+			     j++) {
+				continue;
 			}
-		} else {
-			pkinit_debug(context, 1, "Error data missing.\n");
-			return error->error;
-		}
-		break;
-	case KRB5KDC_ERR_DH_KEY_PARAMETERS_NOT_ACCEPTED:
-		if (typed_error != NULL) {
-			if (td_type == 109) {
-				allowed_algorithms = common_decode_sequence_of_algorithm_identifier(context, context->pool, &typed_error->ad_data);
-				if (allowed_algorithms != NULL) {
-					for (i = 0;
-					     allowed_algorithms[i] != NULL;
-					     i++) {
+			pkinit_debug(context, 2,
+				     "KDC sent list of %d invalid "
+				     "certificates.\n", j);
+			break;
+		case 109:
+			allowed_algorithms = common_decode_sequence_of_algorithm_identifier(context, context->pool, td_data);
+			derdump("Sequence of allowed algorithms", td_data);
+			if (allowed_algorithms != NULL) {
+				for (j = 0; allowed_algorithms[j] != NULL; j++) {
+					continue;
+				}
+				allowed_dh_params = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(context->pool,
+								     sizeof(struct domain_parameters*) * (i + 1));
+				if (allowed_dh_params == NULL) {
+					pkinit_debug(context, 0,
+						     "Out of memory.\n");
+					break;
+				}
+				for (j = k = 0;
+				     allowed_algorithms[j] != NULL;
+				     j++) {
+					oid = SECOID_FindOID(&allowed_algorithms[j]->algorithm);
+					if (oid == NULL) {
+						pkinit_debug(context, 1,
+							     "DH parameter is not a DH parameter?\n");
 						continue;
 					}
-					allowed_dh_params = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(context->pool,
-									     sizeof(struct domain_parameters*) * (i + 1));
-					if (allowed_dh_params == NULL) {
-						pkinit_debug(context, 0,
-							     "Out of memory.\n");
-						break;
+					if (oid->offset != SEC_OID_X942_DIFFIE_HELMAN_KEY) {
+						pkinit_debug(context, 1,
+							     "Expected DH parameters, got %s.\n", oid->desc);
+						continue;
 					}
-					for (i = j = 0;
-					     allowed_algorithms[i] != NULL;
-					     i++) {
-						oid = SECOID_FindOID(&allowed_algorithms[i]->algorithm);
-						if (oid == NULL) {
-							pkinit_debug(context, 1,
-								     "DH parameter is not a DH parameter?\n");
-							continue;
-						}
-						if (oid->offset != SEC_OID_X942_DIFFIE_HELMAN_KEY) {
-							pkinit_debug(context, 1,
-								     "Expected DH parameters, got %s.\n", oid->desc);
-							continue;
-						}
-						dh_params = common_decode_domain_parameters(context, context->pool, allowed_algorithms[i]->parameters);
-						if (dh_params == NULL) {
-							pkinit_debug(context, 1,
-								     "Error parsing domain parameters.\n");
-							continue;
-						}
-						allowed_dh_params[j++] = dh_params;
+					dh_params = common_decode_domain_parameters(context, context->pool, allowed_algorithms[j]->parameters);
+					if (dh_params == NULL) {
+						pkinit_debug(context, 1,
+							     "Error parsing domain parameters.\n");
+						continue;
 					}
+					allowed_dh_params[k++] = dh_params;
+					dump("Allowed DH prime", &dh_params->q);
+					dump("Allowed DH base", &dh_params->g);
 				}
-			} else {
-				pkinit_debug(context, 1,
-					     "Error data type mismatch.\n");
-				return error->error;
 			}
-		} else {
-			pkinit_debug(context, 1, "Error data missing.\n");
-			return error->error;
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
 		}
-		break;
-	default:
-		pkinit_debug(context, 1, "Can't recover from error %d (%s).\n",
-			     error->error,
-			     error_message(error->error + KRB5KDC_ERR_NONE));
-		return error->error;
-		break;
 	}
 
 	/* If we have a preferred slot, try to get a handle for it. */
@@ -886,7 +979,9 @@
 		}
 		return KRB5KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP;
 	}
-	pkinit_debug(context, 1, "Using \"%s\".\n", cert->nickname);
+	pkinit_debug(context, 1, "Using \"%s\" (\"%s\").\n",
+		     cert->nickname ? cert->nickname : "(NULL)",
+		     cert->subjectName);
 
 	switch (pa_data->pa_type) {
 	case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
@@ -1023,7 +1118,7 @@
 			if (context->client_nonce != NULL) {
 				SECITEM_FreeItem(context->client_nonce,
 						 PR_TRUE);
-				context->client_cert = NULL;
+				context->client_nonce = NULL;
 			}
 			if (context->client_dh_nonce != NULL) {
 				SECITEM_FreeItem(context->client_dh_nonce,
@@ -1122,7 +1217,8 @@
 					(context->trust_pkinit_san ?
 					 CERT_MATCHES_KRB_SAN : 0 ) |
 					(context->trust_upn_san ?
-					 CERT_MATCHES_UPN_SAN : 0));
+					 CERT_MATCHES_UPN_SAN : 0) |
+					CERT_MATCHES_TRUSTED_SERVERS);
 
