File 0023_CVE-2022-3550_xkb_11beef0b7f1ed290348e45618e5fa0d2bffcb72e.patch of Package xorg-x11-server

From 11beef0b7f1ed290348e45618e5fa0d2bffcb72e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 12:06:20 +1000
Subject: xkb: proof GetCountedString against request length attacks

GetCountedString did a check for the whole string to be within the
request buffer but not for the initial 2 bytes that contain the length
field. A swapped client could send a malformed request to trigger a
swaps() on those bytes, writing into random memory.

Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
 xkb/xkb.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

--- ./xkb/xkb.c	2023-01-21 19:33:24.945085766 -0800
+++ ./xkb/xkb.c.fixed	2023-01-21 19:32:40.488615366 -0800
@@ -5104,6 +5104,11 @@
     CARD16 len;
 
     wire = *wire_inout;
+
+    if (client->req_len <
+        bytes_to_int32(wire + 2 - (char *) client->requestBuffer))
+        return BadValue;
+
     len = *(CARD16 *) wire;
     if (client->swapped) {
         swaps(&len);