File 0003-protectors-Add-TPM2-Key-Protector.patch of Package grub2

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File 0003-protectors-Add-TPM2-Key-Protector.patch of Package grub2 (Revision 1e9a2f63f2bec099df80ddefb0856cde)

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From ab730e5bc42bae528da62178680284efdd64278e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hernan Gatta <hegatta@linux.microsoft.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2022 05:02:55 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 3/5] protectors: Add TPM2 Key Protector

The TPM2 key protector is a module that enables the automatic retrieval
of a fully-encrypted disk's unlocking key from a TPM 2.0.

The theory of operation is such that the module accepts various
arguments, most of which are optional and therefore possess reasonable
defaults. One of these arguments is the keyfile/tpm2key parameter, which
is mandatory. There are two supported key formats:

1. Raw Sealed Key (--keyfile)
   When sealing a key with TPM2_Create, the public portion of the sealed
   key is stored in TPM2B_PUBLIC, and the private portion is in
   TPM2B_PRIVATE. The raw sealed key glues the fully marshalled
   TPM2B_PUBLIC and TPM2B_PRIVATE into one file.

2. TPM 2.0 Key (--tpm2key)
   The following is the ASN.1 definition of TPM 2.0 Key File:

TPMPolicy ::= SEQUENCE {
     CommandCode   [0] EXPLICIT INTEGER
     CommandPolicy [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
   }

TPMAuthPolicy ::= SEQUENCE {
     Name    [0] EXPLICIT UTF8STRING OPTIONAL
     Policy  [1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMPolicy
   }

TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE {
     type        OBJECT IDENTIFIER
     emptyAuth   [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL
     policy      [1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMPolicy OPTIONAL
     secret      [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
     authPolicy  [3] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMAuthPolicy OPTIONAL
     parent      INTEGER
     pubkey      OCTET STRING
     privkey     OCTET STRING
   }

The TPM2 key protector only expects a "sealed" key in DER encoding,
  so 'type' is always 2.23.133.10.1.5, 'emptyAuth' is 'TRUE', and
  'secret' is empty. 'policy' and 'authPolicy' are the possible policy
  command sequences to construst the policy digest to unseal the key.
  Similar to the raw sealed key, the public portion (TPM2B_PUBLIC) of
  the sealed key is stored in 'pubkey', and the private portion
  (TPM2B_PRIVATE) is in 'privkey'.

For more details: https://www.hansenpartnership.com/draft-bottomley-tpm2-keys.html

This sealed key file is created via the grub-protect tool. The tool
utilizes the TPM's sealing functionality to seal (i.e., encrypt) an
unlocking key using a Storage Root Key (SRK) to the values of various
Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). These PCRs reflect the state
of the system as it boots. If the values are as expected, the system
may be considered trustworthy, at which point the TPM allows for a
caller to utilize the private component of the SRK to unseal (i.e.,
decrypt) the sealed key file. The caller, in this case, is this key
protector.

The TPM2 key protector registers two commands:

- tpm2_key_protector_init: Initializes the state of the TPM2 key
                           protector for later usage, clearing any
                           previous state, too, if any.

- tpm2_key_protector_clear: Clears any state set by tpm2_key_protector_init.

The way this is expected to be used requires the user to, either
interactively or, normally, via a boot script, initialize/configure
the key protector and then specify that it be used by the 'cryptomount'
command (modifications to this command are in a different patch).

For instance, to unseal the raw sealed key file:

tpm2_key_protector_init --keyfile=(hd0,gpt1)/efi/grub2/sealed-1.key
cryptomount DISK1 -P tpm2

tpm2_key_protector_init --keyfile=(hd0,gpt1)/efi/grub2/sealed-2.key --pcrs=7,11
cryptomount DISK2 -P tpm2

Or, to unseal the TPM 2.0 Key file:

tpm2_key_protector_init --tpm2key=(hd0,gpt1)/efi/grub2/sealed-1.tpm
cryptomount DISK1 -P tpm2

tpm2_key_protector_init --tpm2key=(hd0,gpt1)/efi/grub2/sealed-2.tpm --pcrs=7,11
cryptomount DISK2 -P tpm2

If a user does not initialize the key protector and attempts to use it
anyway, the protector returns an error.

Before unsealing the key, the TPM2 key protector follows the "TPMPolicy"
sequences to enforce the TPM policy commands to construct a valid policy
digest to unseal the key.

For the TPM 2.0 Key files, 'authPolicy' may contain multiple "TPMPolicy"
sequences, the TPM2 key protector iterates 'authPolicy' to find a valid
sequence to unseal key. If 'authPolicy' is empty or all sequences in
'authPolicy' fail, the protector tries the one from 'policy'. In case
'policy' is also empty, the protector creates a "TPMPolicy" sequence
based on the given PCR selection.

For the raw sealed key, the TPM2 key protector treats the key file as a
TPM 2.0 Key file without 'authPolicy' and 'policy', so the "TPMPolicy"
sequence is always based on the PCR selection from the command
parameters.

Currently, there is only one supported policy command: TPM2_PolicyPCR.
The command set can be extended to support advanced features, such as
as authorized policy, in the future.

Signed-off-by: Hernan Gatta <hegatta@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
---
 grub-core/Makefile.core.def       |   13 +
 grub-core/tpm2/args.c             |  131 ++++
 grub-core/tpm2/module.c           | 1033 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key.asn        |   31 +
 grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key.c          |  440 ++++++++++++
 grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key_asn1_tab.c |   41 ++
 include/grub/tpm2/internal/args.h |   39 ++
 include/grub/tpm2/tpm2key.h       |   83 +++
 8 files changed, 1811 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 grub-core/tpm2/args.c
 create mode 100644 grub-core/tpm2/module.c
 create mode 100644 grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key.asn
 create mode 100644 grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key.c
 create mode 100644 grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key_asn1_tab.c
 create mode 100644 include/grub/tpm2/internal/args.h
 create mode 100644 include/grub/tpm2/tpm2key.h

diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
index 0335d9add..4a8ff26a8 100644
--- a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
+++ b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
@@ -2525,6 +2525,19 @@ module = {
   enable = efi;
 };
 