 	/* Clean up. */
 	krb5_free_principal(kcontext, tgs_principal);
@@ -1202,6 +1298,7 @@
 	char *unparsed_name;
 
 	context = pa_plugin_context;
+	pkinit_debug(context, 2, "Called to handle a client request.\n");
 
 	/* If we can't create a new memory arena, bail. */
 	pool = PORT_NewArena(sizeof(double));
@@ -1273,7 +1370,8 @@
 					 (context->trust_pkinit_san ?
 					  CERT_MATCHES_KRB_SAN : 0) |
 					 (context->trust_upn_san ?
-					  CERT_MATCHES_UPN_SAN : 0),
+					  CERT_MATCHES_UPN_SAN : 0) |
+					 CERT_MATCHES_TRUSTED_SERVERS,
 					 &signer,
 					 &client_public_info,
 					 &client_nonce,
@@ -1507,6 +1605,9 @@
 	.fini = client_fini,
 	.process = client_process,
 	.tryagain = client_try_again,
+#ifndef PKINIT_CLIENT_MISSING_GIC_OPTS
+	.gic_opts = client_gic_opts,
+#endif
 	.flags = client_get_flags,
 };
 struct krb5plugin_preauth_server_ftable_v0 preauthentication_server_0 = {
Index: src/pkinit.h
===================================================================
RCS file: /usr/local/CVS/pkinit-nss/src/pkinit.h,v
retrieving revision 1.5
diff -u -r1.5 pkinit.h
--- src/pkinit.h	25 Jan 2007 21:32:03 -0000	1.5
+++ src/pkinit.h	2 May 2007 16:06:11 -0000
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 	krb5_prompter_fct fct;
 	void *fct_data;
 	PLArenaPool *pool;
+        krb5_data *gak_data;
 };
 char *pkinit_pwcb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
 
Index: src/pkinitt.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /usr/local/CVS/pkinit-nss/src/pkinitt.c,v
retrieving revision 1.31
retrieving revision 1.37
diff -u -r1.31 -r1.37
--- src/pkinitt.c	5 Feb 2007 16:32:24 -0000	1.31
+++ src/pkinitt.c	25 Apr 2007 17:01:16 -0000	1.37
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
  *   USA.
  */
 
-#ident "$Id: pkinitt.c,v 1.31 2007/02/05 16:32:24 nalin Exp $"
+#ident "$Id: pkinitt.c,v 1.37 2007/04/25 17:01:16 nalin Exp $"
 
 #include "../config.h"
 
@@ -859,6 +859,42 @@
 	},
 };
 
+static const SEC_ASN1Template
+pkinit_typed_datum_template[] = {
+	{
+	.kind = SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE,
+	.offset = 0,
+	.sub = NULL,
+	.size = sizeof(struct typed_datum),
+	},
+	{
+	.kind = SEC_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0 |
+		SEC_ASN1_EXPLICIT |
+		SEC_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED,
+	.offset = offsetof(struct typed_datum, td_type),
+	.sub = SEC_IntegerTemplate,
+	.size = sizeof(SECItem),
+	},
+	{
+	.kind = SEC_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 1 |
+		SEC_ASN1_EXPLICIT |
+		SEC_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED,
+	.offset = offsetof(struct typed_datum, td_data),
+	.sub = SEC_OctetStringTemplate,
+	.size = sizeof(SECItem),
+	},
+	{0, 0, NULL, 0},
+};
+static const SEC_ASN1Template
+pkinit_typed_data_template[] = {
+	{
+	.kind = SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF,
+	.offset = 0,
+	.sub = &pkinit_typed_datum_template,
+	.size = 0,
+	},
+};
+
 struct draft_auth_pack *
 pkinit_decode_draft_auth_pack(struct module_context *mcontext,
 			      PLArenaPool *pool, SECItem *item)
@@ -1099,6 +1135,40 @@
 	return adata;
 }
 
