File shim-fallback-workaround-masked-ami-variables.patch of Package shim

From 38744a099187401f2f5e382c2ce8869e1e9b22a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lans Zhang <jia.zhang@windriver.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Aug 2017 13:42:20 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] fallback: work around the issue of boot option creation with
 AMI BIOS

AMI BIOS (e.g, Intel NUC5i3MYHE) may automatically hide and patch BootXXXX
variables with ami_masked_device_path_guid.

Initially, the normal boot option created by fallback looks like this:
00000000  01 00 00 00 5e 00 42 00  6f 00 6f 00 74 00 6c 00  |....^.B.o.o.t.l.|
00000010  6f 00 61 00 64 00 65 00  72 00 20 00 54 00 65 00  |o.a.d.e.r. .T.e.|
00000020  73 00 74 00 20 00 28 00  36 00 34 00 2d 00 62 00  |s.t. .(.6.4.-.b.|
00000030  69 00 74 00 29 00 00 00  04 01 2a 00 01 00 00 00  |i.t.).....*.....|
00000040  00 08 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 08 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000050  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000060  01 01 04 04 30 00 5c 00  45 00 46 00 49 00 5c 00  |....0.\.E.F.I.\.|
00000070  42 00 4f 00 4f 00 54 00  5c 00 74 00 65 00 73 00  |B.O.O.T.\.t.e.s.|
00000080  74 00 78 00 36 00 34 00  2e 00 65 00 66 00 69 00  |t.x.6.4...e.f.i.|
00000090  00 00 7f ff 04 00                                 |......|
00000096

after reboot, fallback has to create a new one due to the previous boot
option is hidden and masked by AMI BIOS:
00000000  09 00 00 00 76 00 42 00  6f 00 6f 00 74 00 6c 00  |....v.B.o.o.t.l.|
00000010  6f 00 61 00 64 00 65 00  72 00 20 00 54 00 65 00  |o.a.d.e.r. .T.e.|
00000020  73 00 74 00 20 00 28 00  36 00 34 00 2d 00 62 00  |s.t. .(.6.4.-.b.|
00000030  69 00 74 00 29 00 00 00  01 04 14 00 e7 75 e2 99  |i.t.)........u..|
00000040  a0 75 37 4b a2 e6 c5 38  5e 6c 00 cb 7f ff 04 00  |.u7K...8^l......|
00000050  04 01 2a 00 01 00 00 00  00 08 00 00 00 00 00 00  |..*.............|
00000060  00 00 08 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000070  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  01 01 04 04 30 00 5c 00  |............0.\.|
00000080  45 00 46 00 49 00 5c 00  42 00 4f 00 4f 00 54 00  |E.F.I.\.B.O.O.T.|
00000090  5c 00 74 00 65 00 73 00  74 00 78 00 36 00 34 00  |\.t.e.s.t.x.6.4.|
000000a0  2e 00 65 00 66 00 69 00  00 00 7f ff 04 00        |..e.f.i.......|
000000ae

And after several reboot, fallback will have to create more boot options
because AMI BIOS corrupts the previous ones.

We can get the valid device path if just skipping the masked device path and
its next end path.

Signed-off-by: Lans Zhang <jia.zhang@windriver.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0cc030c2f2fba53b74fb09466a07b8e6297a52d3)
---
 fallback.c | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 109 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fallback.c b/fallback.c
index 5602a88..8c0369f 100644
--- a/fallback.c
+++ b/fallback.c
@@ -286,6 +286,105 @@ add_boot_option(EFI_DEVICE_PATH *hddp, EFI_DEVICE_PATH *fulldp,
 	return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
 }
 
