File linux-2.6.34-CVE-sctp-Fix-skb_over_panic-result... of Package kernel-n900-2.6.33.3-11.2.armv7l

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File linux-2.6.34-CVE-sctp-Fix-skb_over_panic-resulting-from-multiple-inv.patch of Package kernel-n900-2.6.33.3-11.2.armv7l (Revision 34816b9a7d008b55be6bd5e7272cc265)

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From 5fa782c2f5ef6c2e4f04d3e228412c9b4a4c8809 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 2010 10:30:59 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] sctp: Fix skb_over_panic resulting from multiple invalid parameter errors (CVE-2010-1173) (v4)

Ok, version 4

Change Notes:
1) Minor cleanups, from Vlads notes

Summary:

Hey-
	Recently, it was reported to me that the kernel could oops in the
following way:

<5> kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:91!
<5> invalid operand: 0000 [#1]
<5> Modules linked in: sctp netconsole nls_utf8 autofs4 sunrpc iptable_filter
ip_tables cpufreq_powersave parport_pc lp parport vmblock(U) vsock(U) vmci(U)
vmxnet(U) vmmemctl(U) vmhgfs(U) acpiphp dm_mirror dm_mod button battery ac md5
ipv6 uhci_hcd ehci_hcd snd_ens1371 snd_rawmidi snd_seq_device snd_pcm_oss
snd_mixer_oss snd_pcm snd_timer snd_page_alloc snd_ac97_codec snd soundcore
pcnet32 mii floppy ext3 jbd ata_piix libata mptscsih mptsas mptspi mptscsi
mptbase sd_mod scsi_mod
<5> CPU:    0
<5> EIP:    0060:[<c02bff27>]    Not tainted VLI
<5> EFLAGS: 00010216   (2.6.9-89.0.25.EL)
<5> EIP is at skb_over_panic+0x1f/0x2d
<5> eax: 0000002c   ebx: c033f461   ecx: c0357d96   edx: c040fd44
<5> esi: c033f461   edi: df653280   ebp: 00000000   esp: c040fd40
<5> ds: 007b   es: 007b   ss: 0068
<5> Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo=c040f000 task=c0370be0)
<5> Stack: c0357d96 e0c29478 00000084 00000004 c033f461 df653280 d7883180
e0c2947d
<5>        00000000 00000080 df653490 00000004 de4f1ac0 de4f1ac0 00000004
df653490
<5>        00000001 e0c2877a 08000800 de4f1ac0 df653490 00000000 e0c29d2e
00000004
<5> Call Trace:
<5>  [<e0c29478>] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb0/0x128 [sctp]
<5>  [<e0c2947d>] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb5/0x128 [sctp]
<5>  [<e0c2877a>] sctp_init_cause+0x3f/0x47 [sctp]
<5>  [<e0c29d2e>] sctp_process_unk_param+0xac/0xb8 [sctp]
<5>  [<e0c29e90>] sctp_verify_init+0xcc/0x134 [sctp]
<5>  [<e0c20322>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x83/0x28e [sctp]
<5>  [<e0c25333>] sctp_do_sm+0x41/0x77 [sctp]
<5>  [<c01555a4>] cache_grow+0x140/0x233
<5>  [<e0c26ba1>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0xc5/0x108 [sctp]
<5>  [<e0c2b863>] sctp_inq_push+0xe/0x10 [sctp]
<5>  [<e0c34600>] sctp_rcv+0x454/0x509 [sctp]
<5>  [<e084e017>] ipt_hook+0x17/0x1c [iptable_filter]
<5>  [<c02d005e>] nf_iterate+0x40/0x81
<5>  [<c02e0bb9>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151
<5>  [<c02e0c7f>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xc6/0x151
<5>  [<c02d0362>] nf_hook_slow+0x83/0xb5
<5>  [<c02e0bb2>] ip_local_deliver+0x1a2/0x1a9
<5>  [<c02e0bb9>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151
<5>  [<c02e103e>] ip_rcv+0x334/0x3b4
<5>  [<c02c66fd>] netif_receive_skb+0x320/0x35b
<5>  [<e0a0928b>] init_stall_timer+0x67/0x6a [uhci_hcd]
<5>  [<c02c67a4>] process_backlog+0x6c/0xd9
<5>  [<c02c690f>] net_rx_action+0xfe/0x1f8
<5>  [<c012a7b1>] __do_softirq+0x35/0x79
<5>  [<c0107efb>] handle_IRQ_event+0x0/0x4f
<5>  [<c01094de>] do_softirq+0x46/0x4d

Its an skb_over_panic BUG halt that results from processing an init chunk in
which too many of its variable length parameters are in some way malformed.

The problem is in sctp_process_unk_param:
if (NULL == *errp)
	*errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk,
					 ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length));

if (*errp) {
		sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM,
				 WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)));
		sctp_addto_chunk(*errp,
			WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)),
				  param.v);

When we allocate an error chunk, we assume that the worst case scenario requires
that we have chunk_hdr->length data allocated, which would be correct nominally,
given that we call sctp_addto_chunk for the violating parameter.  Unfortunately,
we also, in sctp_init_cause insert a sctp_errhdr_t structure into the error
chunk, so the worst case situation in which all parameters are in violation
requires chunk_hdr->length+(sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t)*param_count) bytes of data.