+struct typed_datum *
+pkinit_decode_typed_datum(struct module_context *mcontext,
+			  PLArenaPool *pool, SECItem *item)
+{
+	struct typed_datum *adata;
+
+	adata = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(pool, sizeof(*adata));
+	if (adata == NULL) {
+		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 0, "Out of memory.\n");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(pool, adata, pkinit_typed_datum_template,
+			       item) != SECSuccess) {
+		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1, "Error decoding typed datum.\n");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return adata;
+}
+
+struct typed_datum **
+pkinit_decode_typed_data(struct module_context *mcontext,
+			 PLArenaPool *pool, SECItem *item)
+{
+	struct typed_datum **adata;
+
+	adata = NULL;
+	if (SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(pool, &adata, pkinit_typed_data_template,
+			       item) != SECSuccess) {
+		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1, "Error decoding typed data.\n");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return adata;
+}
+
 SECItem *
 pkinit_encode_draft_pa_pk_as_req(struct module_context *mcontext,
 				 PLArenaPool *pool,
@@ -1256,8 +1326,8 @@
 				 struct authorization_datum **adata)
 {
 	SECItem encoded;
-	if (SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(pool, &encoded, adata,
-			       pkinit_authorization_datum_template) == &encoded) {
+	if (SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(pool, &encoded, &adata,
+			       pkinit_authorization_data_template) == &encoded) {
 		return SECITEM_ArenaDupItem(pool, &encoded);
 	}
 	pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1, "Error encoding authorization_data.\n");
@@ -1285,15 +1355,36 @@
 	return pkinit_encode_authorization_datum(mcontext, pool, &adata);
 }
 
-static SECItem *
+static struct typed_datum *
 pkinit_create_typed_datum(struct module_context *mcontext,
 			  PLArenaPool *pool,
-			  long d_type,
-			  SECItem *d_data)
+			  long td_type,
+			  SECItem *td_data)
 {
-	/* The coding is the same, so just pretend it's authorization data. */
-	return pkinit_create_authorization_datum(mcontext, pool,
-						 d_type, d_data);
+	struct typed_datum *tdata;
+	tdata = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(pool, sizeof(*tdata));
+	if (SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(pool,
+				  &tdata->td_type,
+				  td_type) != &tdata->td_type) {
+		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1, "Error encoding typed data type.\n");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	tdata->td_data = *td_data;
+	return tdata;
+}
+
+SECItem *
+pkinit_encode_typed_data(struct module_context *mcontext,
+			 PLArenaPool *pool,
+			 struct typed_datum **tdata)
+{
+	SECItem encoded;
+	if (SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(pool, &encoded, &tdata,
+			       pkinit_typed_data_template) == &encoded) {
+		return SECITEM_ArenaDupItem(pool, &encoded);
+	}
+	pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1, "Error encoding typed_data.\n");
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 static time_t
@@ -1573,16 +1664,20 @@
 					 krb5_context kcontext,
 					 struct external_principal_identifier **epi)
 {
-	SECItem encoded_cert_list, *td_payload;
+	SECItem encoded_cert_list, *td_payload, *encoded;
+	struct typed_datum *data[2];
 	td_payload = NULL;
 	if (SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(pool, &encoded_cert_list, epi,
 			       bcms_sequence_of_external_principal_identifier_template) == &encoded_cert_list) {
-		td_payload = pkinit_create_typed_datum(mcontext,
-						       pool,
-						       105,
-						       &encoded_cert_list);
+		td_payload = &encoded_cert_list;
 	}
-	return common_krb5_data_from_secitem(mcontext, kcontext, td_payload);
+	data[0] = pkinit_create_typed_datum(mcontext, pool, 105, td_payload);
+	data[1] = NULL;
+	encoded = pkinit_encode_typed_data(mcontext, pool, data);
+#if DEBUG
+	derdump("e_data typed data", encoded);
+#endif
+	return common_krb5_data_from_secitem(mcontext, kcontext, encoded);
 }
 
 static krb5_data *
@@ -1591,16 +1686,20 @@
 				       krb5_context kcontext,
 				       struct external_principal_identifier **epi)
 {
-	SECItem encoded_ca_list, *td_payload;
+	SECItem encoded_ca_list, *td_payload, *encoded;
+	struct typed_datum *data[2];
 	td_payload = NULL;
-	if (SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(pool, &encoded_ca_list, epi,
+	if (SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(pool, &encoded_ca_list, &epi,
 			       bcms_sequence_of_external_principal_identifier_template) == &encoded_ca_list) {
-		td_payload = pkinit_create_typed_datum(mcontext,
-						       pool,
-						       104,
-						       &encoded_ca_list);
+		td_payload = &encoded_ca_list;
 	}
-	return common_krb5_data_from_secitem(mcontext, kcontext, td_payload);
+	data[0] = pkinit_create_typed_datum(mcontext, pool, 104, td_payload);
+	data[1] = NULL;
+	encoded = pkinit_encode_typed_data(mcontext, pool, data);
+#if DEBUG
+	derdump("e_data typed data", encoded);
+#endif
+	return common_krb5_data_from_secitem(mcontext, kcontext, encoded);
 }
 
