File 5a6b36cd-2-x86-msr-emulation-of-SPEC_CTRL-PRED_CMD.patch of Package xen
# Commit ea58a679a6190e714a592f1369b660769a48a80c
# Date 2018-01-26 14:10:21 +0000
# Author Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
# Committer Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
x86/msr: Emulation of MSR_{SPEC_CTRL,PRED_CMD} for guests
As per the spec currently available here:
https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/c5/63/336996-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf
MSR_ARCH_CAPABILITIES will only come into existence on new hardware, but is
implemented as a straight #GP for now to avoid being leaky when new hardware
arrives.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
@@ -120,11 +120,22 @@ int init_vcpu_msr_policy(struct vcpu *v)
int guest_rdmsr(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t *val)
{
+ const struct cpuid_policy *cp = v->domain->arch.cpuid;
const struct msr_domain_policy *dp = v->domain->arch.msr;
const struct msr_vcpu_policy *vp = v->arch.msr;
switch ( msr )
{
+ case MSR_PRED_CMD:
+ /* Write-only */
+ goto gp_fault;
+
+ case MSR_SPEC_CTRL:
+ if ( !cp->feat.ibrsb )
+ goto gp_fault;
+ *val = vp->spec_ctrl.raw;
+ break;
+
case MSR_INTEL_PLATFORM_INFO:
if ( !dp->plaform_info.available )
goto gp_fault;
@@ -132,6 +143,10 @@ int guest_rdmsr(const struct vcpu *v, ui
_MSR_PLATFORM_INFO_CPUID_FAULTING;
break;
+ case MSR_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
+ /* Not implemented yet. */
+ goto gp_fault;
+
case MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES:
if ( !vp->misc_features_enables.available )
goto gp_fault;
@@ -153,14 +168,44 @@ int guest_wrmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t
{
const struct vcpu *curr = current;
struct domain *d = v->domain;
+ const struct cpuid_policy *cp = d->arch.cpuid;
struct msr_domain_policy *dp = d->arch.msr;
struct msr_vcpu_policy *vp = v->arch.msr;
switch ( msr )
{
case MSR_INTEL_PLATFORM_INFO:
+ case MSR_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
+ /* Read-only */
goto gp_fault;
+ case MSR_SPEC_CTRL:
+ if ( !cp->feat.ibrsb )
+ goto gp_fault; /* MSR available? */
+
+ /*
+ * Note: SPEC_CTRL_STIBP is specified as safe to use (i.e. ignored)
+ * when STIBP isn't enumerated in hardware.
+ */
+
+ if ( val & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) )
+ goto gp_fault; /* Rsvd bit set? */
+
+ vp->spec_ctrl.raw = val;
+ break;
+
+ case MSR_PRED_CMD:
+ if ( !cp->feat.ibrsb && !cp->extd.ibpb )
+ goto gp_fault; /* MSR available? */
+
+ /*
+ * The only defined behaviour is when writing PRED_CMD_IBPB. In
+ * practice, real hardware accepts any value without faulting.
+ */
+ if ( v == curr && (val & PRED_CMD_IBPB) )
+ wrmsrl(MSR_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB);
+ break;
+
case MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES:
{
uint64_t rsvd = ~0ull;
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@
#define MSR_PRED_CMD 0x00000049
#define PRED_CMD_IBPB (_AC(1, ULL) << 0)
+#define MSR_ARCH_CAPABILITIES 0x0000010a
+
/* Intel MSRs. Some also available on other CPUs */
#define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0 0x000000c1
#define MSR_IA32_A_PERFCTR0 0x000004c1
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h
@@ -215,6 +215,16 @@ struct msr_domain_policy
/* MSR policy object for per-vCPU MSRs */
struct msr_vcpu_policy
{
+ /* 0x00000048 - MSR_SPEC_CTRL */
+ struct {
+ /*
+ * Only the bottom two bits are defined, so no need to waste space
+ * with uint64_t at the moment, but use uint32_t for the convenience
+ * of the assembly code.
+ */
+ uint32_t raw;
+ } spec_ctrl;
+
/* 0x00000140 MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES */
struct {
bool available; /* This MSR is non-architectural */