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openSUSE:11.4:Update
php5.438
php-5.3.5-CVE-2011-2483-suhosin.patch
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File php-5.3.5-CVE-2011-2483-suhosin.patch of Package php5.438
http://news.php.net/php.internals/54000 http://news.php.net/php.internals/54098 Index: ext/suhosin/crypt_blowfish.c =================================================================== --- ext/suhosin/crypt_blowfish.c.orig +++ ext/suhosin/crypt_blowfish.c @@ -40,12 +40,8 @@ #define __set_errno(val) errno = (val) #endif -#undef __CONST -#ifdef __GNUC__ -#define __CONST __const -#else -#define __CONST -#endif +/* Just to make sure the prototypes match the actual definitions */ +#include "crypt_blowfish.h" #ifdef __i386__ #define BF_ASM 0 @@ -59,6 +55,7 @@ #endif typedef unsigned int BF_word; +typedef signed int BF_word_signed; /* Number of Blowfish rounds, this is also hardcoded into a few places */ #define BF_N 16 @@ -366,35 +363,21 @@ static unsigned char BF_atoi64[0x60] = { 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64 }; -/* - * This may be optimized out if built with function inlining and no BF_ASM. - */ -static void clean(void *data, int size) -{ -#if BF_ASM - extern void _BF_clean(void *data); -#endif - memset(data, 0, size); -#if BF_ASM - _BF_clean(data); -#endif -} - #define BF_safe_atoi64(dst, src) \ { \ tmp = (unsigned char)(src); \ - if (tmp == '$') break; \ + if (tmp == '$') break; /* PHP hack */ \ if ((unsigned int)(tmp -= 0x20) >= 0x60) return -1; \ tmp = BF_atoi64[tmp]; \ if (tmp > 63) return -1; \ (dst) = tmp; \ } -static int BF_decode(BF_word *dst, __CONST char *src, int size) +static int BF_decode(BF_word *dst, const char *src, int size) { unsigned char *dptr = (unsigned char *)dst; unsigned char *end = dptr + size; - unsigned char *sptr = (unsigned char *)src; + const unsigned char *sptr = (const unsigned char *)src; unsigned int tmp, c1, c2, c3, c4; do { @@ -411,16 +394,16 @@ static int BF_decode(BF_word *dst, __CON *dptr++ = ((c3 & 0x03) << 6) | c4; } while (dptr < end); - while (dptr < end) + while (dptr < end) /* PHP hack */ *dptr++ = 0; return 0; } -static void BF_encode(char *dst, __CONST BF_word *src, int size) +static void BF_encode(char *dst, const BF_word *src, int size) { - unsigned char *sptr = (unsigned char *)src; - unsigned char *end = sptr + size; + const unsigned char *sptr = (const unsigned char *)src; + const unsigned char *end = sptr + size; unsigned char *dptr = (unsigned char *)dst; unsigned int c1, c2; @@ -551,32 +534,118 @@ static void BF_swap(BF_word *x, int coun } while (ptr < &data.ctx.S[3][0xFF]); #endif -static void BF_set_key(__CONST char *key, BF_key expanded, BF_key initial) +static void BF_set_key(const char *key, BF_key expanded, BF_key initial, + unsigned char flags) { - __CONST char *ptr = key; - int i, j; - BF_word tmp; + const char *ptr = key; + unsigned int bug, i, j; + BF_word safety, sign, diff, tmp[2]; + +/* + * There was a sign extension bug in older revisions of this function. While + * we would have liked to simply fix the bug and move on, we have to provide + * a backwards compatibility feature (essentially the bug) for some systems an + * a safety measure for some others. The latter is needed because for certain + * multiple inputs to the buggy algorithm there exist easily found inputs to + * the correct algorithm that produce the same hash. Thus, we optionally + * deviate from the correct algorithm just enough to avoid such collisions. + * While the bug itself affected the majority of passwords containing + * characters with the 8th bit set (although only a percentage