 static krb5_data *
@@ -1609,18 +1708,23 @@
 				  krb5_context kcontext,
 				  unsigned int minimum_prime_size)
 {
-	SECItem encoded_dh_param_list, *td_payload;
+	SECItem encoded_dh_param_list, *td_payload, *encoded;
 	struct algorithm_identifier **algorithm_ids;
+	struct typed_datum *data[2];
 	td_payload = NULL;
 	algorithm_ids = oakley_get_groups(mcontext, pool, minimum_prime_size);
-	if (SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(pool, &encoded_dh_param_list, algorithm_ids,
+	if (SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(pool, &encoded_dh_param_list, &algorithm_ids,
 			       common_sequence_of_algorithm_identifier_template) == &encoded_dh_param_list) {
-		td_payload = pkinit_create_typed_datum(mcontext,
-						       pool,
-						       109,
-						       &encoded_dh_param_list);
+		td_payload = &encoded_dh_param_list;
 	}
-	return common_krb5_data_from_secitem(mcontext, kcontext, td_payload);
+#if DEBUG
+	derdump("allowed dh params", td_payload);
+#endif
+	data[0] = pkinit_create_typed_datum(mcontext, pool, 109, td_payload);
+	data[1] = NULL;
+	encoded = pkinit_encode_typed_data(mcontext, pool, data);
+	derdump("e_data typed data", encoded);
+	return common_krb5_data_from_secitem(mcontext, kcontext, encoded);
 }
 
 /* Verify that the contents of the auth_pack are acceptible. */
@@ -1628,7 +1732,7 @@
 pkinit_verify_auth_pack(struct module_context *mcontext,
 			PLArenaPool *pool,
 			krb5_context kcontext,
-			krb5_kdc_req *req_body,
+			krb5_kdc_req *unused_req_body,
 			krb5_data *request_packet,
 			krb5_deltat max_time_skew,
 			struct auth_pack *pack)
@@ -1654,10 +1758,14 @@
 		}
 	}
 
+#if 0
+	RFC 4556 explicitly calls out that this test is bogus, though Windows
+	enforced it for draft 9.
 	if (nonce != (unsigned long) req_body->nonce) {
 		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1, "Nonce mismatch.\n");
 		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
 	}
+#endif
 
 	/* Check that the time is within the acceptible window. */
 	if ((pkauth->ctime.len != 15) || (pkauth->ctime.data[14] != 'Z')) {
@@ -1710,7 +1818,7 @@
 		return KRB5KDC_ERR_DIGEST_IN_SIGNED_DATA_NOT_ACCEPTED;
 	}
 
-	pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1, "Checksum matches.\n");
+	pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2, "Checksum matches.\n");
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1829,8 +1937,8 @@
 		PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
 		return NULL;
 	}
-	encoded_pubval = common_encode_integer(mcontext, pool,
-					       &pub->u.dh.publicValue);
+	encoded_pubval = common_encode_unsigned_integer(mcontext, pool,
+							&pub->u.dh.publicValue);
 	if (encoded_pubval == NULL) {
 		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1,
 			     "Error encoding DH public value.\n");
@@ -2017,6 +2125,9 @@
 		SECOidTag tag;
 		SECItem **pparams;
 	} supported_cms_types[] = {
+		{SEC_OID_AES_256_KEY_WRAP, NULL},
+		{SEC_OID_AES_192_KEY_WRAP, NULL},
+		{SEC_OID_AES_128_KEY_WRAP, NULL},
 		{SEC_OID_CMS_3DES_KEY_WRAP, NULL},
 		{SEC_OID_CMS_RC2_KEY_WRAP, &rc2_params_ptr},
 		{SEC_OID_SHA1, NULL},
@@ -2396,6 +2507,7 @@
 			      krb5_enctype enctype, krb5_keyblock *keyblock)
 {
 	PK11Context *ctx;
+	SECItem key_item;
 	size_t left;
 	unsigned int length;
 	unsigned char buf[512 / 8];
@@ -2434,6 +2546,9 @@
 	key.length = left;
 	key.enctype = enctype;
 