+module = {
+  name = tpm2;
+  common = tpm2/args.c;
+  common = tpm2/buffer.c;
+  common = tpm2/module.c;
+  common = tpm2/mu.c;
+  common = tpm2/tpm2.c;
+  common = tpm2/tpm2key.c;
+  common = tpm2/tpm2key_asn1_tab.c;
+  efi = tpm2/tcg2.c;
+  enable = efi;
+};
+
 module = {
   name = tr;
   common = commands/tr.c;
diff --git a/grub-core/tpm2/args.c b/grub-core/tpm2/args.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0113f64a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/grub-core/tpm2/args.c
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+/*
+ *  GRUB  --  GRand Unified Bootloader
+ *  Copyright (C) 2022 Microsoft Corporation
+ *
+ *  GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *  the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ *  (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *  GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ *  GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ *  along with GRUB.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include <grub/err.h>
+#include <grub/mm.h>
+#include <grub/misc.h>
+#include <grub/tpm2/internal/args.h>
+
+grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2_protector_parse_pcrs (char *value, grub_uint8_t *pcrs,
+				grub_uint8_t *pcr_count)
+{
+  char *current_pcr = value;
+  char *next_pcr;
+  unsigned long pcr;
+  grub_uint8_t i;
+
+  if (grub_strlen (value) == 0)
+    return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
+
+  *pcr_count = 0;
+  for (i = 0; i < TPM_MAX_PCRS; i++)
+    {
+      next_pcr = grub_strchr (current_pcr, ',');
+      if (next_pcr == current_pcr)
+	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+			   N_("Empty entry in PCR list"));
+      if (next_pcr)
+	*next_pcr = '\0';
+
+      grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+      pcr = grub_strtoul (current_pcr, NULL, 10);
+      if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+	return grub_error (grub_errno,
+			   N_("Entry '%s' in PCR list is not a number"),
+			   current_pcr);
+
+      if (pcr > TPM_MAX_PCRS)
+	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE,
+			   N_("Entry %lu in PCR list is too large to be a PCR "
+			      "number, PCR numbers range from 0 to %u"),
+			   pcr, TPM_MAX_PCRS);
+
+      pcrs[i] = (grub_uint8_t)pcr;
+      *pcr_count += 1;
+
+      if (next_pcr == NULL)
+	break;
+
+      current_pcr = next_pcr + 1;
+      if (*current_pcr == '\0')
+	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+			   N_("Trailing comma at the end of PCR list"));
+    }
+
+  if (i == TPM_MAX_PCRS)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE,
+		       N_("Too many PCRs in PCR list, the maximum number of "
+			  "PCRs is %u"), TPM_MAX_PCRS);
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2_protector_parse_asymmetric (const char *value, TPM_ALG_ID *asymmetric)
+{
+  if (grub_strcasecmp (value, "ECC") == 0)
+    *asymmetric = TPM_ALG_ECC;
+  else if (grub_strcasecmp (value, "RSA") == 0)
+    *asymmetric = TPM_ALG_RSA;
+  else
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE,
+		       N_("Value '%s' is not a valid asymmetric key type"),
+		       value);
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2_protector_parse_bank (const char *value, TPM_ALG_ID *bank)
+{
+  if (grub_strcasecmp (value, "SHA1") == 0)
+    *bank = TPM_ALG_SHA1;
+  else if (grub_strcasecmp (value, "SHA256") == 0)
+    *bank = TPM_ALG_SHA256;
+  else if (grub_strcasecmp (value, "SHA384") == 0)
+    *bank = TPM_ALG_SHA384;
+  else if (grub_strcasecmp (value, "SHA512") == 0)
+    *bank = TPM_ALG_SHA512;
+  else
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE,
+		       N_("Value '%s' is not a valid PCR bank"), value);
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2_protector_parse_tpm_handle (const char *value, TPM_HANDLE *handle)
+{
+  unsigned long num;
+
+  grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+  num = grub_strtoul (value, NULL, 0);
+  if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    return grub_error (grub_errno, N_("TPM handle value '%s' is not a number"),
+		       value);
+
+  if (num > GRUB_UINT_MAX)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE,
+		       N_("Value %lu is too large to be a TPM handle, TPM "
+			  "handles are unsigned 32-bit integers"), num);
+
+  *handle = (TPM_HANDLE)num;
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
diff --git a/grub-core/tpm2/module.c b/grub-core/tpm2/module.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5274296b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/grub-core/tpm2/module.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1033 @@
+/*
+ *  GRUB  --  GRand Unified Bootloader
+ *  Copyright (C) 2022 Microsoft Corporation
+ *
+ *  GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *  the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ *  (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *  GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ *  GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ *  along with GRUB.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include <grub/dl.h>
+#include <grub/extcmd.h>
+#include <grub/file.h>
+#include <grub/libtasn1.h>
+#include <grub/list.h>
+#include <grub/misc.h>
+#include <grub/mm.h>
+#include <grub/protector.h>
+#include <grub/tpm2/buffer.h>
+#include <grub/tpm2/internal/args.h>
+#include <grub/tpm2/internal/types.h>
+#include <grub/tpm2/mu.h>
+#include <grub/tpm2/tpm2.h>
+#include <grub/tpm2/tpm2key.h>
+
+GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
+
+typedef enum grub_tpm2_protector_mode
+{
+  GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_UNSET,
+  GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_SRK,
+  GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_NV
+} grub_tpm2_protector_mode_t;
+
+enum grub_tpm2_protector_options
+{
+  OPTION_MODE,
+  OPTION_PCRS,
+  OPTION_BANK,
+  OPTION_TPM2KEY,
+  OPTION_KEYFILE,
+  OPTION_SRK,
+  OPTION_ASYMMETRIC,
+  OPTION_NVINDEX
+};
+
+struct grub_tpm2_protector_context
+{
+  grub_tpm2_protector_mode_t mode;
+  grub_uint8_t pcrs[TPM_MAX_PCRS];
+  grub_uint8_t pcr_count;
+  TPM_ALG_ID asymmetric;
+  TPM_ALG_ID bank;
+  const char *tpm2key;
+  const char *keyfile;
+  TPM_HANDLE srk;
+  TPM_HANDLE nv;
+};
+
+static const struct grub_arg_option grub_tpm2_protector_init_cmd_options[] =
+  {
+    /* Options for all modes */
+    {
+      .longarg  = "mode",
+      .shortarg = 'm',
+      .flags    = 0,
+      .arg      = NULL,
+      .type     = ARG_TYPE_STRING,
+      .doc      =
+	N_("Unseal key using SRK ('srk') (default) or retrieve it from an NV "
+	   "Index ('nv')."),
+    },
+    {
+      .longarg  = "pcrs",
+      .shortarg = 'p',
+      .flags    = 0,
+      .arg      = NULL,
+      .type     = ARG_TYPE_STRING,
+      .doc      =
+	N_("Comma-separated list of PCRs used to authorize key release "
+	   "(e.g., '7,11', default is 7."),
+    },
+    {
+      .longarg  = "bank",
+      .shortarg = 'b',
+      .flags    = 0,
+      .arg      = NULL,
+      .type     = ARG_TYPE_STRING,
+      .doc      =
+	N_("Bank of PCRs used to authorize key release: "
+	   "SHA1, SHA256 (default), or SHA384."),
+    },
+    /* SRK-mode options */
+    {
+      .longarg  = "tpm2key",
+      .shortarg = 'T',
+      .flags    = 0,
+      .arg      = NULL,
+      .type     = ARG_TYPE_STRING,
+      .doc      =
+	N_("Required in SRK mode, path to the key file in TPM 2.0 Key File Format "
+	   "to unseal using the TPM (e.g., (hd0,gpt1)/boot/grub2/secret.tpm)."),
+    },
+    {
+      .longarg  = "keyfile",
+      .shortarg = 'k',
+      .flags    = 0,
+      .arg      = NULL,
+      .type     = ARG_TYPE_STRING,
+      .doc      =
+	N_("Required in SRK mode, path to the sealed key file to unseal using "
+	   "the TPM (e.g., (hd0,gpt1)/boot/grub2/sealed_key). "
+           "Use '-tpm2key' instead"),
+    },
+    {
+      .longarg  = "srk",
+      .shortarg = 's',
+      .flags    = 0,
+      .arg      = NULL,
+      .type     = ARG_TYPE_STRING,
+      .doc      =
+	N_("In SRK mode, the SRK handle if the SRK is persistent "
+	   "(default is 0x81000001)."),
+    },
+    {
+      .longarg  = "asymmetric",
+      .shortarg = 'a',
+      .flags    = 0,
+      .arg      = NULL,
+      .type     = ARG_TYPE_STRING,
+      .doc      =
+	N_("In SRK mode, the type of SRK: RSA (default) or ECC."),
+    },