+/*
+ * AMI BIOS (e.g, Intel NUC5i3MYHE) may automatically hide and patch BootXXXX
+ * variables with ami_masked_device_path_guid. We can get the valid device path
+ * if just skipping it and its next end path.
+ */
+
+static EFI_GUID ami_masked_device_path_guid = {
+	0x99e275e7, 0x75a0, 0x4b37,
+	{ 0xa2, 0xe6, 0xc5, 0x38, 0x5e, 0x6c, 0x0, 0xcb }
+};
+
+static unsigned int
+calc_masked_boot_option_size(unsigned int size)
+{
+	return size + sizeof(EFI_DEVICE_PATH) +
+	       sizeof(ami_masked_device_path_guid) + sizeof(EFI_DEVICE_PATH);
+}
+
+static int
+check_masked_boot_option(CHAR8 *candidate, unsigned int candidate_size,
+			 CHAR8 *data, unsigned int data_size)
+{
+	/*
+	 * The patched BootXXXX variables contain a hardware device path and
+	 * an end path, preceding the real device path.
+	 */
+	if (calc_masked_boot_option_size(data_size) != candidate_size)
+		return 1;
+
+	CHAR8 *cursor = candidate;
+
+	/* Check whether the BootXXXX is patched */
+	cursor += sizeof(UINT32) + sizeof(UINT16);
+	cursor += StrSize((CHAR16 *)cursor);
+
+	unsigned int min_valid_size = cursor - candidate + sizeof(EFI_DEVICE_PATH);
+
+	if (candidate_size <= min_valid_size)
+		return 1;
+
+	EFI_DEVICE_PATH *dp = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH *)cursor;
+	unsigned int node_size = DevicePathNodeLength(dp) - sizeof(EFI_DEVICE_PATH);
+
+	min_valid_size += node_size;
+	if (candidate_size <= min_valid_size ||
+	    DevicePathType(dp) != HARDWARE_DEVICE_PATH ||
+	    DevicePathSubType(dp) != HW_VENDOR_DP ||
+	    node_size != sizeof(ami_masked_device_path_guid) ||
+	    CompareGuid((EFI_GUID *)(cursor + sizeof(EFI_DEVICE_PATH)),
+		        &ami_masked_device_path_guid))
+		return 1;
+
+	/* Check whether the patched guid is followed by an end path */
+	min_valid_size += sizeof(EFI_DEVICE_PATH);
+	if (candidate_size <= min_valid_size)
+		return 1;
+
+	dp = NextDevicePathNode(dp);
+	if (!IsDevicePathEnd(dp))
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * OK. We may really get a masked BootXXXX variable. The next
+	 * step is to test whether it is hidden.
+	 */
+	UINT32 attrs = *(UINT32 *)candidate;
+#ifndef LOAD_OPTION_HIDDEN
+#  define LOAD_OPTION_HIDDEN	0x00000008
+#endif
+        if (!(attrs & LOAD_OPTION_HIDDEN))
+		return 1;
+
+	attrs &= ~LOAD_OPTION_HIDDEN;
+
+	/* Compare the field Attributes */
+	if (attrs != *(UINT32 *)data)
+		return 1;
+
+	/* Compare the field FilePathListLength */
+	data += sizeof(UINT32);
+	candidate += sizeof(UINT32);
+	if (calc_masked_boot_option_size(*(UINT16 *)data) !=
+					 *(UINT16 *)candidate)
+		return 1;
+
+	/* Compare the field Description */
+	data += sizeof(UINT16);
+	candidate += sizeof(UINT16);
+	if (CompareMem(candidate, data, cursor - candidate))
+		return 1;
+
+	/* Compare the filed FilePathList */
+	cursor = (CHAR8 *)NextDevicePathNode(dp);
+	data += sizeof(UINT16);
+	data += StrSize((CHAR16 *)data);
+
+	return CompareMem(cursor, data, candidate_size - min_valid_size);
+}
+
 EFI_STATUS
 find_boot_option(EFI_DEVICE_PATH *dp, EFI_DEVICE_PATH *fulldp,
                  CHAR16 *filename, CHAR16 *label, CHAR16 *arguments,
@@ -315,7 +414,8 @@ find_boot_option(EFI_DEVICE_PATH *dp, EFI_DEVICE_PATH *fulldp,
 	EFI_GUID global = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE;
 	EFI_STATUS rc;
 
-	CHAR8 *candidate = AllocateZeroPool(size);
+	UINTN max_candidate_size = calc_masked_boot_option_size(size);
+	CHAR8 *candidate = AllocateZeroPool(max_candidate_size);
 	if (!candidate) {
 		FreePool(data);
 		return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
@@ -327,17 +427,21 @@ find_boot_option(EFI_DEVICE_PATH *dp, EFI_DEVICE_PATH *fulldp,
 		varname[6] = hexmap[(bootorder[i] & 0x00f0) >> 4];
 		varname[7] = hexmap[(bootorder[i] & 0x000f) >> 0];
 
-		UINTN candidate_size = size;
+		UINTN candidate_size = max_candidate_size;
 		rc = uefi_call_wrapper(RT->GetVariable, 5, varname, &global,
 					NULL, &candidate_size, candidate);
 		if (EFI_ERROR(rc))
 			continue;
 
-		if (candidate_size != size)
+		if (candidate_size != size) {
+			if (check_masked_boot_option(candidate, candidate_size,
+						     data, size))
+				continue;
+		} else if (CompareMem(candidate, data, size))
 			continue;
 
-		if (CompareMem(candidate, data, size))
-			continue;
+		VerbosePrint(L"Found boot entry \"%s\" with label \"%s\" "
+			     L"for file \"%s\"\n", varname, label, filename);
 
 		/* at this point, we have duplicate data. */
 		if (!first_new_option) {
-- 
2.14.1

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