+#if DEBUG
+	dump("Shared secret", input);
+#endif
 	while (left > 0) {
 		ctx = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash_alg);
 		if (ctx == NULL) {
@@ -2496,6 +2611,11 @@
 		left -= length;
 		c++;
 	}
+	key_item.data = key.contents;
+	key_item.len = key.length;
+#if DEBUG
+	dump("Derived key", &key_item);
+#endif
 
 	if (krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(kcontext, &key, keyblock) != 0) {
 		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1, "Error copying keyblock.\n");
@@ -2604,7 +2724,7 @@
 			   SECItem **authorized_certs,
 			   int n_authorized_certs,
 			   const char **additional_authzdn_list,
-			   PRInt32 cert_flags,
+			   PRInt32 client_cert_flags,
 			   CERTCertificate **signing_cert,
 			   struct subject_public_key_info **client_dh_key,
 			   SECItem **nonce,
@@ -2619,6 +2739,7 @@
 	struct external_principal_identifier **error_epis;
 	struct auth_pack *auth_pack;
 	struct content_info *content_info;
+	struct domain_parameters *domain_params;
 	SECItem *padata_item, *auth_data, encoded_cas;
 	const SECItem *roid_data;
 	SECOidData *oid;
@@ -2685,7 +2806,7 @@
 				     "Error determining current time.\n");
 			return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
 		}
-		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1, "Current time is %d, "
+		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2, "Current time is %d, "
 			     "client signed request at %d.\n",
 			     now, signing_time);
 		if (labs(now - signing_time) > max_time_skew) {
@@ -2725,7 +2846,7 @@
 						       signed_data->certificates,
 						       NULL,
 						       additional_authzdn_list,
-						       cert_flags,
+						       client_cert_flags,
 						       kcontext,
 						       request->client,
 						       &error_epis);
@@ -2798,18 +2919,6 @@
 	/* Save the client's DH keying information, if some was provided. */
 	if (client_dh_key != NULL) {
 		if (auth_pack->client_public_value.len > 0) {
-			if ((auth_pack->client_public_value.len * 8) <
-			    minimum_dh_prime_size) {
-				pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1,
-					     "Client's DH prime is less than "
-					     "%d bits in size.\n",
-					     minimum_dh_prime_size);
-				*e_data = pkinit_create_dh_parameters_edata(mcontext,
-									    pool,
-									    kcontext,
-									    minimum_dh_prime_size);
-				return KRB5KDC_ERR_DH_KEY_PARAMETERS_NOT_ACCEPTED;
-			}
 			spki = common_decode_subject_public_key_info(mcontext,
 								     pool,
 								     &auth_pack->client_public_value);
@@ -2820,6 +2929,28 @@
 				*client_dh_key = spki;
 				pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1,
 					     "Saved subject public key info.\n");
+				domain_params = common_decode_domain_parameters(mcontext, pool, spki->algorithm.parameters);
+				if (domain_params != NULL) {
+					pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2,
+						     "Client's DH prime value "
+						     "is %d bits in size.\n",
+						     domain_params->q.len * 8);
+					pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2,
+						     "Client's DH public value "
+						     "is %d bits in size.\n",
+						     spki->subject_public_key.len);
+					if (domain_params->q.len <
+					    minimum_dh_prime_size / 8) {
+						pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1,
+							     "Client's DH prime "
+							     "is too small.\n");
+						*e_data = pkinit_create_dh_parameters_edata(mcontext,
+											    pool,
+											    kcontext,
+											    minimum_dh_prime_size);
+						return KRB5KDC_ERR_DH_KEY_PARAMETERS_NOT_ACCEPTED;
+					}
+				}
 			}
 		}
 	}
@@ -3067,6 +3198,12 @@
 	/* Derive the shared key. */
 	client_pub = *pub;
 	client_pub.u.dh.publicValue = *client_pubval;
+#if DEBUG
+	dump("KDC pubkey", &pub->u.dh.publicValue);
+	dump("Parameter Q", &pub->u.dh.prime);
+	dump("Parameter G", &pub->u.dh.base);
+	dump("Client pubkey", client_pubval);
+#endif
 	sym = PK11_PubDerive(priv, &client_pub, PR_FALSE,
 			     NULL,
 			     NULL,
@@ -3145,8 +3282,8 @@
 