+    /* NV Index-mode options */
+    {
+      .longarg  = "nvindex",
+      .shortarg = 'n',
+      .flags    = 0,
+      .arg      = NULL,
+      .type     = ARG_TYPE_STRING,
+      .doc      =
+	N_("Required in NV Index mode, the NV handle to read which must "
+	   "readily exist on the TPM and which contains the key."),
+    },
+    /* End of list */
+    {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
+  };
+
+static grub_extcmd_t grub_tpm2_protector_init_cmd;
+static grub_extcmd_t grub_tpm2_protector_clear_cmd;
+static struct grub_tpm2_protector_context grub_tpm2_protector_ctx = { 0 };
+
+static grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2_protector_srk_read_file (const char *filepath, void **buffer,
+				   grub_size_t *buffer_size)
+{
+  grub_file_t file;
+  grub_off_t file_size;
+  void *read_buffer;
+  grub_off_t read_n;
+
+  /* Using GRUB_FILE_TYPE_SIGNATURE ensures we do not hash the keyfile into PCR9
+   * otherwise we'll never be able to predict the value of PCR9 at unseal time */
+  file = grub_file_open (filepath, GRUB_FILE_TYPE_SIGNATURE);
+  if (file == NULL)
+    {
+      grub_dprintf ("tpm2", "Could not open file: %s\n", filepath);
+      /* grub_file_open sets grub_errno on error, and if we do no unset it,
+       * future calls to grub_file_open will fail (and so will anybody up the
+       * stack who checks the value, if any). */
+      grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+      return GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
+    }
+
+  file_size = grub_file_size (file);
+  if (file_size == 0)
+    {
+      grub_dprintf ("tpm2", "Could not read file size: %s\n", filepath);
+      grub_file_close (file);
+      return GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
+    }
+
+  read_buffer = grub_malloc (file_size);
+  if (read_buffer == NULL)
+    {
+      grub_dprintf ("tpm2", "Could not allocate buffer for %s.\n", filepath);
+      grub_file_close (file);
+      return GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+    }
+
+  read_n = grub_file_read (file, read_buffer, file_size);
+  if (read_n != file_size)
+    {
+      grub_dprintf ("tpm2", "Could not retrieve file contents: %s\n", filepath);
+      grub_free (read_buffer);
+      grub_file_close (file);
+      return GRUB_ERR_FILE_READ_ERROR;
+    }
+
+  grub_file_close (file);
+
+  *buffer = read_buffer;
+  *buffer_size = file_size;
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2_protector_srk_unmarshal_keyfile (void *sealed_key,
+					   grub_size_t sealed_key_size,
+					   TPM2_SEALED_KEY *sk)
+{
+  struct grub_tpm2_buffer buf;
+
+  grub_tpm2_buffer_init (&buf);
+  if (sealed_key_size > buf.cap)
+    {
+      grub_dprintf ("tpm2", "Sealed key file is larger than decode buffer "
+			    "(%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE " vs %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE " bytes).\n",
+			    sealed_key_size, buf.cap);
+      return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
+    }
+
+  grub_memcpy (buf.data, sealed_key, sealed_key_size);
+  buf.size = sealed_key_size;
+
+  grub_tpm2_mu_TPM2B_PUBLIC_Unmarshal (&buf, &sk->public);
+  grub_tpm2_mu_TPM2B_Unmarshal (&buf, (TPM2B *)&sk->private);
+
+  if (buf.error)
+    {
+      grub_dprintf ("tpm2", "Could not unmarshal sealed key file, it is likely "
+			    "malformed.\n");
+      return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
+    }
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2_protector_srk_unmarshal_tpm2key (void *sealed_key,
+					   grub_size_t sealed_key_size,
+					   tpm2key_policy_t *policy_seq,
+					   tpm2key_authpolicy_t *authpol_seq,
+					   grub_uint32_t *parent,
+					   TPM2_SEALED_KEY *sk)
+{
+  asn1_node tpm2key = NULL;
+  grub_uint32_t parent_tmp;
+  void *sealed_pub = NULL;
+  grub_size_t sealed_pub_size;
+  void *sealed_priv = NULL;
+  grub_size_t sealed_priv_size;
+  struct grub_tpm2_buffer buf;
+  grub_err_t err;
+
+  /*
+   * Start to parse the tpm2key file
+   * TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE {
+   *     type        OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+   *     emptyAuth   [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL,
+   *     policy      [1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMPolicy OPTIONAL,
+   *     secret      [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+   *     authPolicy  [3] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMAuthPolicy OPTIONAL,
+   *     parent      INTEGER,
+   *     pubkey      OCTET STRING,
+   *     privkey     OCTET STRING
+   * }
+   */
+  err = grub_tpm2key_start_parsing (&tpm2key, sealed_key, sealed_key_size);
+  if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    return err;
+
+  /*
+   * Retrieve the policy sequence from 'policy'
+   * policy_seq will be NULL when 'policy' is not available
+   */
+  err = grub_tpm2key_get_policy_seq (tpm2key, policy_seq);
+  if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    goto error;
+
+  /*
+   * Retrieve the authpolicy sequence from 'authPolicy'
+   * authpol_seq will be NULL when 'authPolicy' is not available
+   */
+  err = grub_tpm2key_get_authpolicy_seq (tpm2key, authpol_seq);
+  if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    goto error;
+
+  /* Retrieve the parent handle */
+  err = grub_tpm2key_get_parent (tpm2key, &parent_tmp);
+  if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    goto error;
+  *parent = parent_tmp;
+
+  /* Retrieve the public part of the sealed key */
+  err = grub_tpm2key_get_pubkey (tpm2key, &sealed_pub, &sealed_pub_size);
+  if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    goto error;
+
+  /* Retrieve the private part of the sealed key */
+  err = grub_tpm2key_get_privkey (tpm2key, &sealed_priv, &sealed_priv_size);
+  if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    goto error;
+
+  /* Unmarshal the sealed key */
+  grub_tpm2_buffer_init (&buf);
+  if (sealed_pub_size + sealed_priv_size > buf.cap)
+    {
+      grub_dprintf ("tpm2", "Sealed key is larger than decode buffer "
+			    "(%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE " vs %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE " bytes).\n",
+			    sealed_pub_size, buf.cap);
+      err = GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
+      goto error;
+    }
+
+  grub_tpm2_buffer_pack (&buf, sealed_pub, sealed_pub_size);
+  grub_tpm2_buffer_pack (&buf, sealed_priv, sealed_priv_size);
+
+  buf.offset = 0;
+
+  grub_tpm2_mu_TPM2B_PUBLIC_Unmarshal (&buf, &sk->public);
+  grub_tpm2_mu_TPM2B_Unmarshal (&buf, (TPM2B *)&sk->private);
+
+  if (buf.error)
+    {
+      grub_dprintf ("tpm2", "Could not unmarshal sealed key, it is likely "
+			    "malformed.\n");
+      err = GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
+      goto error;
+    }
+
+  err = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+
+error:
+  /* End the parsing */
+  grub_tpm2key_end_parsing (tpm2key);
+  grub_free (sealed_pub);
+  grub_free (sealed_priv);
+
+  return err;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2_protector_srk_get (const struct grub_tpm2_protector_context *ctx,
+			     TPM_HANDLE parent, TPM_HANDLE *srk)
+{
+  TPM_RC rc;
+  TPM2B_PUBLIC public;
+  TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND authCommand = { 0 };
+  TPM2B_SENSITIVE_CREATE inSensitive = { 0 };
+  TPM2B_PUBLIC inPublic = { 0 };
+  TPM2B_DATA outsideInfo = { 0 };
+  TPML_PCR_SELECTION creationPcr = { 0 };
+  TPM2B_PUBLIC outPublic = { 0 };
+  TPM2B_CREATION_DATA creationData = { 0 };
+  TPM2B_DIGEST creationHash = { 0 };
+  TPMT_TK_CREATION creationTicket = { 0 };
+  TPM2B_NAME srkName = { 0 };
+  TPM_HANDLE srkHandle;
+
+  /* Find SRK */
+  rc = TPM2_ReadPublic (ctx->srk, NULL, &public);
+  if (rc == TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
+    {
+      *srk = ctx->srk;
+      return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+    }
+
+  /* The handle exists but its public area could not be read. */
+  if ((rc & ~TPM_RC_N_MASK) != TPM_RC_HANDLE)
+    {
+      grub_dprintf ("tpm2", "The SRK handle (0x%x) exists on the TPM but its "
+			    "public area could not be read (TPM2_ReadPublic "
+			    "failed with TSS/TPM error %u).\n", ctx->srk, rc);
+      return GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE;
+    }
+
+  /* Create SRK */
