on top of ring0 (bootstrap)

See https://en.opensuse.org/openSUSE:Reproducible_openSUSE/Part2 for how to build this with `pbuild`

To test for packaged that embed uname -r in their build results.

this project should not have packages but only apply extra tweaks via prjconf
to distinguish the effects
from more plain home:bmwiedemann:reproducible
and from home:bmwiedemann:reproducible:test with extra patchy packages

via prjconf

usage:

for r in rb_j1 rb_future1y openSUSE_Factory ; do osc api "/build/home:bmwiedemann:reproducible:rebuild/$r/x86_64/_repository?view=binaryversions" | grep libzzip; done

https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1237231
https://github.com/openSUSE/obs-build/commit/b801c174d64b32ee7ff8870565990b35c45e4e58

as documented in https://www.starlab.io/blog/adding-sha256-digests-to-rpms

home:gygyegy22w7612:branches:openSUSE:Factory:staging

Project to contain test results for reproducible builds

Managed by Bernhard M. Wiedemann.

a simple application to help to notice the passing of time
with tick-tack and dong.

iPXE is a network bootloader. It provides a direct
replacement for proprietary PXE ROMs, with many extra features such as
DNS, HTTP, iSCSI, etc.

Tor is a connection-based low-latency anonymous communication system.

This package provides the "tor" program, which serves as both a client and
a relay node. Scripts will automatically create a "%{toruser}" user and
a "%{torgroup}" group, and set tor up to run as a daemon when the system
is rebooted.

Applications connect to the local Tor proxy using the SOCKS
protocol. The local proxy chooses a path through a set of relays, in
which each relay knows its predecessor and successor, but no
others. Traffic flowing down the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric
key at each relay, which reveals the downstream relay.

Warnings: Tor does no protocol cleaning. That means there is a danger
that application protocols and associated programs can be induced to
reveal information about the initiator. Tor depends on Privoxy and
similar protocol cleaners to solve this problem. This is alpha code,
and is even more likely than released code to have anonymity-spoiling
bugs. The present network is very small -- this further reduces the
strength of the anonymity provided. Tor is not presently suitable
for high-stakes anonymity.

Authors:
--------
- R. Dingledine