 	/* Encode the kdc_dh_key_info. */
 	memset(&kdc_dh_key_info, 0, sizeof(kdc_dh_key_info));
-	encoded_pubval = common_encode_integer(mcontext, pool,
-					       &pub->u.dh.publicValue);
+	encoded_pubval = common_encode_unsigned_integer(mcontext, pool,
+							&pub->u.dh.publicValue);
 	if (encoded_pubval == NULL) {
 		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1, "Error encoding DH public value.\n");
 		SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pub);
@@ -3283,7 +3420,7 @@
 				CERTCertificate *signer,
 				SECItem **additional_certificates,
 				const char **additional_authzdn_list,
-				PRInt32 cert_flags,
+				PRInt32 kdc_cert_flags,
 				krb5_context kcontext,
 				krb5_kdc_req *request)
 {
@@ -3308,7 +3445,7 @@
 					    additional_certificates,
 					    NULL,
 					    additional_authzdn_list,
-					    cert_flags,
+					    kdc_cert_flags,
 					    kcontext,
 					    tgt_princ);
 	if (ret != 0) {
@@ -3330,11 +3467,11 @@
 				  PK11SlotInfo *preferred_slot,
 				  struct pkinit_pwcb_args *pwcb_args,
 				  const char **additional_authzdn_list,
-				  PRInt32 cert_flags,
+				  PRInt32 kdc_cert_flags,
 				  krb5_context kcontext,
 				  krb5_kdc_req *request,
 				  SECItem *envelope,
-				  const SECItem *expected_inner_type,
+				  const SECOidData *expected_inner_type,
 				  SECItem **inner_data)
 {
 	struct signed_data *signed_data;
@@ -3374,6 +3511,7 @@
 	if (SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(&oid->oid,
 				  &enveloped_data->encrypted_content_info.content_type)) {
 		/* Try to parse the data as a content-info structure. */
+		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 3, "Enveloped data contains data.\n");
 		content_info = bcms_decode_content_info(mcontext, pool, data);
 		if (content_info == NULL) {
 			/* Just hope the server's messing with us, and it's
@@ -3382,8 +3520,19 @@
 			content_info = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(pool, sizeof(*content_info));
 			content_info->content_type = oid->oid;
 			content_info->content = *data;
+			pkinit_debug(mcontext, 3,
+				     "Enveloped data is not content-info, "
+				     "assuming it's signed-data.\n");
 		}
 	} else {
+		oid = SECOID_FindOID(&enveloped_data->encrypted_content_info.content_type);
+		if (oid) {
+			pkinit_debug(mcontext, 3, "Enveloped data is \"%s\".\n",
+				     oid->desc);
+		} else {
+			pkinit_debug(mcontext, 3,
+				     "Enveloped data has unknown type.\n");
+		}
 		/* Assemble a content info with the encap type and data. */
 		content_info = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(pool, sizeof(*content_info));
 		content_info->content_type = enveloped_data->encrypted_content_info.content_type;
@@ -3398,11 +3547,6 @@
 	}
 	if (!SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(&oid->oid,
 				   &content_info->content_type)) {
-		oid = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA);
-		if (oid == NULL) {
-			pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1, "Internal error.\n");
-			return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-		}
 		oid = SECOID_FindOID(&content_info->content_type);
 		if (oid != NULL) {
 			pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1,
@@ -3417,9 +3561,21 @@
 		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
 	}
 
+	/* In case the signed data payload is yet another content_info, try to
+	 * unrap it again. */
+	data = &content_info->content;
+	content_info = bcms_decode_content_info(mcontext, pool, data);
+	if (content_info != NULL) {
+		oid = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA);
+		if ((oid != NULL) &&
+		    SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(&oid->oid,
+		    			  &content_info->content_type)) {
+			data = &content_info->content;
+		}
+	}
+
 	/* Decode the signed data. */
-	signed_data = bcms_decode_signed_data(mcontext, pool,
-					      &content_info->content);
+	signed_data = bcms_decode_signed_data(mcontext, pool, data);
 	if (signed_data == NULL) {
 		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1,
 			     "Error parsing signed data part of KDC response.\n");
@@ -3439,7 +3595,7 @@
 	ret = pkinit_validate_kdc_certificate(mcontext, pool, certdb, signer,
 					      signed_data->certificates,
 					      additional_authzdn_list,
-					      cert_flags,
+					      kdc_cert_flags,
 					      kcontext, request);
 	if (ret != 0) {
 		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1,
@@ -3449,10 +3605,10 @@
 	}
 
 	/* Check that the signed data is what we're expecting. */
-	if (!SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(expected_inner_type,
+	if (!SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(&expected_inner_type->oid,
 				   &signed_data->encap_content_info.content_type)) {
 		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1,
-			     "Signed data is not PKINIT key data.\n");
+			     "Signed data is not expected \"%s\".\n");
 		CERT_DestroyCertificate(signer);
 		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
 	}
@@ -3471,7 +3627,7 @@
 				 PK11SlotInfo *preferred_slot,
 				 struct pkinit_pwcb_args *pwcb_args,
 				 const char **additional_authzdn_list,
-				 PRInt32 cert_flags,
+				 PRInt32 kdc_cert_flags,
 				 krb5_context kcontext,
 				 krb5_kdc_req *request,
 				 krb5_data *padata,
@@ -3522,11 +3678,11 @@
 						preferred_slot,
 						pwcb_args,
 						additional_authzdn_list,
-						cert_flags,
+						kdc_cert_flags,
 						kcontext,
 						request,
 						&content_info->content,
-						&oid->oid,
+						oid,
 						&rkeydata);
 	if (ret != 0) {
 		return ret;
@@ -3550,6 +3706,9 @@
 	key.enctype = l;
 	key.length = reply_key_pack->reply_key.keyvalue.len;
 	key.contents = reply_key_pack->reply_key.keyvalue.data;
+	pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2,
+		     "Recovered %d-bit temporary key for use with cipher %d.\n",
+		     key.length * 8, key.enctype);
 