+  authCommand.sessionHandle = TPM_RS_PW;
+  inPublic.publicArea.type = ctx->asymmetric;
+  inPublic.publicArea.nameAlg  = TPM_ALG_SHA256;
+  inPublic.publicArea.objectAttributes.restricted = 1;
+  inPublic.publicArea.objectAttributes.userWithAuth = 1;
+  inPublic.publicArea.objectAttributes.decrypt = 1;
+  inPublic.publicArea.objectAttributes.fixedTPM = 1;
+  inPublic.publicArea.objectAttributes.fixedParent = 1;
+  inPublic.publicArea.objectAttributes.sensitiveDataOrigin = 1;
+  inPublic.publicArea.objectAttributes.noDA = 1;
+
+  if (ctx->asymmetric == TPM_ALG_RSA)
+    {
+      inPublic.publicArea.parameters.rsaDetail.symmetric.algorithm = TPM_ALG_AES;
+      inPublic.publicArea.parameters.rsaDetail.symmetric.keyBits.aes = 128;
+      inPublic.publicArea.parameters.rsaDetail.symmetric.mode.aes = TPM_ALG_CFB;
+      inPublic.publicArea.parameters.rsaDetail.scheme.scheme = TPM_ALG_NULL;
+      inPublic.publicArea.parameters.rsaDetail.keyBits = 2048;
+      inPublic.publicArea.parameters.rsaDetail.exponent = 0;
+    }
+  else if (ctx->asymmetric == TPM_ALG_ECC)
+    {
+      inPublic.publicArea.parameters.eccDetail.symmetric.algorithm = TPM_ALG_AES;
+      inPublic.publicArea.parameters.eccDetail.symmetric.keyBits.aes = 128;
+      inPublic.publicArea.parameters.eccDetail.symmetric.mode.aes = TPM_ALG_CFB;
+      inPublic.publicArea.parameters.eccDetail.scheme.scheme = TPM_ALG_NULL;
+      inPublic.publicArea.parameters.eccDetail.curveID = TPM_ECC_NIST_P256;
+      inPublic.publicArea.parameters.eccDetail.kdf.scheme = TPM_ALG_NULL;
+    }
+  else
+    return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
+
+  rc = TPM2_CreatePrimary (parent, &authCommand, &inSensitive, &inPublic,
+			   &outsideInfo, &creationPcr, &srkHandle, &outPublic,
+			   &creationData, &creationHash, &creationTicket,
+			   &srkName, NULL);
+  if (rc != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE,
+		       N_("Could not create SRK (TPM2_CreatePrimary: 0x%x)"),
+		       rc);
+
+  *srk = srkHandle;
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2_protector_policypcr (TPMI_SH_AUTH_SESSION session,
+			       struct grub_tpm2_buffer *cmd_buf)
+{
+  TPM2B_DIGEST pcr_digest;
+  TPML_PCR_SELECTION pcr_sel;
+  TPM_RC rc;
+
+  grub_tpm2_mu_TPM2B_DIGEST_Unmarshal (cmd_buf, &pcr_digest);
+  grub_tpm2_mu_TPML_PCR_SELECTION_Unmarshal (cmd_buf, &pcr_sel);
+  if (cmd_buf->error)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+		       N_("Failed to unmarshal CommandPolicy for TPM2_PolicyPCR"));
+
+  rc = TPM2_PolicyPCR (session, NULL, &pcr_digest, &pcr_sel, NULL);
+  if (rc != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE,
+		       N_("Failed to submit PCR policy (TPM2_PolicyPCR: 0x%x)"),
+		       rc);
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2_protector_enforce_policy (tpm2key_policy_t policy, TPMI_SH_AUTH_SESSION session)
+{
+  struct grub_tpm2_buffer buf;
+  grub_err_t err;
+
+  grub_tpm2_buffer_init (&buf);
+  if (policy->cmd_policy_len > buf.cap)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+		       N_("CommandPolicy larger than TPM buffer"));
+
+  grub_memcpy (buf.data, policy->cmd_policy, policy->cmd_policy_len);
+  buf.size = policy->cmd_policy_len;
+
+  switch (policy->cmd_code)
+    {
+    case TPM_CC_PolicyPCR:
+      err = grub_tpm2_protector_policypcr (session, &buf);
+      break;
+    default:
+      return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+			 N_("Unknown TPM Command: 0x%x"), policy->cmd_code);
+    }
+
+  return err;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2_protector_enforce_policy_seq (tpm2key_policy_t policy_seq,
+					TPMI_SH_AUTH_SESSION session)
+{
+  tpm2key_policy_t policy;
+  grub_err_t err;
+
+  FOR_LIST_ELEMENTS (policy, policy_seq)
+    {
+      err = grub_tpm2_protector_enforce_policy (policy, session);
+      if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+	return err;
+    }
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2_protector_simple_policy_seq (const struct grub_tpm2_protector_context *ctx,
+				       tpm2key_policy_t *policy_seq)
+{
+  tpm2key_policy_t policy = NULL;
+  struct grub_tpm2_buffer buf;
+  TPML_PCR_SELECTION pcr_sel = {
+    .count = 1,
+    .pcrSelections = {
+      {
+	.hash = ctx->bank,
+	.sizeOfSelect = 3,
+	.pcrSelect = { 0 }
+      },
+    }
+  };
+  grub_uint8_t i;
+  grub_err_t err;
+
+  if (policy_seq == NULL)
+    return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
+
+  grub_tpm2_buffer_init (&buf);
+
+  for (i = 0; i < ctx->pcr_count; i++)
+    TPMS_PCR_SELECTION_SelectPCR (&pcr_sel.pcrSelections[0], ctx->pcrs[i]);
+
+  grub_tpm2_buffer_pack_u16 (&buf, 0);
+  grub_tpm2_mu_TPML_PCR_SELECTION_Marshal (&buf, &pcr_sel);
+
+  if (buf.error)
+    return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
+
+  policy = grub_malloc (sizeof(struct tpm2key_policy));
+  if (policy == NULL)
+    {
+      err = GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+      goto error;
+    }
+  policy->cmd_code = TPM_CC_PolicyPCR;
+  policy->cmd_policy = grub_malloc (buf.size);
+  if (policy->cmd_policy == NULL)
+    {
+      err = GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+      goto error;
+    }
+  grub_memcpy (policy->cmd_policy, buf.data, buf.size);
+  policy->cmd_policy_len = buf.size;
+
+  grub_list_push (GRUB_AS_LIST_P (policy_seq), GRUB_AS_LIST (policy));
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+
+error:
+  grub_free (policy);
+
+  return err;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2_protector_unseal (tpm2key_policy_t policy_seq, TPM_HANDLE sealed_handle,
+			    grub_uint8_t **key, grub_size_t *key_size)
+{
+  TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND authCmd = { 0 };
+  TPM2B_SENSITIVE_DATA data;
+  TPM2B_NONCE nonceCaller = { 0 };
+  TPMT_SYM_DEF symmetric = { 0 };
+  TPMI_SH_AUTH_SESSION session;
+  grub_uint8_t *key_out;
+  TPM_RC rc;
+  grub_err_t err;
+
+  /* Start Auth Session */
+  nonceCaller.size = TPM_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+  symmetric.algorithm = TPM_ALG_NULL;
+  rc = TPM2_StartAuthSession (TPM_RH_NULL, TPM_RH_NULL, NULL, &nonceCaller, NULL,
+			      TPM_SE_POLICY, &symmetric, TPM_ALG_SHA256,
+			      &session, NULL, NULL);
+  if (rc != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE,
+		       N_("Failed to start auth session (TPM2_StartAuthSession: "
+			  "0x%x)"), rc);
+
+  /* Enforce the policy command sequence */
+  err = grub_tpm2_protector_enforce_policy_seq (policy_seq, session);
+  if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    goto error;
+
+  /* Unseal Sealed Key */
+  authCmd.sessionHandle = session;
+  rc = TPM2_Unseal (sealed_handle, &authCmd, &data, NULL);
+  if (rc != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
+    {
+      err = GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE;
+      grub_error (err, N_("Failed to unseal sealed key (TPM2_Unseal: 0x%x)"),
+		  rc);
+      goto error;
+    }
+
+  /* Epilogue */
+  key_out = grub_malloc (data.size);
+  if (key_out == NULL)
+    {
+      err = GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+      grub_error (err, N_("No memory left to allocate unlock key buffer"));
+      goto error;
+    }
+
+  grub_memcpy (key_out, data.buffer, data.size);
+
+  *key = key_out;
+  *key_size = data.size;
+
+  err = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+
+error:
+  TPM2_FlushContext (session);
+
+  return err;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2_protector_srk_recover (const struct grub_tpm2_protector_context *ctx,
+				 grub_uint8_t **key, grub_size_t *key_size)
+{
+  TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND authCmd = { 0 };
+  TPM2_SEALED_KEY sealed_key = { 0 };
+  TPM2B_NAME name = { 0 };
+  void *file_bytes = NULL;
+  grub_size_t file_size = 0;
+  TPM_HANDLE parent_handle = 0;
+  TPM_HANDLE srk_handle = 0;
+  TPM_HANDLE sealed_handle = 0;
+  tpm2key_policy_t policy_seq = NULL;
+  tpm2key_authpolicy_t authpol = NULL;
+  tpm2key_authpolicy_t authpol_seq = NULL;
+  TPM_RC rc;
+  grub_err_t err;
+
+  /*
+   * Retrieve sealed key, parent handle, policy sequence, and authpolicy
+   * sequence from the key file
+  */
+  if (ctx->tpm2key)
+    {
+      err = grub_tpm2_protector_srk_read_file (ctx->tpm2key, &file_bytes,
+					       &file_size);
+      if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+	return grub_error (err, N_("Failed to read key file %s"), ctx->tpm2key);