of those in a + * collision-producing way), the anti-collision safety measure affects + * only a subset of passwords containing the '\xff' character (not even all of + * those passwords, just some of them). This character is not found in valid + * UTF-8 sequences and is rarely used in popular 8-bit character encodings. + * Thus, the safety measure is unlikely to cause much annoyance, and is a + * reasonable tradeoff to use when authenticating against existing hashes that + * are not reliably known to have been computed with the correct algorithm. + * + * We use an approach that tries to minimize side-channel leaks of password + * information - that is, we mostly use fixed-cost bitwise operations instead + * of branches or table lookups. (One conditional branch based on password + * length remains. It is not part of the bug aftermath, though, and is + * difficult and possibly unreasonable to avoid given the use of C strings by + * the caller, which results in similar timing leaks anyway.) + * + * For actual implementation, we set an array index in the variable "bug" + * (0 means no bug, 1 means sign extension bug emulation) and a flag in the + * variable "safety" (bit 16 is set when the safety measure is requested). + * Valid combinations of settings are: + * + * Prefix "$2a$": bug = 0, safety = 0x10000 + * Prefix "$2x$": bug = 1, safety = 0 + * Prefix "$2y$": bug = 0, safety = 0 + */ + bug = (unsigned int)flags & 1; + safety = ((BF_word)flags & 2) << 15; + + sign = diff = 0; for (i = 0; i < BF_N + 2; i++) { - tmp = 0; + tmp[0] = tmp[1] = 0; for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) { - tmp <<= 8; - tmp |= *ptr; + tmp[0] <<= 8; + tmp[0] |= (unsigned char)*ptr; /* correct */ + tmp[1] <<= 8; + tmp[1] |= (BF_word_signed)(signed char)*ptr; /* bug */ +/* + * Sign extension in the first char has no effect - nothing to overwrite yet, + * and those extra 24 bits will be fully shifted out of the 32-bit word. For + * chars 2, 3, 4 in each four-char block, we set bit 7 of "sign" if sign + * extension in tmp[1] occurs. Once this flag is set, it remains set. + */ + if (j) + sign |= tmp[1] & 0x80; + if (!*ptr) + ptr = key; + else + ptr++; - if (!*ptr) ptr = key; else ptr++; } + diff |= tmp[0] ^ tmp[1]; /* Non-zero on any differences */ - expanded[i] = tmp; - initial[i] = BF_init_state.P[i] ^ tmp; + expanded[i] = tmp[bug]; + initial[i] = BF_init_state.P[i] ^ tmp[bug]; } + +/* + * At this point, "diff" is zero iff the correct and buggy algorithms produced + * exactly the same result. If so and if "sign" is non-zero, which indicates + * that there was a non-benign sign extension, this means that we have a + * collision between the correctly computed hash for this password and a set of + * passwords that could be supplied to the buggy algorithm. Our safety measure + * is meant to protect from such many-buggy to one-correct collisions, by + * deviating from the correct algorithm in such cases. Let's check for this. + */ + diff |= diff >> 16; /* still zero iff exact match */ + diff &= 0xffff; /* ditto */ + diff += 0xffff; /* bit 16 set iff "diff" was non-zero (on non-match) */ + sign <<= 9; /* move the non-benign sign extension flag to bit 16 */ + sign &= ~diff & safety; /* action needed? */ + +/* + * If we have determined that we need to deviate from the correct algorithm, + * flip bit 16 in initial expanded key. (The choice of 16 is arbitrary, but + * let's stick to it now. It came out of the approach we used above, and it's + * not any worse than any other choice we could make.) + * + * It is crucial that we don't do the same to the expanded key used in the main + * Eksblowfish