File 820.patch of Package corosync
From d5315f96fa502310d7cf722ca4eb9c9f1a7c844d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Friesse <jfriesse@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2026 09:00:39 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] totemsrp: Return error if sanity check fails
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Previously, the check_memb_commit_token_sanity function correctly
checked the minimum message length. However, if the message was too
short, it incorrectly returned a success code (0) instead of the
expected failure code (-1).
This commit ensures the appropriate error code is returned when the
message length sanity check fails.
Fixes: CVE-2026-35091
Reported-by: Sebastián Alba Vives (@Sebasteuo / 0xS4bb1) <sebasjosue84@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Friesse <jfriesse@redhat.com>
---
exec/totemsrp.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/exec/totemsrp.c b/exec/totemsrp.c
index a716ae9fe..372a96d1f 100644
--- a/exec/totemsrp.c
+++ b/exec/totemsrp.c
@@ -3811,10 +3811,10 @@ static int check_memb_commit_token_sanity(
log_printf (instance->totemsrp_log_level_security,
"Received memb_commit_token message is too short... ignoring.");
- return (0);
+ return (-1);
}
- addr_entries= mct_msg->addr_entries;
+ addr_entries = mct_msg->addr_entries;
if (endian_conversion_needed) {
addr_entries = swab32(addr_entries);
}
From 261a200b6d0b69ddb580a7267f152c163c1f0325 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Friesse <jfriesse@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2026 09:44:06 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] totemsrp: Fix integer overflow in memb_join_sanity
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
This commit addresses an integer overflow (wraparound) vulnerability
in the check_memb_join_sanity function.
Previously, the 32-bit unsigned network values proc_list_entries and
failed_list_entries were added together before being promoted to
size_t. This allowed the addition to wrap around in 32-bit arithmetic
(e.g., 0x80000000 + 0x80000000 = 0), resulting in a required_len
calculation that was incorrectly small.
The solution is to cast the list entries to size_t and verify that
neither exceeds the maximum allowed value before the addition occurs.
Fixes: CVE-2026-35092
Reported-by: Sebastián Alba Vives (@Sebasteuo / 0xS4bb1) <sebasjosue84@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Friesse <jfriesse@redhat.com>
---
exec/totemsrp.c | 12 +++++++++++-
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/exec/totemsrp.c b/exec/totemsrp.c
index 372a96d1f..67596911a 100644
--- a/exec/totemsrp.c
+++ b/exec/totemsrp.c
@@ -3786,7 +3786,17 @@ static int check_memb_join_sanity(
failed_list_entries = swab32(failed_list_entries);
}
- required_len = sizeof(struct memb_join) + ((proc_list_entries + failed_list_entries) * sizeof(struct srp_addr));
+ if (proc_list_entries > PROCESSOR_COUNT_MAX ||
+ failed_list_entries > PROCESSOR_COUNT_MAX) {
+ log_printf (instance->totemsrp_log_level_security,
+ "Received memb_join message list_entries exceeds the maximum "
+ "allowed value... ignoring.");
+
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ required_len = sizeof(struct memb_join) +
+ (((size_t)proc_list_entries + (size_t)failed_list_entries) * sizeof(struct srp_addr));
if (msg_len < required_len) {
log_printf (instance->totemsrp_log_level_security,
"Received memb_join message is too short... ignoring.");