+
+      err = grub_tpm2_protector_srk_unmarshal_tpm2key (file_bytes,
+						       file_size,
+						       &policy_seq,
+						       &authpol_seq,
+						       &parent_handle,
+						       &sealed_key);
+      if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+	{
+	  grub_error (err, N_("Failed to unmarshal key, ensure the key file is in "
+			      "TPM 2.0 Key File format"));
+	  goto exit1;
+	}
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      err = grub_tpm2_protector_srk_read_file (ctx->keyfile, &file_bytes,
+					       &file_size);
+      if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+	return grub_error (err, N_("Failed to read key file %s"), ctx->keyfile);
+
+      parent_handle = TPM_RH_OWNER;
+      err = grub_tpm2_protector_srk_unmarshal_keyfile (file_bytes,
+						       file_size,
+						       &sealed_key);
+      if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+	{
+	  grub_error (err, N_("Failed to unmarshal key, ensure the key file is in "
+			      "TPM wire format"));
+	  goto exit1;
+	}
+    }
+
+  /* Get the SRK to unseal the sealed key */
+  err = grub_tpm2_protector_srk_get (ctx, parent_handle, &srk_handle);
+  if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    {
+      grub_error (err, N_("Failed to retrieve the SRK"));
+      goto exit1;
+    }
+
+  /* Load the sealed key and associate it with the SRK */
+  authCmd.sessionHandle = TPM_RS_PW;
+  rc = TPM2_Load (srk_handle, &authCmd, &sealed_key.private, &sealed_key.public,
+		  &sealed_handle, &name, NULL);
+  if (rc != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
+    {
+      err = GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE;
+      grub_error (err, N_("Failed to load sealed key (TPM2_Load: 0x%x)"), rc);
+      goto exit2;
+    }
+
+  err = GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR;
+
+  /* Iterate the authpolicy sequence to find one that unseals the key */
+  FOR_LIST_ELEMENTS (authpol, authpol_seq)
+    {
+      err = grub_tpm2_protector_unseal (authpol->policy_seq, sealed_handle,
+					key, key_size);
+      if (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+        break;
+
+      /*
+       * Push the error message into the grub_error stack
+       * Note: The grub_error stack may overflow if there are too many policy
+       *       sequences. Anyway, we still can keep the error messages from
+       *       the first few policy sequences which are usually most likely to
+       *       unseal the key.
+       */
+      grub_error_push();
+    }
+
+  /* Give the standalone policy sequence a try */
+  if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    {
+      /*
+       * Create a basic policy sequence based on the given PCR selection if the
+       * key file doesn't provide one
+       */
+      if (policy_seq == NULL)
+	{
+	  err = grub_tpm2_protector_simple_policy_seq (ctx, &policy_seq);
+	  if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+	    goto exit3;
+	}
+
+      err = grub_tpm2_protector_unseal (policy_seq, sealed_handle, key, key_size);
+    }
+
+  /* Pop error messages on success */
+  if (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    while (grub_error_pop ());
+
+exit3:
+  TPM2_FlushContext (sealed_handle);
+
+exit2:
+  TPM2_FlushContext (srk_handle);
+
+exit1:
+  grub_tpm2key_free_policy_seq (policy_seq);
+  grub_tpm2key_free_authpolicy_seq (authpol_seq);
+  grub_free (file_bytes);
+  return err;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2_protector_nv_recover (const struct grub_tpm2_protector_context *ctx,
+				grub_uint8_t **key, grub_size_t *key_size)
+{
+  (void)ctx;
+  (void)key;
+  (void)key_size;
+
+  return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET,
+		     N_("NV Index mode is not implemented yet"));
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2_protector_recover (const struct grub_tpm2_protector_context *ctx,
+			     grub_uint8_t **key, grub_size_t *key_size)
+{
+  switch (ctx->mode)
+    {
+    case GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_SRK:
+      return grub_tpm2_protector_srk_recover (ctx, key, key_size);
+    case GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_NV:
+      return grub_tpm2_protector_nv_recover (ctx, key, key_size);
+    default:
+      return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
+    }
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2_protector_recover_key (grub_uint8_t **key, grub_size_t *key_size)
+{
+  /* Expect a call to tpm2_protector_init before anybody tries to use us */
+  if (grub_tpm2_protector_ctx.mode == GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_UNSET)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_INVALID_COMMAND,
+		       N_("Cannot use TPM2 key protector without initializing "
+			  "it, call tpm2_protector_init first"));
+
+  if (key == NULL || key_size == NULL)
+    return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
+
+  return grub_tpm2_protector_recover (&grub_tpm2_protector_ctx, key, key_size);
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2_protector_check_args (struct grub_tpm2_protector_context *ctx)
+{
+  if (ctx->mode == GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_UNSET)
+    ctx->mode = GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_SRK;
+
+  /* Checks for SRK mode */
+  if (ctx->mode == GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_SRK && ctx->keyfile == NULL
+      && ctx->tpm2key == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+		       N_("In SRK mode, a key file must be specified: "
+			  "--tpm2key/-T or --keyfile/-k"));
+
+  if (ctx->mode == GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_SRK && ctx->keyfile
+      && ctx->tpm2key)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+		       N_("In SRK mode, please specify a key file with "
+			  "only --tpm2key/-T or --keyfile/-k"));
+
+  if (ctx->mode == GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_SRK && ctx->nv)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+		       N_("In SRK mode, an NV Index cannot be specified"));
+
+  /* Checks for NV mode */
+  if (ctx->mode == GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_NV && ctx->nv == 0)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+		       N_("In NV Index mode, an NV Index must be specified: "
+			   "--nvindex or -n"));
+
+  if (ctx->mode == GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_NV &&
+      (ctx->tpm2key || ctx->keyfile))
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+		       N_("In NV Index mode, a keyfile cannot be specified"));
+
+  if (ctx->mode == GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_NV && ctx->srk)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+		       N_("In NV Index mode, an SRK cannot be specified"));
+
+  if (ctx->mode == GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_NV && ctx->asymmetric)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+		       N_("In NV Index mode, an asymmetric key type cannot be "
+			  "specified"));
+
+  /* Defaults assignment */
+  if (ctx->bank == TPM_ALG_ERROR)
+    ctx->bank = TPM_ALG_SHA256;
+
+  if (ctx->pcr_count == 0)
+    {
+      ctx->pcrs[0] = 7;
+      ctx->pcr_count = 1;
+    }
+
+  if (ctx->mode == GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_SRK)
+    {
+      if (!ctx->srk)
+	ctx->srk = TPM2_SRK_HANDLE;
+
+      if (!ctx->asymmetric)
+	ctx->asymmetric = TPM_ALG_RSA;
+    }
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2_protector_parse_file (const char *value, const char **file)
+{
+  if (grub_strlen (value) == 0)
+    return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
+
+  *file = grub_strdup (value);
+  if (*file == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
+		       N_("No memory to duplicate file path"));
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2_protector_parse_mode (const char *value,
+				grub_tpm2_protector_mode_t *mode)
+{
+  if (grub_strcmp (value, "srk") == 0)
+    *mode = GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_SRK;
+  else if (grub_strcmp (value, "nv") == 0)
+    *mode = GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_NV;
+  else
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE,
+		       N_("Value '%s' is not a valid TPM2 key protector mode"),
+		       value);
