File puppet-2.6-CVE-2011-3848.patch of Package puppet.import5746

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File puppet-2.6-CVE-2011-3848.patch of Package puppet.import5746

From 0a92a70a22b7e85ef60ed9b4d4070433b5ec3220 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Pittman <daniel@puppetlabs.com>
Date: Sat, 24 Sep 2011 12:44:20 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Resist directory traversal attacks through indirections.

In various versions of Puppet it was possible to cause a directory traversal
attack through the SSLFile indirection base class.  This was variously
triggered through the user-supplied key, or the Subject of the certificate, in
the code.

Now, we detect bad patterns down in the base class for our indirections, and
fail hard on them.  This reduces the attack surface with as little disruption
to the overall codebase as possible, making it suitable to deploy as part of
older, stable versions of Puppet.

In the long term we will also address this higher up the stack, to prevent
these problems from reoccurring, but for now this will suffice.

Huge thanks to Kristian Erik Hermansen <kristian.hermansen@gmail.com> for the
responsible disclosure, and useful analysis, around this defect.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Pittman <daniel@puppetlabs.com>
---
 lib/puppet/indirector.rb              |    7 +++++++
 lib/puppet/indirector/ssl_file.rb     |    6 +++++-
 lib/puppet/indirector/yaml.rb         |    5 +++++
 spec/unit/indirector/ssl_file_spec.rb |   19 +++++++++++++++++++
 spec/unit/indirector/yaml_spec.rb     |   14 ++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/puppet/indirector.rb b/lib/puppet/indirector.rb
index e6472f4..fd6bf30 100644
--- a/lib/puppet/indirector.rb
+++ b/lib/puppet/indirector.rb
@@ -68,4 +68,11 @@ module Puppet::Indirector
       self.class.indirection.save key, self
     end
   end
+
+
+  # Helper definition for indirections that handle filenames.
+  BadNameRegexp = Regexp.union(/^\.\./,
+                               %r{[\\/]},
+                               "\0",
+                               /(?i)^[a-z]:/)
 end
diff --git a/lib/puppet/indirector/ssl_file.rb b/lib/puppet/indirector/ssl_file.rb
index 531180f..4510499 100644
--- a/lib/puppet/indirector/ssl_file.rb
+++ b/lib/puppet/indirector/ssl_file.rb
@@ -52,8 +52,12 @@ class Puppet::Indirector::SslFile < Puppet::Indirector::Terminus
     (collection_directory || file_location) or raise Puppet::DevError, "No file or directory setting provided; terminus #{self.class.name} cannot function"
   end
 
-  # Use a setting to determine our path.
   def path(name)
+    if name =~ Puppet::Indirector::BadNameRegexp then
+      Puppet.crit("directory traversal detected in #{self.class}: #{name.inspect}")
+      raise ArgumentError, "invalid key"
+    end
+
     if ca?(name) and ca_location
       ca_location
     elsif collection_directory
diff --git a/lib/puppet/indirector/yaml.rb b/lib/puppet/indirector/yaml.rb
index 23997e9..4c488da 100644
--- a/lib/puppet/indirector/yaml.rb
+++ b/lib/puppet/indirector/yaml.rb
@@ -43,6 +43,11 @@ class Puppet::Indirector::Yaml < Puppet::Indirector::Terminus
 
   # Return the path to a given node's file.
   def path(name,ext='.yaml')
+    if name =~ Puppet::Indirector::BadNameRegexp then
+      Puppet.crit("directory traversal detected in #{self.class}: #{name.inspect}")
+      raise ArgumentError, "invalid key"
+    end
+
     base = Puppet.run_mode.master? ? Puppet[:yamldir] : Puppet[:clientyamldir]
     File.join(base, self.class.indirection_name.to_s, name.to_s + ext)
   end
diff --git a/spec/unit/indirector/ssl_file_spec.rb b/spec/unit/indirector/ssl_file_spec.rb
index 37098a7..4760bd7 100755
--- a/spec/unit/indirector/ssl_file_spec.rb
+++ b/spec/unit/indirector/ssl_file_spec.rb
@@ -87,6 +87,25 @@ describe Puppet::Indirector::SslFile do
       it "should set them in the setting directory, with the certificate name plus '.pem', if a directory setting is available" do
         @searcher.path(@cert.name).should == @certpath
       end
+
+      ['../foo', '..\\foo', './../foo', '.\\..\\foo',
+       '/foo', '//foo', '\\foo', '\\\\goo',
+       "test\0/../bar", "test\0\\..\\bar",
+       "..\\/bar", "/tmp/bar", "/tmp\\bar", "tmp\\bar",
+       " / bar", " /../ bar", " \\..\\ bar",
+       "c:\\foo", "c:/foo", "\\\\?\\UNC\\bar", "\\\\foo\\bar",
+       "\\\\?\\c:\\foo", "//?/UNC/bar", "//foo/bar",
+       "//?/c:/foo",
+      ].each do |input|
+        it "should resist directory traversal attacks (#{input.inspect})" do
+          expect { @searcher.path(input) }.to raise_error
+        end
+      end
+
+      # REVISIT: Should probably test MS-DOS reserved names here, too, since
+      # they would represent a vulnerability on a Win32 system, should we ever
+      # support that path.  Don't forget that 'CON.foo' == 'CON'
+      # --daniel 2011-09-24
     end
 
     describe "when finding certificates on disk" do
diff --git a/spec/unit/indirector/yaml_spec.rb b/spec/unit/indirector/yaml_spec.rb
index 86c13c5..c8fadf7 100755
--- a/spec/unit/indirector/yaml_spec.rb
+++ b/spec/unit/indirector/yaml_spec.rb
@@ -63,6 +63,20 @@ describe Puppet::Indirector::Yaml, " when choosing file location" do
     it "should use the object's name to determine the file name" do
       @store.path(:me).should =~ %r{me.yaml$}
     end
+
+    ['../foo', '..\\foo', './../foo', '.\\..\\foo',
+     '/foo', '//foo', '\\foo', '\\\\goo',
+     "test\0/../bar", "test\0\\..\\bar",
+     "..\\/bar", "/tmp/bar", "/tmp\\bar", "tmp\\bar",
+     " / bar", " /../ bar", " \\..\\ bar",
+     "c:\\foo", "c:/foo", "\\\\?\\UNC\\bar", "\\\\foo\\bar",
+     "\\\\?\\c:\\foo", "//?/UNC/bar", "//foo/bar",
+     "//?/c:/foo",
+    ].each do |input|
+      it "should resist directory traversal attacks (#{input.inspect})" do
+        expect { @store.path(input) }.to raise_error
+      end
+    end
   end
 
   describe Puppet::Indirector::Yaml, " when storing objects as YAML" do
-- 
1.7.4.4

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File puppet-2.6-CVE-2011-3848.patch of Package puppet.import5746

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