The result of this error is that a deliberately malformed packet sent to a
listening host can cause a remote DOS, described in CVE-2010-1173:
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2010-1173

I've tested the below fix and confirmed that it fixes the issue.  We move to a
strategy whereby we allocate a fixed size error chunk and ignore errors we don't
have space to report.  Tested by me successfully

Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
 include/net/sctp/structs.h |    1 +
 net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c   |   62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/sctp/structs.h b/include/net/sctp/structs.h
index ff30177..597f8e2 100644
--- a/include/net/sctp/structs.h
+++ b/include/net/sctp/structs.h
@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ int sctp_user_addto_chunk(struct sctp_chunk *chunk, int off, int len,
 			  struct iovec *data);
 void sctp_chunk_free(struct sctp_chunk *);
 void  *sctp_addto_chunk(struct sctp_chunk *, int len, const void *data);
+void  *sctp_addto_chunk_fixed(struct sctp_chunk *, int len, const void *data);
 struct sctp_chunk *sctp_chunkify(struct sk_buff *,
 				 const struct sctp_association *,
 				 struct sock *);
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
index 0fd5b4c..30c1767 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static const struct sctp_paramhdr prsctp_param = {
 	cpu_to_be16(sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)),
 };
 
-/* A helper to initialize to initialize an op error inside a
+/* A helper to initialize an op error inside a
  * provided chunk, as most cause codes will be embedded inside an
  * abort chunk.
  */
@@ -125,6 +125,29 @@ void  sctp_init_cause(struct sctp_chunk *chunk, __be16 cause_code,
 	chunk->subh.err_hdr = sctp_addto_chunk(chunk, sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t), &err);
 }
 
+/* A helper to initialize an op error inside a
+ * provided chunk, as most cause codes will be embedded inside an
+ * abort chunk.  Differs from sctp_init_cause in that it won't oops
+ * if there isn't enough space in the op error chunk
+ */
+int sctp_init_cause_fixed(struct sctp_chunk *chunk, __be16 cause_code,
+		      size_t paylen)
+{
+	sctp_errhdr_t err;
+	__u16 len;
+
+	/* Cause code constants are now defined in network order.  */
+	err.cause = cause_code;
+	len = sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t) + paylen;
+	err.length  = htons(len);
+
+	if (skb_tailroom(chunk->skb) >  len)
+		return -ENOSPC;
+	chunk->subh.err_hdr = sctp_addto_chunk_fixed(chunk,
+						     sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t),
+						     &err);
+	return 0;
+}
 /* 3.3.2 Initiation (INIT) (1)
  *
  * This chunk is used to initiate a SCTP association between two
@@ -1132,6 +1155,24 @@ nodata:
 	return retval;
 }
 
+/* Create an Operation Error chunk of a fixed size,
+ * specifically, max(asoc->pathmtu, SCTP_DEFAULT_MAXSEGMENT)
+ * This is a helper function to allocate an error chunk for
+ * for those invalid parameter codes in which we may not want
+ * to report all the errors, if the incomming chunk is large
+ */
+static inline struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_op_error_fixed(
+	const struct sctp_association *asoc,
+	const struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
+{
+	size_t size = asoc ? asoc->pathmtu : 0;
+
+	if (!size)
+		size = SCTP_DEFAULT_MAXSEGMENT;
+
+	return sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, size);
+}
+
 /* Create an Operation Error chunk.  */
 struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_op_error(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
 				 const struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
@@ -1374,6 +1415,18 @@ void *sctp_addto_chunk(struct sctp_chunk *chunk, int len, const void *data)
 	return target;
 }
 
+/* Append bytes to the end of a chunk. Returns NULL if there isn't sufficient
+ * space in the chunk
+ */
+void *sctp_addto_chunk_fixed(struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
+			     int len, const void *data)
+{
+	if (skb_tailroom(chunk->skb) > len)
+		return sctp_addto_chunk(chunk, len, data);
+	else
+		return NULL;
+}
+
 /* Append bytes from user space to the end of a chunk.  Will panic if
  * chunk is not big enough.
  * Returns a kernel err value.
@@ -1977,13 +2030,12 @@ static sctp_ierror_t sctp_process_unk_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
 		 * returning multiple unknown parameters.
 		 */
 		if (NULL == *errp)
-			*errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk,
-					ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length));
+			*errp = sctp_make_op_error_fixed(asoc, chunk);
 
 		if (*errp) {
-			sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM,
+			sctp_init_cause_fixed(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM,
 					WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)));
-			sctp_addto_chunk(*errp,
+			sctp_addto_chunk_fixed(*errp,
 					WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)),
 					param.v);
 		} else {
-- 
1.5.5.1

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File linux-2.6.34-CVE-sctp-Fix-skb_over_panic-resulting-from-multiple-inv.patch of Package kernel-n900-2.6.33.3-11.2.armv7l (Revision 34816b9a7d008b55be6bd5e7272cc265)

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