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2_protector_init_cmd_handler (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc,
+				      char **args __attribute__ ((unused)))
+{
+  struct grub_arg_list *state = ctxt->state;
+  grub_err_t err;
+
+  if (argc)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+		       N_("The TPM2 key protector does not accept any "
+			  "non-option arguments (i.e., like -o and/or --option "
+			  "only)"));
+
+  grub_free ((void *) grub_tpm2_protector_ctx.keyfile);
+  grub_memset (&grub_tpm2_protector_ctx, 0, sizeof (grub_tpm2_protector_ctx));
+
+  if (state[OPTION_MODE].set)  /* mode */
+    {
+      err = grub_tpm2_protector_parse_mode (state[OPTION_MODE].arg,
+					    &grub_tpm2_protector_ctx.mode);
+      if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+	return err;
+    }
+
+  if (state[OPTION_PCRS].set)  /* pcrs */
+    {
+      err = grub_tpm2_protector_parse_pcrs (state[OPTION_PCRS].arg,
+					    grub_tpm2_protector_ctx.pcrs,
+					    &grub_tpm2_protector_ctx.pcr_count);
+      if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+	return err;
+    }
+
+  if (state[OPTION_BANK].set)  /* bank */
+    {
+      err = grub_tpm2_protector_parse_bank (state[OPTION_BANK].arg,
+					    &grub_tpm2_protector_ctx.bank);
+      if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+	return err;
+    }
+
+  if (state[OPTION_TPM2KEY].set)  /* tpm2key */
+    {
+      err = grub_tpm2_protector_parse_file (state[OPTION_TPM2KEY].arg,
+					    &grub_tpm2_protector_ctx.tpm2key);
+      if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+	return err;
+    }
+
+  if (state[OPTION_KEYFILE].set)  /* keyfile */
+    {
+      err = grub_tpm2_protector_parse_file (state[OPTION_KEYFILE].arg,
+					    &grub_tpm2_protector_ctx.keyfile);
+      if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+	return err;
+    }
+
+  if (state[OPTION_SRK].set)  /* srk */
+    {
+      err = grub_tpm2_protector_parse_tpm_handle (state[OPTION_SRK].arg,
+						  &grub_tpm2_protector_ctx.srk);
+      if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+	return err;
+    }
+
+  if (state[OPTION_ASYMMETRIC].set)  /* asymmetric */
+    {
+      err = grub_tpm2_protector_parse_asymmetric (state[OPTION_ASYMMETRIC].arg,
+						  &grub_tpm2_protector_ctx.asymmetric);
+      if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+	return err;
+    }
+
+  if (state[OPTION_NVINDEX].set)  /* nvindex */
+    {
+      err = grub_tpm2_protector_parse_tpm_handle (state[OPTION_NVINDEX].arg,
+						  &grub_tpm2_protector_ctx.nv);
+      if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+	return err;
+    }
+
+  err = grub_tpm2_protector_check_args (&grub_tpm2_protector_ctx);
+
+  /* This command only initializes the protector, so nothing else to do. */
+
+  return err;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2_protector_clear_cmd_handler (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt __attribute__ ((unused)),
+				       int argc,
+				       char **args __attribute__ ((unused)))
+{
+  if (argc)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+		       N_("tpm2_key_protector_clear accepts no arguments"));
+
+  grub_free ((void *) grub_tpm2_protector_ctx.keyfile);
+  grub_memset (&grub_tpm2_protector_ctx, 0, sizeof (grub_tpm2_protector_ctx));
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static struct grub_key_protector grub_tpm2_key_protector =
+  {
+    .name = "tpm2",
+    .recover_key = grub_tpm2_protector_recover_key
+  };
+
+GRUB_MOD_INIT (tpm2)
+{
+  grub_tpm2_protector_init_cmd =
+    grub_register_extcmd ("tpm2_key_protector_init",
+			  grub_tpm2_protector_init_cmd_handler, 0,
+			  N_("[-m mode] "
+			     "[-p pcr_list] "
+			     "[-b pcr_bank] "
+			     "[-T tpm2_key_file_path] "
+			     "[-k sealed_key_file_path] "
+			     "[-s srk_handle] "
+			     "[-a asymmetric_key_type] "
+			     "[-n nv_index]"),
+			  N_("Initialize the TPM2 key protector."),
+			  grub_tpm2_protector_init_cmd_options);
+  grub_tpm2_protector_clear_cmd =
+    grub_register_extcmd ("tpm2_key_protector_clear",
+			  grub_tpm2_protector_clear_cmd_handler, 0, NULL,
+			  N_("Clear the TPM2 key protector if previously initialized."),
+			  NULL);
+  grub_key_protector_register (&grub_tpm2_key_protector);
+}
+
+GRUB_MOD_FINI (tpm2)
+{
+  grub_free ((void *) grub_tpm2_protector_ctx.keyfile);
+  grub_memset (&grub_tpm2_protector_ctx, 0, sizeof (grub_tpm2_protector_ctx));
+
+  grub_key_protector_unregister (&grub_tpm2_key_protector);
+  grub_unregister_extcmd (grub_tpm2_protector_clear_cmd);
+  grub_unregister_extcmd (grub_tpm2_protector_init_cmd);
+}
diff --git a/grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key.asn b/grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key.asn
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e3b6a03e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key.asn
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+--
+-- TPM 2.0 key file format
+--  To generate tpm2key_asn1_tab.c: asn1Parser tpm2key.asn
+--
+TPM2KEY {}
+DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
+
+BEGIN
+
+TPMPolicy ::= SEQUENCE {
+    CommandCode   [0] EXPLICIT INTEGER,
+    CommandPolicy [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
+}
+
+TPMAuthPolicy ::= SEQUENCE {
+    Name    [0] EXPLICIT UTF8String OPTIONAL,
+    Policy  [1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMPolicy
+}
+
+TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE {
+    type        OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+    emptyAuth   [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL,
+    policy      [1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMPolicy OPTIONAL,
+    secret      [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+    authPolicy  [3] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMAuthPolicy OPTIONAL,
+    parent      INTEGER,
+    pubkey      OCTET STRING,
+    privkey     OCTET STRING
+}
+
+END
diff --git a/grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key.c b/grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..62f6d865b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key.c
@@ -0,0 +1,440 @@
+/*
+ *  GRUB  --  GRand Unified Bootloader
+ *  Copyright (C) 2023 SUSE LLC
+ *
+ *  GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *  the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ *  (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *  GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ *  GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ *  along with GRUB.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include <grub/libtasn1.h>
+#include <grub/list.h>
+#include <grub/misc.h>
+#include <grub/mm.h>
+#include <grub/tpm2/buffer.h>
+#include <grub/tpm2/tpm2key.h>
+
+extern asn1_static_node tpm2key_asn1_tab[];
+const char *sealed_key_oid = "2.23.133.10.1.5";
+
+static int
+asn1_allocate_and_read (asn1_node node, const char *name, void **content, grub_size_t *content_size)
+{
+  grub_uint8_t *tmpstr = NULL;
+  int tmpstr_size = 0;
+  int ret;
+
+  if (content == NULL)
+    return ASN1_MEM_ERROR;
+
+  ret = asn1_read_value (node, name, NULL, &tmpstr_size);
+  if (ret != ASN1_MEM_ERROR)
+    return ret;
+
+  tmpstr = grub_malloc (tmpstr_size);
+  if (tmpstr == NULL)
+    return ASN1_MEM_ERROR;
+
+  ret = asn1_read_value (node, name, tmpstr, &tmpstr_size);
+  if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+    return ret;
+
+  *content = tmpstr;
+  *content_size = tmpstr_size;
+
+  return ASN1_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+static int
+asn1_read_uint32 (asn1_node node, const char *name, grub_uint32_t *out)
+{
+  grub_uint32_t tmp = 0;
+  grub_uint8_t *ptr;
+  void *data = NULL;
+  grub_size_t data_size;
+  int ret;
+
+  ret = asn1_allocate_and_read (node, name, &data, &data_size);
+  if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+    return ret;
+
+  if (data_size > 4)
+    {
+      ret = ASN1_MEM_ERROR;
+      goto error;
+    }
+
+  /* convert the big-endian integer to host uint32 */
+  ptr = (grub_uint8_t *)&tmp + (4 - data_size);
+  grub_memcpy (ptr, data, data_size);
+  tmp = grub_be_to_cpu32 (tmp);
+
+  *out = tmp;
+error:
+  if (data)
+    grub_free (data);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2key_start_parsing (asn1_node *parsed_tpm2key, void *data, grub_size_t size)