 	/* Verify the reply_key_pack. */
 	status = SEC_ASN1DecodeInteger(&reply_key_pack->nonce, &l);
@@ -3576,7 +3735,7 @@
 			    PK11SlotInfo *preferred_slot,
 			    void *pwcb_args,
 			    const char **additional_authzdn_list,
-			    PRInt32 cert_flags,
+			    PRInt32 kdc_cert_flags,
 			    krb5_context kcontext,
 			    krb5_kdc_req *request,
 			    krb5_data *request_pkt,
@@ -3585,7 +3744,7 @@
 {
 	SECStatus status;
 	SECOidData *oid;
-	const SECItem *roid_data;
+	const SECOidData *roid;
 	SECItem *rkeydata;
 	krb5_checksum checksum;
 	krb5_boolean valid;
@@ -3614,18 +3773,18 @@
 	}
 
 	/* Extract the reply key data, and validate the KDC. */
-	roid_data = cert_get_oid_pkinit_rkey_data();
+	roid = cert_get_oid_pkinit_rkey_data_oid();
 	rkeydata = NULL;
 	ret = pkinit_verify_enc_key_pack_common(mcontext, pool,
 						certdb,
 						preferred_slot,
 						pwcb_args,
 						additional_authzdn_list,
-						cert_flags,
+						kdc_cert_flags,
 						kcontext,
 						request,
 						&content_info->content,
-						roid_data,
+						roid,
 						&rkeydata);
 	if (ret != 0) {
 		return ret;
@@ -3648,6 +3807,9 @@
 	key->enctype = l;
 	key->length = reply_key_pack->reply_key.keyvalue.len;
 	key->contents = reply_key_pack->reply_key.keyvalue.data;
+	pkinit_debug(mcontext, 2,
+		     "Recovered %d-bit temporary key for use with cipher %d.\n",
+		     key->length * 8, key->enctype);
 
 	/* Verify the reply_key_pack. */
 	status = SEC_ASN1DecodeInteger(&reply_key_pack->as_checksum.cksumtype,
@@ -3679,7 +3841,7 @@
 pkinit_process_dh_rep_info(struct module_context *mcontext, PLArenaPool *pool,
 			   CERTCertDBHandle *certdb,
 			   const char **additional_authzdn_list,
-			   PRInt32 cert_flags,
+			   PRInt32 kdc_cert_flags,
 			   krb5_context kcontext,
 			   krb5_kdc_req *request,
 			   struct pa_pk_as_rep *rep,
@@ -3749,7 +3911,7 @@
 	ret = pkinit_validate_kdc_certificate(mcontext, pool, certdb, kdc_cert,
 					      signed_dh_data->certificates,
 					      additional_authzdn_list,
-					      cert_flags,
+					      kdc_cert_flags,
 					      kcontext, request);
 	if (ret != 0) {
 		pkinit_debug(mcontext, 1,
@@ -3794,6 +3956,12 @@
 	kdc_nonce = rep->pa_pk_as_rep_value.dh_info.server_dh_nonce;
 	server_dh_pubkey = *client_dh_pubkey;
 	server_dh_pubkey.u.dh.publicValue = *kdc_pubkey;
+#if DEBUG
+	dump("KDC pubkey", kdc_pubkey);
+	dump("Parameter Q", &client_dh_pubkey->u.dh.prime);
+	dump("Parameter G", &client_dh_pubkey->u.dh.base);
+	dump("Client pubkey", &client_dh_pubkey->u.dh.publicValue);
+#endif
 	sym = PK11_PubDerive(client_dh_privkey,
 			     &server_dh_pubkey,
 			     PR_TRUE,
@@ -3830,7 +3998,7 @@
 	/* Convert the secret to a key. */
 	if (pkinit_octet_string_to_aeskey(mcontext, kcontext, SEC_OID_SHA1,
 					  shared_secret,
-					  kdc_nonce ?  client_dh_nonce : NULL,
+					  kdc_nonce ? client_dh_nonce : NULL,
 					  kdc_nonce,
 					  ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
 					  key) != SECSuccess) {
@@ -3855,7 +4023,7 @@
 			   PK11SlotInfo *preferred_slot,
 			   struct pkinit_pwcb_args *pwcb_args,
 			   const char **additional_authzdn_list,
-			   PRInt32 cert_flags,
+			   PRInt32 kdc_cert_flags,
 			   krb5_context kcontext,
 			   krb5_kdc_req *request,
 			   krb5_data *request_pkt,
@@ -3888,7 +4056,7 @@
 						  preferred_slot,
 						  pwcb_args,
 						  additional_authzdn_list,
-						  cert_flags,
+						  kdc_cert_flags,
 						  kcontext,
 						  request,
 						  request_pkt,
@@ -3902,7 +4070,7 @@
 		ret = pkinit_process_dh_rep_info(mcontext, pool,
 						 certdb,
 						 additional_authzdn_list,
-						 cert_flags,
+						 kdc_cert_flags,
 						 kcontext,
 						 request,
 						 rep,
Index: src/pkinitt.h
===================================================================
RCS file: /usr/local/CVS/pkinit-nss/src/pkinitt.h,v
retrieving revision 1.17
retrieving revision 1.18
diff -u -r1.17 -r1.18
--- src/pkinitt.h	5 Feb 2007 16:32:24 -0000	1.17
+++ src/pkinitt.h	23 Apr 2007 21:50:26 -0000	1.18
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 
 #ifndef pkinitt_h
 #define pkinitt_h
-#ident "$Id: pkinitt.h,v 1.17 2007/02/05 16:32:24 nalin Exp $"
+#ident "$Id: pkinitt.h,v 1.18 2007/04/23 21:50:26 nalin Exp $"
 
