Cryptographic modules for Python
http://www.pycrypto.org/
The package contains:
* Hash functions: MD2, MD4, RIPEMD, SHA256.
* Block encryption algorithms: AES, ARC2, Blowfish, CAST, DES,
Triple-DES, IDEA, RC5.
* Stream encryption algorithms: ARC4, simple XOR.
* Public-key algorithms: RSA, DSA, ElGamal, qNEW.
* Protocols: All-or-nothing transforms, chaffing/winnowing.
* Miscellaneous: RFC1751 module for converting 128-key keys into a
set of English words, primality testing.
* Some demo programs (currently all quite old and outdated).
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Source Files
Filename | Size | Changed |
---|---|---|
pycrypto-2.6.1.tar.gz | 0000446240 436 KB | |
python3-pycrypto.changes | 0000003475 3.39 KB | |
python3-pycrypto.spec | 0000002338 2.28 KB |
Revision 1 (latest revision is 2)
Sebastian Wagner (sebix)
committed
(revision 1)
- specfile: * changed to https for source url * updated source url to files.pythonhosted.org - Don't build with python3-buildservice-tweak. The package detects the lack of randomness and aborts the build. - Remove useless make requirements - Remove repreciated python(abi) rependency - Remove unapplied ignore-fastmath-warning.diff - update to version 2.6.1: * [CVE-2013-1445] Fix PRNG not correctly reseeded in some situations. - update to 2.6 * [CVE-2012-2417] Fix LP#985164: insecure ElGamal key generation. (thanks: Legrandin) In the ElGamal schemes (for both encryption and signatures), g is supposed to be the generator of the entire Z^*_p group. However, in PyCrypto 2.5 and earlier, g is more simply the generator of a random sub-group of Z^*_p. The result is that the signature space (when the key is used for signing) or the public key space (when the key is used for encryption) may be greatly reduced from its expected size of log(p) bits, possibly down to 1 bit (the worst case if the order of g is 2). While it has not been confirmed, it has also been suggested that an attacker might be able to use this fact to determine the private key. Anyone using ElGamal keys should generate new keys as soon as practical. Any additional information about this bug will be tracked at https://bugs.launchpad.net/pycrypto/+bug/985164
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