loop. By doing it to only one of these two, we deviate from a + * state that could be directly specified by a password to the buggy algorithm + * (and to the fully correct one as well, but that's a side-effect). + */ + initial[0] ^= sign; } -char *suhosin_crypt_blowfish_rn(__CONST char *key, __CONST char *setting, - char *output, int size) +char *BF_crypt(const char *key, const char *setting, + char *output, int size, + BF_word min) { #if BF_ASM extern void _BF_body_r(BF_ctx *ctx); #endif + static const unsigned char flags_by_subtype[26] = + {2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 4, 0}; struct { BF_ctx ctx; BF_key expanded_key; @@ -598,7 +667,8 @@ char *suhosin_crypt_blowfish_rn(__CONST if (setting[0] != '$' || setting[1] != '2' || - setting[2] != 'a' || + setting[2] < 'a' || setting[2] > 'z' || + !flags_by_subtype[(unsigned int)(unsigned char)setting[2] - 'a'] || setting[3] != '$' || setting[4] < '0' || setting[4] > '3' || setting[5] < '0' || setting[5] > '9' || @@ -608,15 +678,14 @@ char *suhosin_crypt_blowfish_rn(__CONST } count = (BF_word)1 << ((setting[4] - '0') * 10 + (setting[5] - '0')); - if (count < 16 || BF_decode(data.binary.salt, &setting[7], 16)) { - clean(data.binary.salt, sizeof(data.binary.salt)); + if (count < min || BF_decode(data.binary.salt, &setting[7], 16)) { __set_errno(EINVAL); return NULL; } - BF_swap(data.binary.salt, 4); - BF_set_key(key, data.expanded_key, data.ctx.P); + BF_set_key(key, data.expanded_key, data.ctx.P, + flags_by_subtype[(unsigned int)(unsigned char)setting[2] - 'a']); memcpy(data.ctx.S, BF_init_state.S, sizeof(data.ctx.S)); @@ -646,51 +715,33 @@ char *suhosin_crypt_blowfish_rn(__CONST } while (ptr < &data.ctx.S[3][0xFF]); do { - data.ctx.P[0] ^= data.expanded_key[0]; - data.ctx.P[1] ^= data.expanded_key[1]; - data.ctx.P[2] ^= data.expanded_key[2]; - data.ctx.P[3] ^= data.expanded_key[3]; - data.ctx.P[4] ^= data.expanded_key[4]; - data.ctx.P[5] ^= data.expanded_key[5]; - data.ctx.P[6] ^= data.expanded_key[6]; - data.ctx.P[7] ^= data.expanded_key[7]; - data.ctx.P[8] ^= data.expanded_key[8]; - data.ctx.P[9] ^= data.expanded_key[9]; - data.ctx.P[10] ^= data.expanded_key[10]; - data.ctx.P[11] ^= data.expanded_key[11]; - data.ctx.P[12] ^= data.expanded_key[12]; - data.ctx.P[13] ^= data.expanded_key[13]; - data.ctx.P[14] ^= data.expanded_key[14]; - data.ctx.P[15] ^= data.expanded_key[15]; - data.ctx.P[16] ^= data.expanded_key[16]; - data.ctx.P[17] ^= data.expanded_key[17]; - - BF_body(); - - tmp1 = data.binary.salt[0]; - tmp2 = data.binary.salt[1]; - tmp3 = data.binary.salt[2]; - tmp4 = data.binary.salt[3]; - data.ctx.P[0] ^= tmp1; - data.ctx.P[1] ^= tmp2; - data.ctx.P[2] ^= tmp3; - data.ctx.P[3] ^= tmp4; - data.ctx.P[4] ^= tmp1; - data.ctx.P[5] ^= tmp2; - data.ctx.P[6] ^= tmp3; - data.ctx.P[7] ^= tmp4; - data.ctx.P[8] ^= tmp1; - data.ctx.P[9] ^= tmp2; - data.ctx.P[10] ^= tmp3; - data.ctx.P[11] ^= tmp4; - data.ctx.P[12] ^= tmp1; - data.ctx.P[13] ^= tmp2; - data.ctx.P[14] ^= tmp3; - data.ctx.P[15] ^= tmp4; - data.ctx.P[16] ^= tmp1; - data.ctx.P[17] ^= tmp2; + int done; + + for (i = 0; i < BF_N + 2; i += 2) { + data.ctx.P[i] ^= data.expanded_key[i]; + data.ctx.P[i + 1] ^= data.expanded_key[i + 1]; + } - BF_body(); + done = 0; + do { + BF_body(); + if (done) + break; + done = 1; + + tmp1 = data.binary.salt[0]; + tmp2 = data.binary.salt[1]; + tmp3 = data.binary.salt[2]; + tmp4 = data.binary.salt[3]; + for (i = 0; i < BF_N; i += 4) { + data.ctx.P[i] ^= tmp1; + data.ctx.P[i + 1] ^= tmp2; + data.ctx.P[i + 2] ^= tmp3; + data.ctx.P[i + 3] ^= tmp4; + } + data.ctx.P[16] ^= tmp1; + data.ctx.P[17] ^= tmp2; + } while (1); } while (--count); for (i = 0; i < 6; i += 2) { @@ -716,19 +767,117 @@ char *suhosin_crypt_blowfish_rn(__CONST BF_encode(&output[7 + 22], data.binary.output, 23); output[7 + 22 + 31] = '\0'; -/* Overwrite the most obvious sensitive data we have on the stack. Note - * that this does not guarantee there's no sensitive data left on the - * stack and/or in registers; I'm not aware of portable code that does. */ clean(&data, sizeof(data)); return output; } -char *suhosin_crypt_gensalt_blowfish_rn(unsigned long count, - __CONST char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size) +static int _crypt_output_magic(const char *setting, char *output, int size) +{ + if (size < 3) + return -1; + + output[0] = '*'; + output[1] = '0'; + output[2] = '\0'; + + if (setting[0] == '*' && setting[1] == '0') + output[1] = '1'; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Please preserve the runtime self-test. It serves two purposes at once: + * + * 1. We really can't afford the risk of producing incompatible hashes e.g. + * when there's something like gcc bug 26587 again, whereas an application or + * library integrating this code might not also integrate our external tests or + * it might not run them after every build. Even if it does, the miscompile + * might only occur on the production build, but not on a testing build (such + * as because of different optimization settings). It is painful to recover + * from incorrectly-computed hashes - merely fixing whatever broke is not + * enough. Thus, a proactive measure like this self-test is needed. + * + * 2. We don't want to leave sensitive data from our actual password hash + * computation on the stack or in registers. Previous revisions of the code + * would do explicit cleanups, but simply running the self-test after hash + * computation is more reliable. + * + * The performance cost of this quick self-test is around 0.6% at the "$2a$08" + * setting. + */ + +char *suhosin_crypt_blowfish_rn(const char *key, const char *setting, + char *output, int size) +{ + const char *test_key = "8b \xd0\xc1\xd2\xcf\xcc\xd8"; + const char *test_setting = "$2a$00$abcdefghijklmnopqrstuu"; + static const char * const test_hash[2] = + {"VUrPmXD6q/nVSSp7pNDhCR9071IfIRe\0\x55", /* $2x$ */ + "i1D709vfamulimlGcq0qq3UvuUasvEa\0\x55"}; /* $2a$, $2y$ */ + char *retval; + const char *p; + int save_errno, ok; + struct { + char s[7 + 22 + 1]; + char o[7 + 22 + 31 + 1 + 1 + 1]; + } buf; + +/* Hash the supplied password */ + _crypt_output_magic(setting, output, size); + retval = BF_crypt(key, setting, output, size, 16); + save_errno = errno; + +/* + * Do a quick self-test. It is important that we make both calls to BF_crypt() + * from the same scope such that they likely use the same stack locations, + * which makes the second call overwrite the first call's sensitive data on the + * stack and makes it more likely that any alignment related issues would be + * detected by the self-test. + */ + memcpy(buf.s, test_setting, sizeof(buf.s)); + if (retval) + buf.s[2] = setting[2]; + memset(buf.o, 0x55, sizeof(buf.o)); + buf.o[sizeof(buf.o) - 1] = 0; + p = BF_crypt(test_key, buf.s, buf.o, sizeof(buf.o) - (1 + 1), 1); + + ok = (p == buf.o && + !memcmp(p, buf.s, 7 + 22) && + !memcmp(p + (7 + 22), + test_hash[(unsigned int)(unsigned char)buf.s[2] & 1], + 31 + 1 + 1 + 1)); + + { + const char *k = "\xff\xa3" "34" "\xff\xff\xff\xa3" "345"; + BF_key ae, ai, ye, yi; + BF_set_key(k, ae, ai, 2); /* $2a$ */ + BF_set_key(k, ye, yi, 4); /* $2y$ */ + ai[0] ^= 0x10000; /* undo the safety (for comparison) */ + ok = ok && ai[0] == 0xdb9c59bc && ye[17] == 0x33343500 && + !memcmp(ae, ye, sizeof(ae)) && + !memcmp(ai, yi, sizeof(ai)); + } + + __set_errno(save_errno); + if (ok) + return retval; + +/* Should not happen */ + _crypt_output_magic(setting, output, size); + __set_errno(EINVAL); /* pretend we don't support this hash type */ + return NULL; +} + +#if 0 +char *_crypt_gensalt_blowfish_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count, + const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size) { if (size < 16 || output_size < 7 + 22 + 1 || - (count && (count < 4 || count > 31))) { + (count && (count < 4 || count > 31)) || + prefix[0] != '$' || prefix[1] != '2' || + (prefix[2] != 'a' && prefix[2] != 'y')) { if (output_size > 0) output[0] = '\0'; __set_errno((output_size < 7 + 22 + 1) ? ERANGE : EINVAL); return NULL; @@ -738,14 +887,15 @@ char *suhosin_crypt_gensalt_blowfish_rn( output[0] = '$'; output[1] = '2'; - output[2] = 'a'; + output[2] = prefix[2]; output[3] = '$'; output[4] = '0' + count / 10; output[5] = '0' + count % 10; output[6] = '$'; - BF_encode(&output[7], (BF_word *)input, 16); + BF_encode(&output[7], (const BF_word *)input, 16); output[7 + 22] = '\0'; return output; } +#endif Index: ext/suhosin/crypt_blowfish.h =================================================================== --- /dev/null +++ ext/suhosin/crypt_blowfish.h @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/* $Id$ */ +/* + * Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 2000-2011. + * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public + * domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software + * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is + * Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the + * general public under the following terms: + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted. + * + * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied. + * + * See crypt_blowfish.c for more information. + */ + +#ifndef _CRYPT_BLOWFISH_H +#define _CRYPT_BLOWFISH_H + +#if 0 +extern int _crypt_output_magic(const char *setting, char *output, int size); +#endif +extern char *suhosin_crypt_blowfish_rn(const char *key, const char *setting, + char *output, int size); +#if 0 +extern char *_crypt_gensalt_blowfish_rn(const char *prefix, + unsigned long count, + const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size); +#endif + +#endif Index: ext/suhosin/crypt.c =================================================================== --- ext/suhosin/crypt.c.orig +++ ext/suhosin/crypt.c @@ -66,8 +66,7 @@ static MUTEX_T suhosin_crypt_mutex; static int CRYPT_MD5 = 0; -char *suhosin_crypt_blowfish_rn(char *key, char *setting, char *output, int size); -char *suhosin_crypt_gensalt_blowfish_rn(unsigned long count, char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size); +#include "crypt_blowfish.h" static unsigned char itoa64[] = "./0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"; @@ -116,7 +115,7 @@ static PHP_FUNCTION(suhosin_crypt) if (salt[0] == '$' && salt[1] == '2' && - salt[2] == 'a' && + salt[2] >= 'a' && salt[2] <= 'z' && salt[3] == '$' && salt[4] >= '0' && salt[4] <= '3' && salt[5] >= '0' && salt[5] <= '9' && Index: ext/suhosin/tests/strings/crypt_blowfish.phpt =================================================================== --- /dev/null +++ ext/suhosin/tests/strings/crypt_blowfish.phpt @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +--TEST-- +Official blowfish tests (http://cvsweb.openwall.com/cgi/cvsweb.cgi/Owl/packages/glibc/crypt_blowfish/wrapper.c) +--SKIPIF-- +<?php +if (!function_exists('crypt') || !defined("CRYPT_BLOWFISH")) { + die("SKIP crypt()-blowfish is not available"); +} +?