 #include <nspr.h>
 
@@ -182,6 +182,10 @@
 	SECItem ad_type;
 	SECItem ad_data;
 };
+struct typed_datum {
+	SECItem td_type;
+	SECItem td_data;
+};
 
 extern const SEC_ASN1Template pkinit_kerberos_principal_name_template[];
 
@@ -221,6 +225,12 @@
 SECItem *pkinit_encode_authorization_datum(struct module_context *mcontext,
 					   PLArenaPool *pool,
 					   struct authorization_datum *adata);
+SECItem *pkinit_encode_typed_data(struct module_context *mcontext,
+			          PLArenaPool *pool,
+				  struct typed_datum **adata);
+SECItem *pkinit_encode_typed_datum(struct module_context *mcontext,
+				   PLArenaPool *pool,
+				   struct typed_datum *adata);
 struct auth_pack *pkinit_decode_auth_pack(struct module_context *mcontext,
 					  PLArenaPool *pool, SECItem *data);
 struct draft_auth_pack *pkinit_decode_draft_auth_pack(struct module_context *mcontext,
@@ -256,6 +266,12 @@
 struct authorization_datum *pkinit_decode_authorization_datum(struct module_context *mcontext,
 							      PLArenaPool *pool,
 							      SECItem *item);
+struct typed_datum **pkinit_decode_typed_data(struct module_context *mcontext,
+					      PLArenaPool *pool,
+					      SECItem *item);
+struct typed_datum *pkinit_decode_typed_datum(struct module_context *mcontext,
+					      PLArenaPool *pool,
+					      SECItem *item);
 
 krb5_error_code pkinit_build_tgs_name(struct module_context *mcontext,
 				      krb5_context kcontext,
@@ -303,7 +319,7 @@
 					   SECItem **authorized_certs,
 					   int n_authorized_certs,
 					   const char **additional_authzdn_list,
-					   PRInt32 cert_flags,
+					   PRInt32 client_cert_flags,
 					   CERTCertificate **signing_cert,
 					   struct subject_public_key_info **client_dh_key,
 					   SECItem **nonce,
@@ -329,7 +345,7 @@
 						 PK11SlotInfo *preferred_slot,
 						 struct pkinit_pwcb_args *pwcb_args,
 						 const char **additional_authzdn_list,
-						 PRInt32 cert_flags,
+						 PRInt32 kdc_cert_flags,
 						 krb5_context kcontext,
 						 krb5_kdc_req *request,
 						 krb5_data *padata,
@@ -340,7 +356,7 @@
 					   PK11SlotInfo *preferred_slot,
 					   struct pkinit_pwcb_args *pwcb_args,
 					   const char **additional_authzdn_list,
-					   PRInt32 cert_flags,
+					   PRInt32 kdc_cert_flags,
 					   krb5_context kcontext,
 					   krb5_kdc_req *request,
 					   krb5_data *request_pkt,

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File pkinit-nss-0.5.0-1-cvs200705021211.patch of Package pkinit-nss (Revision 802bc08e8f06f4d44e43e6a5db6f2c6b)

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