File 5a95373b-x86-PV-avoid-leaking-other-guests-MSR_TSC_AUX.patch of Package xen
# Commit cc0e45db277922b5723a7b1d9657d6f744230cf1
# Date 2018-02-27 10:47:23 +0000
# Author Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
# Committer Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
x86/pv: Avoid leaking other guests' MSR_TSC_AUX values into PV context
If the CPU pipeline supports RDTSCP or RDPID, a guest can observe the value in
MSR_TSC_AUX, irrespective of whether the relevant CPUID features are
advertised/hidden.
At the moment, paravirt_ctxt_switch_to() only writes to MSR_TSC_AUX if
TSC_MODE_PVRDTSCP mode is enabled, but this is not the default mode.
Therefore, default PV guests can read the value from a previously scheduled
HVM vcpu, or TSC_MODE_PVRDTSCP-enabled PV guest.
Alter the PV path to always write to MSR_TSC_AUX, using 0 in the common case.
To amortise overhead cost, introduce wrmsr_tsc_aux() which performs a lazy
update of the MSR, and use this function consistently across the codebase.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
@@ -1531,9 +1531,9 @@ void paravirt_ctxt_switch_to(struct vcpu
if ( unlikely(v->arch.debugreg[7] & DR7_ACTIVE_MASK) )
activate_debugregs(v);
- if ( (v->domain->arch.tsc_mode == TSC_MODE_PVRDTSCP) &&
- boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) )
- write_rdtscp_aux(v->domain->arch.incarnation);
+ if ( cpu_has_rdtscp )
+ wrmsr_tsc_aux(v->domain->arch.tsc_mode == TSC_MODE_PVRDTSCP
+ ? v->domain->arch.incarnation : 0);
}
/* Update per-VCPU guest runstate shared memory area (if registered). */
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -3582,7 +3582,7 @@ int hvm_msr_write_intercept(unsigned int
v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_tsc_aux = (uint32_t)msr_content;
if ( cpu_has_rdtscp
&& (v->domain->arch.tsc_mode != TSC_MODE_PVRDTSCP) )
- wrmsrl(MSR_TSC_AUX, (uint32_t)msr_content);
+ wrmsr_tsc_aux(msr_content);
break;
case MSR_IA32_APICBASE:
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -1077,7 +1077,7 @@ static void svm_ctxt_switch_to(struct vc
svm_tsc_ratio_load(v);
if ( cpu_has_rdtscp )
- wrmsrl(MSR_TSC_AUX, hvm_msr_tsc_aux(v));
+ wrmsr_tsc_aux(hvm_msr_tsc_aux(v));
}
static void noreturn svm_do_resume(struct vcpu *v)
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -622,7 +622,7 @@ static void vmx_restore_guest_msrs(struc
}
if ( cpu_has_rdtscp )
- wrmsrl(MSR_TSC_AUX, hvm_msr_tsc_aux(v));
+ wrmsr_tsc_aux(hvm_msr_tsc_aux(v));
}
void vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(struct vcpu *v)
--- a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
#include <xen/sched.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(uint32_t, tsc_aux);
+
struct msr_domain_policy __read_mostly hvm_max_msr_domain_policy,
__read_mostly pv_max_msr_domain_policy;
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h
@@ -115,8 +115,6 @@ static inline uint64_t rdtsc_ordered(voi
__write_tsc(val); \
})
-#define write_rdtscp_aux(val) wrmsr(MSR_TSC_AUX, (val), 0)
-
#define rdpmc(counter,low,high) \
__asm__ __volatile__("rdpmc" \
: "=a" (low), "=d" (high) \
@@ -202,6 +200,20 @@ void write_efer(u64 val);
DECLARE_PER_CPU(u32, ler_msr);
+DECLARE_PER_CPU(uint32_t, tsc_aux);
+
+/* Lazy update of MSR_TSC_AUX */
+static inline void wrmsr_tsc_aux(uint32_t val)
+{
+ uint32_t *this_tsc_aux = &this_cpu(tsc_aux);
+
+ if ( *this_tsc_aux != val )
+ {
+ wrmsr(MSR_TSC_AUX, val, 0);
+ *this_tsc_aux = val;
+ }
+}
+
/* MSR policy object for shared per-domain MSRs */
struct msr_domain_policy
{