> +--FILE-- +<?php + +$tests =array( + array('$2a$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC.E5YPO9kmyuRGyh0XouQYb4YMJKvyOeW', 'U*U'), + array('$2a$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC.VGOzA784oUp/Z0DY336zx7pLYAy0lwK', 'U*U*'), + array('$2a$05$XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXOAcXxm9kjPGEMsLznoKqmqw7tc8WCx4a', 'U*U*U'), + array('$2a$05$abcdefghijklmnopqrstuu5s2v8.iXieOjg/.AySBTTZIIVFJeBui', '0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789chars after 72 are ignored'), + array('$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.CE5elHaaO4EbggVDjb8P19RukzXSM3e', "\xa3"), + array('$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.CE5elHaaO4EbggVDjb8P19RukzXSM3e', "\xff\xff\xa3"), + array('$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.CE5elHaaO4EbggVDjb8P19RukzXSM3e', "\xff\xff\xa3"), + array('$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.nqd1wy.pTMdcvrRWxyiGL2eMz.2a85.', "\xff\xff\xa3"), + array('$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.Sa7shbm4.OzKpvFnX1pQLmQW96oUlCq', "\xa3"), + array('$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.Sa7shbm4.OzKpvFnX1pQLmQW96oUlCq', "\xa3"), + array('$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.o./n25XVfn6oAPaUvHe.Csk4zRfsYPi', "1\xa3345"), + array('$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.o./n25XVfn6oAPaUvHe.Csk4zRfsYPi', "\xff\xa3345"), + array('$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.o./n25XVfn6oAPaUvHe.Csk4zRfsYPi', "\xff\xa334\xff\xff\xff\xa3345"), + array('$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.o./n25XVfn6oAPaUvHe.Csk4zRfsYPi', "\xff\xa334\xff\xff\xff\xa3345"), + array('$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.ZC1JEJ8Z4gPfpe1JOr/oyPXTWl9EFd.', "\xff\xa334\xff\xff\xff\xa3345"), + array('$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.nRht2l/HRhr6zmCp9vYUvvsqynflf9e', "\xff\xa3345"), + array('$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.nRht2l/HRhr6zmCp9vYUvvsqynflf9e', "\xff\xa3345"), + array('$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.6IflQkJytoRVc1yuaNtHfiuq.FRlSIS', "\xa3ab"), + array('$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.6IflQkJytoRVc1yuaNtHfiuq.FRlSIS', "\xa3ab"), + array('$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.6IflQkJytoRVc1yuaNtHfiuq.FRlSIS', "\xa3ab"), + array('$2x$05$6bNw2HLQYeqHYyBfLMsv/OiwqTymGIGzFsA4hOTWebfehXHNprcAS', "\xd1\x91"), + array('$2x$05$6bNw2HLQYeqHYyBfLMsv/O9LIGgn8OMzuDoHfof8AQimSGfcSWxnS', "\xd0\xc1\xd2\xcf\xcc\xd8"), + array('$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.swQOIzjOiJ9GHEPuhEkvqrUyvWhEMx6', "\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaachars after 72 are ignored as usual"), + array('$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.R9xrDjiycxMbQE2bp.vgqlYpW5wx2yy', "\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55"), + array('$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.9tQZzcJfm3uj2NvJ/n5xkhpqLrMpWCe', "\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff"), + array('$2a$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC.7uG0VCzI2bS7j6ymqJi9CdcdxiRTWNy', ''), + +); +$i=0; +foreach($tests as $test) { + if(crypt($test[1], $test[0]) == $test[0]) { + echo "$i. OK\n"; + } else { + echo "$i. Not OK: $test[0] ".crypt($test[1], $test[0])."\n"; + } + $i++; +} + +?> +--EXPECT-- +0. OK +1. OK +2. OK +3. OK +4. OK +5. OK +6. OK +7. OK +8. OK +9. OK +10. OK +11. OK +12. OK +13. OK +14. OK +15. OK +16. OK +17. OK +18. OK +19. OK +20. OK +21. OK +22. OK +23. OK +24. OK +25. OK
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