+{
+  asn1_node tpm2key;
+  asn1_node tpm2key_asn1 = NULL;
+  void *type_oid = NULL;
+  grub_size_t type_oid_size = 0;
+  void *empty_auth = NULL;
+  grub_size_t empty_auth_size = 0;
+  int tmp_size = 0;
+  int ret;
+  grub_err_t err;
+
+  /*
+    TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE {
+        type        OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+        emptyAuth   [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL,
+        policy      [1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMPolicy OPTIONAL,
+        secret      [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+        authPolicy  [3] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMAuthPolicy OPTIONAL,
+        parent      INTEGER,
+        pubkey      OCTET STRING,
+        privkey     OCTET STRING
+    }
+  */
+  ret = asn1_array2tree (tpm2key_asn1_tab, &tpm2key_asn1, NULL);
+  if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+    return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
+
+  ret = asn1_create_element (tpm2key_asn1, "TPM2KEY.TPMKey", &tpm2key);
+  if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+    return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
+
+  ret = asn1_der_decoding (&tpm2key, data, size, NULL);
+  if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+    return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
+
+  /* Check if 'type' is Sealed Key or not */
+  ret = asn1_allocate_and_read (tpm2key, "type", &type_oid, &type_oid_size);
+  if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+    return GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE;
+
+  if (grub_memcmp (sealed_key_oid, type_oid, type_oid_size) != 0)
+    {
+      err = GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE;
+      goto error;
+    }
+
+  /* 'emptyAuth' must be 'TRUE' since we don't support password authorization */
+  ret = asn1_allocate_and_read (tpm2key, "emptyAuth", &empty_auth, &empty_auth_size);
+  if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS || grub_strncmp ("TRUE", empty_auth, empty_auth_size) != 0)
+    {
+      err = GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
+      goto error;
+    }
+
+  /* 'secret' should not be in a sealed key */
+  ret = asn1_read_value (tpm2key, "secret", NULL, &tmp_size);
+  if (ret != ASN1_ELEMENT_NOT_FOUND)
+    {
+      err = GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
+      goto error;
+    }
+
+  *parsed_tpm2key = tpm2key;
+
+  err = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+
+error:
+  if (type_oid)
+    grub_free (type_oid);
+
+  if (empty_auth)
+    grub_free (empty_auth);
+
+  return err;
+}
+
+void
+grub_tpm2key_end_parsing (asn1_node tpm2key)
+{
+  if (tpm2key)
+    asn1_delete_structure (&tpm2key);
+  tpm2key = NULL;
+}
+
+grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2key_get_parent (asn1_node tpm2key, grub_uint32_t *parent)
+{
+  int ret;
+
+  if (parent == NULL)
+    return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
+
+  if (tpm2key == NULL)
+    return GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR;
+
+  ret = asn1_read_uint32 (tpm2key, "parent", parent);
+  if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+    return GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR;
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+tpm2key_get_octstring (asn1_node tpm2key, const char *name, void **data, grub_size_t *size)
+{
+  int ret;
+
+  if (name == NULL || data == NULL || size == NULL)
+    return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
+
+  if (tpm2key == NULL)
+    return GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR;
+
+  ret = asn1_allocate_and_read (tpm2key, name, data, size);
+  if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+    return GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR;
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2key_get_pubkey (asn1_node tpm2key, void **data, grub_size_t *size)
+{
+  return tpm2key_get_octstring (tpm2key, "pubkey", data, size);
+}
+
+grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2key_get_privkey (asn1_node tpm2key, void **data, grub_size_t *size)
+{
+  return tpm2key_get_octstring (tpm2key, "privkey", data, size);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The string to fetch 'Policy' from 'authPolicy':
+ *   authPolicy.?XX.Policy
+ */
+#define AUTHPOLICY_POL_MAX_STR "authPolicy.?XX.Policy"
+#define AUTHPOLICY_POL_MAX (sizeof (AUTHPOLICY_POL_MAX_STR))
+
+/*
+ * Expected strings for CommandCode and CommandPolicy:
+ *   policy.?XX.CommandCode
+ *   policy.?XX.CommandPolicy
+ *   authPolicy.?XX.Policy.?YY.CommandCode
+ *   authPolicy.?XX.Policy.?YY.CommandPolicy
+ */
+#define CMD_CODE_MAX_STR AUTHPOLICY_POL_MAX_STR".?YY.CommandCode"
+#define CMD_POL_MAX_STR  AUTHPOLICY_POL_MAX_STR".?YY.CommandPolicy"
+#define CMD_CODE_MAX (sizeof (CMD_CODE_MAX_STR))
+#define CMD_POL_MAX  (sizeof (CMD_POL_MAX_STR))
+
+static int
+tpm2key_get_policy_seq (asn1_node tpm2key, const char *prefix,
+			tpm2key_policy_t *policy_seq)
+{
+  tpm2key_policy_t tmp_seq = NULL;
+  tpm2key_policy_t policy = NULL;
+  int policy_n;
+  char cmd_code[CMD_CODE_MAX];
+  char cmd_pol[CMD_POL_MAX];
+  grub_size_t cmd_policy_len;
+  int i;
+  int ret;
+
+  ret = asn1_number_of_elements (tpm2key, prefix, &policy_n);
+  if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+    return ret;
+
+  /*
+   * Limit the number of policy commands to two digits (99)
+   * Although there is no upper bound for the number of policy commands,
+   * in practice, it takes one or two policy commands to unseal the key,
+   * so the 99 commands limit is more than enough.
+   */
+  if (policy_n > 100 || policy_n < 1)
+    return ASN1_VALUE_NOT_VALID;
+
+  /*
+   * Iterate the policy commands backwards since grub_list_push() prepends
+   * the item into the list.
+   */
+  for (i = policy_n; i >= 1; i--) {
+    policy = grub_zalloc (sizeof (struct tpm2key_policy));
+    if (policy == NULL)
+      {
+	ret = ASN1_MEM_ALLOC_ERROR;
+	goto error;
+      }
+    grub_snprintf (cmd_code, CMD_CODE_MAX, "%s.?%d.CommandCode", prefix, i);
+    grub_snprintf (cmd_pol, CMD_POL_MAX, "%s.?%d.CommandPolicy", prefix, i);
+
+    /* CommandCode   [0] EXPLICIT INTEGER */
+    ret = asn1_read_uint32 (tpm2key, cmd_code, &policy->cmd_code);
+    if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+      return ret;
+
+    /* CommandPolicy [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING */
+    ret = tpm2key_get_octstring (tpm2key, cmd_pol, &policy->cmd_policy,
+				 &cmd_policy_len);
+    if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+      {
+	goto error;
+      }
+    else if (cmd_policy_len > GRUB_TPM2_BUFFER_CAPACITY)
+      {
+	/*
+	 * CommandPolicy is the marshalled parameters for the TPM command so
+	 * it should not be larger than the maximum TPM2 buffer.
+	 */
+	ret = ASN1_VALUE_NOT_VALID;
+	goto error;
+      }
+    policy->cmd_policy_len = (grub_uint16_t)cmd_policy_len;
+
+    /* Prepend the policy command into the sequence */
+    grub_list_push (GRUB_AS_LIST_P (&tmp_seq), GRUB_AS_LIST (policy));
+  }
+
+  *policy_seq = tmp_seq;
+
+  return ASN1_SUCCESS;
+
+error:
+  if (policy)
+    {
+      grub_free (policy->cmd_policy);
+      grub_free (policy);
+    }
+  grub_tpm2key_free_policy_seq (tmp_seq);
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2key_get_policy_seq (asn1_node tpm2key, tpm2key_policy_t *policy_seq)
+{
+  int ret;
+
+  ret = tpm2key_get_policy_seq (tpm2key, "policy", policy_seq);
+  if (ret == ASN1_ELEMENT_NOT_FOUND)
+    {
+      /* "policy" is optional, so it may not be available */
+      *policy_seq = NULL;
+      return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+    }
+  else if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+    {
+      return GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR;
+    }
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+void
+grub_tpm2key_free_policy_seq (tpm2key_policy_t policy_seq)
+{
+  tpm2key_policy_t policy;
+  tpm2key_policy_t next;
+
+  if (policy_seq == NULL)
+    return;
+
+  FOR_LIST_ELEMENTS_SAFE (policy, next, policy_seq)
+    {
+      grub_free (policy->cmd_policy);
+      grub_free (policy);
+    }
+}
+
+grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2key_get_authpolicy_seq (asn1_node tpm2key, tpm2key_authpolicy_t *authpol_seq)
