File 0009-rsa-rsa_ssl.c-make-RSA_padding_check_SSLv2... of Package openssl-1_0_0

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File 0009-rsa-rsa_ssl.c-make-RSA_padding_check_SSLv23-constant.patch of Package openssl-1_0_0 (Revision 4966c0817ed651bbdb9f4d3be91cbc2f)

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From 110ef88b99f1acc6b976f2e49153734924181db2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 14 Sep 2018 17:24:13 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 5/5] rsa/rsa_ssl.c: make RSA_padding_check_SSLv23
 constant-time.

Copy of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2 with a twist that rejects padding
if nul delimiter is preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 603221407ddc6404f8c417c6beadebf84449074c)

Resolved conflicts:
	crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c

(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7737)
---
 crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c | 134 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 97 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
index 831f75aaf4..e9a5fe2385 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "constant_time_locl.h"
 
 int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
                            const unsigned char *from, int flen)
@@ -101,57 +102,116 @@ int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     return (1);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Copy of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2 with a twist that rejects padding
+ * if nul delimiter is preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. It also
+ * preserves error code reporting for backward compatibility.
+ */
 int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
                              const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num)
 {
-    int i, j, k;
-    const unsigned char *p;
+    int i;
+    /* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes */
+    unsigned char *em = NULL;
+    unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask, threes_in_row;
+    int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1, err;
 
-    p = from;
     if (flen < 10) {
         RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL);
         return (-1);
     }
-    /* Accept even zero-padded input */
-    if (flen == num) {
-        if (*(p++) != 0) {
-            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
-            return -1;
-        }
-        flen--;
+
+    em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+    if (em == NULL) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return -1;
     }
-    if ((num != (flen + 1)) || (*(p++) != 02)) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
-        return (-1);
+    /*
+     * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
+     * BN_bn2binpad. Trouble is that since we can't read out of |from|'s
+     * bounds, it's impossible to have an invariant memory access pattern
+     * in case |from| was not zero-padded in advance.
+     */
+    for (from += flen, em += num, i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(flen);
+        flen -= 1 & mask;
+        from -= 1 & mask;
+        *--em = *from & mask;
     }
+    from = em;
+
+    good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
+    good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2);
+    err = constant_time_select_int(good, 0, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
+    mask = ~good;
 
     /* scan over padding data */
-    j = flen - 1;               /* one for type */
-    for (i = 0; i < j; i++)
-        if (*(p++) == 0)
-            break;
-
-    if ((i == j) || (i < 8)) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23,
-               RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
-        return (-1);
-    }
-    for (k = -9; k < -1; k++) {
-        if (p[k] != 0x03)
-            break;
-    }
-    if (k == -1) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK);
-        return (-1);
+    found_zero_byte = 0;
+    threes_in_row = 0;
+    for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
+        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]);
+
+        zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
+                                              i, zero_index);
+        found_zero_byte |= equals0;
+
+        threes_in_row += 1 & ~found_zero_byte;
+        threes_in_row &= found_zero_byte | constant_time_eq(from[i], 3);
     }
 
-    i++;                        /* Skip over the '\0' */
-    j -= i;
-    if (j > tlen) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
-        return (-1);
+    /*
+     * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |from|.
+     * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
+     * also fails.
+     */
+    good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
+    err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err,
+                                   RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
+    mask = ~good;
+
+    good &= constant_time_lt(threes_in_row, 8);
+    err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err,
+                                   RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK);
+    mask = ~good;
+
+    /*
+     * Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
+     * but in this case we also do not copy the message out.
+     */
+    msg_index = zero_index + 1;
+    mlen = num - msg_index;
+
+    /*
+     * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
+     */
+    good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);
+    err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+
+    /*
+     * Even though we can't fake result's length, we can pretend copying
+     * |tlen| bytes where |mlen| bytes would be real. Last |tlen| of |num|
+     * bytes are viewed as circular buffer with start at |tlen|-|mlen'|,
+     * where |mlen'| is "saturated" |mlen| value. Deducing information
+     * about failure or |mlen| would take attacker's ability to observe
+     * memory access pattern with byte granularity *as it occurs*. It
+     * should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal
+     * operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol.
+     */
+    tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num, tlen), num, tlen);
+    msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, num - tlen);
+    mlen = num - msg_index;
+    for (from += msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+        unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen);
+
+        from -= tlen & equals;  /* if (i == mlen) rewind   */
+        mask &= mask ^ equals;  /* if (i == mlen) mask = 0 */
+        to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]);
     }
-    memcpy(to, p, (unsigned int)j);
 
-    return (j);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num);
+    OPENSSL_free(em);
+    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, err);
+    err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & good);
+
+    return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);
 }
-- 
2.20.1

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File 0009-rsa-rsa_ssl.c-make-RSA_padding_check_SSLv23-constant.patch of Package openssl-1_0_0 (Revision 4966c0817ed651bbdb9f4d3be91cbc2f)

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