+{
+  tpm2key_authpolicy_t tmp_seq = NULL;
+  tpm2key_authpolicy_t authpol = NULL;
+  int authpol_n;
+  char authpol_pol[AUTHPOLICY_POL_MAX];
+  int i;
+  int ret;
+  grub_err_t err;
+
+  ret = asn1_number_of_elements (tpm2key, "authPolicy", &authpol_n);
+  if (ret == ASN1_ELEMENT_NOT_FOUND)
+    {
+      /* "authPolicy" is optional, so it may not be available */
+      *authpol_seq = NULL;
+      return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+    }
+  else if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+    {
+      return GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR;
+    }
+
+  /* Limit the number of authPolicy elements to two digits (99) */
+  if (authpol_n > 100 || authpol_n < 1)
+    return GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
+
+  /*
+   * Iterate the authPolicy elements backwards since grub_list_push() prepends
+   * the item into the list.
+   */
+  for (i = authpol_n; i >= 1; i--) {
+    authpol = grub_zalloc (sizeof (struct tpm2key_authpolicy));
+    if (authpol == NULL)
+      {
+	err = GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+	goto error;
+      }
+    grub_snprintf (authpol_pol, AUTHPOLICY_POL_MAX, "authPolicy.?%d.Policy", i);
+
+    ret = tpm2key_get_policy_seq (tpm2key, authpol_pol, &authpol->policy_seq);
+    if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+      {
+        err = GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR;
+        goto error;
+      }
+
+    /* Prepend the authPolicy element into the sequence */
+    grub_list_push (GRUB_AS_LIST_P (&tmp_seq), GRUB_AS_LIST (authpol));
+  }
+
+  *authpol_seq = tmp_seq;
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+
+error:
+  if (authpol)
+    {
+      grub_tpm2key_free_policy_seq (authpol->policy_seq);
+      grub_free (authpol);
+    }
+
+  grub_tpm2key_free_authpolicy_seq (tmp_seq);
+
+  return err;
+}
+
+void
+grub_tpm2key_free_authpolicy_seq (tpm2key_authpolicy_t authpol_seq)
+{
+  tpm2key_authpolicy_t authpol;
+  tpm2key_authpolicy_t next;
+
+  if (authpol_seq == NULL)
+    return;
+
+  FOR_LIST_ELEMENTS_SAFE (authpol, next, authpol_seq)
+    {
+      grub_tpm2key_free_policy_seq (authpol->policy_seq);
+      grub_free (authpol);
+    }
+}
diff --git a/grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key_asn1_tab.c b/grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key_asn1_tab.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..551fc46ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key_asn1_tab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+/*
+ * This file is generated by 'asn1Parser tpm2key.asn' and the '#include'
+ * headers are replaced with the ones in grub2.
+ * - 'grub/mm.h' for the definition of 'NULL'
+ * - 'grub/libtasn1.h' for the definition of 'asn1_static_node'
+ */
+
+#include <grub/mm.h>
+#include <grub/libtasn1.h>
+
+const asn1_static_node tpm2key_asn1_tab[] = {
+  { "TPM2KEY", 536875024, NULL },
+  { NULL, 1073741836, NULL },
+  { "TPMPolicy", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "CommandCode", 1610620931, NULL },
+  { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+  { "CommandPolicy", 536879111, NULL },
+  { NULL, 2056, "1"},
+  { "TPMAuthPolicy", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "Name", 1610637346, NULL },
+  { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+  { "Policy", 536879115, NULL },
+  { NULL, 1073743880, "1"},
+  { NULL, 2, "TPMPolicy"},
+  { "TPMKey", 536870917, NULL },
+  { "type", 1073741836, NULL },
+  { "emptyAuth", 1610637316, NULL },
+  { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+  { "policy", 1610637323, NULL },
+  { NULL, 1073743880, "1"},
+  { NULL, 2, "TPMPolicy"},
+  { "secret", 1610637319, NULL },
+  { NULL, 2056, "2"},
+  { "authPolicy", 1610637323, NULL },
+  { NULL, 1073743880, "3"},
+  { NULL, 2, "TPMAuthPolicy"},
+  { "parent", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "pubkey", 1073741831, NULL },
+  { "privkey", 7, NULL },
+  { NULL, 0, NULL }
+};
diff --git a/include/grub/tpm2/internal/args.h b/include/grub/tpm2/internal/args.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..df3341913
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/grub/tpm2/internal/args.h
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+/*
+ *  GRUB  --  GRand Unified Bootloader
+ *  Copyright (C) 2022 Microsoft Corporation
+ *
+ *  GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *  the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ *  (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *  GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ *  GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ *  along with GRUB.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#ifndef GRUB_TPM2_INTERNAL_ARGS_HEADER
+#define GRUB_TPM2_INTERNAL_ARGS_HEADER 1
+
+#include <grub/err.h>
+#include <grub/tpm2/tpm2.h>
+
+grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2_protector_parse_pcrs (char *value, grub_uint8_t *pcrs,
+				grub_uint8_t *pcr_count);
+
+grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2_protector_parse_asymmetric (const char *value,
+				      TPM_ALG_ID *asymmetric);
+
+grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2_protector_parse_bank (const char *value, TPM_ALG_ID *bank);
+
+grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2_protector_parse_tpm_handle (const char *value, TPM_HANDLE *handle);
+
+#endif /* ! GRUB_TPM2_INTERNAL_ARGS_HEADER */
diff --git a/include/grub/tpm2/tpm2key.h b/include/grub/tpm2/tpm2key.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..df46203e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/grub/tpm2/tpm2key.h
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+/*
+ *  GRUB  --  GRand Unified Bootloader
+ *  Copyright (C) 2023 SUSE LLC
+ *
+ *  GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *  the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ *  (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *  GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ *  GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ *  along with GRUB.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#ifndef GRUB_TPM2_TPM2KEY_HEADER
+#define GRUB_TPM2_TPM2KEY_HEADER 1
+
+#include <grub/types.h>
+#include <grub/libtasn1.h>
+
+/*
+ * TPMPolicy ::= SEQUENCE {
+ *   CommandCode   [0] EXPLICIT INTEGER,
+ *   CommandPolicy [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
+ * }
+ */
+struct tpm2key_policy {
+  struct tpm2key_policy *next;
+  struct tpm2key_policy **prev;
+  grub_uint32_t cmd_code;
+  void *cmd_policy;
+  grub_uint16_t cmd_policy_len;
+};
+typedef struct tpm2key_policy *tpm2key_policy_t;
+
+/*
+ * TPMAuthPolicy ::= SEQUENCE {
+ *   Name    [0] EXPLICIT UTF8String OPTIONAL,
+ *   Policy  [1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMPolicy
+ * }
+ *
+ * Name is not a necessary part to unseal the key. Ignore it.
+ */
+struct tpm2key_authpolicy {
+  struct tpm2key_authpolicy *next;
+  struct tpm2key_authpolicy **prev;
+  /* char *name; */
+  tpm2key_policy_t policy_seq;
+};
+typedef struct tpm2key_authpolicy *tpm2key_authpolicy_t;
+
+grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2key_start_parsing (asn1_node *parsed_tpm2key, void *data, grub_size_t size);
+
+void
+grub_tpm2key_end_parsing (asn1_node tpm2key);
+
+grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2key_get_parent (asn1_node tpm2key, grub_uint32_t *parent);
+
+grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2key_get_pubkey (asn1_node tpm2key, void **data, grub_size_t *size);
+
+grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2key_get_privkey (asn1_node tpm2key, void **data, grub_size_t *size);
+
+grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2key_get_policy_seq (asn1_node tpm2key, tpm2key_policy_t *policy_seq);
+
+void
+grub_tpm2key_free_policy_seq (tpm2key_policy_t policy_seq);
+
+grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2key_get_authpolicy_seq (asn1_node tpm2key, tpm2key_authpolicy_t *authpol_seq);
+
+void
+grub_tpm2key_free_authpolicy_seq (tpm2key_authpolicy_t authpol_seq);
+
+#endif /* GRUB_TPM2_TPM2KEY_HEADER */
-- 
2.35.3

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File 0003-protectors-Add-TPM2-Key-Protector.patch of Package grub2 (Revision 1e9a2f63f2bec099df80ddefb0856cde)

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